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Balkan Studies

A BIENNIAL PUBLICATION
OF THE
INSTITUTE FOR BALKAN STUDIES
(ΙΔΡΥΜΑ ΜΕΛΕΤΩΝ ΧΕΡΣΟΝΗΣΟΥ ΤΟΥ ΑΙΜΟΥ)



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ANGE S. VLACHOS

VICTOIRE OUBLIÉE

Il est particulièrement déconcertant, tant pour ceux qui ont vécu les années de cauchemar de la 2eme Guerre Mondiale que pour ceux qui ne connaissent que par la lecture les hauts faits de l'armée grecque en Albanie (d'où elle fût brusquement attaquée par l'Italie fasciste), que de voir dans les grands dictionnaires parus dans les dernières décennies, aussi bien que dans les ouvrages historiques, une seule brève mention: «Attaque de l'Italie contre la Grèce» suivie, après quelques lignes sur d'autres sujets, d'une autre brève mention: «Intervention de l'Allemagne en Grèce».

Cette double mention est doublement déconcertante. En premier parce qu'il n'est pas fait mention de la contre - offensive grecque en Albanie, qui renversa, en une semaine, l'adversaire et le poursuivit en profondeur lui infligeant une défaite sévère, première brèche au prestige jusqu'à intact du «Pacte d'Acier» Berlin - Rome, effondrement irréparable du moral en Italie. En second il n'est presque rien dit de l'attaque du colosse allemand contre la Grèce ni de l'opération lancée contre la Crète par le Haut Commandement Allemand, opération qui fut tactiquement une réussite puisque la grande île fut à son tour occupée, mais qui fut stratégiquement erreur décisive puis qu'elle se solda par la perte de 15.000 hommes (parachutistes pour la plupart), élite de l'élite de l'armée allemande. C'est en Crète, défendue par des unités grecques, australiennes et neozélandaises, que s'éroula la pointe de la lance teutone. Ces unités d'excellence auraient pu porter des coups très graves et peut-être décisifs contre les positions anglaises, quasi dégarnies, dans le Moyen-Orient (Iraq, Iran, Syrie, Paléatine), coups qui auraient entraîné la perte des pétroles de Mossoul et l'isolement de la Turquie.

Mais ce qui fut crucial pour l'évolution générale du conflit mondial, ce fut le retardement du lancement du plan «Barberousse» contre l'U.R.S.S. retardement qui causa le premier grand échec des Allemands, au début de l'hiver précoce de 1941, devant Moscou sur la ligne Kalouga-Mojzajsk - Rjev.

Sans aucun doute l'opinion mondiale est, aujourd'hui, trop occupée et trop angoissée par l'affrontement des deux superpuissances et par la menace qui plane sur la terre entière, d'un cataclysme qui signifierait la fin de l'Histoire. Mais ce n'est pas, là, une justification valable pour ceux qui se penchent sur le passé d'hier et qui le présentent aux géné-

rations d'aujourd'hui et de demain dans leurs œuvres et dans l'espoir que cela leur servira de leçon. Le seul fait d'écrire une Histoire de la 2ème guerre mondiale est un acte d'optimisme qui devrait imposer, à celui qui entreprend un tel ouvrage, un exposé des événements plus précis et plus détaillé.

Souvent le mémoire est défaillante, (et cela est naturel) ou sélective volontairement (et cela n'est pas excusable). L'historien doit, avant tout «être sans peur, libre, incorruptible, ami de la franchise et de la vérité, ne partageant ni haine ni amitié, d'un jugement égal et d'une bonne disposition pour tous, étranger et apatride dans ses livres, un réfléchissant pas à telle ou telle opinion qui sera exprimée mais écrivant ce qui est advenu».

Sans doute ces conseils de Lucien de Samosate sont plus facilement applicables par les historiens de faits contemporaine qu'ils exposent que par ceux qui s'occupent du lointain passé.

Mais il y a à peine 35 ans que la 2ème Guerre Mondiale a pris fin et d'innombrables livres à sujet général ou à sujet spécifique ont été publiés jusqu'ici, tous étant marqués par la lacune d'un chapitre consacré aux premières victoires que donnait la Grèce au Monde Libre contre l'Axe Berlin - Rome.

C'est au petit matin du 28 octobre 1940 que s'ouvre ce chapitre (quand l'Europe entière, l'Angleterre exceptée, gisait prostrée aux pieds de l'Allemagne) quand l'Ambassadeur d'Italie réveillait le Premier Ministre de Grèce J. Metaxas, à 3 heures après minuit pour lui remettre l'ultimatum — d'un délai de 3 heures — par lequel Mussolini lui demandait de livrer la Grèce à l'Italie. La réponse fut simple et immédiate: «Alors, Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, c'est la guerre».

Ce fut une guerre inégale mais désastreuse pour l'Italie, glorieuse pour la Grèce. Avant même qu'expire l'ultimatum, les troupes italiennes — stationnées en Albanie depuis 16 mois et très supérieures en nombre — commençaient leur avance dans le massif du Pinde, en Epire. Mais en même temps toute la Nation, réveillée à l'aube par les sirènes d'alarme se levait tel un seul homme et courait aux armes envahissant les casernes de dépôts pour y être enrôlée avant même que la mobilisation générale ne soit déclarée. Les troupes de couverture eurent alors la rude charge de ralentir l'avance italienne dans les massifs de l'Epire, jusqu'à l'arrivée de renforts, tandis que les unités grecques, stationnées en Macédoine de l'ouest prénaient l'offensive dès le 2 novembre et avançaient ayant comme objectif Korytza, deuxième ville de l'Albanie et base essentielle de l'armée italienne. Dans le secteur du centre la contre-attaque grecque

fut vivement menée dans des conditions de difficultés extrêmes (même les paysannes de la région chargeaient, à dos, des obus pour ravitailler l'artillerie) et eut comme résultat la déconfiture complète des divisions alpines italiennes, unités d'élite qui laissaient sur le champ de bataille des milliers de prisonniers et des montagnes de matériel et se rempliaient en déroute pour sauver le peu qui leur restait.

Le retentissement de ces premières victoires fut mondial, et, après dix jours quand s'effondrait l'aile gauche italienne et que l'armée grecque occupait Korytza après de durs combats, Churchill disait aux Communes: «Dorénavant nous ne dirons plus que les Grecs combattent comme des héros mais que les héros combattent comme des Grecs».

Il eut suffi, alors, que l'aviation anglaise développe une action décisive contre les ports de débarquement d'Albanie (Valona, Durazzo) pour que l'armée italienne d'Albanie fut anéantie. Mais la R.A.F. engagée dans la bataille de Lybie n'avait pas de forces suffisantes pour cette double tâche. Ainsi, après avoir perdu le quart du territoire albanais, les forces italiennes parvenaient à stabiliser le front, aidées en cela par l'hiver très dur qui survenait. Mussolini, honteux d'avoir subi un tel échec dans une entreprise qu'il avait lancée pour affermir son prestige auprès de Hitler, décida de préparer une offensive de grand style pour le printemps de 1941 espérant culbuter le front grec et ouvrir le chemin de la victoire vers Athènes. Après avoir réuni des forces considérables dans les secteurs du centre, il se rendit lui-même en Albanie pour assister en personne à «l'Offensive du Printemps». Avant son départ il écrivait, de Rome, au général-en-chef du front d'Albanie Cavallero dans une lettre personnelle: «Jusqu'ici nous avons été l'enclume. Maintenant nous devons devenir le marteau». Voulant être témoin en personne de la victoire certaine qu'il se promettait, il suivit les opérations offensives du poste d'observation Koparit. Il y resta sept jours, suivant les efforts désespérés de 5 divisions d'élite qui essayaient, en vain, de repousser, ne fut ce que de quelques centaines de mètres les positions grecques. Dégouté d'avoir été, encore une fois l'enclume il s'en retourna à Rome ne se doutant que vaguement de l'indignation que son nouvel échec avait provoquée chez Hitler dont tous les plans se trouvaient bouleversés. Le dictateur Espagnol Franco, tenait ferme à la neutralité et la campagne d'Albanie était un abcès de fixation pour l'Italie. Donc le Führer qui, de longue date avait les yeux tournés vers l'U.R.S.S. fut obligé d'intervenir dans les Balkans pour pouvoir lancer son plan «Barberousse» contre la Russie sans laisser dans ses arrières une situation qui pourrait prendre une tournure très grave. L'intervention

allemande dans les Balkans, conduite par le maréchal von List ne fut pas une opération éclairée telle que l'espérait le Haut-Commandement Allemand. La résistance de la Grèce, assistée par un corps expéditionnaire formé d'Australiens et de néozélandais, ne cessa, en fait, qu' en Crète, ce qui coûta à Hitler deux précieux mois qui retardèrent la déclaration de guerre contre l'U.R.S.S.

Ce fut là, le salut pour Moscou et pour les Alliés comme le proclamait Staline lui-même le 27 février 1942 s'adressant aux Grecs par la radio-Moscou. Il leurs disait: «Vous avez combattu sans armes contre un ennemi bien armé et vous avez vaincu, petits contre des grands et vous l'avez importé. Et cela ne pouvait être autrement car vous êtes des Grecs. En tant que Russes, en tant qu'hommes nous reconnaissons que grâce à vos sacrifices nous avons eu le temps de nous préparer et de nous défendre. Nous vous en sommes reconnaissants».

Dans le tumulte des événements actuels il est, encore, possible d'enregistrer des faits et de recueillir des documents relatifs à la conduite et à l'évolution de la 2ème Guerre Mondiale afin qu'elle ne soit ni oubliée ni déformée par le Temps:

«Il est, à mon avis, bien difficile et malaisé d'avoir entière connaissance de la vérité des choses anciennes par les mouvements des historiens, attendu que les successeurs ont la longueur du temps qui leur brouille et offusque la nette intelligence des affaires; et l'histoire qui est écrite du vivant des hommes dont elle parle et du temps et des choses dont elle fait mention, quelque fois par haine et par envie, et quelques fois par faveur ou par flatterie, déguise et corrompt la vérité». (Plutarque - traduction Armyot).

JOHN S. KOLIPOULOS

UNWANTED ALLY: GREECE AND THE GREAT POWERS,
1939-1941

Greece's international position and national security, from the spring of 1939 when the Axis powers initiated a policy of outright conquest in Europe until the German invasion of the country two years later, have, until recently, been examined mainly from the point of view of contemporary official Greek policy, leading thus to the development of a semi-official Greek historiography¹. Most of the governing assumptions and premises of this historiography grew out of both war-time rhetoric and the post-war requirements of Greek policy, to become in time axiomatic. Some of these assumptions and premises are: a) that Greece followed, before the Italian attack, a neutral policy towards the great European powers; b) that the Italian attack was unprovoked; c) that Anglo-Greek cooperation was subsequent — and consequent — to the Italian attack; d) that the Greek Government, although resolved to resist a German attack, did everything to avoid it, and e) that the German invasion was unprovoked and undertaken to rescue the defeated Italians in Albania. In this paper I propose to examine these assumptions in the light of evidence newly made available, and see particularly whether Greece followed a really neutral policy until the Italian attack, and whether the Greco-Italian war was, until Germany decided to intervene and extinguish the potentially dangerous conflict in the Balkans, more than a local war loosely connected with the strategical interests of Britain and Germany.

Greece's foreign relations before World War II were first put to the test in April 1939, on the occasion of the Italian occupation of Albania. During the April 1939 crisis, and at the express wish of the Brit-

1. The most representative studies are those by General Alexandros Papagos, *O polemos tis Ellados, 1940-1941*, Athens 1945 (Engl. transl. *The Battle of Greece, 1940-1941*, Athens 1949); B. P. Papadakis, *Diplomatiki istoria tou ellinikou poleμου, 1940-1945* (Diplomatic History of the Greek War, 1940-1945), Athens 1956; P. N. Pipinelis, *Istoria tis exoterikis politikis tis Ellados, 1923-1941* (History of Greek Foreign Policy, 1923-1941), Athens 1948; and Greek General Staff, *Aitia kai aphormai tou ellino-italikou poleμου, 1940-1941* (Causes of the Greco-Italian War, 1940-1941), Athens 1959. The most notable revisionary studies have been M. L. van Creveld's *Hitler's Strategy, 1940-1941: The Balkan Clue*, Cambridge 1973, and the author's *Greece and the British Connection, 1935-1941*, Oxford 1977.

ish Government, Greece received from Italy certain assurances which, however, made the Greeks uneasy, less the Italian assurances were extorted, and left them uncertain about British intentions. But the British were not prepared to give assurances to Greece, except in close consultation with the Italians in order not to offend the Italian Government; and when the Italian assurances had been secured, then Britain could safely do the same². Before, however, these assurances were made public — to satisfy also public opinion in Britain and the United States, which expected a resolute attitude from the British Government in the face of Axis aggression — it was necessary to satisfy British strategic considerations, and particularly that Britain should not undertake obligations, such as the defence of Greece's territorial integrity, which she could never meet³. When this was accepted by the British Government, the Greeks could be informed of the text of the guarantee the British proposed to make public, but, again, not before the Italians were informed of British intention to make a public statement assuring Greece⁴.

The British «Guarantee» of Greece, therefore, which was declared by Chamberlain in the House of Commons on 13 April 1939, did not constitute a definitive commitment to go to war over Greece's territorial integrity, but only an undefined promise of support, in the event that Greece fell victim of aggression and chose to resist such aggression. For Britain, the public assurances to Greece — and to Romania — amounted to little more than a carefully measured gesture of support, meant to assure the prospective victim without, however, offending the potential aggressor. As far as Greece was concerned, the British gesture left much to be desired, for the Greek Government were seeking since the previous year an Anglo-Greek alliance to ward off a possible Italian attack and secure vital assistance from Britain. But the British

2. The main sources for the April 1939 crisis are *Diplomatika engrapha: I italiki epitthesis enantion tis Ellados* (Diplomatic Papers: The Italian Attack on Greece), Athens 1940, Engl. edition, *The Greek White Book*, London 1942, Nos. 19, 25, 26, 27, 28; *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, 3rd Series, vol. V, Nos. 91, 101, 112, 136, 140, 145; John Metaxas, *To prōsōpiko tou imerologio* (His Personal Diary), vol. IV, edit. P. Vranas, Athens 1960, pp. 364 ff., and above all the British Foreign Office and Cabinet Papers at the Public Record Office, vols. F.O. 371/23780, F.O. 434/6, and Cab. 27/624.

3. Cab. 27/624, F.P. (36)41, 11 Apr. 1939.

4. F.O. 434/6, F.O. Tel. to Rome No. 192, 12 April 1939; D.B.F.P., 3rd Ser., vol. F, Nos. 140, 145; Metaxas, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, p. 368.

promise was accepted for what little it meant in terms of security, in the hope that it would eventually lead to the cherished goal, namely, a binding British commitment to defend Greece's territorial integrity⁵.

A considerable step towards closer relations with Britain was taken in September 1939, following the outbreak of war in Europe and on the occasion of the soundings about the Greco - Italian Pact of Friendship of 1928, which was due to expire that month. Metaxa's initial willingness to renew the pact or negotiate a new one, but subject to British approval, limited drastically his own foreign policy and decided the future of Greco - Italian relations. The British reply to his enquiry left no room for doubt as to British requirements from Greece; the proposed Greco - Italian agreement had to be phrased in more general terms than the old pact and its provisions had to comply with the following desiderata: a) Greece should preserve full liberty of action in the event of war between Britain and Italy, and b) the country should similarly preserve full liberty of action in the event of war between the Balkan Entente and Italy⁶. The British provisions for a Greek-Italian agreement essentially ruled out a meaningful understanding between the two countries and prescribed the course of Greek policy. The Italians, although unaware of the precise British conditions conveyed to Metaxas, did assume as much and accepted the indefinite formula of agreement expressing the hope that the international situation would make it possible for the two governments in the near future to give their relationships a more «concrete form»⁷. The Greek Government has been criticized for evading a friendly gesture from Italy, which could in no way have compromised Greece's position. This evasion, it has been argued, was bound to make the Italians suspicious that the Greeks had already bound themselves to the British⁸. It is, however, questionable whether Metaxas was, by this time, in a position to pursue a policy that conflicted with British interests or wishes.

Around the same time and independently of the Greco - Italian soundings, the British approached the Greeks with a view to concluding a war trade agreement that would restrict Greek exports to Germa-

5. See Koliopoulos, *op. cit.*, pp. 87 ff.

6. F.O. 371/23780, F.O. Tel. to Athens No. 376, 18 Sept. 1939.

7. *Greek White Book*, No. 52; *Documenti Diplomatici Italiani*, 9th Series, vol. I, Nos. 456, 546, 648; Emanuele Grazzi, *Il principio della fine: L'impressione di Grecia*, Rome 1945, pp. 74-75, 79-80, 90-92.

8. Pipinelis, *op. cit.*, p. 294.

ny. Under a temporary agreement signed in October 1939, the Greek Government undertook to fix a maximum for the export, from Greece to Germany, of cereals, fruits, vegetables, olive oil, tobacco and particularly metals. The Greeks agreed to supply the British with statistics at monthly intervals of Greek exports of these commodities to all destinations in Europe. Pending an agreement fixing maxima, the Greek Government undertook not to permit the export, in any one calendar month, of these commodities in excess of one - twelfth of the average annual exports to Germany during the years 1934-1938. The British for their part undertook to put no obstacle in the way of importation into Greece of certain commodities for domestic consumption, and to facilitate the supply from their own or other resources of certain commodities also needed for domestic consumption⁹. Finally, in January 1940, Greece and Britain signed a definitive war trade agreement reiterating all the above, as well as a shipping agreement, which was concluded by the Greek shipowners and the British Government (after the necessary pressure on the shipowners from the Greek Government) and secured to Britain the lease of a sizable portion of the Greek merchant marine¹⁰.

These agreements bound Greece to Britain's economic war effort against Germany, and marked the first stage of Greek departure from neutrality. The Greek Minister in Berlin did his best to explain Greece's difficult position with respect to British contraband control in the Mediterranean and Greek dependence on British coal and the income derived from shipping; but the Germans remained sceptical and made it plain that they considered Greece's attitude unsatisfactory¹¹. A Greco-German trade agreement signed in September 1940 did not reverse the pattern, as the Greek Government applied the brake on exports to Germany and turned a deaf ear to German complaints and veiled threats¹².

9. F.O. 871/23765, where the relevant correspondence between the Foreign Office and the British Minister in Athens, as well as the October 1939 agreement.

10. F.O. 871/23765/23766/24904/24905, where the relevant correspondence. See also Simopoulos Papers (St. Antony's College, Oxford), where correspondence between Metaxas and Simopoulos, the Greek Minister in London, of the period October 1939 - January 1940, and Metaxas, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, p. 410.

11. *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, Series D, vol. VIII, Nos. 375, 614.

12. F.O. 371/24914, Athens dispatches Nos. 239 and 457, 28 Sept. and 7 Oct. 1940 respectively.

In 1940 Greek foreign policy was circumscribed by an unmistakable leaning towards Britain and an ambiguous neutrality, which were the result of the cumulative forces of the war and the willingness of the Greek Government to cooperate with the British. British attitude towards Greece, on the other hand, depended on such variables as German and Italian policy and plans and the attitude of Turkey. British intervention in the area to support Greece would depend on the benevolent neutrality of Italy and the active support of Turkey, both of which were very doubtful¹³. Britain's position on assistance to Greece depended on the following factors: British forces, if available, could not be sent to Greece, except in the case where Crete was not in Italian hands. Britain, however, could not provide adequate forces for defending the island itself, whose own defences were non-existent. Another governing factor was the relative security of British communications in the Aegean. Britain would be unable to secure these communications until the Italian threat in the Aegean was reduced by knocking out the Italian bases in the Dodecanese, but that would not be possible until Britain was able to reinforce her naval and air forces in the Mediterranean appreciably. In short, British assistance to Greece depended on denying Crete to Italy and neutralizing the Dodecanese; but neither of these requirements was likely to be fulfilled in view of Britain's inadequate forces and vulnerable position in the Mediterranean and the Middle East¹⁴. At the end of May and before Italy entered the war against France and Britain, British attitude to assisting Greece was the following: in the event of an Italian attack on Greece, action would be initially limited to a) the dispatch of troops to Crete to help the Greeks deny the island to the Italians, and b) operations to control communications in the Aegean. In any case, because of vital commitments elsewhere and Britain's limited resources, the British could not possibly take Greece under their protection¹⁵.

In May 1940 also the British Government considered the question on an alliance with Greece, as Metaxas returned to the subject from time to time. If Italy were to enter the war on the side of Germany,

13. F.O. 371/24887, Memo. by Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 28 Mar. 1940.

14. F.O. 371/24942, M.R. (40)63, «Military action open to the Allies in the event of war with Italy», 1 May 1940.

15. F.O. 371/24915, F.O. Tel. to Athens No. 244, 31 May 1940. The telegram was drafted by the Chiefs of Staff.

Greek intervention would divert Italian forces, and facilitate the dispatch of British forces to Crete and the use of Greek harbours and bases. Failing an alliance, Greece might be inclined to come to terms with Italy. But the alliance had many disadvantages for Britain, since it would constitute a «strategically undesirable» commitment. The Greeks would also be entitled to demand military and economic assistance, which Britain could not spare. Alliance with Greece would «expose» Britain's inability to provide adequate and direct support. Finally, Britain could reasonably expect Greece's friendly cooperation, in the event of war against Italy in the Mediterranean, even without an alliance. The issue was briefly discussed by the Cabinet on 23 May, only to be shelved indefinitely¹⁶.

Greece's strategic value for Britain did not appreciably change even after Italy's entry into the war in June and the collapse of France. An effort might be made to induce Greece and Yugoslavia to intervene on the British side, as the British Chiefs of Staff recommended. But the Foreign Office was sceptical; while Italy kept her promise not to attack Greece and Yugoslavia, and as long as the tide did not turn in favour of Britain, it would be virtually impossible to induce the Balkan countries to intervene in the war. Moreover, if Germany was actively engaged in the Balkans, it was essential that both Turkey and the Soviet Union should not be estranged by Britain's intervention in the area, and that both powers should side with Britain. In the light of circumstances, however, both desiderata were problematic. Moreover, Germany could very well attack both Britain and the Balkans at the same time, and probably press on towards the Straits, while Britain could not aid Turkey effectively¹⁷.

About this time, Italian designs against Greece were taking shape. In early July, Hitler assured Ciano that everything concerning the Mediterranean was a «purely Italian matter», in which Germany did not intend to interfere¹⁸. But in August and as a result of the Italian terrorist attacks against Greek ships in the Aegean, the Germans inter-

16. Cab. 80/11, C.O.S. (40)870, «The role of Greece in the event of war in the Mediterranean», 20 May 1940; F.O. 371/24924, W.P. (40)164, «The question of an alliance with Greece», 21 May 1940; and W.M. (40)185, 23 May 1940.

17. F.O. 371/24948, F.O. Minutes of June 1940; F.O. 371/24980, C.O.S. (40)525, «Balkan policy after the French collapse», 3 July 1940.

18. *Ciano's Diplomatic Papers*, edit. M. Muggeridge, London 1948, pp. 375-379; D.G.F.P., Ser. D, vol. X, No. 129.

vened and asked the Italians to restrain their actions against Greece for the time being; or that at least can be assumed from Ciano's instructions to the Military Governor of Albania to slow down the pace of Italian moves against Greece¹⁹. Germany wanted to leave the Balkans out of the war, as long as this important source of supplies for Germany provided these supplies, and in order to avoid a clash of interests in the area between Italy and the Soviet Union. Moreover, if drawn into the war, the Balkans could become a British base for air strikes against the oilfields of Romania, or even a dangerous theatre of war. In September and October, however, and after the failure of Germany's invasion of England and Greece's failure to live up to the Greco - German trade agreement, Mussolini and Hitler began considering an attack on Greece as a British potential base²⁰. Greece was «one of the main points of English maritime strategy in the Mediterranean», according to Mussolini, who had already decided to occupy Greece and informed Hitler on 19 October of his resolution to deal soon with the Greek problem. The attack materialized before Hitler had a chance to hold back Mussolini; or so he claimed later²¹. But it is rather doubtful whether Hitler would have been willing to hold back Mussolini²², even if it had been possible at this late stage.

At this point it would be useful to examine Greek and British strategic considerations, particularly the former, before the Italian attack on Greece. The first soundings about the possibility of a common or parallel strategy in the event of war in the Mediterranean took place in early 1939, when Metaxas undertook to explain the essentials of Greek war planning to the British. According to Metaxas, Greek defence plans were based on a Mediterranean war in which Italy would be hostile and Greece on Britain's side. Hitherto, Greece had been preparing for a Balkan war, in which the predominant role would be played by the army; but attention had been turned lately to a Mediterranean war, in which the navy and the air force would play the principal part, in close cooperation with the British Mediterranean Fleet and Air Arm²³.

19. Franz Halder, *Diaries*, Washington D.C. 1950, vol. IV, pp. 166, 170; Ciano's *Dipl. Papers*, p. 385.

20. D.G.F.P., Ser. D, vol. XI, No. 135.

21. *Ibid.*, Nos. 194, 199, 209; *Les lettres secrètes échangées par Hitler et Mussolini*, Paris 1946, pp. 81 ff.; Ernst Weizsäcker, *Memoirs*, London 1951, p. 244.

22. Crevel, *op. cit.*, p. 39ff.

23. F.O. 371/23760, Reports of the British Service Attachés, Jan. 1939.

These explanations came two months after a proposal from Metaxas for an Anglo - Greek alliance. The first approaches for placing Anglo - Greek relations on an alliance basis had been made by the Greek Government in May 1938, in the light of Britain's decision to facilitate Bulgaria's rearmament. A month later Metaxas himself proposed to the British Minister that Britain should undertake to guarantee Greece's frontiers, or sign an alliance with her; and King George implored the British to do «something» for Greece, in the face of Bulgaria's rearmament²⁴. On this occasion the Foreign Office found the Greek approaches besides the point. The British Chiefs of Staff had already considered the subject in March of the same year and decided that an alliance with Greece or other Balkan states would constitute an «embarrassing commitment»²⁵. In October, finally, Metaxas proposed to the British Government an Anglo - Greek alliance to facilitate Greek war preparations and Anglo - Greek cooperation in the event of war in the Mediterranean. But the British were not prepared to consider such an alliance, mainly because they did not want on the one hand to undertake to defend Greek territorial integrity and on the other to run the danger of estranging Italy²⁶. It is worth noting in this context that Metaxas considered that control of the Greek peninsula and islands would be a «vital strategical necessity» to Britain's position in the Eastern Mediterranean²⁷; an appreciation, of course, that was outdated and based on World War I strategical desiderata.

To return now to Metaxa's confidential explanations of early 1939 to the British, it seems that the view that Greece had of late been preparing for a «Mediterranean» war was not in accord with the views of the Greek General Staff; for, at least until the April 1939 crisis, war planning and preparations covered almost exclusively the Bulgarian threat, as the elaborate and costly fortifications on the border with Bulgaria clearly showed. General Papagos, Chief of the General Staff, admitted later that the Government had made it clear that the aim of Greek rearmament was to deal with Bulgaria in the event of a Greco - Bulgarian war, in which Bulgaria would have the initiative. This aim was also in accordance with Greece's obligations arising

24. F.O. 371/22362, F.O. correspondence and minutes, May - June 1938.

25. F.O. 371/22362, F.O. minutes of June 1938, and Cab. 27/627, C.O.S. 698, 21 Mar. 1938.

26. Koliopoulos, *op. cit.*, pp. 89 ff.

27. F.O. 371/22363, Athens Tel. No. 200, 16 Oct. 1938.

from the Balkan Pact. And he adds: «The Government had never considered the possibility of a war against Italy to be the purpose of our military preparations». Greece according to Papagos, did not even possess a plan covering the Italian danger²⁸.

The April 1939 crisis sounded the alarm, and the Greek General Staff then produced the first plan covering both Italy and Bulgaria. The new plan (Plan IB) took into consideration the help Greece might expect from her Balkan partners, in the event of Bulgaria attacking alone; it presupposed British naval superiority in the Mediterranean, and counted on some British and French assistance; and divided Greek land forces between two lines of defence, the frontiers with Albania and Bulgaria, allocating the forces in a way that clearly favoured the Bulgarian sector. This allocation, according to Papagos, was made necessary by the need to hold Bulgaria at all costs until Turkish help arrived. But this hardly constitutes by itself a convincing explanation of the attitude of the General Staff. It is worth stressing in this context that expenditure on the line of fortifications facing Bulgaria was not reduced after the Italian occupation of Albania, as one might have expected. On the contrary, the Bulgarian sector received between April 1939 and October 1940 the lion's share of funds spent on fortifications, approximately, 90.4 per cent against 9.6 per cent; indeed, more than half of total expenditure on defence works in the years 1936-1940 was spent in the post-April 1939 period²⁹.

Clearly, the Greek General Staff prepared for a «Balkan» not a «Mediterranean» war, notwithstanding Metaxas's assurances to the contrary. There are even some indications that the Greek Government—not only the General Staff—were seriously preoccupied with the Bulgarian danger well after the April 1939 crisis, as late as August 1939³⁰. As might be expected, the British Government disapproved of the em-

28. Alexandros Papagos, *O ellinikos stratos kai i pros polemon proparaskevi tou, 1923-1940* (The Greek Army and Its War Preparedness, 1923-1940), Athens 1945, pp. 325-6.

29. *Ibid.*, pp. 220, 327-8; Athanasios Korozis, *Oi polemoi tou 1940-1941: E-pitychiai kai efthinai* (The Wars of 1940-1941: Successes and Responsibilities), Athens 1958, vol. I, pp. 154-5, 613, 638 ff.

30. During the negotiations of August 1939 about buying aircraft from Britain, Metaxas informed Simopoulos that Greece needed the aircrafts to cover Bulgaria, as well as Italy. But Simopoulos was directed that, in his talks with the British, he «should not mention Bulgaria». Simopoulos Papers, letter from Metaxas to, Simopoulos, 26 August 1939.

phasis and general line of Greek strategy and war preparations: in the first place, the British believed that Bulgaria on her own would not attack Greece in the event of a general war; in the second place, they considered that the major danger to Greece was from Italy, and from Britain's point of view this was most certainly the case³¹. Indeed, to meet this danger, the British Chiefs of Staff recommended that the Greeks concentrate on aircraft, anti - aircraft guns, coastal defence guns and anti - submarine vessels; that is to say, armaments meant to protect Greek harbours and supplement British strategic requirements in the Mediterranean³².

But the Italian occupation of Albania and the resulting threat to Greece's security from that direction changed the strategic realities in the area at a stroke. As already seen, the British Chiefs of Staff were now faced with a situation for which they had no answer. Strange though it may sound, the Italian military presence in the Balkans shifted the emphasis in such a way as to put Greece outside Britain's main strategic concerns and interests; because the more Italian power in the area increased, to the detriment of British power and Greek security, the more the British considered Greece a vulnerable and unattractive base of operations. Greece's strategic value to Britain depended on Britain's ability to dispatch to Greece forces and keep them with relative safety and control communications in the Aegean.

British strategy in relation to Greece came under consideration in early September, when the Chiefs of Staff concluded that, with the attitude of Italy in the balance, Britain's interests would be best served by maintaining the neutrality of Greece³³. The same conclusion was arrived at later in the month, on the occasion of the Italian proposals to the Greek Government regarding the Greco - Italian Pact. With the exception of a situation in which Bulgaria and Turkey were both belligerent and on Britain's side, it would be to Britain's advantage for Greece to remain neutral as long as possible, even if Italy declared war against Britain. As a belligerent, Greece was expected to prove a liability and absorb valuable British resources, which could be better used in more vital theatres of the war. In any event, Britain could not provide any land or air forces to assist Greece unless the neutrality

31. F.O. 371/23760, report by the Military Attaché in Athens, 7 March 1939, and F.O. letter to the War Office, 17 March 1939.

32. F.O. 371/23760, report by the Chiefs of Staff, 31 March 1939.

33. Cab. 79/4, C.O.S. (39)6, 7 Sept. 1939.

of Italy was assured beyond any doubt. All that was expected of Greece, in all circumstances, was to deny the use of her harbours to Britain's enemies, with the least possible support from Britain³⁴.

The Italian attack on Greece in October 1940 made Greece a belligerent, but only against Italy. To the extent that the Italian attack was considered a pre-emptive strike against a potential British base — which was certainly the case — the Greco-Italian war was part of the European war, but only indirectly so. Greece was not at war with Germany; nor was she officially an ally of Britain. Greece was allied to Britain only as long as she fought against Italy. Indeed, as far as Britain was concerned, the attack on Greece created an inconvenient commitment. Britain had given Greece a solemn assurance that she would come to her assistance if she became the victim of aggression and chose to oppose the aggressor, but was not bound by an alliance. Churchill could promise to Metaxas, in a message on the day of the attack, that Britain would give Greece all the help in her power, since the two countries fought a «common foe»³⁵; but help was more easily promised than given. When pressed by the British Minister in Athens two days later to urgently send assistance to Greece, Churchill replied that no explicit pledges of support had been made, except that Britain would do her best; and that, in any case, the British Guarantee had been given in conjunction with France³⁶.

Interestingly enough — but not surprisingly — a similar position with respect to Anglo-Greek relations was also taken by the Greek Government. When invited by the British Government in early November to participate in a meeting of allied governments, which would be held in London as a show of solidarity among the allies fighting the Axis, Metaxas replied that Greece's position differed from that of states like Poland, Czechoslovakia, Norway and the Netherlands, and therefore Greek participation was not «appropriate». To British pressure to reconsider his position on the meeting of allied governments in London, Metaxas felt obliged to draw the attention of the British to the possible consequences of Greece's participation, namely, an attack from Ger-

34. Cab. 80/3, C.O.S. (39)45, 22 Sept. 1939.

35. F.O. 371/24919, F.O. Tel. to Athens, 28 Oct. 1940; Metaxas, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, p. 526; *Ellinika diplomatika engrapha, 1940-1941* (Greek Diplomatic Documents, 1940-1941), Athens 1980, No. 6.

36. F.O. 371/24919, Athens Tel. No. 1019 and 1023, 30 and 31 Oct. 1940, and F.O. reply Tel. No. 806, 31 Oct. 1940.

many. If the British Government considered that the Greeks should not refrain from inviting such attack, Metaxas expected the British to state that «categorically» and be fully aware of the consequences and the responsibility they were undertaking in common with the Greeks³⁷. Metaxas's explanations to the British defined Greece's position *vis-à-vis* the belligerent European powers and the character of the Greco-Italian war in the context of the general war.

The Greek counter-attack, which was launched in mid-November and met with unexpected success, allowed Metaxas to press the British for assistance with more conviction than hitherto. Greek successes in the field presented the British with an opportunity to transfer their main war effort against Italy from North Africa in the Balkans. For better or worse, explained King George to the King of Britain, the British had a «Balkan front»; and he was at a loss to account for their reluctance to press home the advantage this front gave them, before the Germans had time to retrieve the difficult position in which Italy had placed the Axis³⁸. But there is little doubt that what the Greek Government wanted the British military presence in Greece for was to knock Italy out of Albania; and what they essentially meant by a Balkan front was a deterrent to Germany, not so much a theatre of offensive operations — for which the British, anyway, lacked the necessary forces. The invitation to the British to send forces to mainland Greece, it is worth noting, was followed, after one day, by Metaxas's revealing reservations about Greek participation in the proposed meeting of allied governments.

It was Germany then, more than Italy and Britain, that defined Greece's international position and the character of the Greco-Italian war; more precisely, it was Germany's attitude towards Greece, more than Greece's war against Italy and cooperation with Britain, that determined the character of Greek belligerency. It is interesting to note that, just as the British were beginning, towards the end of November to consider the Albanian front useful, because it pinned down considerable Italian forces and drained valuable supplies³⁹, the Germans turned their attention to Greece and the war she waged against Italy.

37. *Greek Dipl. Documents*, Nos. 19, 20, 38.

38. F.O. 871/24921, Athens Tel. No. 1133, 14 Nov. 1940, and letter from King George to the King of Britain, 10 Nov. 1940. See also *Greek Dipl. Documents*, No. 30, and Metaxas, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, p. 534.

39. F.O. 871/24892, F.O. Memo., 28 Nov. 1940.

German policy with respect to Greece is now fairly easy to trace. When plans for the invasion of Britain were finally shelved, Hitler began considering a «peripheral strategy», essentially a series of strikes against Britain in the Mediterranean. In the light of this strategy, Greece became an important objective, or rather a springboard from which attacks could be launched against Britain's position in the Mediterranean. Thus, initial German strategic considerations on Greece had a distinctly offensive character. After the Russo-German talks of November, however, and the realization on the part of the Germans of the differences that separated them from the Russians with respect to the Balkans, besides other parts of the world, Hitler set his mind on a war against the Soviet Union. In the light of the new priorities, therefore, the «peripheral strategy» against Britain was dropped as hurriedly as it was devised, and Greece was to be considered from now on mainly in relation to German plans and preparations for an invasion of Russia. Of course, Hitler would have been happy to deal with Russia and Britain at the same time, but this was not feasible for lack of the necessary forces and resources. The German General Staff and Hitler, therefore, had to settle for a limited undertaking in order to secure the right flank of German forces directed against Russia, that is a pre-emptive strike against Greece as a potential British base⁴⁰.

In the light of these German plans, the Italian action against Greece, which from the start had been unwelcome to the German General Staff⁴¹, now became an extremely annoying and inconvenient factor, in the shape of serious Italian revenses, which offered Britain the opportunity to establish herself in Greece and threaten the planned invasion of Russia. A British foothold in the Balkans could have endangered Germany's venture in the East in more than one ways. Besides the real and immediate danger to the Romanian oilfields, to which the Germans had always been alive, Britain's military presence on mainland Greece was a potential threat to the right flank of the German forces, if this presence was to develop into something similar to the Allied Salonika front of World War I⁴². Therefore, it can now be reasonably maintained that Germany's planned action against Greece was not so much in support of Italy's deteriorating position in Albania

40. Crevelde, *op. cit.*, pp. 55 ff., 81 ff.

41. Halder, *op. cit.*, vol. V, p. 4; *Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 1940-1941*, London 1947, pp. 112 ff.

42. Crevelde, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

as a pre-emptive move against Britain's position in Greece; in other words, Operation «Marita», the German code word for military action against Greece⁴³, had very little to do with Italy and very much to do with Britain.

In the meantime, the Germans made an effort to mediate in the potentially dangerous Greco-Italian conflict. If the war between Greece and Italy could be brought to an end, the British would probably be compelled to withdraw from Greek territory, since the presence of their forces in Greece could be associated solely with the Italian threat to that country. There is no question that Germany would have been delighted to see an end to this rather irrelevant war in the Balkans⁴⁴; and it is logical to argue that the reason for the rejection by Metaxas of the German offer for mediation must be sought in Britain's obvious interest in preventing such a development⁴⁵. The British Government, despite Metaxas's assurances that he would never agree to «any attempt to drive a wedge between Britain and Greece» and that, after knocking out Italy, the two allies must turn their attention to Germany⁴⁶, considered that the position of Greece, in the event of Italy's defeat and elimination from the war, would be «anomalous». The same would also be true if Greece concluded a separate peace with Italy. Greece had not declared war on Germany and, once the Greco-Italian war was over, she was likely to revert once more to neutrality. In that case, Britain would have to evacuate Crete and abandon the naval and air bases on the southern Greek mainland. This would be both a short-term loss for the navy and the air force and a long-term loss in case Britain were to embark on a Balkan campaign in the spring⁴⁷. To ensure that Greece would not conclude a separate peace with Italy the British were even considering the possibility of making the Germans commit an act of aggression against Greece; or persuading the Greek

43. *Hitler's War Directives, 1939-1945*, ed. H. R. Trevor-Roper, London 1965, pp. 46 ff.

44. Ehrengard Schramm von Thadden, *Griechenland und die Grossmächte im Zweiten Weltkrieg*, Wiesbaden 1955, pp. 150, 217-8; M. L. van Creveld, «Prelude to Disaster: The British Decision to Aid Greece, 1940-1941», *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. IX (1974), for the most recent and complete account of the affair.

45. Creveld, «British Decision», pp. 71 ff.

46. F.O. 371/24920, Athens Tel. No. 1289, 7 Dec. 1940.

47. F.O. 371/24921, F.O. Memo., «Possibility of Greece making a separate peace», 14 Dec. 1940.

Government to declare war on Germany, if Italy was knocked out of the war⁴⁸.

Metaxas proved more accommodating than the British expected, without even demanding—as they feared he would—in return for not concluding a separate peace with Italy, specific undertakings on assistance to Greece, or territorial acquisitions the British Government might find impossible to agree to⁴⁹. All the same, Metaxas was very reluctant to provoke Germany, before the war against Italy was brought to a successful end; an attitude that reflected the ambiguous position of Greece *vis-à-vis* the belligerent powers and the self-defeating effort of the Greek Government to preserve that position, in the vain hope that the war against Italy in Albania could be brought to a successful conclusion. In rejecting, in late December 1940, a British proposal for the establishment of air forces at Salonika, Metaxas assured the British Government that, after defeating the Italians, the Greeks would help the British against the Germans as well⁵⁰.

Greek preoccupation with the prosecution of the war against Italy was more than understandable: Greece was fighting for her very existence as an independent state, and that only with little British support. But refusal to consider measures for meeting what appeared, by the end of 1940 and the beginning of 1941, to be a certain German invasion of the Balkans in the spring, before successfully terminating the war against Italy, amounted to a pretext for doing nothing at all. This refusal reflected the progressive disintegration of Greek policy under pressure from the Commander-in-Chief and the commanders on the Albanian front, which had acquired by now its own momentum and requirements. The attempt, at this crucial juncture, to set apart the Greek war effort against Italy in Albania from the general war and its requirements contributed on the one hand to the serious divergence of pursuits and aims between Greece and Britain and on the other to the equally serious and more dangerous divergence of views between the government and the military leadership of Greece a few months later.

The Albanian front and its needs were set apart from the fortunes of the general war by Metaxas in early January, when he asked the

48. F.O. 371/24922, F.O. minutes, Dec. 1940.

49. *Greek Dipl. Documents*, No. 61, and Metaxas, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, pp. 545-546.

50. F.O. 371/29818, Athens Tel. No. 1456, 31 Dec. 1940, and F.O. 371/29825, Athens, Tel. No. 1457, 31 Dec. 1940. See also Metaxas, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, p. 550.

P, 7095

British to supply Greece with aircraft and transport vehicles for exclusive use on the Albanian front, after a meeting with Papagos and in view of the expected German advance in the Balkans⁵¹. Even more explicit and determined was Metaxas's effort to safeguard the autonomy of the Greek war in his meeting with the British Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, in mid-January, when the British proposed again to anticipate the German advance by sending forces to Salonica, reversing thus all previous strategical considerations and plans⁵², and Metaxas tried to secure a British commitment to support Greece solely on the Albanian front⁵³. Once the Albanian situation was cleared up, he stated to the British, large Greek forces would be available for the Salonika front and Greece would then welcome British forces for a front against Germany⁵⁴; anyway, the British offer of forces fell short of Greek General Staff estimates and plans concerning the German threat and ways to meet it⁵⁵.

The Greek General Staff put before the government two important conditions concerning Anglo-Greek cooperation against Germany: a) that the Albanian front should not be stripped of any forces, and b) that the line of defence against the Germans should be along the Eastern Macedonian fortifications⁵⁶. These conditions of the Greek military essentially meant that the bulk of the Greek army would remain in Albania facing the Italians, irrespective of developments to the east of the Albanian front, and that the fortified line would be manned and defended against the expected German advance mainly by the British. For the British Metaxas reserved the following position: Greece, although determined to resist a German attack, would in no case provoke this attack, unless Britain was in a position to make the necessary forces available in Macedonia⁵⁷.

Greece, in other words, was determined not to submit to Germany without a fight. But the battle had to be fought on the fortified line and with nominal Greek forces, because the bulk of the army (some

51. Papadakis, *op. cit.*, pp. 132-3; Metaxas, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, pp. 555-6; F.O. 371/29818, Athens Tel. No. 26, 5 Jan. 1941.

52. W. S. Churchill, *The Grand Alliance*, Boston 1950, p. 16.

53. Koliopoulos, *op. cit.*, pp. 207 ff.

54. F.O. 371/29818, Tel. from Wavell to the Chief of Imperial General Staff, No. P. 26 cipher 15/1, 15 Jan. 1941.

55. Papagos, *Battle of Greece*, pp. 257-9.

56. *Ibid.*, pp. 327-9.

57. Metaxas, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, pp. 560-1; *Greek Dipl. Documents*, No. 82.

14 divisions) was held down on the Albanian front. The forces required to check the German advance had to be put forward mainly by the British. All these, in view of the limited forces the British were in a position to send to mainland Greece and Greek refusal to accept these forces and organize a line of defence before the Germans could move south in the spring, essentially meant that the Greek Government and General Staff were looking forward to a quick and honourable fall under the expected German onslaught. It was the position one could expect from a small country faced with the might of a great power. But in the case of Greece that position was subject to a number of factors, such as the country's special relationship with Britain, the form and structure of the ruling regime, the state of the army, the organization of the defences and, above all, the war effort against Italy, which favoured unrealistic and illusory demands and expectations, and undermined the pursuit of a coherent and sound policy.

The negative effect of all these factors became apparent under Metaxas's successors, who wavered dangerously under pressure from various quarters and conflicting interests and in the face of the imminent danger emanating from Germany. The occasion for the appearance of these features was the Anglo-Greek talks of February - March 1941, which marked the beginning of the last and most crucial phase of the Greek war. The talks of February, held to decide in common on how to face the expected German advance in the Balkans, revealed a serious divergence of views and interests, which everyone concerned tried to minimize for the sake of uninterrupted Anglo-Greek cooperation. The British decision to send troops to Greece, at the earliest possible moment, satisfied the need to make a brave gesture of support to a country publicly guaranteed by Britain, a country moreover resolved to resist the Germans even alone if necessary, and at the same time made it more likely that Yugoslavia and Turkey would finally decide to join in a common effort against Germany. In other words, the dispatch of British forces to Greece satisfied both political and military considerations⁵⁸.

Greece, on the other hand, was willing to accept British troops for the organization of a common line of defence against a German advance, but wished to avoid provoking a German attack and was re-

58. F.O. 871/29813, F.O. minutes, 10 Feb. 1941; Cab. 65/17, W. M. (41)15, 10 Feb. 1941; Premier 3/209, Chiefs of Staff Tel. of 11 Feb. 1941 to the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East.

solved a) to prosecute the war in Albania unhindered by other campaigns, and b) not to abandon the fortified line in Eastern Macedonia without a fight⁵⁹. In view of the inadequate forces the British were prepared to make available and the extremely cautious and unresponsive attitude of Yugoslavia and Turkey, to reach agreement for military cooperation required a great capacity for self-deception. The Anglo-Greek agreement of 22nd February, which glossed over the diverging views and aims of the two countries and rested on such variables as the attitude of Yugoslavia, the availability of British shipping, the pace of work for the improvement of roads in Greece and the fortunes of the war in Albania, was bound to run into serious trouble. The agreement, however, represented the form and extent of military cooperation the special Anglo-Greek relationship allowed under the circumstances; and the disagreement over the timing of withdrawal of the Greek forces from Eastern Macedonia on the common line of defence in Central Macedonia was, essentially, no more than a permissible difference of interpretation of the agreement, although the British side could present their case more convincingly than the Greek⁶⁰.

A second agreement, negotiated on 4th March, following the entry of German military units in Bulgaria and after considerable pressure was applied on Papagos through King George, made it almost certain that the Greeks and the British would be soundly and quickly beaten by the invading Germans. Greek priorities and British expediences were satisfied, but not sound strategy. The Greek Government and General Staff invited disaster, particularly on the Albanian front, where the German danger had a negative effect on morale. What officers and soldiers feared most and were eager to avoid at all costs was humiliating surrender to the Italians, whom they had defeated and held in contempt. By the time of the German attack, it was commonly felt that to continue the war against the new and more formidable aggressor was futile. Battle-weary and demoralized, but determined all the same to avoid surrender to a defeated enemy, the Greek army in Albania saw capitulation to the Germans as the only honourable solution⁶¹. Strong

59. Koliopoulos, *op. cit.*, pp. 231 ff.

60. *Ibid.*, Ch. VIII, for a detailed account and analysis of the Anglo-Greek talks and the consequent agreement and disagreement, based on the unpublished British record of the meetings.

61. Greek General Staff Archives, F623/A/407, F627, F628, F634. See also Greek General Staff, *To telos mias epopoitas, Aprilios 1941* (The End of an Epic,

pressure from the field commanders to permit capitulation and equally strong pressure from the British to continue fighting led to the disintegration of the army and the capitulation of its leadership to the Germans and the Italians. The Greek Government, headed by the King, abandoned the country amidst chaos and defeat to continue the struggle against the Axis from abroad on the side of Britain, at last, unqualified ally of fully belligerent but enemy occupied Greece.

ZACHARIAS N. TSIRPANLIS

THE ITALIAN VIEW OF THE 1940-41 WAR
COMPARISONS AND PROBLEMS

*Quae sit libertas, quaeris? Nulli rei
servire, nulli necessitati, nullis casibus,
fortunam in aequum deducere.*

Sen. Ep. 51,9

The Argument

The intention of this article is to examine the Italian historical sources, to compare them with the Greek viewpoints and thus arrive at an understanding of the truth. The period concerned, as far as I am aware, has yet to be properly researched¹. Using scientific evidence as accurate as possible and by a comparative examination of the relevant testimonies, it is, I think, a worthwhile exercise to assess the attitude of Fascist Italy's political leaders towards Greece before and during the hostilities; how the Italian generals and soldiers viewed the Greek soldier; how Italian historians view these events today, to whom they attribute responsibility for the war, and how generally they justify Italy's wrongful actions against Greece. Do they distort the truth, do they recognise it or simply adapt it to accommodate their shortcomings, thereby obscuring or belittling the Greek victory?

It must first be said, however, that numerous Italian sources on the war against Greece have been published, and to study, classify and evaluate them all is a task which requires an enormous amount of time. Such sources include diplomatic documents published by the national printing-house of Italy, diaries of political and military leaders, memoirs of diplomatic officials, attempts at reconstructing events by chroniclers, journalists, and other people who took part in the war, letters from ordinary soldiers, dispatches from the various military units, operational plans and documents of the Italian General Army Staff, and even the songs sung by the soldiers (though not, of course, those imposed by the Fascist party). On the basis of all this material, it is possible to observe not only the official activities of the State, but also the unknown reactions of the people and the army.

1. I did myself make a preliminary study a few years ago; Zacharias N. Tsirpanlis, *Πώς είδαν οι Έταλοι τον πόλεμο του 1940-41* (The Italian View of the 1940-41 War), Ioannina 1974, 80, pp. 56 (panegyric; ed. University of Ioannina).

Before I go on to deal with the relevant information, I feel I should mention a slight problem which, I think, bears directly on this matter. How is it possible for a nation which was defeated, and not simply and heroically in a defensive war, to take such a lively interest in examining its defeat?

Again I must emphasise that Italian literary output concerning the Greco-Italian war is considerable. Suffice it to say that in the bibliography of works on the Second World War published by the Italian General Staff in 1955, there are more than thirty publications (independent books and articles) dealing specifically with the Greek front of 1940-41². One of these books — and I mention it particularly for its interest to Italians — is the Italian translation of Alexander Papagos' famous *The Greek War. 1940-1941*. It was first published in Greece in 1945 and the Italian translation came out in 1948³. I should

2. Cf. Stato Maggiore Esercito-Ufficio Storico, *Saggio bibliografico sulla seconda guerra mondiale*, Roma 1955, p. 11, for the numerical details about the *Guerra sul fronte greco-albanese*. Detailed though this bibliography is, I must point out the omission of the Fascist Riccardo Crespi's book, *Squadristi in Albania*, Milano 1941. Cf. excerpts and comments in Mario Cervi, *Storia della guerra di Grecia*, Milano 1965, p. 311-312.

3. In the *Saggio bibliografico*, op. cit., p. 381-382, the year of the publication in Greek of A. Papagos' book is given as 1947. I mention the 1945 edition, but I do not know whether or not it was republished in 1947. According to *Saggio* the Italian translation, *La Grecia in guerra*, was published in 1948 by the publishing firm of Garzanti (Milano). Cervi's book, however, (op. cit., p. 53 and 508) mentions the publication of a translation of Papagos' book in 1950 (Milano), a translation by Cervi himself. I do not know if two Italian translations really were published within so short a period, nor do I possess either of them in order to ascertain the truth of the matter. It should be noted, however, that Papagos' book was translated into other European languages too, e.g. English (*The Battle of Greece. 1940-41*, Athens 1949, or *The Greek War. 1940-41*, New York 1946), French (*La Grèce en guerre. 1940-41*, Athènes 1951), German (*Griechenland im Kriege. 1940-41*, Bonn 1951). The book's circulation was extremely wide, owing chiefly to the valuable historical documents it contains. In Italy, though, it aroused strong objections; the most important of which were expressed in General Carlo Geloso's article, «La Grecia in guerra», *Rivista Militare*, giugno 1950, p. 579-587. Geloso was the Commander of the Eleventh Italian Army in Albania from 16 November 1940 onwards. His article acknowledges the numerical superiority of the Italian forces at the start of the war and confesses that the Greek victory was truly admirable. Nevertheless, he compares the opposing forces and reaches different conclusions from Papagos. He too finally agrees (p. 582) that further archive material will have to be published before history can reach definite conclusions. As I was assured (in a letter dated 1.4.1974) by Mr. John Ghikas, head of the Press Office of the Greek Embassy in Rome

also point out that since 1955 Italian books dealing specifically with the war against Greece have continued to be published in impressive numbers.

Why, then, all this literary activity? There are many reasons, of which two, in my opinion, are the most important: a) To place the responsibility for the declaration of the war squarely on the shoulders of the Fascist party, indeed exclusively on Mussolini and Ciano, thereby clearing the Italian people of the dreadful accusation that they struck the first blow. b) To exonerate the unknown Italian soldier, who in obedience to his superiors' orders fought, with no ideals to support him, and sacrificed himself to his duty.

It is easy to see that both these reasons, which, as we shall see, pervade almost all the Italian books, form a kind of counter-balance to the defeat and thereby safeguard the morale and the historical survival of a nation whose military forces and whose human dignity too were so soundly shaken in the mountains of Epirus. But does history justify these opinions? It may be too early to give an unequivocal answer⁴. For all the great bulk of published material, public and private archives still hold many unpublished documents, and it is only when they have all come to light that the opinions expressed above will be able to be fully assessed.

For the present, we do have the means at our disposal to understand how the Italians viewed their relations with the Greeks right from the eve of the war until its end. Chronologically, then, I intend to start with the back-stage diplomatic activities, move on to the period of hostilities, and finally look at subsequent historical writings.

1. Diplomats' Testimonies

With regard to the period immediately preceding the start of the

both before and after the 1940 war, Papagos wrote a reply to Geloso's article. It was published in the *Military News* and Mr. Ghikas ensured that it appeared in Italian in the newspaper *Momento* and in the monthly review *Illustrazione Italiana* (published by Garzanti). I have been unable to obtain copies of these publications, nor can I recall the precise relevant details.

4. Kostas N. Triantaphyllou, *'Απόρρητα τοῦ πολέμου 1940* (Secrets of the 1940 War), Patras 1981, p. 40-44, points out, on the basis of authentic information in historical writings, the Italian political parties' approbation of the colonialist foreign policy both of Mussolini and of the governments which preceded him. For a concise account of the relations between Italy and the Balkans during the XIXth and XXth centuries, cf. Mario Pacor, *Italia e Balcani dal Risorgimento alla Resistenza*, Milano (Feltrinelli Editore) 1968, p. 7-52 (:Italiani in Balcania). Cf. also below.

war, authentic and interesting sources are available to us, such as the memoirs of the Italian minister in Athens, Emanuele Grázzi, and the military attaché to the Italian embassy in Athens, Colonel Luigi Mondini, the diary of the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Galeazzo Ciano (Mussolini's son-in-law), and a series of Italian diplomatic documents, chiefly from the archives of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Let us take a brief look at each of these historical sources.

First, Grazzi's memoirs, which he published immediately after the war in 1945, under the title *The Beginning of the End*, and with the sub-title *The Campaign Against Greece*. The first few lines of the foreword reveal his feelings towards Greece and explain why he chose such a title. He believes that his own country's attack on a small country like Greece had no moral justification whatsoever, and that it was instigated from the most spurious and contemptible motives. Grazzi even acknowledges that "the Greco-Italian conflict was far more than a glorious stanza of the national epopee of a small nation ...", and that the Greek victory "signalled the beginning of the end not only with regard to the repercussions, whether immediate or delayed, in the military sector, but also with regard to the consequences in the psychological and political condition of the Italian people"⁵.

These words denote a man of sound sense and honesty, very rare qualities in the Fascist environment of the time. In his memoirs Grazzi reveals himself as an honourable diplomat who made every effort to alleviate the tension and the coolness which had developed in Greco-Italian relations after the seizure of the Greek Dodecanese islands (in April-May 1912) by the Italian forces⁶, the bombing of and landing

5. Emanuele Grazzi, *Il principio della fine. (L'impresa di Grecia)*, Roma 1945 (7 November), p. 5. Chryso Ghika's Greek translation of this work has recently been published: *Εμμανουέλε Γκράττσι, 'Η ἀρχή του τέλους. ('Η επιχείρηση κατά της Ελλάδος)* [Emanuele Grazzi, *The Beginning of the End. (The Campaign Against Greece)*], Athens ("Estia") 1980, 80, pp. 307. A brief evaluation of the book is to be found in John Ghikas' article, *α'Τὰ απομνημονεύματα Γκράττσι μετά 35 χρόνια* (The Grazzi Memoirs 85 Years Later), in the newspaper *Τὸ Βήμα* 1.1.1981, which gives information about Grazzi's activities after the war. Our references concern the original work.

6. A great deal has been written in Italian on the Dodecanese Question. I shall mention only — of the older writings and with a Fascist leaning — the book by Renzo Sertoli Salis, *Le isole italiane dell'Egeo dall'occupazione alla sovranità*, Roma 1939, and of the more recent works, Cesare Marongiu Buonaiuti's interesting monograph, *La politica religiosa del Fascismo nel Dodecanneso*, Napoli 1979.

on Corfu (31 August - 28 September 1923)⁷, and the final annexation of Albania to the kingdom of Italy (April 1939), to mention only the most important episodes in Italy's imperialistic policy against Greece. The Italian ambassador left Rome on 15 April 1939 and went to Athens without receiving the slightest instruction from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as to Italy's political line with regard to Greece.

Nevertheless, he himself believed that Italy had every interest in maintaining friendly relations with her neighbour, since, were the tables ever to be turned, Greece would be a veritable thorn in the Italian peninsula's flesh⁸. Grazzi supports this opinion of his clearly and realistically as he describes the Metaxas regime, Greece's internal situation, her position in the Balkans and in the Mediterranean, the Greeks' anglophile sentiments and their justifiable hatred for the Italians on the eve of the war, and he ends with the sound observation that whereas violation of her neutrality by the English would arouse vociferous protest from Greece, such violation by the Italians would be met with armed resistance⁹. Events were to prove him correct.

And yet, from the very first a mutual liking had bound Grazzi and Metaxas, who, the Italian ambassador himself affirms, had nurtured a deep love for Italy from the time of his exile in Siena, and was the only real friend Italy could claim in Greece¹⁰.

Grazzi struggled to create a friendly atmosphere and cordial relations between the Greeks and the Italians, but his own country's Ministry of Foreign Affairs left him in total ignorance of its foreign policy. He was not informed about a single matter and frequently received no reply to his reports and telegrams¹¹. Consequently, in his talks with Metaxas or with the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Ma-

7. Of all the well-known writings on this event I should like to mention only the brief, but comprehensive, account of the military and diplomatic episode by an Italian historian of the period, who was "outlawed" by the Fascist party, Gaetano Salvemini, *Mussolini diplomat*, Paris 1932, p. 32-45.

8. Grazzi, *op. cit.*, p. 18-19. Cf. also *ibid.* (p. 20) the Greek government's endeavour in 1938 to revive relations with Italy. For Greece's irreproachable attitude towards Italy from 1936 onwards, cf. also P. Pipinelis, *Ἱστορία τῆς ἐξωτερικῆς πολιτικῆς τῆς Ἑλλάδος, 1923-1941* (History of Greece's Foreign Policy. 1923-1941), Athens 1948, p. 283.

9. Grazzi, *op. cit.*, p. 81-44 (particularly p. 43).

10. Grazzi, *op. cit.*, p. 27, 29, 33.

11. Grazzi, *op. cit.*, p. 57, 60, 103 (instances of lack of co-ordination in the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs), p. 107-108, 123, 145-148, 156, 158, 198.

vroudis, he often felt, as he himself puts it, "like a barrister compelled to plead a case about which he has not been given all the relevant papers, and feeling quite certain, in fact, that it is the other party who is in the right rather than his own client"¹². Despite these difficulties the Italian diplomat was sincerely working towards a peaceful co-existence between Italy and Greece, and openly declared his belief, as did the Greeks, that the war would go against Germany and Britain would win (indeed he said this to both Mussolini and Ciano)¹³. At any rate, he successfully called forth repeated assurances from the Italian leadership that Greece's territorial integrity would be respected, and he adroitly negotiated the, albeit temporary, renewal of the Greco-Italian friendship agreement, when it came to an end on 30 September 1939¹⁴. The crowning success of his pacifist activities was the document which Mussolini himself dictated to him on 11 September 1939, according to which Italy was to withdraw her troops 20 kms away from the Greek-Albanian border, and declared her friendship with Greece and her willingness even to provide Greece with war equipment. The Greek people received Mussolini's promises with joy and relief and with declarations of friendship towards Italy¹⁵.

But it was all proved short-lived a year later, in 1940. Italy declared war on France on 10 June and the first clashes took place on 20-21 June, when the French had already, on the 17th, called for a truce with the Germans, who had occupied Paris. Mussolini's action, in the words of the French ambassador in Rome (académicien) André-François Poncet, was tantamount to knifing a man when he was already on the ground¹⁶. The hostilities between Italy and France lasted

12. Grazzi, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

13. Grazzi, *op. cit.*, p. 67, 101.

14. Grazzi, *op. cit.*, p. 47, 48-49, 62, 74-77, 79, 80-85 (Greece's difficulties on an international level increase, before she is able to go ahead and sign a definitive friendship agreement with Italy), 99, 101. For the general political situation cf. also P. Pipinelis, *Ιστορία της εξωτερικής πολιτικής* (History of Greece's Foreign Policy), p. 288-289, 291-294 (concerning Greece's circumspection and her position with regard to England).

15. Grazzi, *op. cit.*, p. 65-73. Greece too, though the Italian document did not demand it, withdrew her forces from the border.

16. Cf. the scene between the French ambassador and Ciano, as described in the latter's diary: Galeazzo Ciano, *Diario, 1939-1943*, vol. 1 (1939-1940), edizione economica, Milano 1963, p. 314. Poncet's actual words were: «È un colpo di pugnale ad un uomo in terra. Vi ringrazio comunque di usare un guanto di velluto».

just four days. The Italians were victorious, of course, but the losses they suffered in the Alps were so grievous that Mussolini's campaign was described as a spectacular failure¹⁷.

On 11 June Greece assured Grazzi, and through him the Italian government, that she was determined to preserve her neutrality at all costs¹⁸. But from June 1940 onwards a ceaseless barrage of Italian provocations was steadily leading the two countries into war. It was Grazzi who suffered most dramatically from the development of events, as his superiors in Rome sent him no information, while he himself retained an implicit faith in the Greek-Italian friendship. In his book he describes vividly and accurately, in chronological order, his country's provocative actions, such as the accusations about British bases in Greece, about British ships in Greek ports, about British warships flying the Greek flag, about the notorious business of the murder of the common criminal Daut Hoggia, whom the romanticised reports in the Albanian and Italian newspapers made out to be Albania's most illustrious hero, etc. etc. In each of these cases, and with the most convincing arguments, such as I have never yet encountered in any Greek writing, Grazzi demonstrates the Greeks' innocence and the purity of their feelings towards Italy¹⁹. Indeed, his impartial objectivity compels him openly to condemn his government for the endless violations of Greek air-space, the bombing of Greek ships, the senseless acts and fantastic plans for occupying Greece devised by the inimitable governor of the Dodecanese, Cesare Maria de Vecchi, whom Grazzi considered amongst the foremost responsible for the war²⁰.

But it was the torpedoing of the *Helle* in the harbour of the sacred island of Tinos on 15 August 1940 that delivered the coup-de-grâce to the dying friendship between the Greeks and the Italians. The enraged Italian ambassador rigorously denounced it as a contemptible and piratical action. He had no doubts as to the nationality of the

17. Τὰ Ὑπερ καὶ τὰ Κατὰ Μουσσολίνι. (Οἱ φάκελοι Mondadori) [The Pros and Cons. Mussolini. (The Mondadori Files)], Athens 1972, p. 138-140.

18. Grazzi, *op. cit.*, p. 108-109. Grazzi here expresses his anxiety and his opposition to his country's participation in the war.

19. Grazzi, *op. cit.*, p. 110-111, 115, 122, 124-125, 128, 130-131, 132, 139, 141-143, 149, 165, 169-171. Cf. also Luigi Mondini, *Prologo del conflitto italo-greco*, Roma 1945, p. 203, 206-208. Mondini's account of the Daut Hoggia affair is lacking in details and greatly inferior to Grazzi's version.

20. Grazzi, *op. cit.*, p. 125-127, 138, 134, 135-140.

submarine²¹; he saw the abyss yawning ahead of him, his post a bed of nails. On several occasions he was on the verge of resigning or asking to be recalled, while on the other hand believing that his continuing presence might yet help to ameliorate the situation. Later he was to realise that, in most Machiavellian style, he was being retained at his post deliberately in order to allay the suspicions of the Greek government and so that the aggressive plans against Greece might remain concealed in Rome²². And so it came about that a strange game of misunderstandings was being played in the diplomatic sector at that time. Grazzi thought, wrongly, that he was interpreting Ciano's thoughts; Ciano, however, was dancing now in step with the Duce and now quite out of rhythm; and Metaxas, for his part, believed Grazzi to be the faithful executor of Rome's orders and so swung constantly between moments of optimism and crises of prudent rationalism²³.

21. Ciano, too, *Diario*, vol. 1, p. 337 (under the date 15 August 1940), confidently states the view that the torpedoing of the *Helle* was the result of the "intemperance" of the impulsive de Vecchi, Governor of the Italian-occupied Dodecanese. Strangely enough, Mussolini's attitude to de Vecchi was one of scornful indifference (cf. Ciano, *Diario*, p. 129); and yet in Rome de Vecchi's information about Greece's situation was taken into account, while no notice was taken of Grazzi's reports. After the end of the war and the recent publication (in 1960) of de Vecchi's memoirs and the views of Giuseppe Aicardi, captain of the submarine which sank the *Helle*, it was quite clearly proved that it was de Vecchi who instigated the torpedoing (cf. M. Cervi, *Storia della guerra di Grecia*, p. 49-52, and A. I. Korandis, *Διπλωματική Ιστορία της Εξέλιξης (1919-1956)* [Diplomatic History of Europe (1919-1956)], vol. 3, part 1, Thessaloniki 1979, p. 381-383. Cf. also the interview between Aicardi and the Italian sailor Gianelloni Antonio, who actually fired the torpedo, and the Greek journalist Yannis Tsenis: «Δυὸ ἰταλικά ὑποβρύχια τορπιλίσαν τὴν "Ἑλλη"» (The Torpedoing of the *Helle* by Two Italian Submarines), in the periodical *Ταχυδρόμος* no 42 (1381) 30.10.1980, p. 51-66. — «Ὁ τορπιλισμὸς τῆς "Ἑλλης" ἀπὸ τὸ περισκόπιο τοῦ ἰταλικοῦ ὑποβρυχίου» (The Torpedoing of the *Helle* Through The Italian Submarine's Periscope), *ibid.*, no 43 (1382) 6.11.1980, p. 51-66, with further interesting evidence and, above all, unpublished photographs from the Italian archives.

22. Grazzi, *op. cit.*, p. 172-182. L. Mondini, in *Prologo*, p. 209-210, describes the torpedoing of the *Helle*, without foreseeing any repercussions it might have on Greco-Italian relations. He gives only a bare description of the event and clearly wishes to avoid attributing responsibility.

23. Cf. M. Cervi, *op. cit.*, p. 16. Mondini too, *op. cit.*, p. 145, seems to have been of the view that the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs used ambassador Grazzi's activities for its own ends, "to keep the way clear until the right moment should arrive". He wonders, however, whether all the good intentions have been thwarted by events, or whether Grazzi has been taking the initiative over the Greco-Italian

At all events, one thing was certain, and that, according to later sources gathered by Grazzi, was that in the summer of 1940 Count Ciano decided to attack Greece. To be precise, during a dinner given in his honour in Tirana, Ciano proposed to General Carlo Geloso, commander of the Italian forces in Albania, that he make ready for an offensive against Greece. Since the general objected, on the grounds that the forces at his disposal in Albania would be quite unable to undertake such a venture successfully, he was replaced a few days later by Visconti Prasca²⁴. Prasca, after assuming his duties in June 1940, was summoned to Rome on 13 August, where he was informed that in accordance with the proposals of the leader of the government (i.e. Mussolini), he was to carry out a kind of coup d'état in Epirus, using the existing forces in Albania and at a time of total peace (*in piena pace*). On 23 August, however, it was decided to postpone the plan until 10 October²⁵. In October Ciano conveyed the following message to Grazzi via a journalist: "Tell Grazzi he can write what he likes, I'm going to make war with Greece"²⁶.

The anguish of the Italian ambassador in Athens steadily increased as, day by day, more and more news was heard of the impending offensive, and yet he still received no official notification from Rome. But the most tragic period of Grazzi's life was undoubtedly between 26 and 28 October. He had invited the most important members of Athenian society to an official reception at the embassy after a special performance of Puccini's *Madame Butterfly* on the evening of 26 October. That very evening the coded parts of the famous ultimatum began to arrive from Rome. Grazzi was afraid that the offensive would be announced that night. "I imagine", he wrote, "that condemned prisoners in the death cell cannot feel very differently from the way

friendship beyond the bounds outlined by his country's foreign policy. It is my own opinion that these thoughts of Mondini's do not really hold water. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has not only the right, but also the duty, immediately to recall any of his ambassadors who might be overstepping the limits of his diplomatic duty. But Ciano did not do so in Grazzi's case.

24. Grazzi, *op. cit.*, p. 80. Cf. details in Cervi, *op. cit.*, p. 53-54. (The event is placed at the beginning of May 1940).

25. Grazzi, *op. cit.*, p. 158. Cf. details from Sebastiano Visconti Prasca himself in his book, *Io ho aggredito la Grecia*, Milano 1946, p. 31-36. Prasca's information tallies with what Grazzi has to say.

26. Grazzi, *op. cit.*, p. 225. Ciano considered the war against Greece to be particularly his own (*la mia guerra*, as he called it); *ibid.*, p. 185, 243.

I do myself at this moment". On the morning of 27 October the ultimatum was decoded and, in accordance with his orders from Rome, he was to deliver it, with no prior warning, to the Prime Minister of Greece at 3 a.m. on the 28th. "The whole day was like a nightmare... and the minutes between midnight and three o'clock crawled by like hours; assuredly the cruellest hours of my life". His account of the delivery of the ultimatum at Metaxas' house is very moving. With a few clipped words the Greek Head of State rejected Rome's hypocritical proposals and, as he accompanied Grazzi to the door, said to him: "Vous êtes les plus forts...". "I simply did not know what to say... In all my long career as a government official, I have never felt such an overwhelming disgust for my profession as I did at that moment; my duty was like a cross I had to bear, not only tormenting, but also humiliating; because these sorrowful words were spoken by a venerable old man who had spent his life fighting and suffering for his country... and because even at that supreme moment he chose the way of sacrifice for his homeland and not the path of dishonour. I bowed to him with the deepest respect and left his house"²⁷.

I have rather insisted on evaluating the information provided by Grazzi's memoirs for the following reasons:

a) Because it is provided by the most competent representative in Athens of Italy's foreign policy from April 1939 to 28 October 1940. He describes events through which he lived and in which he played, for the most part, a leading role; he describes them, moreover, in chronological order, without contradicting himself, clearly and with historical accuracy.

b) Because, since their publication in 1945, these memoirs have not been contested by anyone, neither by Italians nor, naturally enough, by Greeks. The various sources which have been published since 1945 have never controverted even the slightest detail of what Grazzi reports; on the contrary, they reinforce his views and consolidate his arguments. Consequently, the book's veracity, the authenticity of the appended documents and the cogency of his arguments are quite unimpeachable²⁸.

27. Grazzi, *op. cit.*, p. 239, 242-243, 245. Cf. also the same information (clearly inferior as regards accuracy, detail and descriptiveness) in Mondini, *Prologo*, p. 231-233, 237-245.

28. Mondini, *op. cit.*, p. 143-145, gives an interesting description of Grazzi. He presents him as a likeable person who was indubitably working for his coun-

c) Because no historical monograph, either Italian or Greek²⁹, has yet made exhaustive use of Grazzi's evidence in order to demonstrate on the one hand the pure intentions of Greece, as a strictly neutral country, and on the other the deceit and perfidy of Italy, as a great power which called forth great terror by its, albeit Pyrrhic, victories in France, Africa and Albania. Such evidence is of exceptional importance for the Greeks, coming as it does from the enemy camp, and indeed Grazzi himself repeated it all, with more precise clarifications, to a Greek journalist who met him and had an extensive discussion with him³⁰.

try's interests. The accusations made against Grazzi, in that case — i.e. that he was pro-Greek (cf. Grazzi, *op. cit.*, p. 121-122, 126 [de Vecchi's accusation], 181, 242), do not hold water. As far as Grazzi's reliability is concerned there is a slight problem, however. Ciano, *Diario*, p. 360, reports that Grazzi visited him on 8 November 1940 and assured him that Greece's domestic situation was very serious indeed and that her resistance would be virtually nil. He also told him that Metaxas had been prepared to give way to the Italian demands, but following a talk with the king, and after the intervention of the British ambassador, he had changed course. Grazzi, *op. cit.*, p. 256-257, gives a report, though without many details, of his meeting with Ciano, and mentions nothing of the above. But he does stress the fact that what he told Ciano was not always what Ciano conveyed to Mussolini over the telephone. I personally tend towards the view that Ciano does not give an accurate account of his conversation with Grazzi.

29. Various writers have undoubtedly taken Grazzi's memoirs into account, but I do not think that they have made satisfactory use of his information, nor linked it up with other sources. At all events, it should be noted, as far as the Greeks are concerned, that extracts from Grazzi's work are to be found in translation in the books produced by the Army History Division of the Greek General Staff: 'Ο ελληνικός στρατός κατά τον Δεύτερον Παγκόσμιον Πόλεμον. Αίτια και άφορμαί ελληνο-ιταλικού πολέμου 1940-1941 (The Greek Army During the Second World War. Grounds and Motives for the Greco-Italian War 1940-41), Athens 1959, p. 122, 164, 168; 'Ο ελληνοιταλικός πόλεμος 1940-1941. 'Η ιταλική εισβολή (28 'Οκτωβρίου μέχρι 13 Νοεμβρίου 1940) [The Greco-Italian War 1940-41. The Italian Invasion (28 October to 13 November 1940)], Athens 1960, p. 28-31. Cf. also Angelos Terzakīs, 'Ελληνική 'Εποποιία 1940-1941 (Greek Epopee 1940-41), Athens 1964, p. 18, 25, 37-38; Th. Ph. Papakonstantinos, 'Η μάχη τής Ελλάδος 1940-1941 (The Battle of Greece 1940-41), Athens 1966, p. 19-21, 38. Of the Italian books cf. M. Cervi, *op. cit.*, p. 15-16, 19, 23-25, 27, 32, 33, 34 etc., and the recent official publication of the Italian General Staff: Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito-Ufficio Storico (hereafter referred to as S.M.E.), *La Campagna di Grecia*, tomo I: Testo, Roma 1980, p. 11-96, in which Grazzi's memoirs are used here and there with reference to events preceding the hostilities; no reservations are expressed with regard to their authenticity, but nor, on the other hand, are they used sufficiently.

30. Cf. D. K. Svolopoulos' interview, «'Ο Γκράτσι άποκαλύπτει» (Grazzi Discloses), in the newspaper *Μακεδονία* 28.10.1971.

d) Finally, because Grazzi's memoirs point out Greece's great contribution after her victory, not only to the free world fighting against the Axis, but also to Italy herself. "That unfortunate and ignominious campaign against Greece", the Italian diplomat writes, "is a page of prime importance in the recent history of Italy", because the defeat of the Italian armed forces destroyed the Fascist prestige and opened the eyes of the Italian people, who had been so hypnotised by the Duce's arrogant bluster; and so soon afterwards they were able to react and to crush the Fascist régime³¹. I think there can be no greater moral satisfaction for Greece than for it to be acknowledged that in 1940-41 not only did she fight for home and religion, not only did she battle for the freedom of the western world, but she also offered inestimable service to her very enemies.

The memoirs of the military attaché to the Italian embassy in Athens, Colonel Luigi Mondini, are on a somewhat inferior level. They were published in Rome in March 1945 under the title *Prologue to the Greco-Italian Conflict*³². Mondini, who after the war wrote other studies of the military events of his time, and rose to the position of commandant of the Military Academy of Modena and in charge of the Publication's Office of the Military History of the Italian General Staff and attained the rank of general³³, was posted in Athens from August 1938 to 28 October 1940. As he himself affirms, he never kept a diary, and shortly before leaving Athens deemed it expedient to burn his office archive. He thus admits that his book was written on the basis of his memory alone³⁴. This makes me circumspect in accept-

31. Grazzi, *op. cit.*, p. 257-259. These are possibly the loveliest pages in the whole book.

32. L. Mondini, *Prologo del conflitto italo-greco*, F.lli Treves Editori, Roma 1945, 80, pp. 288.

33. Cf. Saggio bibliografico, *op. cit.*, p. 348-349, for an account of Mondini's published works. As a writer he is known in Greece from articles of his which were translated into Greek and published in six instalments in the newspaper 'Εμπρός, α'Ο Ιταλο-ελληνικός πόλεμος όπως τον είδαν οι 'Ιταλοί. Έκστρατεία κατά τῆς 'Ελλάδος: Μία τραγωδία (The Greco-Italian War as the Italians Saw It. The Campaign Against Greece: A Tragedy. Four Articles by the Italian general Luigi Mondini who was serving on 28 October 1940 as military attaché in Athens), 'Εμπρός 26.10.1974, p. 1, 9, 16; 2.11.1974, p. 9, 13; 9.11.1974, p. 9; 16.11.1974, p. 9; 23.11.1974, p. 9; 30.11.1974, p. 9. These articles examine the opposing forces and justify the Italian defeat with the argument that the Italian army was not fully armed and prepared for the attack (cf. below).

34. Mondini, *op. cit.*, p. 7, 9-10.

ing his version of events as accurate. As far as the structure of the book is concerned, one soon realises that approximately half of it is devoted to pointless digressions on the mentality and customs of the Greek people, the country's internal conditions, its position in international terms and its relations with the other Balkan countries and with Italy. All this is backed up by a most inadequate bibliography, while not only is the narrative characterised by a dryness of style exacerbated by the absence of any historical background, but the book also contains gross errors, if not outright lies, concerning situations and events on the Balkan peninsula, the truth of which is known from more authoritative works³⁵.

Mondini's entire book demonstrates a general absence of any critical facility for evaluating the information he discusses, it is full of puerile contradictions and untenable arguments³⁶ and reveals a general indifference towards apportioning any blame to Italy for her provocations against Greece³⁷. His basic error, however, is that he quite unjustifiably accuses Metaxas and Papagos of "playing a double game" — that is, of negotiating with Britain and France for the use of Greek territory while pretending strict neutrality to Italy³⁸.

35. Cf. e.g. his sophistry when he supports the Italians' occupation of the Dodecanese (Mondini, *op. cit.*, p. 62-63, with no mention whatever of de Vecchi's inconsistent activities, which worked to the detriment of the Italians also); his nonsensical, if not downright ridiculous, attempts to account for the Greeks' hatred of the Italians (p. 71-72); the unfounded accusations he levels at the Balkan countries with the charge that they were unjust to the Bulgarians during the Balkan Wars (p. 83-84, 87); his complete ignorance of historical facts, demonstrated when he maintains that the Greek language began to be spoken only after the 1821 Revolution! (p. 105). Also typical of this writer's mentality is the great pride he takes in the Italian conquests in Libya and Abyssinia (p. 72). His perception must have been too limited for him to realise the situations that lay behind events, which may have been due to the lack of an historical and classical education.

36. Cf. such instances on p. 161-162 (false arguments about the Italians' violations of Greek air-space and about the military songs); p. 212-214 (where Mondini complains that the system of mobilisation in Greece was so well organised that he did not realise what was going on. He concludes therefore that it is very difficult to come by the truth in Greece. Perhaps Mondini would have liked the Greek General Staff to send him the plans and explain the mobilisation system to him... It is amazing that an ambassadorial military attaché should think and write such things; he shows no trace of Grazi's subtlety, dignity, sincerity and diplomatic tact).

37. This is noticeable when he writes about the murder of Daut Hoggia (p. 206-208) or the torpedoing of the *Helle* (p. 209-210), as I pointed out earlier.

38. Mondini, *op. cit.*, p. 134-135, 253-255.

This grave accusation, according to Mondini, is based on the famous French documents discovered by the Germans in an abandoned wagon in June 1940 in the station of the small French town of Vitry La Charité, and published exactly a year later³⁹. But the contents of these documents — and their authenticity was in doubt from the very first — do not substantiate in any way an accusation of violation of Greece's neutrality. The relevant evidence, which is absolutely irrefutable, may be read in the memoirs not of a Greek, but of an Italian writer, Grazzi, who censures his former subordinate's views as absolutely groundless⁴⁰. It is significant indeed that throughout the war neither Germany nor Italy voiced any protest against Greece as a result of the information contained in the Charité documents⁴¹, and nor did historians consider them afterwards⁴².

Mondini's book, then, written with the aim of uncovering the supposed deceitfulness of the Greek government, is crushed by the weight of historical fact. Its usefulness is limited solely to its author's account of events he personally witnessed⁴³.

39. Mondini, *op. cit.*, p. 267-279.

40. Cf. Grazzi, *Il principio della fine*, p. 115-122. Cf. also p. 50 (where Grazzi corrects Mondini on another point) and p. 80 (where he rejects the allegations of the Greek government's "double game"). It should be noted that Mondini's book came out in March 1945, and Grazzi's in November 1945, which explains how the latter was able to take the former into account.

41. Mondini, too, admits this, *op. cit.*, p. 278. Cf. also Grazzi, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

42. It should be noted that M. Cervi, *Storia*, p. 26, refers to the Charité documents without attaching much importance to them. Nevertheless, he does not make use of Grazzi's very correct views. In the Greek translation of Cervi's book (*Ὁ ἑλληνο-ιταλικὸς πόλεμος*, Athens 1967, vol. 1, p. 38) no remarks are included about these documents from the Greek point of view. Later, in his speech on 18 November 1940, Mussolini was to invoke the Charité documents (cf. Cervi, p. 194, 460) in justification of the war against Greece. Twenty days previously, however, (on 28 October) nothing of this had been mentioned in the Italian ultimatum. The strangest thing is that on 19 October 1940 Mussolini vilified Greece in a letter to Hitler, mentioning the Charité documents, which, he said, had been sent to him by von Ribbentrop (cf. *I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani*, 9th series, vol. 5, Roma 1965, p. 721, no 753; Cervi, *op. cit.*, p. 428). Cf. too what the Greek General Staff has to say on the subject of these documents in *Αἰτία καὶ ἀφορμαὶ τοῦ ἑλληνο-ιταλικοῦ πολέμου 1940-1941* (Grounds and Motives for the Greco-Italian War 1940-41), Athens 1959, p. 163-164. Cf. also the complaints about the Charité documents expressed in the communication sent by Germany to the Greek embassy in Berlin (6 April 1941): Papakonstantinos, *Ἡ μάχη τῆς Ἑλλάδος* (The Battle of Greece), p. 378.

43. This sort of information has recently been drawn on by the Italian writer Cervi, *op. cit.*, p. 511 (index).

Ciano's diary, which covers the period from 10 June 1936 to 8 February 1943, is of incomparably greater value regarding the Second World War⁴⁴. It provides quite apocalyptic information about Italy's diplomatic machinations against Greece both before and after 28 October 1940: the preparations for the offensive, the changeable psychological condition of Mussolini, Ciano himself and the military leaders, the Fascist world's general evaluation of the situation — all is described concisely but vividly⁴⁵. The diary's essential evidence with regard to Greece before 28 October 1940 relates to two fundamental aspects:

a) Mussolini's displeasure, expressed on 11 May 1939, that Greece had accepted the Anglo-French guarantee⁴⁶. As we know, the Italians occupied Albania on 7 April 1939, which aroused lively concern in Greece. Then, on 13 April, the British and the French announced that they would guarantee Greece's territorial integrity. This was not at Greece's own request, though she could not reject this friendly gesture, which aroused suspicion in Italy nevertheless⁴⁷. And so Ciano justifies the coolness with which the Greek ambassador was received in Rome on 5 July 1939⁴⁸. On the other hand, however, it seems that

44. Ciano's diary aroused international interest both from a political and from an historical point of view. The Germans tried in vain to obtain the original from Ciano's wife, promising her her husband's release from Verona jail in exchange [cf. *Τὰ Ὑπὲρ καὶ τὰ Κατὰ Μουσσολίνι* (The Pros and Cons. Mussolini), p. 169]. The Americans were the first to publish the diary (New York 1946), followed by the Italians (Milano 1946), the French (*Journal politique*, vol. 1-2, Neuchâtel 1948), the Swiss (*Tagebücher 1939-1943*, second edition, Bern 1947). The most recent edition of the *Diario* came out in May 1980: Galeazzo Ciano, *Diario 1937-1943*, a cura di Renzo de Felice, Milano 1980 (Rizzoli Editore), 80, pp. 751. I refer here to the *edizione economica* (Rizzoli), vol. 1-2, second edition, Milano 1963.

45. The Greek reading public is familiar, through translations, with some extracts from Ciano's diary which concern Greece. Cf. e.g. extensive use of information provided by the diary in Th. Papakonstantinos, *Ἡ μάχη τῆς Ἑλλάδος* (The Battle of Greece), p. 29, 36, 37, 38, 39, 41-42, 42, 48, 67. Cf. also A. Terzakis, *Ἑλληνική Ἐποποιία* (Greek Epopee), p. 19, 25, 27, 29, and also G. Roussos, «Τὸ τραγικὸ πέρασμα τοῦ Μουσσολίνι ἀπὸ τὴν ἀλαζονεία στὴν ἀπόγνωση» (Mussolini's Tragic Passage from Arrogance to Despair), in the periodical *Ὁ Ταχυδρόμος* 27.10.1967, p. 32-33.

46. Ciano, *Diario*, vol. 1, p. 110.

47. Cf. Grazzi, *op. cit.*, p. 17, 52, for relevant details. Cf. also Pipinelis, *Ἱστορία τῆς ἐξωτερικῆς πολιτικῆς* (History of Greece's Foreign Policy), p. 294-295.

48. Ciano, *op. cit.*, p. 146. Cf. also the report by the Greek ambassador in Rome, dated 6.7.1939, in the Greek *Λευκὴ Βίβλος* (White Book), doc. n°. 44: republished

the rekindling of Greco-Italian relations in September 1939 stemmed from this very displeasure. On the 19th of that month Ciano wrote: "The talks between Grazzi and Metaxas, as I expected, have given good results. Tomorrow a preliminary announcement is to be made, which will arouse further censure for France and Britain. In fact, in the next few days a good many similar announcements are going to be given out"⁴⁹. In other words, Italy used her friendly overtures towards Greece, with Machiavellian cynicism, to detach her from the two great powers. And yet, both Grazzi and Metaxas sincerely believed in this Greco-Italian friendship⁵⁰.

b) Italy's military preparations near the Albanian-Greek border. Just one month after the occupation of Albania, on May 12 1939, Ciano wrote that "the entire road-building programme has been directed towards the Greek border. And this is by order of the Duce, who is thinking more and more of attacking Greece at the first opportunity"⁵¹. The events in Europe arising from the extension of the war occupy the Italian dictator's son-in-law more between May 1939 and August 1940. But in the summer of 1940 Mussolini's eyes were fixed unblinkingly on the Balkan peninsula; he thought of it as his own particular fief and was very much afraid that the Germans would take it from him. On 6 August he talked of nothing but an offensive against Yugoslavia⁵², and between 10 and 12 August we see him menacing the Greeks, with whom he has had some unfinished business ever since 1923 (the matter of Corfu), and making a detailed plan for a surprise attack on Epirus⁵³. He postponed this plan after pressure from the Germans, according to Ciano⁵⁴.

in the recent work, *Σαράντα χρόνια αργότερα* (Forty Years Later), Athens ("Estia") 1980, p. 42-43.

49. Ciano, *op. cit.*, p. 190.

50. Grazzi, *op. cit.*, p. 70-78.

51. Ciano, *op. cit.*, p. 111.

52. Ciano, *op. cit.*, p. 334.

53. Ciano, *op. cit.*, p. 336-337.

54. Ciano, *op. cit.*, p. 339. The offensive against Greece was postponed owing to the impending Italian operation against the British in Egypt, and to the German campaign against Great Britain. In the instructions he gave on 22 August 1940 Mussolini proposed the deceleration of preparations in the Yugoslavian and Greek theatres of war and set new dates for the start of hostilities, i.e. 20 October, instead of 20 September, for the Yugoslavian front, and the end of September, instead of the end of August, for the Greek front. Cf. the document published in the series: *I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani* (ed. Ministero degli Affari Esteri), 9th series, vol.

On 8 October 1940 he was looking for a way of sending Italian forces to Romania⁵⁵, and when four days later, with no prior warning, he was informed that the Germans had established themselves in Romania, his fury was uncontrollable. He turned chiefly against his implacable ally Hitler, and in Ciano's diary we read his actual words: "Hitler is always presenting me with *faits accomplis*. This time I shall pay him back in his own coin, and he'll find out from the newspapers that I've occupied Greece. That will restore the balance". And further on he says emphatically: "I shall hand in my resignation as an Italian if anyone finds it difficult to fight the Greeks". And Ciano agrees: "Actually, I believe the operation to be useful and easy"⁵⁶. On 22 October he himself drew up the ultimatum. "Of course", he writes, "it's a document that cuts off all escape routes. They have to choose between occupation and attack. Grazzi is to deliver it to Metaxas at 2 a.m. on 28 October"⁵⁷. Ciano's words sound like the epitaph of the Fascist burlesque to our modern ears. Thousands of Italians were to pay with their lives for Mussolini's outburst of rage⁵⁸ and Ciano's amoral diplomacy.

Interesting details about Italy's policy towards Greece are also to be found in a collection of documents published in a weighty volume in 1965 by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The documents cover the period between 11 June and 28 October 1940⁵⁹, that is, from the day after Italy declared war on France and Britain up to the day the offensive was launched against Greece. Concerning these documents' significance with regard to Greece, I shall quote from the foreword the remarks of Mario Toscano, president of the publishing committee and former professor of International Relations at the University of Rome:

5, Roma 1965, p. 452-453, no 467. Cf. also *ibid.*, p. 454, no 469, the document in which Ciano, on the same day (22.8.40), announced Mussolini's decisions to the Governor of Albania, Fr. Jacomoni. Both documents have been re-published by M. Cervi, *Storia*, p. 397-398 (no 23, 24).

55. Ciano, *op. cit.*, p. 352.

56. Ciano, *op. cit.*, p. 353.

57. Ciano, *op. cit.*, p. 356.

58. The Italian General Staff's recent publication about the Greco-Italian war also attributes Italy's entry into the Second World War to the Duce's impetuous character, his efforts to exploit the situations arising out of Germany's victories, and his admiration for the impressive power of the German war machine: S.M.E., *La Campagna di Grecia*, v. 1, p. 30.

59. The next volume in the series, which will continue the documents from 28 October 1940 onwards, has not yet been published. See above for the exact details.

"As we all know, the campaign against Greece ended in total failure. This was due, as the published material confirms, to Mussolini's conviction, based on indications he received from his colleagues, that the campaign would be decided in the political rather than the military sector. The consequences of this error were so serious as to bring about Italy's complete subjection to Germany as far as the political and military direction of the war was concerned. But in addition to this, there is the enormous moral stigma left by having unjustly attacked a neighbouring country, which, though small, is rich in the noblest of political traditions. The publication of this material, apart from the usual historical aims, is intended particularly to emphasise the general condemnation of the offensive..."⁶⁰.

When one studies these documents, which directly or indirectly concern the Italian preparations for war against Greece⁶¹, one does indeed feel a genuine repugnance. The plans for the supposed uprising of the Tsamourian Albanians⁶², the instructions for the anti-Greek propaganda in the Albanian, and later in the Italian press⁶³, Mussolini's invitation to the King of Bulgaria to participate in the war against Greece, offering him in exchange right of access to the Aegean⁶⁴, fabrications invented by the Italians themselves to incriminate the Greek government and so justify the offensive⁶⁵ — all these typify a situation from which every trace of moral principles has quite vanished.

The best-known and most revelatory document is undoubtedly

60. *I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani*, p. X. On the same page one finds the assertion that this published material, too, is unable to answer fully the questions arising out of the problems of the Greco-Italian war.

61. There are approximately 50 documents altogether. Almost all of them have been re-published in Cervi's book, *op. cit.*, p. 377 et seq.

62. *I Documenti*, p. 424-425 (doc. 442 dated 17 August 1940) = Cervi, *op. cit.*, p. 392-394 (no 18). The Italian diplomatic documents form the chief basis for Hryssa Vayena's article, «Η Ιταλική πολιτική στην 'Αλβανία πριν από την έναρξη του ελληνο-ιταλικού πολέμου σε σχέση με το θέμα της Τσαμουριάς» (Italian Policy in Albania before the Start of the Greco-Italian War, in Connection with the Subject of Tsamouria), *Παράσπονδος* 19 (1977) 556-563.

63. *I Documenti*, *op. cit.*, p. 427 (doc. 445 dated 18 August 1940) = Cervi, *op. cit.*, p. 395 (no 20).

64. *I Documenti*, p. 712-713 (doc. 788 dated 16 October 1940) = Cervi, *op. cit.*, p. 424-425 (no 42). Cf. also the relevant document dated 17 October 1940 (*I Documenti*, p. 713), and the Bulgarian king's negative answer: *Ibid.*, p. 716-717 (doc. 746 dated 18 October 1940) = Cervi, *op. cit.*, p. 426-427 (no 44). For the Bulgarian point of view, cf. Pantelej Šterev's account of the political situation in Bulgaria at that time, in *Obšti Borbi na bălkarškija i grăckija narod sreštu hitlerofašistkata okupacija*, Sofija 1966, p. 40-50.

65. *I Documenti*, p. 747-748 (doc. 779 dated 23 October 1940) = Cervi, *op. cit.*, p. 442-443 (no 53).

the minutes of the meeting held on 15 October 1940 in Mussolini's office and involving the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ciano, the Chief of the General Staff, Badoglio, the Under-Secretary for War, Soddu, the Governor-General in Tirana, Jacomoni, the Deputy Chief of the Army General Staff, Roatta and the military commander in Albania, Visconti Prasca. In a euphoric atmosphere and with the confidence of the strong and undefeated, Mussolini decided on war with Greece and fixed the opening of hostilities for 26 October (later it was to be postponed to the 28th). "This campaign," he said, "has been maturing in my mind for a long time, for months now; since before we entered the war, even before the war was declared". His colleagues, with the exception of the prudent Badoglio, spoke with unrestrained optimism of success. Jacomoni averred that the Greek morale was very low. Visconti Prasca maintained that his soldiers' enthusiasm was unrestrained, their only sign of indiscipline stemming from their eagerness to hurl themselves into the fray at the first opportunity. The Greeks had no desire to fight, they had no arms nor suitable war-planes; the numerical ratio at the time was 70,000 Italians, not including the special divisions and the Albanians, to a mere 30,000 Greeks. Satisfied, the Duce summed up: "Offensive in Epirus, pressure on Thessaloniki, and then the march on Athens"⁶⁶.

66. The minutes of this famous meeting held on 15 October 1940 have been published repeatedly and were later commented on by the men who were present. Each attempted to clarify and mitigate his own position and to place responsibility on other shoulders. It is possibly the most widely discussed Italian historical document concerning the Albanian war. An initial publication of the document, though changed in various subtle details regarding the responsibility borne by Badoglio in particular, was undertaken by Mussolini himself (from June to August 1944): Benito Mussolini, *Il tempo del bastone e della carota. Storia di un anno (ottobre 1942 - settembre 1943)*, Milano 1966 (re-publication), p. 151-159. The minutes were published in full by the newspaper *Il Tempo* on 18 July 1944. After this, they were also published by Grazzi, *Il principio della fine*, p. 206-224 (together with an extensive commentary). Cf. also their publication in *Documenti*, op. cit., p. 699-705 (no 728) = Cervi, op. cit., p. 417-424 (no 41). Comments on the text are to be found in Pietro Badoglio, *L'Italia nella seconda guerra mondiale*, Verona 1946, p. 52-57. Mario Roatta, *Otto milioni di baionette*, Verona 1946, p. 122-130. Visconti Prasca, *Io ho aggredito la Grecia*, p. 61-70. Francesco Jacomoni, *La politica dell'Italia in Albania*, Rocca San Casciano 1965, p. 254-258. S.M.E., *La Campagna di Grecia*, vol. 1, p. 71-85 (including useful cross-references), vol. 2, p. 159-167. For a Greek translation of the document, see Th. Papakonstantinos, *Ἡ μάχη τῆς Ἑλλάδος* (The Battle of Greece), p. 348-349, and Mario Cervi, *Ὁ ἑλληνο-ιταλικὸς πόλεμος* (The Greco-Italian War), vol. 2, Athens 1967, p. 203-211.

These documents also give further proof of the credibility of Grazzi's memoirs⁶⁷. Francesco Jacomoni di San Savino, the Italian Governor-General in Tirana, would seem not to have been so honest. He devotes two chapters of his book, *Italy's Policy in Albania*, to Mussolini's policy towards Greece and the outbreak of the war⁶⁸. He is undoubtedly attempting to vindicate himself with regard to the intentions behind the information he provided. Moreover, he claims to believe that Italy was aiming at the annexation of Tsamouria only, which would include Preveza and Ioannina. In neither case is it likely that he is telling the truth. His information, as expressed in these documents, about Greece's political and military situation, does not correspond to the true facts; the most charitable view would consider it groundless, misleading and consequently dangerous⁶⁹. It is my opinion, then, that Jacomoni too contributed to the decision to go to war against Greece. And his notion that Italy intended only to annex Tsamouria and not to occupy the whole of Greece does not fit in with the reasoning behind Fascist policy and is quite unconvincing, as Mario Cervi has shown⁷⁰.

2. Testimonies of the Military

The information available about both the Greek and the Italian military operations is both plentiful and valuable⁷¹, and it is impos-

67. Cf. e.g. documents published by Grazzi and comprised, without changes, in *I Documenti*, p. 1-2 (doc. 8) = Grazzi, *op. cit.*, p. 109. *I Documenti*, p. 362 (n° 374). Cf. also Grazzi, *op. cit.*, p. 144-147. *I Documenti*, p. 394 (n° 410). Cf. also Grazzi, *op. cit.*, p. 171-172. *I Documenti*, p. 448 (n° 462). Cf. also Grazzi, *op. cit.*, p. 190-191, et al. In particular, cf. the document dated 25.10.1940: *I Documenti*, p. 751 (n° 785), which proves that Grazzi did in fact know nothing of the intrigue in Rome against Greece.

68. Cf. Francesco Jacomoni di San Savino, *La politica dell'Italia in Albania*, Rocca San Casciano 1965, p. 249-275.

69. Cf. e.g. the documents sent by Jacomoni to Ciano and Zenone Benini: *I Documenti*, p. 424-425 (doc. 442 dated 17 August 1940), p. 468-469 (doc. 483 dated 24.8.1940), p. 498-495 (doc. 509 dated 27.8.40), p. 616-617 (doc. 639 dated 24.9.40), p. 725-727 (doc. 755 dated 19.10.40), p. 734-736 (doc. 764 dated 21.10.40), p. 747-748 (doc. 779 dated 23.10.40). This evidence shows that Jacomoni's justifications, *op. cit.*, p. 258, 256, and claims that he bore no responsibility for the war in Albania must be considered quite untenable.

70. Cervi, *op. cit.*, p. 45-47. Cf. also Quirino Armellini, *Diario di guerra*, Cernusco sul Naviglio 1946, p. 106, 113 (= General Staff: *Αίτια και άποφαι ελληνο-ιταλικού πολέμου* (Grounds and Motives for the Greco-Italian War), p. 175-176).

71. For a brief account of the views of Italian soldiers about the events from

sible for me to quote all the sources. I shall simply confine myself to describing the attitude of the Italian officers and soldiers towards their adversary.

Let us begin with the higher Italian officers, and the highest-ranking of all, Pietro Badoglio, the Chief of the General Staff. On 16 October 1940, before the outbreak of the war, he assured Jacomoni that "the Greeks are good fighters. They proved it even in the last war with Turkey; they were beaten, but they fought very gallantly"⁷². Later, in his memoirs, he maintained that the Greek soldiers had made no friendly gestures, as Rome had vainly hoped they would. "And indeed," he writes, "rather than collaborating with us, the Greek forces in Epirus put up valiant resistance at Kalamas, unlike the Albanian soldiers, battalions of whom were amalgamated into some of our divisions and either proved disloyal and treacherous through acts of sabotage against us, or simply went over to the ranks of the Greeks. We were then obliged to withdraw the Albanian forces and partially disarm them"⁷³. Nevertheless, Jacomoni endeavoured to justify the Albanian desertions, without, however, convincing anyone⁷⁴.

The evidence provided by the commander of the Italian armed forces in Albania, General Sebastiano Visconti Prasca, is much more authentic. He held this position from June until 10 November 1940, and so it was he who organised the military manoeuvres in Albania and launched the offensive against Greece. His memoirs bear the characteristic title *I Attacked Greece* and were published immediately after the war in 1946⁷⁵. The book's content is for the most part accurate and supported by a rich volume of documents and statistical tables. The historical section of the Greek General Staff made good use of this information, using a strictly scientific methodology and the essential cross-references for its objective report of the events of the Italian invasion⁷⁶.

28.10. to 4.12.1940, cf. George Katsimitros, «Πώς είδαν οι Έταλοι τον πόλεμο με την Ελλάδα» (How the Italians Saw the War with Greece), *Ιστορία Εικονογραφημένη* n° 77 (November 1974) 54-63.

72. Jacomoni, *op. cit.*, p. 260.

73. P. Badoglio, *L'Italia nella seconda guerra mondiale*, p. 54.

74. Jacomoni, *op. cit.*, p. 269-270.

75. Sebastiano Visconti Prasca, *Io ho aggredito la Grecia*, Milano 1946 (Rizzoli Editore), 80, pp. 249.

76. General Staff, *Η Ιταλική εισβολή* (The Italian Invasion), Athens 1960, p. 6, 7, 64, 65, 68-69, 71, 76-77, 81, 85, 89-91, 95, 260-261, 267 et seq. On pp. 278-



However, with regard to the way in which the Italian general reports the facts, let me quote the following very sound comments from a recent Italian work: «Like many of the worst Italian generals, Visconti Prasca too was an effective writer of memoirs ... They make fascinating reading, packed as they are with malicious observations, controversial sallies, petty or scandalous background revelations, accusations and denigrations. No civilian could so effectively have demolished the General Staff and its environment, the men at the top of the Italian military machine. However, certainly without intending to do so and perhaps without even suspecting it, he also demolished himself. The book, though written in self-defence, does not succeed in covering up its author's colossal errors and irresponsibility»⁷⁷.

He harshly accuses Field-Marshal Badoglio, the Army Deputy Chief of Staff General Mario Roatta, the Under-Secretary for War and Deputy Leader of the Armed Forces General Ubaldo Soddu and the Air Chief of Staff General Francesco Pricolo of intriguing behind his back, of trying to ruin him, of showing indifference to the speedy dispatch of reinforcements, of not providing air-support in time and even of not having had the courage to contradict Mussolini and make him realise the disastrous deficiencies of the Italian army⁷⁸. In support solely of himself, he even goes so far as to maintain that in his battle plan against Epirus he would not change a single syllable, and that he would take on the whole operation again, if it were necessary of course, if only he could be sure that dark and treacherous deeds were not being hatched in the background, as was the case in October 1940⁷⁹. But this egoistic and dangerously optimistic⁸⁰ general speaks of his adversaries, the Greeks, with sincere admiration.

First of all, he mentions the excellent impression made upon him

281, 286-289, 302-305 interesting documents from Prasca's book are to be found in translation. Cf. also the recent re-publication in Greek of excerpts from them from the same book: Sebastiano Visconti Prasca, «Io ho aggredito la Grecia» (I attacked Greece), *Ἑπταετώνικη Ἐταιρεία*. Information bulletin, year 8, issue n° 62 (November 1981), p. 3-15.

77. Cervi, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

78. Visconti Prasca, *op. cit.*, p. VIII note 1, p. 16, 20, 47-52, 67, 68-69, 70, 151-153, 155-159, 162-163, 164-165.

79. Visconti Prasca, *op. cit.*, p. 170. Concerning the weaknesses of Prasca's plan cf. Terzakis, *Ἑλληνική Ἐποποιία* (Greek Epopee), p. 34-35.

80. Cf. opinions expressed in General Staff, *Ἡ Ἰταλική ἐισβολή* (The Italian Invasion), p. 2-3.

by the Greek officials he had come into contact with⁸¹. During the 1940 war, "concerning the Greeks' morale," he writes, "I was frequently asked, when I returned to Italy, if there were any truth in the rumour that some of the Greek generals had been 'bought', seduced by the jingle of coins like professional footballers, so that our enemies should put up no resistance to our advance. I cannot vouch for the truth of this, especially the bribery ... But if I had been told this before the war I should not have believed it. The Greek people, like all people, have their virtues and their vices, which correspond to the spirit and temperament of the Nation. However, it is a fact never to be doubted by anyone who knows Greece that 'a Greek never betrays either his country or his guest' "⁸².

Visconti Prasca goes on to compare, quite perceptively, the morale of the Greek and of the Italian soldiers, and I think he hits on the fundamental difference when he says: "The preparation of the combatants' morale is one of the duties of the leaders, as vital and proper as the duty of marshalling equipment and food. The soldiers should be led into battle to the beat of martial music and not to the sound of a funeral march. The Greeks' moral obligation to perform this moral action was of course easier than ours. We were fighting for a political matter which few understood or sympathised with, and we were impelled chiefly by a sense of duty. But our enemies were fighting in defence of their own homeland, and consequently their duty was the noblest and simplest a soldier could ever have; a duty to which not even the most indifferent fighters could raise objection"⁸³.

It should be noted that the lack of morale of the Italian soldiers in Albania did, in fact, particularly occupy the attention of the Fascist activists. On 22 February 1941 Piero Parini, the leader of the Albanian Fascist party in Tirana, attempted to investigate the causes

81. Visconti Prasca, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

82. Visconti Prasca, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

83. Visconti Prasca, *op. cit.*, p. 68. It should also be noted that immediately after the Greco-Italian war ended the Fascist organs attempted to minimise the morale of the Greek soldiers. In July 1941 a journalist somewhat lacking in critical ability published an article expressing completely untenable views, with no details or possible interpretation of the situations considered, and with the sole intention of serving the political line of the moment. This is why it ought to have no place in the Italians' serious and responsible bibliography. The article was written by G(ino) V(illa) S(anta), «Ricordi personali della Campagna Italo-Greca. Qualità militari del soldato ellenico e psicologia di massa», *Nazione Militare*, luglio 1941, p. 520-525.

of the Italians' fear and terror when they were propelled in the direction of the front line:

"It was true, unfortunately, that both large and small units seemed to have been struck by an unhealthy kind of melancholy fatalism and submission, which slowly increased as they approached the line of fire. This psychological state was largely due to the harsh and hostile environment and to the weather, for the Albanian landscape in winter is one of the most oppressive in the world, owing to the ceaseless rain, the inordinate amount of mud, the rivers, the overflowing torrents and the deserted roads. The country has few centres of habitation; the conditions of life are barely supportable; the people are little short of primitive; the mountains, valleys and plains, which our soldiers had to cross after they had disembarked in order to reach the front, arouse such a feeling of depression as to cause even the strongest character to despair. In this psychological state, a few days after landing, our soldiers were flung into bloody battle against an enemy transported by a sort of religious frenzy, ready to die without the slightest hesitation"(1)⁸⁴.

This sort of diagnosis and interpretation of his fear proves the Fascist world's inability to perceive the inner crisis of the ordinary Italian soldier, who was going into battle completely devoid of ideals.

It is a well-known fact that the Italians were fighting for an arrogant and extravagant notion, the creation of the Roman Empire of the Caesars; for an idea, that is, dating back to distant antiquity or the Middle Ages, an idea which was totally unrealistic in the middle of the XXth century. The Italian soldiers, with the exception of the praetorian Blackshirts, did not consider this idea to be worth sacrificing their lives for. They saw that they were soldiers in an unjust and ill-matched affair which verged on cowardice. Undoubtedly they fought for the simple reason that in battle, when life is in jeopardy, the blind, primitive urge for self-preservation is automatically aroused⁸⁵.

In a report sent from the front by a Greek journalist in February 1941, we read the following interesting account of the delicate subject of the Greeks' attitude to the Italian soldiers: "It would be a lie and an insult to the indomitable children of the Greek race who are fighting up here, to say that they are facing a non-combatant army. There is, of course, no lack of incidents witnessing to the enemy's cowardice and demonstrating his evasion tactics. But they are no more than incidents. Each one of our victories up to now has been the fruit of

84. S.M.E., *La Campagna di Grecia*, vol. 1, p. 611, vol. 2, p. 790-791, doc. n° 282.

85. Terzakis, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

superhuman efforts"⁸⁶. And General Katsimitros, commander of the 8th Division and winner of the Battle of Kalpaki, sincerely reports in his book *Ἡ Ἠπειρος Προμαχοῦσα (Epirus the Champion)* that "the Italian infantry, under able command, fought well, and the Italian soldier, particularly in defence and in good hands, was a very good fighter"⁸⁷. It was a fault on the part of the Greek authorities that they cultivated the impression at the time that the Italians were cowardly, ridiculous and insignificant adversaries. They fought doggedly to the limits of their endurance. But when the struggle demanded that they go beyond this, then the difference became plain between them and the Greek soldier with his moral supremacy⁸⁸. This, I think, is what Visconti Prasca means in the passage quoted above.

This explains the dispatches from Italian division commanders accusing their soldiers of desertion from the line of fire and unwarranted panic; the following circumstance was characteristic: "whenever patrols or enemy formations approach our lines exaggerated significance is attached to the event, the front is thrown into a state of confusion, and resistance (on the part of infantry and artillery) is passive, a fact which denotes an undeniable lack of initiative" (extract from a dispatch from the Siena Division dated 12 November 1940)⁸⁹. Even during the Italians' famous spring offensive (9-15 March 1941), when careful preparation and Mussolini's presence at the theatre of operations had raised the troops' morale, there were still serious instances of faint-heartedness, if not downright cowardice, on the part of the attackers: "On 9 and 10 of March," Camillo Mercalli, Commanding General of the 4th Army Corps, wrote bitterly on 14 March 1941, "I saw units — whole battalions even — for hours and even for days, despite con-

86. Papakonstantinos, *Ἡ μάχη τῆς Ἑλλάδος* (The Battle of Greece), p. 92.

87. Ch. Katsimitros, *Ἡ Ἠπειρος προμαχοῦσα. Ἡ δράσις τῆς VIII Μεραρχίας κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον 1940-1941* (Epirus the Champion. The Action of the VIII Division during the 1940-41 War), Athens 1954, p. 136. The objective report by the General Staff, *Χειμεριναὶ ἐπιχειρήσεις. Ἱταλικὴ ἐπίθεσις Μαρτίου* (Winter Operations. The Italian March Offensive), Athens 1966, p. 156-158, acknowledges the combative attitude of the Italian infantry, which, however, left much to be desired in its use of the territory and in its formations (which were usually compact) during the offensive. For the Italians' fighting condition, cf. also further Greek evidence in K. Triantaphyllou, *Ἀπόρρητα τοῦ πολέμου 1940* (Secrets of the 1940 War), p. 44-46.

88. Papakonstantinos, *op. cit.*, p. 89-91.

89. For the complete text see General Staff, *Ἡ Ἱταλικὴ εἰσβολὴ* (The Italian Invasion), p. 110.

stant and furious fire from our own artillery and infantry, advancing no more than a few metres and then being pinned to the ground. One particular infantry battalion preferred to stay under the deadly fire of the enemy mortars and to suffer extremely heavy losses, rather than take the single step forward which would not only have ensured the capture of the objective, but also have delivered them from such grievous and futile sacrifices. One is forced to the conclusion that *the will* is simply not there, or, even worse, that their *heart* is not in it. I cannot believe it, I do not want to believe it!..."⁹⁰. This, I think, is a profoundly disturbing testimony, given in an outburst of possibly involuntary self-criticism and frankness. These were not the first days of the conflict, nor yet was it the time of the Greek counter-offensive of November 1940. Some five months had passed since the start of the Greco-Italian war, and yet the Italian soldiers' conviction had remained almost at the same level as before.

But the attackers lacked something more: they were unable to identify religious feeling with nationalistic sentiments. This is a harmonious fusion of psychological states which has been particularly strong in the Greek people ever since the Turkish occupation. For the Greek, Homeland, Race, Nation and Orthodoxy are inseparable concepts, an insoluble compound. Which explains the vision the Greek army saw at night at the front: "a female form walking along, tall and slender, stepping lightly, her veil thrown back from her head onto her shoulders. He knew her, had always known her, they had sung about her to him when he was tiny and dreaming in the cradle. She was the Mother, noble in pain and in glory, the wounded woman of Tinos, the champion General"⁹¹.

The Greeks' first victories gave rise to a wave of international philhellenism, a fact which Visconti Prasca perceived very well and explained with candour in his memoirs: "This resistance (on the part of the Greek army) was greeted, as was only right, with demonstrations of enthusiasm in many countries, for Greece holds the fascination of her brilliant culture, the mother as she is of modern civilisation. As the war went on there was always the idea that it was a battle between the small and the large, and the spectators always take David's part and turn against Goliath"⁹².

90. S.M.E., *La Campagna di Grecia*, vol. 1, p. 688, vol. 2, p. 854-855, doc. n° 301.

91. Terzakis, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

92. Visconti Prasca, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

Besides Prasca, other Italian officials of the time also wrote and published memoirs. In 1946 Mario Roatta, the Army Deputy Chief of Staff, published a book entitled *Eight Million Bayonets. The Italian Army in the War from 1940 to 1944*. His self-confessed intention was to prove, amongst other things, that "the Italian army was forced to fight a war which the Nation did not want..."⁹³. More specific is the Air Chief of Staff Francesco Pricolo's book *Indolence Against Heroism. The Greco-Italian Episode. October 1940 - April 1941*⁹⁴. Here he attempts to vindicate and to make known those responsible for the Italian air force's wretched performance during the Greco-Italian war.

Another very useful volume is the diary of General Quirino Armellini, who was attached to the High Command of the Armed Forces for nine months. His diary covers the period between 11 March 1940 and 26 January 1941, i.e. the time which particularly concerns the Greek affair⁹⁵. This source permits us easily to observe the back-stage developments of the campaign against Greece in the military circles of Rome. Armellini shows himself to have been well-disposed towards Badoglio, but he deals severely with Ciano, Jacomoni, Visconti Prasca and Soddu, whom he holds responsible for the Italian failures in Albania, and whom he castigates for their optimism, their lack of seriousness and their failure to comprehend the reality of the situation. But the greatest responsibility is attributed to Mussolini, whom Armellini sees as a poker-player whose bluff has failed, as far as Greece is concerned⁹⁶. His insistence on carrying out in Greece the *Blitzkrieg* which the Germans had brought off in Poland showed him to be not only ridiculous but also dangerous. He would brook no opposition. "Everyone is right, everyone can see the problem", wrote Armellini on 9 No-

93. Mario Roatta, *Otto milioni di baionette. (L'esercito italiano in guerra dal 1940 al 1944)*, Verona 1946. Chapter six (p. 117-139) concerns the war against Greece. Very few events are described and in a heavy-handed fashion, and Roatta also attempts to justify the defeat — on the grounds that the Italian army was not fully prepared. Cf. also the Greek translation of an interesting report by Roatta in the General Staff's, *Αίτια και ἀφορμαί τοῦ ἑλληνο-ιταλικοῦ πολέμου 1940-1941* (Grounds and Motives for the Greco-Italian War 1940-1941), p. 180-188.

94. Francesco Pricolo, *Ignavia contro eroismo. (L'avventura italo-greca. Ottobre 1940 - Aprile 1941)*, Roma 1946, pp. 144. Cf. also excerpts from Pricolo's book translated into Greek: General Staff, *Αίτια και ἀφορμαί* (Grounds and Motives), p. 177-180.

95. Quirino Armellini, *Diario di guerra. Nove mesi al Comando Supremo*, Cernusco sul Naviglio 1946 (ed. Garzanti), pp. 308.

96. Armellini, *op. cit.*, p. 138 (7 November 1940).

vember 1940, "but no-one is able to change things. All we can do is hope that God will get him out of the way, since no mortal is prepared to take on the task"⁹⁷.

The Greek army's initial successes were sufficient to make the Duce's immediate colleagues devoutly wish for his death. Moreover, the intellectuals⁹⁸ and the industrial and the merchant classes' disapproval of the war with Greece began to make itself felt and to increase throughout Italy⁹⁹. The Duce was to vilify Jacomoni and Visconti Prasca openly¹⁰⁰, to replace the latter with Soddu, even to turn against his son-in-law Ciano, because "he gave him inaccurate information"¹⁰¹. On December 4 Soddu telephoned from Albania to say that military action was now impossible on the Greek front and that the only solution was political intervention. It was as though the general had thrown down his arms before his soldiers had, commented Ciano¹⁰². But what sort of successes could a general like Soddu achieve, a man who even in Albania spent his evenings composing music for films? (This information from Ciano's diary)¹⁰³. In the final analysis, Armellini concludes,

97. Armellini, *op. cit.*, p. 145-146 (9 November 1940).

98. Compare Petros Haris's account of the Greek intellectuals' united consciousness and their activities in «'Η 28η 'Οκτωβρίου 1940 καὶ ὁ κόσμος τοῦ πνεύματος» (The 28 October 1940 and the Intellectual World) (a speech), *Athenian Academy Records* 44 (1969), p. 42*-65*. Cf. also the speeches made by various academicians in the volume of collected works entitled *Παθηρυκοὶ λόγοι ἀκαδημαϊκῶν γιὰ τὴν 28η 'Οκτωβρίου 1940* (Panegyric Speeches for the 28 October 1940), collected by Petros Haris, Athens 1978 (ed. Athenian Academy, Kostas and Eleni Ouranis Foundation, n° 5), 80, pp. 608 (P. Haris's speech on pp. 460-484). One may also evaluate the contribution made by Greek literary writings by reading Glykeria Protopapa-Bouboulidou's detailed work, *Πεζογραφικὰ κείμενα τοῦ πολέμου καὶ τῆς κατοχῆς* (Literary Texts of the War and the Occupation), Ioannina (University ed.) 1974, 8°, pp. 216.

99. Armellini, *op. cit.*, p. 169 (24 November 1940).

100. Ciano, *Diario*, vol. 1, p. 360 (9 November 1940).

101. Ciano, *op. cit.*, p. 363 (14 November 1940). Cf. also Armellini, *op. cit.*, p. 188 (4 December 1940).

102. Ciano, *op. cit.*, p. 371 (4 December 1940).

103. Ciano, *op. cit.*, p. 381 (30 December 1940). An extract from a letter from an Alpini lieutenant to a colleague chiefly concerns Soddu: "You know, one day they sent one of the top brass from Rome to see if he could do the job better; well, do you know what he did? In the evenings he'd sit at the piano composing little songs, while everything went to pieces around him. The guards and the waiters saw and heard him and they told us. It soon got around. You can imagine what sort of thing a reputation like that led to": B. Bellomo, *Lettere censurate*, Milano 1975, p. 146 (concerning this book see below).

the war had been reduced to the level of an operetta¹⁰⁴.

Soddu was also to be replaced, on 30 December 1940, by Marshal Ugo Cavallero, Chief of the General Staff, successor to Badoglio after the latter's resignation. It was the penultimate day of 1940, when Mussolini was giving serious thought to a remark from a speech by Roosevelt: peace will not be imposed by the Axis. Meaning that an acceptable peace would not be imposed by force but would be the result of negotiations. And Mussolini was to conclude, addressing himself to his Minister for Education, Giuseppe Bottai: "When all's said and done, we shan't be beaten. And do you know why? Because neither Germany nor Italy can be invaded». And Bottai's moral: «The year is ending with the password for imminent failure: we've moved from 'we shall win' (vinceremo) to 'we shan't be beaten' »¹⁰⁵.

Cavallero, then, took great pains to keep a really quite detailed diary, which is of great help to historians today. The events it covers begin in December 1940 and end on 31 January 1943¹⁰⁶. The first part deals with the Greco-Italian war and comprises what he remembers of the events between 1 December 1940 and 30 April 1941¹⁰⁷. Cavallero's narrative is simple and dry, without lengthy comments and criticisms. It certainly contains a great many of his conversations with the leaders of the military units and gives a satisfactorily detailed account of the atmosphere created by the Duce's presence at the spring offensive in March 1941. But it is worth noting that Cavallero makes a considerable attempt to mitigate the impression left by the failure of the offensive. Not so Mussolini, who, enraged by the Greeks' spirited defence, railed long against his generals. "... I perceive", he told them, "with what clear foresight Napoleon chose his generals from amongst

104. Armellini, *op. cit.*, p. 228 (21 December 1940).

105. Giuseppe Bottai, *Vent'anni e un giorno (24 luglio 1943)*, Cernusco sul Naviglio 1949 (ed. Garzanti), p. 198.

106. Ugo Cavallero, *Comando Supremo. Diario 1940-43 del Capo de S.M.G.*, Rocca S. Casciano 1948 (Editore Cappelli), 80, pp. XXVIII+464. Satisfactory use has been made of this source too on the Greek side; cf. General Staff, *Χειμερινὰ ἔπιχειρήσεις. Ἱταλικὴ ἐπίθεσις Μαγρίτου (7 Ἰανουαρίου - 26 Μαρτίου 1941)* [Winter Operations. The Italian March Offensive (7 January - 26 March 1941)], Athens 1966, p. 44, 45, 46, 64, 90, 95, 110 (where use is made of U. Cavallero's Archivio Segreto, which was published in the periodical *L'Europeo* on 17 February 1957; cf. also p. 218-215).

107. Cavallero, *op. cit.*, p. 7-91. Cavallero's evidence about the Italians' spring offensive are more valuable, because Ciano's diary has no entries between 27 January and 23 April 1941 (cf. Ciano, *Diario*, vol. 2, p. 20).

the corporals and the sergeants. A general's job is not just like any job. It is an art, a vocation. I should have got the soldiers to elect their generals vocally, as they used to do in the Roman Empire. A good many generals, these days, clinging limpet-like to their career, bear their sabres like desk-clerks, buried in their warm offices with their sleeves rolled up"¹⁰⁸. In a further outburst of rage the Italian dictator was also to rail against his army in general: "The Greek campaign was organised in the political sector in a masterly fashion. It was the army that was entirely at fault"¹⁰⁹.

But undoubtedly the most important source for the subject that concerns us was published recently in Italy; it is the monumental three - volume work produced by the Italian General Staff, entitled *The War Against Greece*¹¹⁰. I have already made intermittent use of it, but I shall now point out its importance with particular emphasis on its most valuable aspects in combination with other sources of information.

a) It ensures the possibility of an objective comparison and contrast between Greek and Italian sources of evidence. It is a well - known fact that the Greek General Staff has publicised its position with regard to the Greco-Italian war by producing five volumes since 1959¹¹¹, in the form of an historical account accompanied by documents and making use too of the available Italian books on the subject. The official Italian publication now comes to fill a great gap which neither specialist historians nor military experts had previously been able to bridge. The military experts especially, and with some ease, will now be

108. Cf. the extract in Gian Carlo Fusco, *Guerra d'Albania*, Milano 1961, p. 82. Cf. also Mussolini's speech in Rome on 23.2.1941, concerning the full responsibility borne by the generals: S.M.E., *La Campagna di Grecia*, vol. 1, p. 613 and 907 (here Carlo Geloso's criticism of the shortcomings of the military command units).

109. Paolo Monelli, *Mussolini piccolo borghese*, 3rd edition, Milano 1972 (Aldo Garzanti Ed.), p. 218-219.

110. S.M.E., *La Campagna di Grecia*, tomo I. Testo, Roma 1980, 8°, pp. 967. Tomo II. *Documenti*, Roma 1980, 8°, pp. 1027. Tomo III. *Schizzi e fotografie*, Roma 1980, 8°, pp. 269 (with 176 sketches and 51 photographs of the period).

111. General Staff, *Αίτια και άπορροαι έλληνο-ιταλικού πολέμου 1940-1941* (Grounds and Motives of the Greco-Italian War 1940-1941), Athens 1959. *Η ιταλική εισβολή* (The Italian Invasion), Athens 1960. *Η ελληνική άντεπίθεση* (The Greek Counter-offensive), Athens 1966. *Χειμώνας έπιχειρήσεις και ιταλική έπίθεση Μαρτίου* (Winter Operations and the Italian March Offensive), Athens 1966. *Τό τέλος μιας Έποποιίας* (The End of an Epopee), Athens 1959.

able to reach a much clearer interpretation of the specific events and errors in the theatre of operations. I must also emphasise that the compiler of the first volume, General Mario Montanari, in his notable endeavour to give a composite account of the Greco-Italian war, made use not only of the five volumes produced by the Greek General Staff, but also of the Greek White Book (in its French translation), and of A. Papagos' book *The Greek War* (in its Italian translation). So we have to acknowledge that the Italians did not ignore the Greek evidence, which is a noteworthy indication of their objectivity.

b) The Italian sources which are published in full or are used in part should be considered authentic and of vital importance. They are taken from the Italian General Staff's historical archives. Of particular interest are the 336 documents published in the second volume, not in chronological order but according to the order in which they are referred to in the first fourteen chapters of the first volume (the fifteenth and final chapter comprising the conclusions). This particular order is something of a drawback, as is the more serious absence of a table of abbreviations and an index of names and places in the first and second volumes. Most of the above-mentioned documents were hitherto unknown. They include reports by higher military officials on the situation in Albania, various plans of action for the operations on the Greek-Albanian front, the minutes of military meetings, dispatches concerning the disposition of the units, letters or instructions from Jacomoni, Ciano, Zenone Benini (the Under-Secretary of State for Albanian Affairs), Visconti Prasca, Soddu, Cavallero, Pricolo and other generals and commanders of the various divisions, estimates and calculations from the Commissariat, etc. The historical diaries of the Supreme Command of the Army, the High Command of the Armed Forces of Italy and Albania, the Military Commissariat, the 9th and 11th Armies and their dependent large units, the 14th and 17th Army Corps, and the reports from the commanders of large units were all utilised in the course of the compilation. In other words, we have here a rich mine of information ready to be excavated, which will provide plentiful material for future specialised studies.

c) Volume 1 (the compilatory section of the work) is distinguished by a scientific exactness upon which the interpretation of facts hinges; facts being Italy's inadequate political preparation for the war against Greece, accompanied by military inadequacy in terms of both men and equipment, while Albania's unpleasant climatological conditions

(mud, cold, snow) multiplied all the problems¹¹². The reasons for the defeat are investigated systematically. Badoglio's serious misgivings about the chances for the success of an offensive against Greece are mentioned¹¹³; the disintegration of the Italian army, with the constant dismissals and short-lived recruitments of 1940 are put forward¹¹⁴; the trials and tribulations of bureaucracy¹¹⁵, the lack of experienced junior and senior officers¹¹⁶, the disorganisation of the units by the enforcement of the so-called double division (comprising two, rather than three, infantry regiments)¹¹⁷, the brief period of service and the soldiers' inadequate training¹¹⁸, the imperfect system of producing officers and supplementary staff¹¹⁹, the deficient organisation of transportation and of the Commissariat¹²⁰ — all these aspects are underlined. The work also points out the great responsibility attributable to the three supreme commanders of the Italian units in Albania, Visconti Prasca, Soddu and Cavallero, who had all led brilliant military careers¹²¹.

Even the shortcomings of the Italian soldier are contrasted with relative frankness with the qualities of the Greek soldier during the critical time of the offensive: "When our artillery fire slowly withdrew and the response of the enemy fire began, the infantry, instead of de-

112. S.M.E., *La Campagna di Grecia*, vol. 1, p. 7 (with a foreword by the Director of the Army History Department of the Italian General Staff).

113. *Ibid.*, p. 21-23, 32, 86-88, 92 (concerning Badoglio's passive attitude towards Mussolini). The objections of Badoglio and the generals commanding the various arms to the opening of hostilities, as expressed on 17-18.10.1940, brought down thunderbolts from Mussolini at the Great Fascist Council of 19.10.1940: "In 1940 we've got the soldiers we want. But not the generals. The soldiers are aggressive, they're in the mood for fighting. But the same cannot be said of the generals, who are intent on making the enemy seem more significant than he really is. Of course, we mustn't underestimate the enemy — but nor should we exaggerate his real worth. The generals do not want war. They always wait for everything to be solved — and this is the formula they use — 'in the political sector'. Well, *we'll* think about the politics; *they* can fight the war" (from Giuseppe Bottai's diary, *Vent'anni e un giorno (24 luglio 1943)*, p. 192).

114. S.M.E., *op. cit.*, p. 68-70, 925-928.

115. *Ibid.*, p. 909-910.

116. *Ibid.*, p. 67, 908, 909.

117. *Ibid.*, p. 911-925.

118. *Ibid.*, p. 929-931, 935.

119. *Ibid.*, p. 934-935.

120. *Ibid.*, p. 937-938.

121. *Ibid.*, p. 900-904.

ploying, advancing and exploiting all the possibilities of its weapons, clustered together and submitted to an extremely dangerous state of mind: the mentality of fatalism, weakness and mass submission. On the contrary, the Greek soldier, aggressive, bold, persistent, strong in his own ideology and certainly no richer in means than ourselves, very quickly asserted himself over our self-esteem, which unfortunately, on occasion, turned to fear"¹²².

This official publication of the Italian General Staff is particularly concerned with attempting to determine the ideals and the morale of the Italian soldier. Though I have already referred to this important matter above, I think it is worthwhile to give the authentic view of the historical section of the Italian army:

"Finally, it is not out of place to mention the feelings which reigned in the military sections. The fact that they had not really become fully conscious of the war can be attributed to general underestimation of the event, to the suddenness of the decision to commence hostilities and to the absence of any national differences which might have touched popular feeling or imagination. No doubt protest movements were aroused in Albania of some significance for the well-known irredentist question, but this was certainly not the case in Italy, and nor did the Fascist propaganda ever succeed in drumming up hatred for the Greeks. The great majority of the unit commanders, if not all of them, in invoking certain moral and psychological values were not impelled to do so by Mussolini's orders, but through a sense of 'duty' they attempted to explain as best they could the motives behind the conflict; during the course of the conflict itself they based their hopes decisively upon the (glorious) traditions of the corps or the regiment. It would perhaps be foolhardy to assert that such attempts were undertaken with exceptional eloquence. Re-reading dispatches or directives from some of the highest officials, one is faced with a jarring rhetoric, which, though characteristic of the situation, it must be confessed is still one of our most widely known traits. It would be unjust, however, to deny the brave conviction of the commanders, particularly those of the small units, under exceptionally difficult circumstances; the ordinary soldier always responded positively to his officer's orders, as long as he felt that his 'leader' was sharing in his own trials and tribulations. Nevertheless, an officer did not always turn out to be technically prepared to carry out his duties properly; and when it becomes clear that such an officer is not up to his rank, owing to psychological or physical weakness, the blame does not rest solely on his shoulders; the original fault is attributable to those who made the mistake of selecting him in the first place"¹²³.

But let us leave this work now, for to continue could lead to lengthy discussions of many of the areas it covers. The general conclusion one

122. *Ibid.*, p. 935-936.

123. *Ibid.*, p. 910-911.

reaches after examining the first, compilatory, volume is that the Italians, to a great extent quite unprepared with regard to both men and materials, were in too great a hurry to go to war to take into account the unfavourable geography and the wretched climatic conditions of the theatre of operations. Let me simply remind the reader that on 7 April 1939 the Greeks had not elaborated staff defence plans for the Albanian border and could not easily, without the fear of Italian misinterpretation, organise themselves on the Albanian side; that the road network in Northern, Albanian-occupied, Epirus was incomparably better than that of Southern, Greek Epirus; that the natural disposition of the mountains and the general geographical structure of the theatre of operations favoured the Italian offensive; that the Greeks' supplies were provided by most primitive means; that by the time the ordinary Greek soldier reached the front he had already walked 200-400 kms¹²⁴. But the Italian double division was as well supplied as the Greek treble division with mortars, divisional artillery and 75 and 100 mm guns¹²⁵. This information is not refuted in the Italian General Staff's official publication. Later on I shall use this source again to make a quantitative comparison of the opposing forces. However, I am bound to add here that serious staff errors were observed on the Greek side too, both before and after the start of hostilities; that there were shortages and unforgivable delays in the arming of the soldiers and the fortification of the Pindus and of the Epirus front; that there were tragic gaps in the disposition of the forces, particularly in the Pindus; that valuable time was lost in the exploitation of opportunities, thereby causing unjustifiable losses in human terms¹²⁶.

In addition to the official Italian views, there are also the *unofficial ones*, which sometimes give a more vivid and realistic impression

124. See Bernard Vernier's brief but comprehensive article, «Les opérations gréco-italiennes du 28 octobre 1940 au 20 avril 1941», *Revue d'histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale*, vol. 10, n° 38 (avril 1960) 15-36. The article is written according to the Greek point of view and is based on information given to the author by A. Papagos.

125. Alexandros Papagos, *Ο πόλεμος της Ελλάδος 1940-1941* (The Greek War 1940-1941), Athens 1945, p. 149 (comparative table).

126. Cf. details in General D. Katheriotis's (former Head of the General Staff) book, *Αι κυριώτεραι στρατηγικαί φάσεις του πολέμου 1940-41. Μελέτη επιτελική* (The Principal Strategic Phases of the 1940-41 War. Staff study), Athens 1946, pp. 186. Cf. also further evidence in K. N. Triantaphyllou, *Απόρρητα του Πολέμου 1940* (Secrets of the 1940 War), p. 64-69.

of the facts and help one to a truer interpretation of events. This is why I turned my research in the direction of the ordinary Italian conscript, the unknown soldier, the man who vainly fought against his fellow man. There is a collection of letters written by the Italian soldiers on the western front (in France), on the Greek-Albanian front and on the Russian front¹²⁷. Most of the letters are from Russia, where the Italians lived through frightful experiences; very few are from Albania. If we take into account that these letters were strictly censored, to the extent that before reaching their destination words and whole phrases had frequently been effaced¹²⁸, then of course we cannot maintain that they are an incontestable source from which to comprehend the opinions of the Italian soldiers¹²⁹. Still, certain facts can be gleaned from them. For instance, on 28 December 1940 a sergeant in the First Alpine Regiment wrote that rumours were flying around of a probable truce with Greece; "we're praying and hoping the rumours will turn out to be true"¹³⁰. Some are waiting for victory so that they can quietly go home¹³¹, others complain of the fleas¹³², some are expecting German assistance¹³³, others devote their whole letter to what they have to eat and what they dream of eating¹³⁴, and one, finally, asks his parents if their cow has calved yet, if it's a nice calf¹³⁵, etc.

But the letters which possibly never reached their destination through being held back by the censor are undoubtedly the most revelatory of the Italians' feelings about Mussolini and the war with Greece. The Italian postal censor has now decided, after so many years, to deal with the contents of thousands of letters from the war years and thereby make an enormous material contribution to history and social science. The censor, Bino Bellomo, was a university professor

127. Nuto Revelli, *L'ultimo fronte. Lettere di soldati caduti o dispersi nella seconda guerra mondiale*, Torino 1971, pp. 534 (Einaudi Editore).

128. N. Revelli, *op. cit.*, p. 77, 107, 108, 115 (here the writer of the letter asks the addressees not to write about politics or about anything else which might be subject to censorship).

129. Cf. also M. Cervi, *Storia*, p. 297-313, where soldiers' evidence has been collected in the form of memories, letters and diaries.

130. Revelli, *op. cit.*, p. 81, 82 (3 February 1941).

131. Revelli, *op. cit.*, p. 86, 49.

132. Revelli, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

133. Revelli, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

134. Revelli, *op. cit.*, p. 48, 49.

135. Revelli, *op. cit.*, p. 74, 75.

of political economics, and on 10 July 1940 was assigned to the military postal censorship office, and transferred in March 1942 to the military information service. During his time in the postal service he recorded the contents of some 100,000 letters, without noting the names of the senders, but keeping a note of only their function or their rank. Of the importance of his job, Bellomo writes: "My collection is the only one of its kind in Italy and will be of service to sociologists and psychologists and to all those who are interested in acquiring more information about the Second World War".

With particular regard to the war against Greece, after the Italians' first bloody defeats 26 out of every 100 letters were pessimistic. Here are some extracts, which give the general range of this pessimism:

"Now they're calling up more age-groups. We don't understand anything any more and what we hear is pretty bad. For the time being, while they're just handing us empty chatter, all we can do is trust in God" (from a letter to a soldier from relatives).

"At times like this you have to do what you can and not what you want. These are hard times. He (i.e. Mussolini) is up to his tricks again and seems so positive, but all we want is to go home" (from a letter from a soldier of the 23rd infantry regiment to a relative).

"To the Duce everything seems simple, but people are saying that this is a hard war and likely to go on for years and years. Let's hope not" (from a letter from a civilian to a soldier).

"For some time now actions have been speaking louder than words. Meanwhile, they've reduced our wages from three liras a day to one, and everyone's fed up about it. But that doesn't bother us all that much. All the men who come back off leave say the villages seem dead, there are no people. Let's hope things will be as the Duce promised us; he's made us a lot of promises and so far everything's gone wrong" (from a letter from an artillery soldier to a relative).

Following the Greeks' aggressive invasion of Albania, the letters expressing optimism about the situation and the outcome of the war number no more than five in every thousand (0.5%). This optimism is quite emphatic, however. Even when Mussolini declared on 18 November 1940 that he was going to break Greece's back, still there were optimists in the Party. But the Italians' reactions were growing more serious. The Italian dictator's authority continued to decrease. Visconti Prasca reports that even Mussolini himself was seized by feelings of pessimism, and to him is attributed the descriptive phrase, "the boat's

leaking"¹⁸⁶. British propaganda in Rome put about disquieting announcements, in which, however, the Italian General Staff played a part. Someone wrote that the Greeks were fishing Italian soldiers' bodies out of the rivers with nets, at which point precautionary censorship was imposed on the news and articles transmitted from abroad.

From the Italians' letters we are able to understand the feelings aroused in them by Mussolini's declaration that he would break Greece's back. "I believe," we read in a letter addressed to a captain in the 26th machine - gun battalion, "that you didn't manage to hear the Duce's speech. He's absolutely certain of victory and seems to think time of no consequence, two months or two years, it's all the same... It's nice, after the blows we've suffered, that such certitude can exist. Meanwhile, our own backs been broken. If we can hope in anything now it's in Divine Intervention". "And he talks about breaking backs" (a relative writes to a man in the artillery). "Meanwhile, even the bare necessities aren't to be found in the warehouses. The upper classes live on exorbitant words, on plenty of illusions and on the ostentatious medals they wear on their proud unsullied chests. They see victory, they see empire, glory, and they dream of riches, which some of them are grabbing in advance". "Who reads the newspapers?" (writes a civilian in a letter to a cavalry officer of the Savoia Cavalleria). "And it's better not to listen to the radio if you don't want your blood poisoned. And as for the Duce whom we once idolised, he seems outside reality now. They've had to call up men from the 1915 age - group. They drew lots and set off weeping for Albania. Everything's hasty and ill - considered. Everything's useless. And then what? The 1914 age - group discharged. Our thoughts are black. We feel humiliated knowing the war won't end unless the Germans come and help us. But then it'll be Hitler who wins the war. And so, whether we win or lose, either way we're beaten already".

The soldiers' impressions of Mussolini's visit to Albania in March 1941, to observe the famous spring offensive, are disconcerting. Here a gunner writes to his family about his feelings: "The Duce has come to visit the front. 'Are you proud to be fighting?' he asked us. 'Yes, Duce', we answered. And he added, 'Bear up, spring will soon be here and the Greeks are going to feel awful'. At the moment it's us who are feeling awful". And another testimony: "When he got out of his car they told us to shout 'Long live the Duce'; and so we did, some

186. Visconti Prasca, *op. cit.*, p. 127, note 1. Cf. also Bottai's evidence above.

from the heart and others to avoid getting into trouble. We could see our superiors watching us out of the corners of their eyes... Some of the chaps gave us a wink and shouted, 'We're going to win, Duce'. And he shouted loudly back, 'We certainly are'. We gave back a hearty 'Hooray', but later on we found out that the little group who had shouted 'We're going to win, Duce' had only been being sarcastic. The Duce never realised..." (from a letter from an Engineer serving in the 13th Army Corps, to his family)¹³⁷.

During Mussolini's visit to Albania General Pricolo managed to discern the Italian soldiers' reaction amidst the applause and cheering they had been directed to perform. His information is, I think, credible. The incident he describes is as follows:

"Amongst the hundreds of cheering soldiers one caught my attention who had been left behind alone half-way down the road and was calmly carrying on eating. He did not strike me as being particularly young; he was quite heavily built and with a neglected beard. As he brought his spoon to his mouth he would raise his eyes to his excited fellow-soldiers, and now and then his hand would hover over his mess-tin as he watched dumbfounded the scene which was clearly meaningless to him. At one moment he realised that I was sitting watching him with some curiosity. He carried on eating for a while, then began moving slowly backwards and I lost sight of him as he disappeared into the bushes"¹³⁸.

137. All the above information and the extracts from letters are taken from a forerunner of Bino Bellomo's book by a journalist named Aldo Santini. The latter's article, entitled "Letters and Censorship" was translated into Greek and appeared in the newspaper *Θεσσαλονίκη* on 28.6.1972. Bellomo's book came out in 1975: Bino Bellomo, *Lettere censurate. 1940-42: Pottosità del potere si scatena sulla corrispondenza tra soldati e civili*, Milano (Longanesi e C.) 1975, 16°, pp. 201. For the Italian originals of the extracts quoted, see pp. 60-61, 63-64, 65-66. A great many more letters (e.g. p. 56, 57, 58, 59, 71, 76-78, 84-87, 92-96, 133-137) provide shocking information about the tragic times endured by the Italian people, both military and civilian. The civilians, because of the senseless war, suffered from hunger, poor clothing, frostbite and the arrogant attitude of the Fascist Party officials. Rage, indignation, irony and sarcasm are frequent characteristics of these letters written by soldiers and civilians alike. It should be noted, however, that Bellomo's classification of the letters in his notable book — various groups being, e.g. relations between soldiers and officers, Fascist propaganda, love for the homeland and hatred of the enemy, adoration of and faith in Mussolini, corruption and disorganisation within the army, the civilians' trials and tribulations, difficulties on the Libyan front, blows from the Greek front, the Fascist leaders' quarrels, the resistance in the Balkans, deceptions from the Russian front — is more of a hindrance than a help to our particular subject. One has to flick through a great deal of the book in order to pinpoint the various testimonies from soldiers serving on the Greek front.

138. Francesco Pricolo, *Ignavia contro eroismo*, p. 122. Cf. also Cervi, *op. cit.*, p. 281.

In view of the above evidence, it seems to me that the large number of Italians taken prisoner can easily be explained. And so, what Ciano wrote in his diary on 11 January 1941 is not inexplicable: "Our forces, even the newcomers, bear up as long as the Greeks apply no pressure. But in conflict they give way, and very quickly at that. Why? Mussolini finds the whole situation an inexplicable tragedy, and all the more serious for being inexplicable"¹³⁹.

By the end of the war more than 23,000 Italian soldiers had been taken prisoner, and the majority of these POWs had friendly feelings towards their enemies. Indeed, it frequently happened that, having been settled in POW camps, their spirits would quickly rise again, and they would soon be singing, laughing and joking. No case of an Italian POW escaping was ever recorded, nor were there any instances of indiscipline. In any event, the Greeks treated the captured Italians with every display of humanity¹⁴⁰. Eleftherios Eimarmenos (pseudonym of John Vorres) gives a moving account in this respect in his book *Greece in the Albanian Mountains*¹⁴¹. And even today many Italians who were taken prisoner in Greece still retain the fondest memories of the country, as I have myself ascertained in conversations with them; and many, if they have not already done so, express the desire to return to the same places and spend their holidays here (cf. below).

The Italian soldiers paid the Greek soldiers back in the same coin of their own humane behaviour when, later, with the help of their German allies, they became the occupiers of the country which had beaten them. It is worth noting the incident recounted in an Italian book¹⁴², in which, rather splendidly I think, the humane attitude of an ordinary Italian soldier is contrasted with the inhuman discipline of the German Nazi in the face of the misery and hunger of two little Epirot children.

When, after the surrender of the Greek army, the Italians crossed the Greek - Albanian border and were confronted with the letter E scratched on the rock in token of the fact that from that point onwards the ground belonged to Greece (Ἑλλάδα), they realised what

139. Ciano, *Diario*, vol. 2, p. 18.

140. Papakostasinos, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

141. Eleftherios Eimarmenos, *Ἡ Ἑλλάς σὰν βουνὸ τῆς Ἀλβανίας. (Ἀφήγησις, συζητήσεις καὶ σκέψεις)* [Greece in the Albanian Mountains. (Narrative, conversations and thoughts)], Athens 1945, p. 134-142.

142. Gian Carlo Fusco, *Guerra d'Albania*, p. 93-95.

sort of a people they were fighting. "Greece," writes one Alpini, "a name which we have always had within us, bound with that ancient civilisation in which we feel ourselves to be participants even today. Perhaps the Romans felt the same way the day they first set foot there. Which is why it may be that in this war we are not confronting enemies but simply warriors". Another Alpini stopped in the middle of the road and in a stentorian voice addressed the ground on which he was treading: "Hail, O land of Homer, Pindar, Sophocles, Aristotle. Hail, motherland of eternal beauty, of beautiful temples, of marble columns. Hail thou who bore those noble spirits, creators of a great civilisation! Forgive us who dare to violate thee with our iron-shod feet and disturb the sleep of those immortal souls"¹⁴³.

It is worth noting at this point that some three months after the German-Italian occupation of Greece, the Greeks' admiration for the German discipline and military supremacy, on the one hand, and their scorn and abhorrence for the Italians, on the other, gave place to precisely the opposite sentiments. The discreet behaviour of the Italian officers, and the ordinary Italian soldier's generosity, forbearance and benevolent disposition aroused the esteem of common Greek opinion. As Angelo Giuseppe Roncalli, the Vatican's apostolic vicar in Greece (and later Pope John XXIII, †1963) stated in his report dated 24.7.1941 (Athens), in both Thessaloniki and the Greek capital people were hoping that the authority of the occupying forces would fall into Italian hands. There was widespread fear not only of German cruelty but also of the rumoured Bulgarian occupation of Thessaloniki¹⁴⁴.

But let us return to the early hours of 28 October 1940. The two armies fell to, with centuries of culture and civilisation behind them. The one side were obliged to carry out their duty; and their material superiority made them arrogant. The others were fewer in number, had fewer means, and consequently their victory was looked upon as nothing less than a miracle. But I, for one, must disagree with such a view. History in general, and Greek history in particular, is principally an applied science. It is not founded on metaphysics, but on one positive element which creates it: and that is the ideal. And this was precisely what the Italians lacked.

143. Giovanni Zanette, *Tempesta sulle alpi albanesi*, Milano 1967, p. 245-246.

144. See Roncalli's interesting document containing his impressions of Thessaloniki and Athens, in *Actes et Documents du Saint Siège relatifs à la Seconde Guerre Mondiale*, volume 5: *Le Saint Siège et la Guerre Mondiale, juillet 1941-octobre 1942*, Città del Vaticano 1969, p. 99-103, n° 19.

The general absence of ideals is indicated by the popular Italian songs which sprang spontaneously to the lips of the army in those days, expressing their feelings and desires. Here are the words of one of these songs, entitled *For Greece*:

"On 16 September — no-one was expecting it — the red notification [= call-up papers] — compelled us to leave. We set off from Udine — called in at Bari — and stepped ashore at Durazzo — Greece our destination. We must go — with sadness in our hearts — leaving our sweethearts — to fall in love with others. Marching along — a feather in his cap — a stout kit-bag on his back — that's the Alpini. The day will come — when we'll be singing like this — the tour of duty will be over — and we'll go rejoicing home"¹⁴⁵.

There is no sign of battle fury nor of a passionate desire for revenge, no trace of any ideal nor any notion of justice on behalf of which these Alpini are marching against Greece. Nor is there so much as a mention of *mare nostrum* or the Empire of the Caesars the Duce was dreaming of. Nothing recalls the romanticism and the sweet lyricism of the Fascist hymn "giovinezza, giovinezza, primavera di bellezza" (youth, youth, springtime of beauty). The young people in question were to be lamented in simple and inconsolable words by the very same Alpini of the hand-picked Julia Division, which was pitifully decimated in the Pindus¹⁴⁶. A mournful song about the Perati bridge gathers all their sorrow together: "On the Perati bridge — a black flag — it's in mourning for the Julia Division — going to war. It's in mourning for the Julia Division — going to war — the flower of youth — buried in the ground. Those who went — never came back — in the mountains of Greece — there they stayed ...". This song was later to be banned by Mussolini¹⁴⁷.

145. See the text in Pier Paolo Pasolini, *La poesia popolare italiana*, Milano 1960, p. 242. Cf. also Z. N. Tsirpanlis, «Ένα Ιταλικό βιβλίο για τον πόλεμο του 1940-41» (An Italian Book about the 1940-41 War), *Ἐποχές* issue n° 41 (September 1966), p. 273 (for the Italian text). Compare the derisive songs and the cartoons in particular, from the Greek point of view: D. Lazoyorgou-Ellinikou, *Κορόιδο Μουσολίνι* (Ridiculous Mussolini), Athens 1972.

146. For the activity of the Alpini in Albania, Greece and the Balkans in general, see Manlio Barilli, *Con gli Alpini del 6° in tutte le guerre*, Udine 1966, p. 249-400. For scenes from the everyday life of the soldiers of the Julia regiment, see Manlio Cecovini, *Ponte Perati. La Julia in Grecia*, Milano (Longanesi e C.) 1973, 160, pp. 283.

147. Pier Paolo Pasolini, *op. cit.*, p. 244. See also the periodical *Domenica del*

It would be an excellent idea, I think, to collect the Greek as well as the Italian military and civilian songs¹⁴⁸, and to make a comparative study of them all. The demotic Greek songs of 1940, to the best of my knowledge, are fairly numerous and preserve the structure and rhythm of the Klephtic songs of the Turkish occupation¹⁴⁹. But this field demands specialised research.

3. Journalistic evidence, chronicles, historical essays

The Italian works which appeared immediately after the war for the Greek-Albanian front naturally varied in style and approach from journalistic impressions and narratives in chronicle form to strictly documented treatises. To the first group belong those writers who, either from a distance or actually on the spot, in one way or another lived through the events.

In this category I might classify the brief chronicle of a young Alpini dispatch rider, Mario Rigoni Stern¹⁵⁰. His narrative is elegant and charming. He portrays the wretchedness of war as being due more to the difficulties caused by Albania's physical environment and climate than to the inhuman cruelty of the conflict in the front line. The book is also imbued with a scorn for the worthless Blackshirts and the fanatical representatives of the Fascist party in general. At one point one also comes across a brief, un-triumphant description of captured Greek prisoners: "They too were thin, their clothes in tatters;

Corriere of 15.5.1969. Cf. also the newspaper *Τὸ Βήμα* of 31.10.1973, p. 2, and 28.10.1978, p. 2 ('Αντίπαλοι τοῦ Ἀκροατῆ column).

148. Of considerable interest is a recent book by Pietro Cavallo and Pasquale Iaccio, *Vincere! Vincere! Vincere! Fascismo e società italiana nelle canzoni e nelle riviste di varietà. 1935-1943*, Roma (Editrice Iannua) 1981, 80, pp. 208.

149. For the Greek demotic songs of 28 October 1940 see K. S. Konstas, «Ἡ 28ῃ Ὀκτωβρίου στὴν αἰτωλικὴ δημοτικὴ ποίηση» (The 28 October in Aetolian Demotic Poetry), *Νέα Ἑστία*, 46 (1949) 1400-1404. Yeoryios Mihailidis-Nouaros, *Οἱ ἐθνικοὶ ἀγῶνες τοῦ 1912 καὶ τοῦ 1940 καὶ ἡ λαϊκὴ ποιητικὴ ψυχὴ* (The National Struggles of 1912 and 1940 and the Popular Poetic Spirit) (panegyric), Thessaloniki 1956, p. 16-20, 25-26. Cf. also Yannis Andrikopoulos, «Ἡ 28ῃ Ὀκτωβρίου στὴν ποίησή μας» (The 28 October in our Poetry), *Ἑλληνικὴ Δημοσυργία*, 6 (1950) 657-662. For songs from Chios concerning 1940 see S. Kavvadas, «Τραγούδια Χιώτικα» (Chiot Songs), *Περιοδικὸν τοῦ ἐν Χίῳ Συλλόγου Ἀγένητη*, 4 (1951), issue no 1-2, p. 117-118.

150. Mario Rigoni Stern, *Quota Albania*, Torino (ed. Einaudi) 1981 (2nd edition; the first edition came out in 1971), 160, pp. 158 (for the war in Albania see pp. 43-146).

they were covered in fleas and had long thick beards. But in their deep dark eyes, inside their silence, they had dignity"¹⁵¹.

Another little book, probably the best-written in this category, is by a journalist named Gian Carlo Fusco, *The Albanian War*¹⁵². Though the pages are few, they portray the trembling reality of the sorrowful and tragic days of the Greco-Italian war, bringing people and gestures to life with all their harshness in time of battle and all their humanity in time of the brotherhood of the nations. This little book certainly has not the completeness of later writings, but it nevertheless remains unsurpassed as an authentic testimony. In many respects it resembles a report by a special correspondent at the front. In its author's view, the Greco-Italian war for the Italians was a time of "stupidity, incompetence, senseless cruelty and pointless sacrifices"¹⁵³.

Another notable source lies in the testimonies to be found in articles published in various Italian newspapers or weekly periodicals dating from 1944 to 1949. They are articles by or interviews with ordinary soldiers who fought on the Greek front and stayed in Greece, either as POWs or as conquerors, and also the impressions and opinions of Italian statesmen or eminent Italian hellenists (such as the university professors Filippo Maria Pontani and Bruno Lavagnini), all dealing with Greek and Italian sentiments both during and after the war. These publications are positively imbued with a strong repugnance for the unjust war and an affinity for everything Greek¹⁵⁴.

The various writers of general works devote a good many pages to the offensive against Greece; Amedeo Tosti, in his book *The War Which Ought Not to Have Happened (June 1940 - September 1943)*¹⁵⁵; Edoardo Scala, in the tenth volume of the history of the Italian infantry¹⁵⁶; Giorgio Bocca, in his book *The Story of Italy in the Fascist War*

151. *Ibid.*, p. 98-99.

152. Gian Carlo Fusco, *Guerra d'Albania*, Milano 1961 (Editore Feltrinelli), 16°, pp. 122. This is chiefly a chronicle rather than a literary work. It was translated into Greek and published in 15 instalments in the newspaper *Θεσσαλονίκη*, on 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 October and 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12 November 1969.

153. Fusco, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

154. See the book entitled: *Grecia Moderna. Come sono i Greci. (Testimonianze e giudizi italiani)*, Roma aprile 1949 (stab. tip. de «Il Giornale d'Italia»), 80, pp. 80. It was published a cura dell'Ufficio Stampa della R. Legazione di Grecia in Italia (under J. Ghikas).

155. See Amedeo Tosti, *La guerra che non si doveva fare (giugno 1940 - settembre 1943)*, Roma 1945, p. 109-127.

156. Edoardo Scala, *Storia delle fanterie italiane*, vol. 10: *Le fanterie nella Se-*

1940-1943¹⁵⁷; Franco Catalano, in his comprehensive account of events in Italy from the first signs of the Fascist dictatorship up to the foundation of the Republic (1919-1948)¹⁵⁸ *et al.*

Of all the works in this category, Aldo Lualdi's book *Naked Before the Target*¹⁵⁹ deserves our attention most. It describes the heroism and the tragedy of the Italian soldiers at the various battle fronts of the Second World War and is based on the private diaries and letters of soldiers and on interviews Lualdi conducted with survivors. He gives particular significance to the Greco-Italian conflict (pp. 115-205), because he believes that Italy's great tragedy took place in the Albanian mountains, even more so than on the Russian front: "The war against Greece," he declares emphatically, "left a bloody reminder etched on the breast of every soldier who took part in it..."¹⁶⁰. Smoothly he takes us into the ranks of the first Italians to cross the Greek border on the morning of 28 October 1940 and outlines their agonising quest for the enemy. He follows the fortunes of every Italian section, not with heavy war terminology, but in a light literary tenor which does not seem to falsify the events. It seemed to me as I read this book that I could actually hear the breathless panting of the soldier in the front line. All the same, the author does not abstain from over-emphasising the fact that the Greek soldiers were better armed and more warmly dressed than the Italians¹⁶¹. Elsewhere, though, he frankly acknowledges that "the Greeks defend their land passionately, fight with super-human tenacity, though they are in no better circumstances than we are as far as the quantity and quality of weapons, ammunition, food and supplies are concerned. And yet they show no hatred; they fight humanely..."¹⁶².

conda Guerra Mondiale (ed. Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito-Ispettorato dell'Arma di Fanteria), Roma (offprint s.d.), p. 432-452 (the military events are described in a fairly summary fashion, no fresh information is supplied and the author shows himself most anxious to justify the defeat).

157. Giorgio Bocca, *Storia d'Italia nella guerra fascista 1940-1943*, Roma-Bari 1973 (Editori Laterza), vol. 1, p. 245-269, 286-302, vol. 2, p. 337-355.

158. Franco Catalano, *L'Italia dalla dittatura alla democrazia 1919-1948. Nuova edizione accresciuta*, vol. 1, Milano 1975 (Giorgio Feltrinelli Editore), p. 258-261 (for the war against Greece).

159. Aldo Lualdi, *Nudi alla meta*, Milano (Sugar Editore) 1965, 8°, pp. 387.

160. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

161. *Ibid.*, p. 129-130, 138.

162. *Ibid.*, p. 159.

There are also the books which are devoted exclusively to the Greco-Italian war and are based on memoirs, diaries, documents and other sources. In other words, we are moving gradually away from the personal aspect of the war in the direction of disinterested and objective historical research¹⁶³. Furthermore, most, if not all, of the protagonists on both sides are no longer alive. Mussolini, Ciano, Visconti Prasca, Soddu, Cavallero on the one hand, and Metaxas and Papagos on the other, are all dead. Every one of them left us his manuscripts, and the burden falls upon the historian, whether of the older or the younger generation, to use these papers and reconstruct the back-stage activities, the battles and the outcome of the war. It was from this perspective that the following books were written. One by Carlo Baudino, entitled *A Senseless War. The Campaign Against Greece*, was published in April 1965¹⁶⁴. The second is by the Milanese journalist and lawyer Mario Cervi and is entitled *Storia della Guerra di Grecia* (English title: *The Hollow Legions*). It was first published in August 1965, a second edition followed within five months (December 1965) and a third, paperback, edition came out in 1969. It has also been translated into Greek with a commentary by the Greek General Army Staff¹⁶⁵. Cervi's book is undoubtedly the most thorough

163. Valuable information, together with detailed tables and graphical representations of the Italian convoys and the transportation of the soldiers both before and during the hostilities in Albania, are to be found in the weighty tome of the Ufficio Storico della Marina Militare, *La Marina italiana nella Seconda Guerra Mondiale*, Volume IX. *La difesa del traffico con l'Albania, la Grecia e l'Egeo*, Roma 1965 (particularly pp. 13-96).

164. Carlo Baudino, *Una guerra assurda. La Campagna di Grecia*, Milano-Varese 1965 (ed. Cisalpino), 80, pp. 287. For a review of this work see Z. N. Tsirpanlis, «Ένα Ιταλικό βιβλίο για τον πόλεμο τοῦ 1940-41» (An Italian Book About the 1940-41 War), *Ἑποχές* 41 (September 1966), p. 271-273.

165. Mario Cervi, *Storia della guerra di Grecia*, Milano 1965 (Sugar Editore), pp. 519. The same book was re-published in Varese 1969 (Edit. Arnoldo Mondadori) pp. 384 with only seven of the 84 documents published in the first edition. A Greek translation (of the first Italian edition) was made by Yoryos Bolas in two volumes (pp. 301 + 295) with a foreword by N. K. Paparrodos, Athens 1967 (ed. Alvin Redman Hellas). I am compelled to point out that the Greek translation is not strictly faithful in many places. The book has also been translated into English: Mario Cervi, *The Hollow Legions. Mussolini's blunder in Greece, 1940-1941*. Translated from the Italian by Eric Mosbacher, London 1972 (Chatto and Windus), 8°, pp. XIV + 336 (of the documents only the report of the meeting held on 15.10.1940 is included). The Italian author has written other works in which he expresses the same views: Mario Cervi, «L'attacco alla Grecia apre un nuovo fronte», in the

and is written in a good-natured style, with no fanaticism, notwithstanding his barbs against Papagos and his severe criticism of Metaxas¹⁶⁶. Of course, the problem of objectivity is a difficult one¹⁶⁷ even today. It is impossible for the Greek or Italian historian not to be influenced by his feelings, even if he took no part in the war. The scars on the soldiers' bodies are ineradicable, memories live on, the wounded, now grey-haired, still relate their exploits. Cervi himself was an infantry officer in occupied Greece, and his wife is Greek.

A third historical work, *How we did not win the war against Greece, Facts and Coulisses*, is written by Jeanne Baghiou. Her book is addressed to the general public, and it is written with an understanding of Greek affairs, but with the proper critical view of the behavior of the Fascist leadership^{167a}.

4. Conclusions and comparisons

I do not think that there is anything to be achieved by my going

periodical *Storia illustrata* n° 147, vol. 24 (febbraio 1970), p. 149-162. Cf. also id., *Dove va la Grecia?*, Milano 1968, p. 83-87.

166. Cervi, *Storia* (ed. 1965), p. 9, 53, 132, 263, 266-267, 327, 330, 331, 332 (for Papagos), p. 14-15, 268-269 (for Metaxas). Compare what an opponent of the Metaxas dictatorship has to report about Papagos' military activities and Metaxas' policies: Panayotis Kanellopoulos, *Tà xρόνια τοῦ Μεγάλου Πολέμου 1939-1944. Ἱστορικὴ ἀναδρομὴ καὶ κείμενα* (The Years of the Great War 1939-1944. Historical retrospection and texts), second edition, Athens 1964, p. 19-24.

167. A characteristic example of subjectivism is to be found in an article by G(ino) V(illa) S(anta), «La fine della guerra e il convegno dei plenipotenziari», *Nazione Militare*, luglio 1941, p. 525-527, in which, with none of the essential details and with a certain measure of romanticism and narcissism, the author describes the first meeting between Greek and Italian officers in order to sign the armistice. It is quite typical, indeed, that nothing whatsoever is said in the article about the reasons for the end of the war (i.e. the Germans' salutary intervention on behalf of the Italians).

167a. Jeanne Baghiou, *Come non vincemmo la campagna di Grecia. Fatti e retroscena*, Milano 1971 (Giovanni De Vecchi editore), 80, pp. 224. It is informative and written in popular style. There is no mention of sources and nor is a bibliography provided. The author makes use of *Grazzi*, *Jacomoni*, the *Documenti Diplomatici Italiani*, and also *Cervi*. Part of the book deals with Greek history since 1821, in some cases inadequately (p. 7-88). The assumptions as far as the responsibility of the political and the military leadership of Italy is concerned and the outbreak of the war are correct (see pp. 107, 121-128, 163, 168). The author gives a personal touch to her narrative since she refers to her memories of the Italian occupation of Greece (pp. 214-217, 219).

into extensive and detailed criticisms. I shall confine myself simply to the basic conclusions I have reached through studying general and specialised historical works:

a) The Italian writers acknowledge that the war against Greece was unjust, futile and had no moral foundation whatsoever. This self-knowledge is undoubtedly most creditable.

b) Everyone acknowledges that the Greeks fought gallantly, honourably and humanely, and won the war by their own valour and their passionate desire for freedom. Even Mussolini, on the first anniversary of Italy's entry into the war (10 June 1941), while underlining the positive aspects of Italy's state of war, admitted, amidst the confusion of his arrogant thoughts, that "I must honestly say that many of the Greek sections have fought very bravely... The Greek 'Case' shows that armies cannot be assessed by immutable criteria and that the surprises, though by no means frequent, are nevertheless possible"¹⁶⁸.

c) The Italians maintain that their soldiers fought in obedience to their superiors. As soldiers they performed their duty. Irrespective of what they were fighting for, the Italians honour them today for the sacrifice they made.

d) All are unanimous in casting the blame for the declaration of war on the senior Fascist Party leaders, and above all on Mussolini¹⁶⁹, Ciano, Badoglio¹⁷⁰, Visconti Prasca and Jacomoni. But if I may express an opinion at this point, it seems to me that history has a serious problem here: how is it that the responsibility was confined to such

168. S.M.E., *La Campagna di Grecia*, vol. 1, p. 829.

169. After the Italian army's significant defeats in the mountains of Epirus, in January 1941 Mussolini declared: "If anyone on 15 October (referring to the meeting held on 15.10.40) had forecast what was really going to happen later on, I'd have shot him" (Ciano, *Diario*, vol. 2, p. 16). These words prove beyond doubt his responsibility for the war. None of the military leaders, however, was prepared to risk his position and his life, all preferring to accept the slaughter of the Italian people.

170. By mid-November 1940 the journalistic organ *Il Regime Fascista* (22.11.40) run by the powerful Fascist agent Roberto Farinacci had already made known Mussolini's displeasure with Badoglio and the Italian General Staff, because of the Italians' humiliation in Albania. Badoglio replied in the newspaper *La Tribuna*, which was immediately confiscated; the text of the reply was circulated illegally amongst the military units and soldiers and officers alike expressed their moral condemnation of the leaders of the State and the Army. For the relevant texts see Bellomo, *Lettere censurate*, p. 138-147. S.M.E., *La Campagna di Grecia*, vol. 1, p. 324-345, vol. 2, p. 515-518 (the texts themselves).

a small circle at a time when the Italian people, from 1922 to 1943, had been living under the Fascist regime¹⁷¹? In all those years was the responsibility for the leadership's actions not distributed amongst more people?

e) The Italian writers have made a systematic endeavour to prove that their country entered the war at a time when its military preparations were still incomplete, and neither men nor materials were ready to face the Greeks. Indeed, Cervi goes so far as to say that "the Albanian war was not a battle between David and Goliath but between two Davids, one of whom had right on his side"¹⁷². It is quite natural, I suppose, for the losers to employ striking metaphors to reduce the significance of their defeat.

Forty years later a serious Italian newspaper reminded its readers of the Duce's foolish decision to declare war on Greece. The relevant articles discuss Italy's unpreparedness for war and emphasise the numerical superiority of the Greek army. The blame is cast upon Ciano's and Mussolini's evil and corrupt informers and social circles; cf. *Corriere della Sera* (edizione Romana) of 27.10.1980, p. 7. The writers of the two articles: Francesco Metrangolo and Arrigo Petacco. I mention this in order to give some idea of how public opinion may be informed about this sort of incident.

History, however, requires evidence. How large were the enemy forces, then, on the morning of 28 October 1940? The numbers are well known.

According to Italian sources the Italian soldiers numbered 100,000 altogether and the Greeks 40,000¹⁷³. Other sources, again Italian, say

171. I should like to remind the reader at this point of Italy's expansionist policy with regard to Albania and the Balkans in general from 1920 onwards, and indeed ever since the end of the last century. See Giovanni Zamboni's well-documented work, *Mussolinis Expansionspolitik auf dem Balkan. Italiens Albanienpolitik vom I. bis zum II. Tiranapakt im Rahmen des italienisch-jugoslawischen Interessenkonflikts und der italienischen 'imperialen' Bestrebungen in Südosteuropa*, Hamburg 1970 (*Hamburger Historische Studien*, n° 2), 8°, pp. 514 (in photo-offset). See also S. Smirnova's interesting monograph (based on Yugoslavian and Albanian archives), *Balkanskaja politika fašistkoj Italii*, Moskva 1969, 8°, pp. 281 (cf. also a brief review of the book in the *Δελτίον Ρωσικῆς Βιβλιογραφίας* (Bulletin of Russian Bibliography), year 8 - fascicle 1, Thessaloniki July 1971, p. 67-68). A brief account is to be found in Hugh Seton-Watson's book, *Eastern Europe between the Wars 1918-1941*, 3rd edition, New York, Evanston and London 1967, p. 366-378. Cf. also above.

172. Cervi, *Storia*, p. 10. Cf. also the Greek translation vol. 1, p. 20-21 (note with asterisk).

173. Visconti Prasca, *Io ho aggredito la Grecia*, p. 90, 95.

that by the middle of August 1940 the Italians in Albania numbered 104,000¹⁷⁴.

The numbers quoted in the recent official publication of the Italian General Staff are undoubtedly more accurate and better documented. We can accept with certainty, then, that on 18 October 1940 the Italian active forces in Albania comprised: 163,000 men, 22,000 pack animals, 3,400 vehicles of various kinds and 1,500 motorcycles¹⁷⁵. Moreover, at the end of October these numbers were increased by 11,200 men, 3,200 pack animals and 600 vehicles¹⁷⁶. There is nothing to be gained here by giving the detailed tables of the distribution of men and materials¹⁷⁷. Let me simply note, in broad terms, that on 28 October 1940 the Italian infantry (comprising the usual units of fusiliers, Bersaglieri, Granatieri, Alpini, the special units of Italian and Albanian Blackshirts, the Albanian volunteers, the militia, the armoured units, the accompanying mortar units etc.) was divided into 83 battalions; there were three cavalry regiments; the artillery (divisional units, Army corps, special position units, anti-aircraft and anti-tank units) was divided into forty units with 164 batteries and 686 guns of various calibres; the engineers formed one battalion and 19 special units (of various technicians, electricians etc.). These numbers are higher than the Greek General Staff's historical research had estimated¹⁷⁸.

In contrast with the Italian forces, the Greek army, thanks to the premobilisation measures taken between August and 27 October 1940 on the Albanian border, numbered some 35,000 men, divided into 39 infantry battalions and 40½ batteries of various calibres¹⁷⁹.

174. Cervi, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

175. S.M.E., *La Campagna di Grecia*, vol. 1, p. 831. These details are provided by the Commissariat of the Italian army. In other places the same source reports that the Italian army numbered 150,000 (document of Soddu dated 18.10.1940: *ibid.*, p. 88, and vol. 2, p. 171, doc. n° 56), or 140,000 men (*ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 189). The difference in numbers may be due to a different evaluation of the soldiers' duties (fighting, auxiliary, or civilians on military service). Of course, the correct number is that given by the Commissariat, since daily provisions had to be supplied for this number of men.

176. S.M.E., *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 832.

177. S.M.E., *op. cit.*, p. 142-144.

178. General Staff, *Ἡ ἰταλικὴ ἐισβολὴ (28 Ὀκτωβρίου μέχρι 13 Νοεμβρίου 1940)* [The Italian Invasion (28 October to 18 November 1940)], p. 2-5.

179. General Staff, *op. cit.*, p. 8-18 (including information about war equipment and fortifications).

These details are not contradicted in the Italian General Staff's publication; however, one remains sceptical of the 'conjectural' comparisons of the opposing forces in October 1940, which attempt to arrive at a numerical balance¹⁸⁰ without reference to sources and without giving the facts from the Greek point of view, which might possibly refute their figures. The exorbitant claim has even been made that Greece employed her entire military machine against the Italian offensive and mobilised some 700,000 men¹⁸¹, which is of course without any basis whatsoever. Since no sources are mentioned, I cannot possibly accept such assertions nor even discuss them. One would expect a categorical rejection¹⁸² of the by now well-known Greek position and an attempt to refute it. Nevertheless, the Italians acknowledge their own superiority in two areas: their air force and their armoured units. Not that these two superior weapons achieved any positive or spectacular results¹⁸³. Moreover, the Greeks frankly admit that the Italian forces were fewer in number than the Greek in the area of north-west Macedonia and towards Korytsa¹⁸⁴.

The final conclusion which follows from the above investigation is that the Greek General Staff's assertion remains uncontested that on the Pindus front the ratio of Greeks to Italians on 28 October 1940 was 1:3 for the infantry and 1:5 for the artillery; on the Epirus front the 8th Greek Division was confronted by a considerably greater number of Italians, as far as the infantry was concerned; and as for the artillery, the Italians overwhelmingly outnumbered the Greeks¹⁸⁵. Nor

180. S.M.E., *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 134, 137-139, 148.

181. *Ibid.*, p. 145.

182. And yet the comparative statistics (*ibid.*, p. 169) for the forces on the Epirus, Pindus and north-western Macedonian fronts are quoted without refutation just as they appear in the General Staff's *Αἷτια καὶ ἀφορμαὶ ἐλληνο-ιταλικοῦ πολέμου 1940-1941* (Grounds and Motives for the Greco-Italian War 1940-1941), p. 158-159 [= General Staff, *Ἡ Ἰταλικὴ ἐισβολή* (The Italian Invasion), p. 13]. And the comparisons between the fighting sections and the armaments of the Greeks and the Italians, as reported in Papagos' book *Ὁ πόλεμος τῆς Ἑλλάδος* (The Greek War), p. 239-241, 251-252, 319-320), arouse no comment or counter-argument in the Italian publication.

183. S.M.E., *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 140-141. Cf. also M. Cervi, *Storia della guerra di Grecia*, p. 137, 139-141.

184. General Staff, *Ἡ Ἰταλικὴ ἐισβολή* (The Italian Invasion), p. 13.

185. General Staff, *Αἷτια καὶ ἀφορμαὶ* (Grounds and Motives), p. 158-159. Cf. also Cervi, *op. cit.*, p. 135-136.

should we forget that such numerical differences play a definitive part, particularly in the beginning; a successful manoeuvre within the first few days of the war has a decisive effect on the subsequent trend of developments¹⁸⁶.

But when the front stabilises and the enemy has already brought great forces to the front line, comparisons are no less useful. On 13 November 1940, the eve of the Greek counter-offensive, the Greek forces in the Albanian theatre of operations are estimated as having totalled 232,000 men and 556 guns¹⁸⁷. The Italian sources determine the number of Italian soldiers as being 185,000 (+ 25,000 civilian workers) on 10 November 1940, 200,000 during the latter half of November, 300,000 in December, 350,000 on 30 December 1940 and 400,000 at the end of February 1941¹⁸⁸. Clearly a comparison of numbers which changed from day to day cannot lead to positive conclusions. There seems to have been numerical equality only around mid-November 1940¹⁸⁹. And consequently, particular significance can be attributed to the failure of the Italian offensive on 28 October 1940, the success of the Greek counter-offensive on 14 November 1940 and the failure of the Italian spring offensive in March 1941.

An investigation of the mistakes made by the losing side, in a historical examination of its defeat, is a legitimate and commendable proceeding. Exaggeration, however, of its organisational shortcomings or of the adversary's low numbers has no place in historical research. And so, if it so happens that the Italian air force missed its targets in repeated raids¹⁹⁰, if it so happens that the Italians mis-estimated

186. General Staff, *Ἡ ἰταλική ἐισβολή* (The Italian Invasion), p. 18.

187. General Staff, *op. cit.*, p. 247-248. The Greek combatants then totalled 300,000, of whom 68,000 were at the Greek-Bulgarian border.

188. S.M.E., *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 836, 838, 848, 857, 878 (corresponding to the numbers quoted). Cf. the comparison of Greek and Italian forces in Albania at the beginning of April 1941, in Papakonstantinos, *Ἡ μάχη τῆς Ἑλλάδος* (The Battle of Greece), p. 215-216. He clearly proves the Italians' superiority in both men and armaments.

189. The opposing forces' total losses were roughly equal. Specifically, the Italian dead were estimated at 18,755, the Greek dead at 18,408; the Italian wounded 50,874, Greek wounded 42,485; Italian missing 25,067 (most killed in action), Greek missing 4,253; Italians suffering from frostbite 12,368, Greeks more than 10,000; Italian sick 52,108, the number of Greeks is not mentioned. For the collected evidence see S.M.E., *op. cit.*, p. 943 (where Greek sources are also used).

190. For relevant instances see Papakonstantinos, *op. cit.*, p. 168-172. Cf.

the nature of the ground and drove their tanks into swamps and mud (as they did at Kalpaki), if it so happens that the Greek soldiers were better trained, more skilful and more accurate in the firing of the few mortars they had¹⁹¹, this does not mean that Goliath went unarmed into the battle. He was disarmed by David¹⁹², who used not only his poor weapons but also his ingenuity, every undulation of his territory and his ability to make correct decisions quickly and carry them out bravely and boldly.

There is another factor which clearly proves the Italian superiority, and which the Italian writers do not usually mention. When we examine historical events without placing them in their universal context, then there is a great danger of reaching quite arbitrary conclusions. To be more specific — what were the relative positions of Italy and Greece in the world on the morning of 28 October 1940?

To begin with, Italy was considered to be a Great Power. She had held Libya since 1911, the Dodecanese since 1912, Ethiopia since 1935, Albania since 1939, and the Italian army's importance had been considerably increased by its successful participation in the Spanish Civil War. That year (1939) she signed the 'Iron Agreement' with Germany, in which Japan was to interfere in September 1940. In June 1940 Italy was considered, albeit only nominally, to have conquered France. In August-September 1940 Italian forces had occupied British Somalia and Djibouti. Italy's great ally, Germany, had had amazing successes. Czechoslovakia (15 March 1939), Denmark (9 April 1940) and Luxembourg (10 May 1940) had given way before her demands without armed resistance, and she had subjugated Poland in 30 days (1 September - 1 October 1939), Norway in 81 days (9 April - 30 June 1940), Holland in 4 days (10-14 May 1940), Belgium in 8 days (10-18 May 1940) and France in 42 days (10 May - 22 June 1940)¹⁹³. There

also the ironic German reaction to the Italians' first air failures: Mondini, *Prologo del conflitto italo-greco*, p. 247, 250.

191. For acknowledgement of the success of the Greek fire see Cervi, *op. cit.*, p. 138. Cf. also the Italian soldiers' amazement when they heard the first shots from the Greek side: «Tenente, ma i Greci sparano» (But Lieutenant, the Greeks are firing): Bocca, *Storia d'Italia nella guerra fascista*, vol. 1, p. 263. The essential mistake of the Italian military and political leadership was to give the soldiers the impression that the enemy was incompetent and unwilling to fight.

192. See e.g. the Italian plunder in the hands of the Greeks four months after operations commenced: Papakonstantinos, *op. cit.*, p. 186.

193. See a brief account in Stephanos Zotos, *Greece: the Struggle for Freedom*, New York 1967, p. 3.

was only England left to fight Germany. The USA had not yet entered the war. The USSR had already, on 23 August 1939, signed a friendship agreement with Hitler and was seeking friendship with Italy too both before and after 28 October 1940. Italian troops had not suffered a single defeat in Africa.

In the face of the overwhelming supremacy of the Berlin-Rome Axis, Greece was a small country, strictly neutral and with no powerful ally behind her. She had nothing but Britain's vague promises, and economically and even culturally she was under German influence¹⁹⁴. Greece could place no hopes in her Balkan neighbours or allies, either. Neither Yugoslavia nor Turkey was interested in co-ordinating their efforts with Greece in the face of the Italian danger. The Germans had occupied Romanian territory without bloodshed since 12 October 1940. Bulgaria was flirting with Hitler. When the Greco-Italian war began each of the other Balkan countries took care to negotiate with Germany in order to obtain assurances that Greek territory would be ceded to each of them at the end of the war¹⁹⁵.

And so, on 28 October 1940 we were forced to rely exclusively on our own powers, and our moral rather than our material power, at that. Greece had enjoyed no great military success until then. On the contrary, since the Asia Minor Disaster she had been struggling to get both her army and her society organised¹⁹⁶. Consequently, the war in the Epirot mountains was not a war between two poor nations — it was a war between a wealthy feudal lord and an improverished serf.

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194. Dušan Lukač, «Germanija i strane jugo-vostočnoj Evropy v period podgotovki i načala ital'janskoj agresii na Greciju v 1940 godu», *Balkanica* 4 (Beograd 1978) 381-404.

195. Papakonstantinos, *op. cit.*, p. 192-200. For quite revelatory details see P. Pipinelis, *Ιστορία της εξωτερικής πολιτικής της Ελλάδος* (History of Greece's Foreign Policy), p. 299 et seq. For Turkey's position, the British underestimation of Greece's critical moment, and the Soviet Union's pro-Fascist policy, cf. A. I. Korandis, *Διπλωματική Ιστορία της Ευρώπης* (Diplomatic History of Europe), vol. 3, part 1, p. 420-434. For Yugoslavia's position of neutrality and her bargaining with Germany over the annexation of Thessaloniki, see Alfredo Breccia's monograph, *Jugoslavia 1939-1941. Diplomazia della neutralità*, Roma 1978, p. 341-379.

196. For Greece's military organisation see Alexandros Papagos' monograph, *Ο Έλληνικός στρατός και η προς πόλεμον προπαρασκευή του από Αύγουστον 1923 μέχρι Οκτωβρίον 1940* (The Greek Army and its Preparations for War from August 1923 until October 1940), Athens 1945. The country's military preparations began essentially in 1936 and continued from then onwards.

DUŠAN LUKAČ

AGGRESSION OF ITALY AGAINST GREECE AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE OF ITALIAN EXPANSION

A more intensive cooperation between Western democratic powers, France and Great Britain, in the Autumn of 1939, after conquering actions by Nazi Germany in Central Europe (the *Anschluss* of Austria, disintegration of Czechoslovakia etc.), influenced fascist Italy to calm down its militant attitude. Worried of the possibility of the world war, in Summer of 1939, Mussolini attempted to advise Hitler against attacking Poland, and at the same time he temporarily lessened his aggressiveness against Yugoslavia and Greece. Since he was not successful in dissuading Germans, after the beginning of war in Poland, he declared Italy's intention to lead neutral policy particularly in the Balkans where he wanted to reinforce his influence in the area of south hinterland of Germany. Along the lines of such intentions were Mussolini's actions to calm down the relations with Greece. After the initiative of Rome the notes were published at the same time in both capitals on friendship and mutual honouring of state borders, while the war in Poland was going on. Specific measures also followed, i.e. partial decrease of number of troops on both sides of the Albanian-Greek border, withdrawal of a part of Italian troops from the Dodecanese Islands, with the promise by the Greek government not to permit stay of British warships in Greek ports, etc. Motives for such measures both with Italian and Greek governments were mainly of a political nature. By their approaching Greece, Italians wanted to prevent closer relations between Greece and the belligerent powers, while at the same time to emphasize their independence from the belligerents. The act towards Greece should have been the first step in taking over the initiative in the Balkans from the Germans, since Italians expected them to be occupied for quite a time with the war in the West. On the other hand, Greek government wanted by its step, and in addition to other reasons, to prevent Turkish government to take an active part in the conflict between the great powers, which could mean misfortunes both for Greece and the Balkans.

Since Turkey did not abandon its flirting with Western powers, even attempting to conclude a pact of friendship and mutual assistance, it seemed that mentioned step of Italy and Greece did not reach the effect both sides wanted. In order to influence once more the indecis-

ive Turkish government not to engage actively in the war, at the end of November new statements from Rome and Athens followed according to which the line was emphasized of political cooperation and of prevention of war in the Mediterranean.

Hitler was fast in realizing his intentions in Poland, so that he continued with militant actions in the West in the scope dictated by his adversaries, while he did not show any sign of diminishing his interests for the South East Europe, or of abandoning the initiative in that part of continent to Italy. This caused the change in Mussolini's Balkan policy, which amounted to the intensification of aggression towards a significant part of the region, i.e. Yugoslavia. From the very beginning Hitler was against such a war, since he did not want to abandon the initiative to Mussolini in the Balkans, although formally he considered that region as Italian sphere of interests. At the times when Mussolini was useful to Hitler in preparations for his war against Poland and the West, Hitler was ready to permit the attack of Italy against Yugoslavia, or at least it seemed so, but as soon as critical moments were over, he was again not ready to spread the war over the Balkans. Thus after first great successes in the West, Hitler invited Mussolini to participate in destroying France, as he intended to take his attention off the Balkans. Italian government at that time too tried to persuade Greek government in its good intentions.

After mentioned successes of German Reich in the West and at the time of relating Hitler's expansion to the South East Mussolini's passion for war and the wishes not to be second after his ally became more and more intensive. His aggressiveness towards the Balkans, in its entirety, grew up, although its center was Yugoslavia, which looked to Mussolini an easy plunder due to its internal situation of national subjugation, and particularly of Croatian discontent, and he even expected the aid of Croats. With Greece too the relations deteriorated more and more. In July of 1940 Italians accused Greeks to secretly cooperate with the British, who were already at war with Italy. A request was submitted that Greek government renounces the guaranties given by Great Britain unilaterally to Greece already in the Spring of 1939¹.

1. Diplomatski arhiv Sekretarijata inostranih poslova SFR Jugoslavije, skraćeno DASIP (Archives of the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of the SFRJ, abbrev. DASIP). Fond jugoslovenske ambasade u Ankari (Fund of the Yugoslav Embassy in Ankara abbrev. Amb. A.). Izveštaji Ministarstva inostranih poslova

These were the moments when Mussolini equally manaced Yugoslavia and Greece, while accumulating his troops on the borders of both countries. Incidents started to occur on Greek and on Yugoslav borders. In August and in the beginning of September, under the pressure from Berlin, the aggressiveness of Mussolini towards Yugoslavia eased, while at the same time it increased towards Greece. The ugly incidents became more frequent at the borders, Italian war planes flew over Greek territory, Greek ships were exposed to attacks and the like. On 15th August of 1940 Italian airplanes sank Greek cruiser *Elli* at the island of Tinos².

All these menaces, contrary to the situation usually expected in other countries, calmed down internal Greek controversies and Greek people became united and ready to defend the country against the aggression of a great power. At the same time, great patience showed by Greece towards the incidents and provocations of Italian fascists raised the level of sympathy in the countries of the world towards Greece and its people, naturally with the exception of the Axis camp³.

Since the second part of September, Mussolini aimed his pressure mostly at Greece. The concentration of Italian troops at the Greek border took place, while the government in Belgrade had been continuously informed through various channels that there were no more danger of Italian attack against Yugoslavia. These informations, however, were received with caution in Belgrade, since the same thing was transmitted from Rome to Athens but in order to diminish Greek attention and caution⁴.

At the beginning of October of 1940 there existed several signs of imminent attack of Italian army against Greece. This was even the subject of open writing and conversation between the diplomats of various countries in Rome, Ankara and other European centers⁵.

Kraljevine Jugoslavije (Reports of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom Yugoslavia abbrev. MIP KJ). Fascicle (abbrev. F.) 81. Strogo pov. nr. (Confidential abbrev. Con. nr.) 2755, 4 June, nr. 20514, 7 July, nr. 20343, 27 July, Con. nr. 2089, 26 Sept., nr. 23657, 28 Oct. 1940.

For more detailed information see: nr. 20647, 25 Sept., nr. 20805, 28 Oct., Con. nr. 2562, 30 Oct. and 2613, 13 Nov. 1940.

2. Public Record Office London, Foreign Office (abbrev. PRO FO) 871/24917, R. 7250/764/19, Report, Athens, 22 Aug. 1940. DASIP, Amb. A. 1940, F-84, MIP KJ nr. 22075, 24 Aug. 1940.

3. DASIP Amb. A. 1940. F-84, Report Con. nr. 2700, 3. Sept. 1940.

4. Ibid., nr. Amb. A. 1466, 26. Sept. 1940 and nr. MIP KJ 27084, 5. Oct. 1940.

5. Ibid., nr. Amb. A. 1622. 25. Oct. 1940.

Greek government had a very controlled behaviour at that time in order not to provoke Italian fascists even more. The situation in the Balkans and in the world in general was not at all favourable for the Greeks at the moment of imminent aggression by one of the great world powers of the time. In Bulgaria there was a revisionist movement which claimed territorial extension in the Western Thrace. The allies from the Balkan Pact had their own troubles and were also exposed to threats, so that they were not willing to help Greece. Great Britain had promised all aid it could supply and it hoped for the conflict to take effect. In fact Britain even instigated it, expecting to establish, in order to defend Greece, a Balkan front, which was planned. However, engaged in many other battles of the war, and particularly at sea and in the air, Britain was not able to supply troops or materials for such a Balkan theater of operations. Britain's expectations that the defense of the Balkans be taken over by the Balkan states themselves could not be fulfilled, since the regimes in those countries were eroded by internal weakness.

The attitude of Germans was most undetermined as far as Greece was concerned, since it seemed, first of all, that they did not believe Mussolini would attack or, if he did, the war would not be intensive and that its solution would be found in a compromise manner, meaning compliance of Metaxas to the requests of Mussolini. At the time of intensive crisis in Italian - Greek relations, in August and September, Germans did not change their attitude towards Greeks, so that trade and other relationships continued to develop. When, in the middle of August Italian threats became conspicuous, Greek government addressed Berlin to act and mediate with its Italian ally⁶.

Greeks were stubbornly advised by Berlin to avoid cooperation with the British, to yield to Italians and even to accept Mussolini's requests. Influenced by these suggestions, Metaxas, in order to appease his adversary, did not permit the raising of the troops, otherwise requested by the military⁷.

In September Berlin's attitude began to change, so that pressures replaced advices, in order to win over Metaxas and king George to

6. Akten zur deutschen Auswärtigen Politik, Serie D, Band 10 (abbrev. ADAP), nr. 363, p. 420 and nr. 372, p. 430. See, *ibid.*, nr. 333, p. 388, nr. 334, p. 389, nr. 377, p. 434 and nr. 386, p. 443.

7. Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Bonn (abbrev. PA), Note Ernst Woermann, 24. Aug. 1940.

accept Italian requests. In such a way there would be no war in the Balkans according to Germans. Greek government was advised to renounce unilateral British guaranties and the cooperation with Great Britain as well as to stop receiving British war supplies⁸.

Being exposed to pressures from both sides — from Berlin to accept compromise and make concessions, and from London to engage in an open and active defense, Metaxas attempted to find a middle solution. He expected to postpone Mussolini's aggression through giving minimum concessions and by obtaining favours and support of Berlin. It was believed that it was not in the interest of the Axis powers to create a new theater of war, where in addition to Greeks new participants could emerge including the British and neighbouring nations⁹.

However, since the pressures of Italy were more and more arrogant and the attitude of Berlin more and more unfriendly, Metaxas and king George, who were main factors of the policy in Greece, had to take stand according to the mood of people and turn to the British. This caused condemnation by Berlin and the relations between Greece and Germany began to cool down¹⁰. However, on both sides there still were attempts at appeasement and compromising. Germans requested from Greek government to abandon its relations with Britain, while promising support and aid for the Greek cause in Rome. At the time of deterioration of relations between the two countries at the Greek - Albanian border, Hitler sent words to Metaxas according to which he would not allow Mussolini to attack Greece. Believing in such promises, Metaxas continued to deny the requests of military commanders to order the mobilization, in spite of Italians accumulating their troops towards Greece¹¹.

The entering of the advance elements of German army into Bu-

8. Akten zur deutschen Auswärtigen Politik 1918-1945, Serie D, Band. 10, (abbrev. ADAP), nr. 394, pp. 449-450.

9. DASIP Amb. A. Teleg. MIP KJ nr. 26716, 2. Oct. and Con. nr. 2922, 3. Oct. 1940.

10. Deutsches Zentralarchiv Potsdam (abbrev. DZA) PA, 68435 B. 167-168. Report OKW nr. 4592, 12. Oct. 1940. PRO FO 371/24891 R-7849/5/67, Report, 9. Oct. 1940. Г.Д. КИРЬЯКИДИКС, ГРЕЦИЯ ВО ВТОРОЙ МИРОВОЙ ВОЙНЕ (Greece in the Second World War) Москва 1967, pp. 38-42. J. S. Koliopoulos, *Greece and the British Connection 1935-1941*. Oxford 1977, pp. 138-143.

11. A. Papagos, *Grčka u ratu 1940-1941* (Greece et War, serbo-croatian Edition translated from French), Beograd 1954, p. 80.

carest, on October 12, 1940 was more than enough for Mussolini, who envied his ally, so that he finally decided to continue the raid over the Balkans. At the October 15 meeting with his closest associates he stated that he is going to requite with his friend Hitler by destroying small Greece. He did not even think that this could be a tough nut to crack, and even believed that Bulgarians would march too over Thrace and Macedonia, while he thought that the Greek allies from the Balkan Pact would not extend their help. It was then agreed that the attack should begin at the end of October or in the beginning of November¹².

German intelligence agents found out of that agreement and informed accordingly Berlin, while quoting October 18th as a possible date of attack. German Embassy in Rome sent a new information on October 19th with another term, i.e., October 23rd¹³. During the second half of October a series of informations emerged from Belgrade and other centers, according to which Italians were prepared to attack Greece. In his letter to Hitler on October 19th Mussolini too spoke of his intention to attack Greece. At the time Hitler was on his way to France where, on the French - Spanish border and in Vichy, he had talks with the Spanish dictator Franco and with the president of the Vichy government marshal Pétain, the subject of conversations being the coordination of actions in the war against Britain. As soon as he learned of the contents of the letter, he requested a prompt meeting with Mussolini, with the intention to talk him again out of the attack. However, this meeting took place only on October 28th, so that it was too late, since Italian troops already began the attack¹⁴.

German Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been informed on Italy's ultimatum to Greece on October 27th¹⁵. That same evening German

12. ADAP D, 11/1, nr. 191, pp. 274-275. I documenti diplomatici italiani, Nona serie (abbrev. DDI IX), vol. 5, nr. 728, pp. 699-705, nr. 738, pp. 712-713, nr. 740, p. 730, nr. 746, pp. 716-717, nr. 754, pp. 722-725. For more detailed information see, A. Hilgruber, *Hitlers Strategie, Politik und Kriegführung 1940-1941*, Frankfurt a/M, 1965, pp. 284. D. M. Smith, *Musolinijevo rimsko carstvo*, Zagreb 1980, pp. 207-208. В. ЧЕРЧИЛ, ДРУГИ СВЕТСКИ РАТ БЕОГРАД (Serbo-croatian Edition translated in cyrillic translated from English, The Second World War), III, 1980, pp. 207-208.

13. ADAP D 11/1, nr. 191, pp. 274-275 and nr. 194, p. 278.

14. Ibid., nr. 229, p. 334. DDI, IX/5, nr. 753, pp. 720-722. В. ЧЕРЧИЛ, о.с., II, p. 488.

15. ADAP D 11/1, nr. 242, pp. 345-346. DDI, IX/5, nr. 789, pp. 753-755.

ambassador in Rome Hans Georg von Mackensen sent to his Ministry an extensive cable containing full text of the Italian ultimatum, followed by the explanation of Italian requests. The statement by Ciano has also been quoted according to which if the Greeks did not meet the requests of giving bases to Italians and did not disrupt coordination with the British, they had to be attacked the day after, i.e. on October the 28th. Immediately before the attack the representatives of Yugoslavia, Rumania and Bulgaria in Rome have been notified accordingly. Greek prime minister Metaxas after receiving the ultimatum of October 27th requested at once the intervention and support from Berlin¹⁶. However, it seemed that in this occasion otherwise perfect German intelligence service had failed. Hitler was not informed on time on the above events, so that he was not aware that the war would break out so soon. In his letter to Mussolini, written later, on November 20th, Hitler admitted that he was mistaken. As soon as he received mentioned letter from Mussolini with the news on the beginning of war, he rushed to Florence still hoping that he would win over Mussolini not to spread the war over the Balkans. But when he arrived there, Mussolini's troops have already attacked¹⁷.

This was a sort of returning the debt, so that there was not much dissatisfaction over that move of Mussolini. At the Florence meeting both dictators discussed many subjects concerning the activity of the Axis powers, but Greece and the Balkans were hardly mentioned. Along the lines of his earlier declaration according to which Hitler will learn of the fall of Greece from the newspaper, Mussolini expected at that very moment an easy and fast victory. On the other hand, Hitler still believed that, with the help of pro-German forces in Athens, and after the first Italian successes in the war, he shall find the solution of conflict which would mean both accepting Italian requests and closer relations between Germany and Greece in the future¹⁸.

16. ADAP D 11/1, nr. 247, pp. 357-358. PA U. St. S. Griechenland, Februar 1940 - September 1942. Telegramm, Roma, nr. 1946, 27. Oct. 1940. DASIP NAW T-120, Rol. 348, 258392-258403, Report of the German Embassy, Roma, 28. Oct. 1940.

17. DDI IX/5 nr. 807, pp. 771-775. A. Hillgruber, *Staatsmänner und Diplomaten bei Hitler*, Frankfurt a/M, 1967, nr. 40, pp. 281-294. ADAP D XI/1 nr. 246, pp. 848-857, nr. 365, pp. 535. M. L. V. Creveld, *Hitler's Strategy 1940-1941. The Balkan Clue*, Cambridge 1974, pp. 36-49.

18. DDI IX/5 nr. 807, pp. 771-775. J. Lukacs, *The Great Powers and Eastern Europe*, Chichago 1953, pp. 228-412. D. Lukač, *Uloga Balkana u osvajačkim pla-*

However, even the very beginning of the aggression, at dawn of October 28, 1940, did not develop according to expectations of both dictators. Although much weaker, both in number and equipment, Greek border troops were not run down as Mussolini expected, their withdrawal instead being organized and followed by inflicting heavy casualties to the aggressor¹⁹. While respecting the orientation of its people, Greek government asked Britain for aid in the spirit of duties to extend guaranties to Greece, assumed in the Spring of 1939. The British promised all aid they could provide²⁰.

It seemed that the resistance with the aid of Britain would be long, and the developments turned out differently than expected by the Nazis, so that Berlin decided to amend accordingly its plans for future war actions in the South East of Europe. Until the beginning of war in the Balkans, the Nazis expected quite a different development of situation in the wider area of Europe, including the Balkans. Along these lines during the war in the West, Hitler got the idea to move the center of war and aggression towards the Soviet Union. Already at the end of July of 1940, Hitler submitted this idea to his closest associates²¹, while particularly emphasizing the significance of preserving achieved positions, and first of all the peace in the South East of Europe. Unexpectedly strong resistance of Greek people caused great worries to Hitler and dictated changes in his strategic plan on campaign to the East and on the realization of supremacy over the European continent.

Hitler thought that the most important task was to narrow down the conflict and to prevent intervention of neighbouring countries. It was considered that even the intervention of Bulgaria on the Italian side would be detrimental to the interests of the Axis powers, and particularly to those of the Reich, since it could provoke engagement of other Balkan countries on the other side. New orientation of Germany in this region was enforced by the intention of all surrounding

novina «osovinskih sil» (Role of the Balkans in Conquering Plans of the «Axis Powers») in *Putevi mira*, Zagreb 1978, pp. 200-202.

19. DASIP Amb. A. 1940, F-40, Tel. MIP KJ Con. nr. 3274, 8. Nov. Con. nr. 2984, 30. Oct. and 3274, 8. Nov. 1940. See: ADAP D 11/1, nr. 248, p. 359 and A. Hillgruber, *Strategie...*, pp. 287-290.

20. B. ЧЕРЧИЛ, o.c., II, p. 489.

21. W. L. Shirer, *Uspon i pad Trećeg Reicha* (Serbo-croatian Edition translated from English, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich), Zagreb 1977, III, pp. 238-239.

countries to stay out of armed conflict and eventual wider complications. As soon as the war began, i.e. when it became clear that it will last long, German diplomacy started to be active in Belgrade, Sofia, and Ankara. It seemed that most important was the attitude of Yugoslavia. At the request of Berlin, Belgrade issued promises already on October 29th that Yugoslavia would not interfere in the Italian - Greek conflict, and that it would keep the neutrality status. There was much concern in Belgrade regarding eventual Italian occupying Thessaloniki, although it was believed that Berlin would find some way which would mean the end of the war. When the British promised aid, it was hoped that due to that Italians would not be able to reach Thessaloniki²².

Other forces which did not agree with the promise of the government of Yugoslavia were also influential in that country. The stumbling - block was Thessaloniki which for decades was the object of aspirations by Serbian bourgeoisie, and which, according to the opinion of that current, should never be left over to Italians. Under the influence of these forces the government had to change its attitude and already on October the 30th it was advised to Germans that the attack of Bulgarians towards Thessaloniki in order to help Italian actions, would amount to the reaction by Yugoslav troops. Germans had to take seriously into account this decision by Yugoslav government, the more so as the government of Turkey too announced the same intention²³.

The way out of the danger and new entanglement and complications had to be found in the attitude and policy of Bulgaria towards the Greek-Italian war. Berlin exerted corresponding pressure in that direction too, so that Bulgarian government declared its intention not to interfere, i.e. to keep the neutrality status²⁴.

Basic unknown elements over the war have been cleared up since the intervention of the Balkan countries was avoided, while the British aid was manifested through occupation of ports in the Cyprus and sending of the first squadron of airplanes on November 1st. At

22. *Aprilski rat* (April War), Beograd 1961, nr. 870, p. 871.

23. DASIP Amb. A. 1940, F-34. Tel. Yug. Embassy Ankara, Con. nr. 1636, 30. Oct. and 1647, 31 Oct. 1940. *Aprilski rat*, nr. 298, pp. 872-874. PA Büro St. S. Türkei, Bd. 2. Tel. Germ. Embassy Ankara nr. 876, 2, Nov. 1940.

24. DASIP Amb. A. 1940 F-40, Reports MIP KJ nr. 29934 and 29935, 31, Oct. 1940. Ibid., NAW T-120 R-348, 258388, Report Germ., Embassy 31. Oct. 1940.

least for the time being, it was known who is against whom in the war and what were the intentions²⁵.

Excessive evaluations of Italian reserves and of their possibilities to engage on the Greek front even stronger forces, aided by armoured units and air force, caused much concern of the great-Serbian forces in Belgrade, who connected the fate of Thessaloniki with that of their own aspirations. These forces were the strongest and most numerous around the royal court, so that the regal council was continuously in session. Pro-German forces in that council forced over the idea according to which it would by all means be appropriate to make preparations to occupy Thessaloniki as soon as possible by Yugoslav troops, after the agreement by Berlin. Everybody was impatient over this, so that Yugoslav military attaché in Berlin Vauhnik transmitted that possibility to the Germans. When Italian troops slowed down their movements in the beginning of November and when the British forces started to engage more intensively in defending the Greeks, this action was tacitly postponed²⁶.

Germans found this idea rather appealing. This single move could create a deep misunderstanding between Yugoslavia, on the one hand, and Great Britain and its allies, on the other, while at the same time the ground to work on the compromise solution of the Greek-Italian conflict. Moreover, German influence in Yugoslavia would only become stronger. Vauhnik's information on the idea was transmitted immediately to Italians, together with the statement on the positive sides of such a movement. Mussolini, however, discovered on time that such positive sides were only in favour of Hitler, who did not abandon his efforts to stop the war and to give to Italy only the chips, while he could continue his campaign and take over the entire South East of Europe. In order to cut off this combination at the very beginning Mussolini sent, on November the 5th, his airplanes to bombard Bitolj, where first Yugoslav victims of the new war in the Balkans fell — ten dead and twenty three wounded²⁷.

All these events in the Balkans at the end of October and the beginning of November of 1940 made visible to Germans the fact that

25. PRO Cab. 64/16, Minutes, 4. Nov. 1940, pp. 8-14. В. ЧЕРЧИЛ *о.с.*, II, pp. 490-491.

26. Aprilski rat, nr. 293, 294, 296, 297, 298, 300, 301, 302. PA U. St. S. Griechenland, Februar 1940 - September 1942, tel. Belgrad, nr. 796, 8. Nov. 1940.

27. PA Büro St. S. Türkei, Bd. 2. Telegramm, Ankara nr. 898, 6. Nov. 1940. PRO FO 371/25117 R-8441/316/44, 9. Nov. 1940.

the war in the Balkans was a serious matter which might bring a lot of surprise. Therefore Germans continued to transport new divisions to Rumania.

The offensive in mid - November of 1940 effected by major Italian forces did not yield significant results. At the northern part of the front Greeks succeeded to consolidate their positions either on the frontier or near it. In the middle section of the front and on the right wing, Italian forces advanced some tens of kilometers, down the Ionian coast, and in the center towards the town of Vovus, north of Ioanina — but this was all they accomplished. Italians were not much more successful in the war in North Africa, as well as in battles at sea against British navy and air force. Although considered as being on the defensive, the British even suddenly attacked with airplanes from the aircraft carrier *Illustrious* a concentration of Italian navy in the Taranto Bay, destroying considerable number of Italian battleships and damaging many others²⁸.

In the middle of November reorganized Greek troops launched an offensive against still more numerous Italian troops, and after heavy fighting where mostly decisive were unity, bravery and readiness of Greek soldiers and officers, they succeeded until the middle of December to defeat Italian army on the entire front, while throwing them out of the Greek territory and even chasing them some thirty to fifty kilometers deep into Albania²⁹.

Thus small in number but courageous and unified Greek people, for the first time in the initial period of the Second World War, forced to panic retreat Axis divisions, which had to worry the other member of the Axis and the main creator of the «new» order Adolf Hitler. In such a situation Hitler was forced to amend the program of his strategy in the South East and to seriously reconsider his own engagement in the Greek territory. Prior to this, however, he had to save the honour and pride of Mussolini, since there was quite a danger that the flurried Italian army could be thrown to the sea, burying thus the pride of the other member of the Axis³⁰.

28. PRO FO 371/2491 R-8715/764/19 Report, Athens, 9. Nov. 1940. See: В. ЧЕРЧИЛЛ, *о.с.*, II, p. 499. Richter Heinz, *Griechenlan zwischen Revolution und Konterrevolution, 1936-1946*, Frankfurt a/M 1973, pp. 91-92. E. Schramm-Thaden, *Griechenland und die Grossmächte im Zweiten Weltkrieg*, Wiesbaden 1955, pp. 118-184.

29. A. Papagos, *о.с.*, pp. 267-286.

30. DASIP Amb. A. 1940, F-40, Teleg. MIP KJ Con. nr. 3470, 20, Nov. 1940. ADAP D 11/2 nr. 470, p. 676 and nr. 499, p. 710.

In the action of saving Italian honour Hitler counted very much also on German friends in Greece who were indulgent towards Berlin. Fear of too much success and of the confrontation with the Germans forced Greek prime minister Metaxas to give in, so that Greek divisions were stopped, although they could continue to advance since Italian resistance was weak. That fear caused his continuous caution over the scope and width of cooperation with the British. He received material aid from them, as well as the help of British air force, but refused to receive British troops for the action against Italians on Greek territory, hoping that in such a way he would avoid the attack of Germans. Along the lines of such a policy was Metaxas' refusal to participate in the British-Turkish talks in the beginning of January of 1941 in Ankara, which were related to the creation of an active Balkan front against both of the Axis powers³¹. This was already known tactics and the policy of all governments of the Balkan countries.

While accepting such a policy of Metaxas towards Germany and using the soft attitude of Greek government, Hitler started to find new ways to neutralize Greece and to subdue it to the interests of the Axis, since it was clear to him that Italians were not able to do this. He knew that the decisive role had to be played in this respect by German army, but prior to that and in the aim to get ready for German intervention, he had to benefit from other possibilities in order to save Italy and to ease the way for the main attack of German troops. Along the lines of such a strategy, the services of Yugoslavia were also taken into account. However, this idea did not meet any strong reaction even by the bourgeois leading circles in Belgrade, since there were only a few protagonists of the active cooperation with Mussolini's Italy³².

In the policy of preventing new complications, according to evaluation of Berlin, significant position was held by Turkey. Therefore in the moments of crisis of Italian army in the war against Greece, Germans intensified their activity in Ankara, while using all available connections and influences in calming Turkey down. They began from the realistic assessments that one could not request more from Turkey than to effect its promise to stay neutral, i.e. not to engage on either side. The possibility was permitted of its adhering to the Treaty on Mutual Assistance with Britain, concluded on October 18, 1939, i.e.

31. ADAP D 11/2 nr. 584, pp. 822-823 and 665, pp. 928-930.

32. Aprilski rat, nr. 304, p. 905, 305, pp. 305-306 and 307, pp. 911-912.

its use in relation to the right of defense of Turkey. In such a situation Hitler was very far from even thinking to attack that country. Ambassador Papen explained that Turkey's duties in the treaty with Britain related only to the case of Turkey being attacked, as well as that this should be the ground in attempts at obtaining the policy of non-interference by Turkey⁸³.

Turkish governing circles dominated by the well-known Balkan policy of avoiding to be entangled in the conflict between the great powers, favoured the line enforced by Berlin. The Turks endeavoured not to relate too closely to Britain, hoping not to become entangled between the fists of the two great powers. All their promises on helping Greeks were within the framework of Bulgarian-Greek conflict, i.e. of an eventual Bulgarian attack, while the case of German military engagement into the Italian-Greek conflict was continuously passed over in silence⁸⁴.

All these measures in relation to the neighbours of Greece were now of a secondary and temporary character and their aim was to prevent the extending of war, while final solution had to be found by the Axis powers, i.e. by the German armed forces. At the end of 1940 and in the beginning of 1941 several talks had been held between highest functionaries of the two Axis powers with the aim of coordinating the actions for the decisive movement.

One of such talks was the Obersalzberg meeting between Hitler and Ciano on November 18, 1940 when Italian campaign against Greece became unsuccessful. On that occasion Hitler emphasized all negative consequences of Italian attack against Greece, then the weaknesses of Italian army and the like, all that in order to point out the greatness of power of German armed forces, so that such an ally would by all means have the upper hand in the actions. He then formulated German aid as the only way of restoring the situation in that region of Europe. This, however, could be realized only in Spring of next year and after completing a series of affairs, the most important being the winning over of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia for joining the Tripartite Pact, and ensuring Turkish neutrality⁸⁵.

83. ADAP D 11/2 nr. 396, pp. 587-588.

84. DASIP Amb. A. 1940. F-34, Tel. MIP KJ Con. nr. 3548, 26. Nov. 1940 and nr. Amb. A. 1799, 25. Nov. 1940. PRO Cab. 65, Vol. 16, Minute, 25. Nov. 1940, pp. 35-36.

85. See: A. Hillgruber, *Staatsmänner...*, nr. 44, pp. 330-335. Aprilski rat, nr.

In his letter to Mussolini transmitted through Ciano, Hitler once again and in more details explained all these tasks which, due to defeat of Italian army, faced the shaken Axis. Here again the significance has been emphasized of winning Yugoslavia over to the Tripartite Pact and to cooperation, as a prerequisite to war engagement for solving the Greek question. Without disclosing the main reason, i.e. preparing the attack against Soviet Union, he emphasized that all this has to be completed until the Spring of next year, so that would-be powerful Italian navy could be employed during Summer in some more important war theaters against Britain³⁶.

In order to prove his capacity to defeat the Greeks with his own forces, Mussolini received from Hitler only several squadrons of war planes and a small number of transportation means. In November and December, after renewing his forces again, he attempted several times to repulse the Greeks from Albanian territory. The success, however, was insignificant. In order to find some excuse, Italians informed that Greeks were aided by British troops, but the truth of the matter was that during that whole period, i.e. until the beginning of 1941, only the Greeks were engaged in battle and they were the ones who had been winning. Germans too knew the situation, since they had exact data according to which there were about eight thousand British troops in the island of Crete, while only about five thousand in the entire territory of continental Greece — in the airfields and in ports, i.e. in various professional and rear services, in addition to some two hundred thirty British airplanes supporting Greek troops³⁷.

World public knew and Germans too recognized that victories over Italians were won by the Greek soldiers who were courageous, unified and devoted³⁸.

Defeats of Italian army revealed to Germans the fact that the crisis in Albania could be resolved only by direct intervention of their army, so that the situation in the South East of Europe could be put

312, pp. 921-925. G. Ciano, *Diario 1939-1943*, I, Milano 1963, pp. 364-365. ADAP D 11/2, nr. 358, pp. 509-512.

36. ADAP D, 11/2 nr. 369, pp. 535-539.

37. PA Büro St. S. Griechenland Bd. 1. Report, Athens, 30. Nov. 1940.

38. Ibid., U. St. S. Broader report on the Situation in Greece in the first half of November 1940, p. 7. DASIP Amb. A. 1940, F-34, Teleg. MIP KJ nr. 84431, 14. Dec. 1940, Report Yug. Emb. Ankara nr. 1898, 14. Dec. 1940. See: PRO FO 371/24892 R-8860/5/67, 9. Dec. 1940. DASIP NAW T-120 R-848, 258381, 20. Dec. 1940.

to order prior to effecting the Barbarossa plan in the East. Therefore Hitler decided in the middle of December of 1940 to intervene militarily in Greece, and that plan was called Marita. Prior to the intervention in Greece, which was planned for the end of March of 1941, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia had to be won over to the Tripartite Pact, while Turkey for neutrality and non-interference in the British-German conflict. Prior to engaging the troops, twenty four complete German divisions had to be sent across Rumania and Bulgaria, to form shock troops for fast penetration over the Greek territory³⁹.

In his letter to Mussolini, dated December 31, Hitler informed Italians on his decision to intervene across Bulgarian territory⁴⁰. The British discovered Hitler's intention and the plan to solve the problem of his relations with Bulgaria and Yugoslavia until Spring, as well as to clear the situation in Greece later on by using the army. They attempted therefore to take some counter-actions in order to establish a Balkan front and eventually check German expansion towards the south of the Balkan Peninsula.

At the end of 1940 and in the beginning of 1941 Germans, while using the services of Hungaria and Rumania, effected the concentration of a strong contingent of crack units of the *Wehrmacht* down the lower Danube, as well as prepared the conditions, with the help of Bulgaria, to quickly put this army across Danube⁴¹.

German readiness to engage militarily in the Balkans influenced negatively the behaviour of Greeks on the front with Italians. In the so-called third stage of war, which began in January, there were less and less active movements and victories of the Greek army. This was not due to Italians eventually becoming dominant in the moral and military way. The leading forces in Greece, namely, became less dedicated to take advantage and win new victories. Prime minister Metaxas was afraid of his own victories, which would cause rage of Germans, so that Greek government in a way tried to maintain relations with Germany. Pro-German groups tried to emphasize that Greece was

39. ADAP D 11/2 nr. 511, pp. 724-725. Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv Freiburg, RW 4/5 587 nr. 1/0317/40, 21. Dec. 1940. E. Schramm-Thadden, *o.c.*, pp. 135-173.

40. ADAP D 11/2 nr. 586, pp. 825-826.

41. ADAP D 11/2 nr. 642, pp. 894-985. See: PRO Cab. 65. Vol. 16, 27, Dec. 1940, FO 371/29934 R-129/22, 1. Jan. 1941. PA Büro St. S. Griechenland, Bd. 1. Telegramm RAM nr. 1650, 7. Jan. 1941. W. Ansel, *Hitler and the Middle Sea*, Durham 1972, pp. 61-111. M.L.V. Creveld, *o.c.*, pp. 27-65.

not fighting against Germans and that it is only defending from Italian attack⁴². According to assessment of some contemporaries and, later, of historians, Greek army in its great dash already in November and December of 1940 had considerable opportunities to chase Italian army out of Albania, liquidating thus the problem of Italian aggression in the Balkan Peninsula. However, leading people of Greece were not ready to undertake such a great action⁴³.

One of those who hesitated was the prime minister Metaxas, particularly since the end of December, i.e. since it became clear that Germany would interfere in the conflict. Therefore the agreement for British troops to land had been delayed⁴⁴. New prime minister Alexandros Korizis who came to position after the death of Metaxas, under the pressure from the people and the British, who insisted on creating a Balkan front, accepted the active struggle against the aggression. At that time the British began intensive preparations to resist the Germans⁴⁵.

In spite of failure to win over the governments in Belgrade and Ankara for the active resistance against Germans and for the defense of Greece, as well as in spite of refusal of Greece to confront both Axis powers directly, the British continued with their efforts to form a Balkan front which should stop the oncoming German offensive. In order to persuade the Greek government, British minister for foreign affairs Eden came to Athens on February 22nd. In his contacts with the leading figures of Greece, he attempted to emphasize the need for an uncompromising resistance against the Germans, which at that time made preparations to force Danube in order to continue their aggression towards the south. It was agreed to intensify the efforts at winning over Yugoslav and Turkish governments for the active cooperation in checking the aggression and expansion of the Axis powers⁴⁶.

Already weak hopes that something could be done in activating

42. See: J. S. Koliopoulos, *o.c.*, pp. 169-218.

43. Г.Д. КИРЬЯКИДИС, ГРЕЦИЯ ВО ВТОРОЙ МИРОВОЙ ВОЙНЕ, pp. 68-69.

44. A. Papagos, *o.c.*, pp. 303-305.

45. H. Richter, *o.c.*, pp. 91-107. ADAP D 11/2 nr. 665, pp. 928-929. See: PRO FO 371/29798 R-4000/1483/67, 13, Febr. 1941. A. Papagos, *o.c.*, pp. 302-304. J. S. Koliopoulos, *o.c.*, pp. 211-213.

46. PRO FO 371/29787. Minutes of the Session of the British and Greek Delegation 22 and 23 Febr. 1941 et Athens, pp. 1-19 and 102-105. See: J. S. Koliopoulos, *o.c.*, pp. 221-247, E. Schramm-Thaddenn, *o.c.*, pp. 174-190, В. ЧЕРЧИЛ, *o.c.*, III, pp. 60 and 62-71.

Yugoslavia and Turkey, lost even more ground with Bulgaria joining the Tripartite Pact on March 1st, and with the beginning of Danube crossing by German army, and of its fast moving towards Greek frontier⁴⁷.

While expecting that a more intensive cooperation between the military missions of Greece and Britain on preparing defense and on including Greece into a complete alliance with Britain would amount to strengthening of the anti-Axis forces in Yugoslavia and Turkey, the British intensified their contacts with the Greeks. At the meetings between high political and military delegations of both countries, held on March 2-4, 1941, the subject of talks was again the cooperation in organizing resistance against German aggression. Due to hesitant attitude of Yugoslav government, Greek general staff could not establish any firm plan of resistance in the north-eastern parts of Greece. Also it was not known what would be eventual Yugoslav protection of the parts of Greek border in the north.

In such an uncertain situation it was decided that large part of the Aegean Macedonia should be defended by all means, naturally counting on the protection by Yugoslav army from the north, i.e. from Vardar Macedonia, while leaving the possibility to move towards the west if the need be, in order to organize final resistance along the line Kaymakchalan - Vermion - Olympus⁴⁸. At these meetings the schedule of coming and distribution of British troops had been also agreed upon. These troops landed already on March 4th to be immediately sent to the defending line in the north of Greece, where German attack was expected soon. The presence of a secret deputy of the Yugoslav general staff into mentioned talks between military missions of Britain and Greece again raised hopes that Yugoslavia should finally join the efforts in organizing the resistance against the aggression of Axis powers, but these expectations did not materialize due to the hesitant attitude of the government in Belgrade⁴⁹.

At the time of these difficult dilemmas of the Greek general staff over instituting a definite defense plan in the northern part of the country,

47. DASIP Amb. A. 1941 F-37, Report Yug. Embassy Ankara Con. nr. 288, 25 Febr. 1941.

48. A. Papagos, *o.c.*, pp. 317-326. PRO FO 371/29787, Minutes of the Session 2-4 Marz 1941, pp. 37-70.

49. PRO FO 371/29782, Minutes 8-12 Febr. 1940. A. Papagos, *o.c.*, pp. 320-326. B. ЧЕРЧИЛ, *o.c.*, III, pp. 85-101.

mainly caused by uncertain and hesitant attitude of the governments of Yugoslavia and Turkey, Mussolini launched a new offensive in the middle of March against Greek army on the Albanian front, since he wanted to erase the shame and defeat by an unexpected victory. He hoped thus to raise his prestige with the Germans. Strong concentration of Italian army had been effected most secretly, and the attack started on March 9, with combined actions by air force, artillery and armed cars and under direct supreme command of Mussolini. However, in heavy fightings, from March 9th to 15th, all attempts of Mussolini to disintegrate Greek defense and to throw out Greeks from Albania failed. Greek units, although less numerous and not adequately equipped, but with a high morale, repulsed the attacks of Italian army, so that Mussolini had again to quit unsuccessfully his great offensive in the war with Greece⁵⁰.

After the abortive Italian offensive there was a period of waiting on an extended front. Italians did not attempt to effect any larger movement in the western front after the above failure. Germans made their preparations for invasion while, on the other side, Greeks and British invested great efforts to create strong defense line against German forces. Relations between Greece and Germany, in spite of efforts exerted by pro-German forces in Greece, deteriorated rapidly. At the same time between British and German diplomacies heavy and unequal struggle was going on in relation to winning over the two remaining countries of the region, which did not yet take their stand, i.e. Yugoslavia and Turkey⁵¹.

The events would later on prove that Germany succeeded in preventing these two countries to organize on time cooperation with Britain and Greece with the aim of effecting resistance to the Axis expansion over the Balkans.

However, heroic resistance of the Greek people against a large power in course of half a year period, positively influenced the events in the South East of Europe at the time of German preparations to attack the Soviet Union. The victory of Greek arms pointed at the weakness of the block of totalitarian powers, while considerably contributing to weakening of confidence between the two Axis powers. At

50. A. Papagos, *o.c.*, pp. 223-280. ADAP D 12/1 nr. 141, pp. 163-164.

51. ADAP D 12/1, nr. 77, p. 144, nr. 143, pp. 209-210, nr. 155, pp. 230-231, nr. 170, pp. 246-247 and nr. 189, pp. 268-270.

the same time, this victory, in spite of hesitant and defeatist attitude of governments of the neighbouring countries, was a stimulus to the anti-fascist forces in these countries and contributed to their resistance against the Axis powers. Greek people by its bravery and unity in the struggle against much more numerous fascist forces showed its fidelity to the traditions of liberation struggle, as well as steadiness to defend the homeland against assaults of aggressors, regardless of their might and number.

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BRITISH INTERVENTION IN GREECE 1940-1941: THE ANATOMY OF A GRAND DECEPTION

INTRODUCTION

Shortly before the Second World War began the British and French governments gave a guarantee to Greece based upon the presence of a French army in Syria and the British navy in the Eastern Mediterranean. No plans were drafted then for action in case the guarantee should be invoked. It lapsed of course when France fell in June 1940. But in September the British unilaterally renewed it in response to practical inquiries from General Ioannis Metaxas, the then President of the Council in Athens. The reassuring gesture made little sense since the British were in such a parlous position. They were even having difficulties supplying coal for the Greek railways, at that time the Ptolemais fields being undiscovered. Though the British had camped about Salonika for the latter part of the First World War, they knew little about Greece and had few maps of it¹. They had never systematically collected information on the country, which hung in their minds somewhat hazily between the Balkans and the Levant. It is scarcely surprising to find, therefore, that they had no grand strategy for southeastern Europe and the eastern Mediterranean.

Though there were some connections between the Royal Navy and the Royal Hellenic Navy, and with the Royal Hellenic Air Force (RHAF), the Greek Army and Air Force were equipped with French, Czech and Polish arms all entirely incompatible with British equipment. Nor had the British any idea of the economic or physical geography

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1. Alan Palmer, *The Gardeners of Salonica* (London, 1965). As Major Miles Reid records in *Last on the List* (London: 1974, 1979), the first weeks of his special reconnaissance team's work were largely devoted to making maps in the southern part of Greece.

of the country. The economic meant close ties with Germany, whose engineers, for instance, were deeply involved in the telephone and cable systems, and the physical an incomprehension of the nature and size of Greece and ignorance of the fact that there was just one standard gauge railway line running from Athens north and only one main road suitable for motorized units. There were also only two usable deep water ports of any size — the Piraeus and Salonika, with a less developed harbor at Volos².

It is important to remember that during the Italo-Greek War of 1940-1941 military technology was in transition. In many ways the weapons and methods used were still those of the 1914-1918 rather than of the 1939-1945 War³. The first radar sets, for instance, only began to reach the Mediterranean theater early in 1941. ULTRA, the top secret decrypts of German Air Force wireless traffic, is only identifiable from 5 April 1941, when it was fed directly to General Maitland Wilson commanding the British troops in Greece⁴. Landing craft and ships were not available. Aircraft still operated from unreinforced grass airfields, weather permitting, and wireless sets were so unreliable that they would not work at certain hours of the day or night and not in the mountain valleys. Many of these things, when coupled as well to medical problems, meant that operations in Greece were about at the level that today would be described as those of the Third World⁵.

The First Moves - the Air Factor

The immediate British response to the Italian attack on Greece on 28 October 1940 was to order the despatch of No. 30 Blenheim

2. A great deal of information is contained in the Reports of the British Military Mission which are to be found both in the Foreign Office (FO 371/24920, 371/29814, 371/33145, 371/29816, 371/29815, 371/29777, 371/29782) files and in the various War Office WO 106 and 201 series in the Public Records Office in London.

3. On this general topic see my essay in Deutsches Marine Institut, *Seemacht und Geschichte: festschrift zum 80. Geburtstag von Friedrich Ruge* (Bonn, 1975), «Weapons Old and Weapons New: Technology at D-Day», 123-132.

4. A lot of valuable insights as well as confirmations of British Intelligence activities and attitudes can be found in F. H. Hinsley, *British Intelligence in the Second World War*, I (London, 1979). German Army codes were not broken till 1942.

5. Medical histories are a much overlooked source. In this case the 1918 Macedonian experience was communicated from South Africa to the Prime Minister (Allan S. Walker, *Clinical Problems of War* (Canberra, 1952)). See also F.A.E. Crew, *The Army Medical Services - Campaigns I* (London, 1956).

«mixed» fighter and bomber and No. 84 bomber squadrons to Athens. These were chosen because the Bristol Blenheim was the only machine that Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Longmore, the AOC-in-C Middle East thought at first he could spare. Moreover it had the advantage that it could be flown non-stop from airfields in Egypt to Athens without having to make a stop in Crete where hand refuelling from four-gallon petrol tins would take about two-and-a-half hours on an airfield only some 100 miles from the Italians at Scarpanto in the Dodecanese. As it was the Bristol Bombay bomber-transport which accompanied the Blenheims and carried the spares, luggage and airmen, had to risk a stop in Crete. Indicative of the state of British knowledge of Greece was the sending of the airmen in No. 30 squadron with two blankets apiece, which was all very well in the Egyptian desert in November, but not nearly good enough around Athens. So when the first flight of No. 84 left on 7 November each airman carried six blankets, of which two, presumably were for his mate in No. 30⁶.

This early British air assistance was really more symbolic than real. In the first place, except for fighter patrols flown from 7 November onwards by Blenheims, the bombers only sortied 123 times that month⁷. Secondly, their loads were minimal as the heaviest bomb they carried was the standard 250-lb., and only four of those, while on some occasions they only carried 40-lbers. Moreover, they could not operate in daylight except with adequate cloud cover, they could not get over the mountains in bad weather, and if they did reach the target areas, there was no guarantee that they really would hit anything significant. Their chief value was to build morale as, after all, Greece was the only ally Britain had who was still fighting on the continent of Europe.

What Metaxas and the Greek government really wanted, and what they strove to get all along, were British supplies so that they could

6. Interestingly this material does not exist in AIR files at the PRO, but may be located in WO 201/89, but then 26 copies of movements orders were cut. For details on squadrons see Philip Moyes, *Bomber Squadrons of the RAF...* (London, 1964, 1976).

7. AIR 24/1666.8299 is RAF Form 540, the log of HQ, British Air Force in Greece as it was originally. Part I is the legal log of who came and went and Part II, made up in London, summarizes daily operations. Wellingtons flew 21 sorties in November grouped in three nights of 6 and 1 of 3. Standing fighter patrols are not easy to record for statistical purposes and the term is used without specific numbers.

re-equip their own soldiers and airmen to drive out the hated Italians without provoking the Germans with whom they had close economic and ideological ties. It was a delicate situation which the doughty Metaxas handled with consummate skill and firmness. Unfortunately, apart from a small amount of captured Italian material transshipped from the Western Desert after Wavell's successful offensive began in December, very little of the desired supplies reached the Greeks⁸. The replenishment of the RHAF is a case in point. By mid-November it was virtually out of action due to losses and unserviceability in spite of operating to minimal standards⁹. Appeals for British replacement aircraft were answered with one delivery of 12 Gloster Gladiator biplane fighters on 6 December 1940, all that Longmore could spare from his already bare cupboard. Attempts to get planes from the United States foundered on bureaucracy in Washington and bad faith in London. But they also were wrecked by technical considerations — there was no ammunition for the American .50 cal. machine-guns when the out-classed Curtiss P-40's arrived in Egypt so equipped, while the radial-engined version, the P-36, suffered from defects which necessitated an engine change before they could be flown. And last but not least, the Greeks were the victims of technical attitudes and cultural bias on the part of the British which denied that a veteran Balkan pilot could switch from a Polish to a British fighter without a three-months course in Iraq¹⁰. At the bottom of it all was the RAF Middle East's problem that it had more aircraft than pilots. The records are filled with a continuous exchange between Cairo and London of messages on this theme, which in the end resulted in Longmore's recall in May 1941, though London was at fault. It was not until 17 April 1941 that the War Cabi-

8. The Report of the British Military Mission is to be found in WO 201/119 and it gives a tally for what it handed over.

9. For a capsule history of the RHAF in English see *Aerospace Historian* (Fall 1974), 'Greek Combat Aviation', 129-138. There were 11 squadrons to support the army, of which 3 were obsolete, and 3 for maritime duties. Most airfields in existence then are described by the Air Staff historian as 'doubtful if not utterly impractical' (page 133). On the pitiful attempt to rearm the RHAF see G. E. Patrick Murray, 'Under Urgent Consideration': American Planes for Greece, 1940-1941, *Aerospace Historian* (Summer 1977), 61-69. For the state of the Greek AF at the time see the reports of the Military Mission in WO 201/100 etc. and Sir Michael Palaret, the Ambassador's, telegrams to the Foreign Office in FO 371/24920, etc.

10. D'Albiac's reports are in AIR 23/6870 and in the *London Gazette*, No. 87846, 7 January 1947, 205-216. Tedder's comments are in AIR 23/811.

net in London noted that while since November 1940 they had allocated 1785 aircraft to the Middle East, only 905 had been sent and of these only 377 had actually arrived by that date¹¹.

Once the RAF did get to Greece, there was a serious problem of airfields. While they always based a squadron at Eleusis near Athens, it was not at that time an all-weather airfield and when it rained neither the Bristol Blenheims nor the Vickers Wellingtons, the heavy bombers flown in for occasional operations, could operate from there. In early 1941, for instance, Eleusis was closed on 3, 8, 9, 11, 12, 14-18, 23, 24, 26-27, 29 and 30 January (16 days) because the airfield, rather than the aircraft, was unserviceable. Nor was there any airfield-building equipment available in the Middle East because the practice there was to pick firm sand, and bulldozers were not yet available as military equipment. So the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, General Sir Archibald Wavell, had urgently to request that airfield-construction companies be sent out from the United Kingdom. In the meantime, surveyors were allowed to seek airfield sites south of a line running east and west through Mount Olympus, but not in the vital Salonika area until after Metaxas's death at the end of January 1941, when surveys alone progressed. Even after these had been agreed, a severe shortage of labour in a Greece already being drained to the bottom of the barrel by the struggle against the Italians prevented the recruitment of man or womanpower to construct fields. The Germans in May 1941 had the advantages of being conquerors, of a demobilized people, and of better weather so they could build their fields rapidly in preparation for the assault on Crete. Later in the war the availability of both the bulldozer and of PSP (perforated steel plate) made it possible to lay waterproof runways in days. The upshot of the lack of airfield building facilities was that when the Germans attacked on 6 April, the RAF had only 11 squadrons (3 of them fighters) in Greece because it did not have space for any more. And of these the Air Ministry did not know the location of four¹².

Equally critical was the lack of a Royal Observer Corps system or any other type of early-warning network, including radar. The only thing that was available in Greece was the telephone system, and it

11. Much of this is covered in *Cabinet Telegrams: Middle East*, multi-volumes within a multi-volume set with separate pagination, in Cabinet papers in the CAB 65 series, and in some AIR sets. For the detailed figures CAB 65/22, 17 April 1941.

12. AIR 24/1670.8299, 1 April 1941.

was useless for warning messages as it took up to six hours to get through. Owing to mountains, many airfields were cut off from radio contact with forward observers, and so the first warning they had of an impending attack was when the enemy aircraft swooped into sight, often at too close range for even fighters to be scrambled. It was a situation such as this coupled with mistakes in directions which saw 14 out of 20 Hurricanes wiped out on one of two airfields at Argos on 23 April¹³ while the anti-aircraft gunners protected the other. The alternative solution was standing patrols, and they were too costly and depended upon a control system which was not available.

Lack of airfields contributed in another way to casualties. When aircraft were damaged or had a failure in the air, they had sometimes to seek out the nearest landing area. With no suitable recovery vehicles available, if the aircraft came down in some remote spot, it was abandoned there and the crew walked out. In part this was because recovery away from airfields was a subject which at that stage of the war had not yet been recognized as vital, since in peacetime a write-off was an asset because it enabled the service to acquire a new machine.

One last aspect of the technological side of air operations must be noted. As early as 13 July 1940 the Germans were taking high altitude photographs of Athens and other parts of Greece. These were gathered by special Junkers Ju-86P pressurized aircraft flying at 33,000 to 39,000 feet. Their presence was denied by the Greek authorities, perhaps both for diplomatic and for public-relations reasons, while they were incorrectly identified by British A/A gunners as Heinkel 111's. In any case, they were operating with impunity well above the reach of either the guns or the fighters. The clock in the camera on 19 January 1941 shows that the aircraft spent two-and-a-half hours over Athens on a series of leisurely photographic runs¹⁴. In this PRU work the Germans were clearly superior; however, their interpretation and use of the intelligence was not as good as that of the British. As far as Athens was concerned, of course, it did not matter, as the Nazi ambassador and military attachés were free to operate there anyway.

13. Sources vary on the figures; these are the Air Ministry's in AIR 24/1670. AVM D'Albiac, the AOC British Forces Greece, gives 13 out of 15. But action was very confused at the end.

14. Photos in the National Archives Cartographic Section, Washington, D.C., GR 113.SD, 19.1.41. An earlier series was taken on 13.7.40. Request by latitude and longitude.

Remembering that a sortie was one flight by one aircraft, in the period from 28 October 1940 to 6 April 1941, it was only during direct support for the Greek February offensive that the RAF exceeded 12 sorties a day more than half a dozen times. The Wellington heavy bombers attacking Durazzo, the Italian supply port, actually only carried out 23 sorties in November, 7 in December, 5 in January, 10 in February, and 36 in March. Blenheims were by far the most active aircraft, except perhaps for Gladiators and later Hurricanes on defensive patrols for which the number of sorties are not available. And once the Germans attacked, the myth that British Air Force, Greece, was the RAF of the Battle of Britain, was quickly dispelled when in just over two weeks the force was withdrawn to avoid its complete destruction. It lasted, in fact, only about the same number of days as the RHAf against the Italians in November¹⁵.

Where the Wellington force was concerned, there was a proposal, especially in March 1941, that it should be reinforced from England, and used to bomb the Roumanian oilfields. Not only were the Greeks against this for fear of triggering a German attack on Greece, but Longmore was opposed on the very sound and simple grounds that the aircraft themselves could not get over the Bulgarian mountains in winter and would therefore have to fly from Athens up the Dardanelles and thus violate Turkish neutrality, an equally dangerous course¹⁶. The limitations of technology thus, fortunately, limited strategy.

The Role of Crete in Technological Grand Strategy

The Royal Navy's role in aid to Greece was largely peripheral in that its heavy involvement was in convoying. This is not to say that neither of its victories at Taranto (11 November 1940) and at Cape Matapan (27 March 1941) were not important, but merely to say that the Greek campaign was not its main focus. Yet, the Hellenic world was very much on Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham's mind as he had to detach more and more cruisers to act as fast troopships to make the run to the Piraeus and dip deeper and deeper into his slender flotillas of destroyers to furnish escorts for convoys. One of his constant concerns was the need to refit his destroyers whose boilers were

15. See note 13.

16. Sir Llewellyn Woodward, *British Foreign Policy in the Second World War*, I (London, 1970), 518.

getting into a precarious state from many knots at high speeds without proper repairs¹⁷. His interest in Crete lay in Suda Bay.

Because the RN had always had control over the world's coaling stations and because it had generally been the superior fleet, until the aeroplane suddenly changed the rules in the Mediterranean, the RN had never had to worry about range and replenishment at sea. After 10 June 1940 when Italy entered the war, the Mediterranean was not an Italian lake, but it was no longer a British lagoon either. Submarines and airpower made Malta far less habitable than it had ever been, and so suddenly the British navy faced the need to find an operational base close to Italy, but less vulnerable than Malta. Though Crete could be shuttle bombed by Italian aircraft going back and forth from Italy to the Dodecanese, it was far larger than Malta and offered great possibilities as a bastion on the British right flank of the Middle Eastern position, the belt-buckle of the Empire as Churchill had once called Cairo.

As long as Greece was neutral, Metaxas was very careful not allow any transgressions of that status. But as soon as the Italians attacked, the British were welcomed to Suda Bay and discussions started shortly to turn it into a full-fledged naval base. Immediately the question of anti-aircraft defence arose and the whole question of supplying the guns became entangled in the general paucity of air defences in the Middle East theater. A Mobile Naval Base Defence Organization was called for, but the MNDBO was still in Britain. By the time it was shipped out, Crete had fallen in May 1941. Air Defence needed not only guns, but also fighters and boom defences. A survey team was sent, but the island had six commanders in six months and nothing much was done. The result was that the cruiser *York* was sunk in Suda Bay on 26 March and abandoned on 22 May 1941. But far more importantly, in spite of constant urgings by Prime Minister Churchill himself, airfields had not been built on Crete and the island fell to the Germans in part because the defensive fighters were not there to shoot down the paratroopers' or air-landing troops Junkers Ju-52's, nor were the light bombers there for offensive operations.

Periodically there were mentions made in both London and Cairo that Crete was vital, but in the days before the big battalions, it did not merit a high priority when sandwiched in with all the other equally tenuous positions.

17. A. B. Cunningham, *Sailor's Odyssey* (London, 1948), 276-277.

In October 1940 Anthony Eden, then Secretary of State for War, visited the Middle East and discovered that Wavell was planning a surprise offensive against the superior forces of the Italian Marshal Graziani in the Western Desert for early December. Apparently neither then nor after he returned to London did the British Cabinet or Chiefs of Staff sit down and plot out a grand strategy for the Eastern Mediterranean which took into account the limits of the weapons then available and their restricted supply. If they had, they should surely have given top priority to two considerations. The first was the fortification of Crete to ensure its safety as both the right flankguard and as a link with Greece, which Metaxas for one saw as a future bridgehead for an offensive into Europe. The second was *Operation Mandible*, the seizure of the Dodecanese Islands so as to wipe out the Italian presence in the Levant. The Dodecanese, especially Rhodes, provided the Italians and then the Germans with stepping stones to two vital Near Eastern points — the oil wells of Iraq with the pipeline to Haifa and the Suez Canal. The Germans were well aware of the importance of the islands, using Rhodes as a staging post for highly effective raids against the Canal starting on the night of 16/17 January 1941, of which more later. The British failure to take *Mandible* seriously produced expeditions reminiscent of the Dardanelles in 1915, with the result that the Axis still held the islands in May 1945. And the loss of Crete, in itself «a near run thing», meant that the Germans were a thorn in the side of operations in the Eastern Mediterranean until 1944, because they controlled the air bases there.

Crete fell in part, then, because its importance was never impressed upon the Higher Direction of War in London and Cairo. Thus, when the debacle occurred in Greece in April 1941, Crète was hastily garrisoned with weary, ill-trained, under-armed troops who found nothing prepared.

Technical Assistance Declined

Early in January 1941 General Wavell was ordered to take a break from overseeing O'Connor's victorious desert offensive and visit Athens. He was instructed to offer the maximum British assistance possible. The President of the Council, Metaxas, and the King, George II, agreed to his trip.

Almost as soon as the Italo-Greek War had broken out, the British had despatched a Military Mission to Athens which had superseded

the military attachés. Actually the only one dispossessed to any extent was Colonel Jasper Blunt of the Army, since the Naval Attaché, Rear-Admiral Charles Turle became head of Mission, while the Air Attaché, who was already shared with Ankara, was replaced with British Air Forces Greece headed by Air Commodore, shortly to be Air Vice Marshal, J. H. D'Albiac, who also had an operational command. The job of the Military Mission was to provide aid and advice to the Greeks and to relay their wants to Cairo and London, a task which the ambassador supported with emotional appeals. From the very beginning Wavell had supplied things like socks, boots, jerkins, and the like from his limited stocks as well as some Boys anti-tank rifles. But he was largely helpless to supply much other than captured Italian weapons, ammunition and equipment to Greek forces who were equipped with French, Czech, and Polish arms. It thus became clear fairly early on that, if the Greeks and the British were really going to become an effective force, since the Greeks had no manufacturing capacity other than the Powder Works and a small aircraft factory, that ultimately a start would have to be made with the artillery and to go from there to re-equip the whole Greek Army with British weapons. By late January it was obvious that that time would be before summer¹⁸. Motor vehicles, on the other hand, were a less serious commodity since they could be interspersed in the system, though as a visiting engineer pointed out, it made most sense to substitute them upon one route at a time so that recovery, repair and spares could be organized in a rational and efficient manner¹⁹. With or without vehicles, the road system made pack animals essential, even women being recruited for this job in the forward areas. One of the constant worries of the stalwart Greek Commander-in-Chief, General Alexandros Papagos, was that he would not be able to build up sufficient forward dumps of supplies to be able to maintain his momentum on the attack in January and the following months when he sought to knock the Italians out of the war.

It was into this situation that Wavell was reluctantly forced. But like Metaxas, Wavell was a realist. He had written the official history of the Palestine campaign in the First World War and the life of its most successful commander, Lord Allenby. He had a sense for politics, while military affairs bored him. He was, however, unfailingly loyal

18. AIR 8/544.

19. WO 201/10.

and dutiful, if not without a sense of humor²⁰. He went to Athens and offered Metaxas British artillery for use against the Italians. He did not offer very much because he could not really spare any. In turning down the offer, the little Greek Moltke, as he was affectionately known in the Army, complimented him on making «the offer of a commander-in-chief». They understood each other. The Greeks wanted the guns, but not the British gunners. They had men, but they lacked material. And as the British liaison officers had warned, the British had to be very careful about offering to teach victorious Greeks how to fight²¹.

Unfortunately, Metaxas was unwell and his heart stopped on 29 January 1941. This led to what appears to be a puzzling metamorphosis in Wavell's policy towards Greece, unless it is assumed that he was skilfully disobeying orders for the common good of Greeks and Britons alike.

Wavell, no stranger to Egypt and a disciple of another great master of deception, Allenby, knew Cairo was a leaky sieve. Very early in February he had the walls in his office hung with maps of Greece and on the 11th orders went out for advance planning and a mass meeting of staff officers. Englishmen are gamblers and the argument can be made that Wavell was gambling on a leak. The real deception was that no one knew his plans. He had a grand strategy which involved O'Connor's thrust in the Western Desert, and cleaning up the Italians in East Africa first to free his forces then engaged in that nearly completed task. Moreover he was a good judge of men. He knew Prime Minister Churchill had created in his own mind in January — quite different from in the Nile Valley in reality — a Central Reserve of four divisions which he was in his usual impetuous way anxious to send into action in some noble cause. Preparing to send it to Greece on a slow shipping schedule which would take until mid-June to accomplish, if all went well, gave Wavell time and risked no more than he could afford to lose of the little he had anyway. If this were not all a deception, why was a force of 120,000-200,000 men considered, when less than 60,000 were actually sent? The answer at first is because that was the ultimate size of the intended force. But the real answer is that Wavell, who was familiar with Russia from his own visit there, guessed that the Ger-

20. On Wavell see Ronald Liewin, *The Chief* (New York, 1981).

21. The records of these meetings are in the 1981 Greek White Paper *Greece 1940-41* (Athens, 1981), Documents 77-82 (French translation kindly supplied by Major-General Konstantinos Kanakaris).

mans had bigger things in mind than Greece, which they would polish off quickly no matter what the British army did. As Wavell noted shortly afterwards, his team had done all right against Italians, but they would find the Germans a lot tougher. What ultimately may have thrown his calculations was, not of the Germans in the Balkans, but the aggressive appearance of the German armour under Rommel in the Western Desert, which also surprised Berlin.

The Tatoi Conference and Technical Schedules

Though in December 1940 Hitler had decided upon *Operation Marita* to clear up his southern flank before invading the U.S.S.R., on the whole the Germans appeared, and the Greeks certainly hoped that they were, content to allow a small British air force to operate against the Italians in Albania. But as the Italians proved less and less able to solve their own problems, the Germans opted for turning *Marita* into a full-scale invasion of Greece. Since full diplomatic relations existed between the Greeks and the Germans, the Greek staff in Athens and, thus also, the British were well informed of what was happening, the Greek military attachés in other countries either telephoning or telegraphing important items of interest, whether rumor or fact. British diplomatic staffs and military attachés were still operating in the Balkans until April 1941. But two things caused a misreading of all this vital non-ULTRA intelligence. The first were preconceptions in the eyes of the beholders. The second was the injection into Anglo-Greek relations of the Eden-Dill mission in February 1941, which insisted on making plans without knowledge of the peoples, the topography, the distances, and the technical limitations these imposed. They brought the unrealism prevalent in London to decision-making in Cairo and Athens.

This situation came about because after he accepted the premiership, Alexandre Koryzis was pressed by the British Ambassador, the pro-Greek Sir Michael Palairet, to affirm or deny the Metaxas response of 18 January 1941. In that Metaxas had taken the position that he could use British air support and weapons, but that he could not accept inadequate British forces for fear of provoking the Germans, and by inadequate, he meant fewer than could hold the northern frontier, probably 3 Greek and 9 British divisions²². Not knowing anything of

22. The figure of 9 divisions was mentioned in discussions on 15 January.

the 18 January memorandum, Koryzis suggested that it needed to be studied and asked, quite properly, what the British could do to implement it. Palairot incorrectly reported this to London as a request for aid. At No. 10 Downing Street the ever-itchy Churchill took this as a golden opportunity to get British forces back into action on the mainland of Europe and shortly despatched the Foreign Secretary, his «heir» Anthony Eden, and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Field Marshal Sir John Dill, with *carte blanche* to make arrangements, but with in their sealed orders an admonition to use their judgment. The Cabinet was not told of their mission until they reached Cairo very late on 19 February²². The normal decision-making process was now to be disrupted in three important ways: Eden had pro-consular powers as the man on the spot, the two Chiefs of Staff remaining in London bowed to the judgment of their colleague in Cairo, and Eden failed to refer proposed arrangements back to London for final approval, even though the Dominions were involved and the Australian prime minister, Menzies, was in fact in London himself. The result was that when this was coupled with the peacetime amateurism of the British forces of the day, notably of the Army, and with the abysmal shortage of trained staff, critical decisions were made without the proper administrative foundations or assessments.

All of this has to be coupled with one of the enigmatic puzzles of World War II — why did Wavell decide to send forces — to Greece, a change of mind which he had apparently made between 18 January and 19 February? As near as can be determined now he had decided to go to Greece by the end of the first week in February. His resources had not changed appreciably since mid-January when he had offered Metaxas essentially two regiments of artillery. His divisions were worn out from campaigning and needed resting and refitting. But he was a master of deception. And one person he occasionally had to deceive, as before his 9 December 1940 offensive, was a sometime lieutenant of Hussars, Winston Churchill. No one apparently knows how much ULTRA Wavell was getting at this time and certainly no one can say

See note 20. The War Office in London thought 19 would be needed. Major-General Sir John Kennedy, *The Business of War* (London, 1957), 69, says 20 divisions was the estimate on 9 December 1940.

23. Various accounts of the journey out are to be found in Eden's memoirs, *The Reckoning* (London, 1965), in Churchill, *The Grand Alliance* (Boston, 1950), and in Brigadier Mallaby's official account in WO 106/2145/6 and in Pierson Dixon's in FO 371/33145.

how he utilised it²⁴. But what can be suggested is that this quiet, silent, one-eyed man assessed the German threat to Greece as real and swift. He assumed that Dill, sensible soldier that he was, would be opposed and opt anyway for aid to Turkey. But he did his sums and decided that the way to get London off his back was to agree to go to Greece, assuming that shipping delays would so hamper his movements that only a very small force would be in Hellas and need to be evacuated when the Germans attacked successfully as soon as the snows melted in the Bulgarian passes. Cairo was a hotbed of spies and so his cover plan was the story we have been told and the deception he maintained till his death. And since he wrote his still-secret memoirs in 1948, 26 years before the ULTRA secret came out, we may never know the whole truth²⁵.

Just as one example of why the above may not be an irrational figment of the imagination. Wavell claimed to have lost 8,000 vehicles in Greece, but if every British division sent had taken its full complement of 1400, only 4900 would have been landed with the 58,000 men who actually got there before the evacuation started. And that is assuming that every unit was up to full establishment, which they were not. Nor were thousands of vehicles sent to the Greeks. The Military Mission's total tally of those turned over was only 861. And most of the time the Canal was blocked and the motor-vehicle ships south of it at Suez²⁶.

What is known is that early in February Wavell decorated his office with maps of Greece and that by the time Eden and Dill arrived, he was prepared to shift from the Western Desert to Greece, helped by his doubts that his worn troops and their flogged equipment could reach Tripoli. So on 22 February the British party flew to Athens, landed secretly at Menidi airfield and drove to the nearby neo-Gothic

24. Hinsley, *British Intelligence*, I, 10, 349, 353-354, 389-396, 408.

25. In the foreword to John Connell, *Wavell*, I (London, 1964), 11, it states that the work is based upon Wavell's own memoirs in manuscript. Recent correspondence with the family contained denials that it existed, though apparently an American doctoral candidate, Robert Charles Ovelmen, got access to it in 1978 for his dissertation, «The British Decision to Send Troops to Greece, January-April 1941» (Ann Arbor, MI, 1979).

26. On the blocking of the Canal see I.S.O. Playfair, et al, *The Mediterranean and the Middle East*, I (London, 1954); C.B.A. Behrens, *Merchant Shipping and the Demands of War* (London, 1955), and D.A. Farnie, *East and West of Suez* (London, 1969). For the Report of the Military Mission, see WO 201/119.

Tatoi Palace for a secret conference. On the way over Brigadier Malla-bay of Dill's staff took a list of what could be offered the Greeks and, according to Major de Guingand, later Field Marshal Montgomery's Chief of Staff, multiplied it out of recognition into a mythical box of gifts²⁷. Why? And by whose orders? Another peculiar incident of the trip over was a stop at Benghazi to see General Maitland «Jumbo» Wilson, just recently moved from commander of British troops in Egypt to Governor of Cyrenaica, then becoming in Wavell's view a garrison job. Wilson shared a house with Sir Archibald and Lady Wavell in Cairo, but he was not a field commander. In fact, he was a nuisance to Sir Richard O'Connor, whom Wavell had had to protect from interference during his brilliant campaign since 9 December. Why, then, had the Tatoi party stopped so that Wavell could tell Wilson that they were going to send a force to Greece and that he, Wilson, was, if the Greeks accepted it, to command it? Was it because Wavell knew it was going to be a lost cause and that, therefore, he needed to put in command someone visibly impressive whose reputation could not be harmed?

At any rate, at the Tatoi conference the discussion hinged about what the British had to offer²⁸. The results were distorted by a master-client relationship, reinforced by the preponderance of high-ranking British officialdom present versus the three Greek leaders—Prime Minister Koryzis, General Alexandros Papagos, the Commander-in-Chief, and King George II. Eden and Dill pressed help which was inadequate without knowing the ground. Papagos looked the gift horse in the mouth fully aware that endless years of meetings with the proposed allies, the Yugoslavs and the Turks, had yielded few results and were likely to bring fewer. The British proposed a Balkan bloc, which on paper looked like a good idea—a revival of the French Little Entente, but which made little sense in 1941 with German armies spread down the Danube in a position to strike across that river at Belgrade on the western bank and thus divide Yugoslavia in two physically, if its own internal problems did not shatter it, and with Bulgaria an ever-ready agent for the take-over of Macedonia and the seizure of Salonika,

27. Major-General Sir Frederick de Guingand, *Operation Victory* (London, 1947, 1960), 50.

28. In addition to the sources in note 23, see also the official *Greece 1940-41* (Athens, 1981), Documents 122-124, which include the «Greek shopping list». For a translation of the Greek sections of these documents I am most heavily indebted to Major-General Konstantinos Kanakaris of the Hellenic Army Directorate of History.

a threat to both Yugoslavia and Greece, and an ancient enemy of Turkey. While the Germans could not do much until the winter weather broke, for even flying was not very practical over the Balkans in winter in those days, none of the Balkan states trusted each other and no hegemony was likely to result, a fact that the British should have known. Moreover, they had nothing to promise even countries such as Yugoslavia which had bought the latest British weapons, such as Hurricane fighters, pre-war²⁹. England could not even supply its forces in the Middle East, a fact which the Turks had established for themselves by a visit to Cairo in October 1940.

On a much more practical level, the British were not in a position to discuss sending troops to Greece from first-hand knowledge for only Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Longmore, the AOC-in-C ME, had actually viewed the country, and he had not been north of the Plains of Thessaly upon which the major base of Larissa was located. Yet much of the military argument hinged upon whether or not the British had the forces to send, what they had to send, and where it should be located in conjunction with what few Greek forces might be available. Except on the medical side there is no positive evidence of carry-over from World War I around Salonika.

The furthest forward of these lines was the frontier combined with the Metaxas Line of prepared fortifications, against Bulgaria alone, and turnable if the enemy came through Yugoslavia. Then there were the two shorter lines still covering Salonika along the rivers Nestos and Struma (Strymon) and the Rupel Pass, but their weakness was that they lay in flat country behind fordable rivers. And while the frontier line needed a force of up to 19 divisions, the Nestos-Struma system needed at least 12³⁰. In both cases there was a very real question as to how much time would be available. Metaxas had said that the British could land as soon as the Germans crossed the Danube into Bulgaria, but they were now already ensconced there. And because of Metaxas's fears of arousing the Germans, the British had made no reconnaissances of the few ports in the area. Nor did they at this period of the war have landing craft, so any debarkation would be a tedious affair highly susceptible to disruption by air attack since few AA guns were avail-

29. Francis K. Mason, *Hawker Aircraft* (London, 1961).

30. The question of the number of divisions needed was the subject of discussion on several occasions, notably at the Tatoi Conference on 23 February and in Athens in early March. WO 106/2145.

able and no airfields. Moreover at the time, only one aircraft carrier *Formidable*, was assigned to the Mediterranean Fleet (after *Illustrious* was damaged at Malta on 9-23 January 1941) and she was stuck until 10 March on the south side of the Suez Canal due to German aerial minelaying.

Looking at the map of northern Greece, then, as it was laid out on the polished dining table at the Tatoi, Papagos pointed out the only possible place for a defensive stand along the Vardar or Axios River — the Aliakmon Line. But this was not a line at all. It started at the eastern end as a river emptying into the Gulf of Therma below Salonika, but it soon shifted to two mountain ranges, the passes through which were the strong points. But again its weakness lay in that its exposed western end or flank lay on relatively flat ground which could be turned by a thrust down from the Monastir Gap in Yugoslavia, which in its turn was accessible from Bulgaria. At best it might have been called the Aliakmon Outposts or Passes for, as the Germans were to show, it was not impregnable and mountain troops could work in between its strongpoints. A further problem with this line was that the British and Greeks looked at the map with different eyes. Dill the Staff College man saw it in British motorized terms with dimensions in feet, names in Greek, and few roads to manage or defend, while Papagos the C-in-C looked at it in Greek infantry terms of metres, of mule-track mountains in which the Greek infantry excelled in defense, and the possibilities of infiltration and lateral movement; it could be thinly held.

The major difficulties with the Aliakmon Line were that Salonika was forward of it, so were the whole of Macedonia and Western Thrace with their large Greek populations, and also in front of the whole position was the vital Athens-Florina railway line upon which the army on the Albanian front depended for its supplies. The narrow-gauge line Volos - Pharsala - Trikkala - north had never been completed though the roadbed had been laid, but not the rails before the Germans attacked on 6 April 1941⁸¹.

For the British the difficulties of the Aliakmon lay in getting their troops to Greece, forward to the Line, and dug in in time, as well as in getting airfields prepared and in finding the troops.

For the Greeks the Aliakmon Line presented two practical diffi-

81. Great care must be taken in using the maps in the official histories as the railway lines are not always marked correctly.

culties — where would they get the troops to help man it (as only weak recently called-up battalions remained) and, if these were to be withdrawn from Macedonia and Western Thrace, would there be time to do that so that they would not be caught on the flats by German armour and would the population permit it? For both the British and the Greeks there were also the technical problems that hindered their activities. The only viable port was the Piraeus which was served by a standard gauge railway line, but it was so short of coal that in March 1941 the number of 25-waggon trains available had to be limited to 2 for the British until the 10th when they were increased to 3. On the Volos-Larissa Line the locomotives were burning olive wood in place of coal, which meant that they could only haul trains of 40 percent of the normal tonnage, thus severely restricting the use of that largely undeveloped port. At Larissa there were not enough sidings and no freight or goods sheds, so supplies had to be dumped alongside the track until lorries could haul them away. From Larissa to the Aliakmon Line was roughly 200 kilometers over switchback mountain roads, most of which were unpaved, icy metalled nightmares, the only main road being from Athens through Larissa and then north about 9,700-for high Mount Olympus to Katerini and on to Salonika. When troops did land at Athens, they were sent north by train to Katerini and then marched into position. But there were delays because the passes north of Athens, notably the Brallos, were snow-filled for days on end in March so that convoys could not get through, and when they did the road was so bad that the AA guns being towed were damaged³².

The outcome of the Tatoi Conference was that it was decided that the Aliakmon positions could be manned with 3 weak Greek Divisions and 3.5 British. The former would need 20 days to get into position after the attitude of Yugoslavia was ascertained, while the latter would require three months, if the Suez Canal remained open all the time. This latter was critical since 53 ships had to be used and losses would have to be made good from incoming convoys from Britain completing the 12,000-mile voyage around the Cape of Good Hope. But the Germans had already closed the Canal by mining on 17 January. So if the Canal was not open, the movement of Lustre Force from Egypt to Greece, as the expedition was misnamed, would take six months. That would very definitely mean that the British Army

32. There are many details in the Engineer and other files contained in WO 201/68, 201/65, 201/73, 201/53, and in the lessons of the campaign in WO 201/126.

would be campaigning in Greece in the midst of the very malarial and blackwater fever season which his medical officers had warned Wavell needed to be avoided at all costs³³. Taking the shipping schedule and the medical alarms into account, 'it is tempting again to infer that Wavell in saying he was going was deceiving London — in the best interests of British grand strategy in the Middle East.

After the Tatoi Conference broke up, Papagos ordered preliminary work on the Aliakmon positions, but moved no troops. Eden and Dill and their party returned to Cairo. De Guingand went to survey the Aliakmon and discovered that unlike Salisbury Plain it was a vast mountainous area for which the British simply did not have the troops or the guns at all, and, after being caught in the Larissa earthquake, so informed Athens and Cairo. Is it possible that his report simply added to Wavell's one-eyed inscrutable smile behind which was a mind which thought that Dill and company would wake up to the facts? The Germans were expected to attack in about two weeks with three to five divisions, but the British did not expect to be dug in for three to six months. As the German invasion schedule had been obtained from Sofia on 1 February with its goal of reaching Athens and taking all of Greece by late April or mid-May, and given the Wehrmacht's successes in 1939 and 1940, Wavell had good reason to think as suggested³⁴.

Shortly after they returned to Cairo, Eden and Dill visited Ankara, where they made no progress with persuading the Turks to take an active part in the war. And while in Ankara Eden also heard from the Yugoslav ambassador that the result of his personal appeal from Athens to Prince Paul of Yugoslavia was also negative. However, no one passed that word to Athens. So when on 2 March Eden's party returned to the Greek capital, they were stunned to discover that Papagos had not moved his three divisions onto the Aliakmon, while he protested his innocence because he had been told nothing of the Yugoslav reply³⁵. At any rate, panic ensued because the Germans were scheduled to attack on the 12th and Papagos did not now have

83. For the medical officers' opinions see Crew, *Army Medical Services*, I.

34. British sources, both FO and WO, make it plain that ULTRA was not needed — Athens and Cairo were well-informed if they chose to see what was told them. The German schedule came from Sofia through normal diplomatic channels.

35. This was bad staff work on Eden's part. The message from the Yugoslav ambassador was crucial as the Tatoi message to Belgrade had gone through British channels and Papagos had only agreed to prepare to move.

20 days in which to switch his troops. And to move an experienced division from the Albanian front required 30 days, by sea. At any rate, after much discussion in which the British blamed the Greeks for their own careless staff work, the Dill-Papagos Agreement was worked out and signed. This provided for three very weak, scratch Greek divisions to be joined on the Aliakmon position by 3.5 British divisions, mostly composed of Australian, New Zealand and Polish troops, supported by a weak air force. This was far from the 8 to 10 British divisions that Papagos had asked for or the 200,000 troops which Metaxas had called for.

But the 58,000 sent were probably the maximum which the Middle East might have been able to support. In January when Churchill had mentally created the 4-division Middle East Reserve in the Nile Delta, it had been noted that if that force had been sent to Greece, it would in one month have sucked dry the ammunition reserves in the theater³⁶. When in June 1979 Major-General Konstantinos Kanakaris of the Greek Army Military History Directorate and I visited the Aliakmon Line we noted that its defence depended upon firepower. And firepower in a defensive struggle is highly consumptive of supplies. If Wavell was concerned about this, it has not been recorded, or at least discovered. But it is equally likely that since he was told early in March that the Germans would have 3 to 3.5 divisions on the Veria Line, that is at one of the passes in the Aliakmon, by 22 March, when he only expected to have a brigade ashore, there was nothing he needed to worry about — his deception plan was working as expected and his Dunkirk would occur shortly.

As soon as London heard of the Dill-Papagos Agreement the Cabinet was furious, but delighted that they could make Eden the scapegoat because he had failed to refer a diplomatic document back to them before concluding it. Churchill was at this point still for trying to back out³⁷. He was, through ULTRA and other sources, much more aware of the dangers and his political instincts were working in the right manner when he sensed that a decision had been made on facts totally unlike those which had been presented when the approval had been made in principle, since neither Yugoslavia nor Turkey would budge to create a bloc and aid themselves. Neither, of course, could

36. Kennedy, *The Business of War*, 82.

37. CAB 65/22; see also Sir Alexander Cadogan, *Diaries, 1938-1945* (New York, 1971), 362.

afford to do so. But neither Churchill nor the Cabinet were willing to be blunt, even though Menzies in London and the Australian and New Zealand Governments strongly suggested it, and so Eden and those in Cairo went on thinking that they had probably done the right thing.

At any rate, before the decisions were taken at the Tatoi and in Athens, the wheels were already in motion to send an expeditionary force from Egypt to Greece. It might have been part of a deception intended to keep the enemy off-balance while Wavell replenished the Western Desert forces for the final push they so much wanted to make on to Tripoli. But there was interference both from London and from Berlin. Churchill, who kept switching priorities, ordered Greece to become the first priority, thus depriving the dutiful Wavell of his grand strategic initiative, and Fliegerkorps X and Rommel showed up in the central Mediterranean. (Here ULTRA may have deceived Wavell; we do not know. Berlin, at least, thought Rommel was to lie low). So Wilson was sent to Greece barely disguised as «Mr. Watt» and sequestered in the British Embassy, the old Venizelos House on Loukia-nou Street in Athens, from which he was not allowed to emerge until a few days before the campaign began, though his staff had taken over the Hotel Acropole. Lieutenant-General Philip Neame, an Engineer friend of O'Connor's, was made Governor of Cyrenaica.

In the meantime the goings on in the Western Desert had affected Athens in another way. Almost from the first arrival of the British there in November 1940 there had been signals problems. The RAF signals set-up was professional and the Military Mission adopted it. But at the Cairo end Wavell was 3000 signallers short and those he did have had often been hastily trained and were not up to standard, with the result that they could not take messages at the speed at which the RAF transmitted. Moreover, this meant that the amount of traffic sent and received had to be cut back, which made it easier for the enemy to detect changes. Normal practice at that time was to limit traffic to 8000 four-letter groups per day of which, at this period, about 3000 were dummy messages used as fillers. As the British rolled west in the Desert they began to need more channels for the larger number of messages over longer distances. So certain channels which had originally been assigned to Athens were taken away and reallocated. This put a strain on communications to and from Greece, since the mails took about ten days even by air, for the channels left open could not be worked from midnight to six a.m. as the Hemisphere Layer shifted

and the signals would not bounce off the layer so they could be received at the other end. Thus there was a dead time daily when no messages could be sent or received. After the brief campaign in Greece, Wilson wrote a blistering report on his troubles which included a short dissertation on wireless sets. The British W/T sets of the day would not work in the mountains and most of them would not stand up to being driven around in trucks. After less than ten days of campaigning, only the special sets belonging to Major Reid's GHQ Liaison Regiment worked and even for these to be used the vehicle had to be stopped and two small masts erected or at least handheld. As Wilson noted, in the fast-moving defensive battle that developed, it took his liaison officers up to 24 hours to go from their posts to his headquarters and back again, by which time the situation was different and the posts were somewhere else³⁸.

One last curious feature of the Greek affair must be mentioned. After the survivors got back to Cairo, post-mortems were held by the various branches and these were then assembled into a critical report on the lessons to be learnt from the Greek campaign. By then, of course, Wavell had been forced into the abortive June battle in the Desert against Rommel after a long retreat from the borders of Tripoltania, had lost Churchill's confidence, and been moved to India. For over a year, partly because he was involved in other problems in the Far East, he refused to let the report go forward. Was it because it came to the wrong conclusions, or because he could not tell the whole story? Nor could he when his *London Gazette* dispatch appeared in 1946 nor yet when he wrote his autobiography in 1948. For all the family denies it exists, in spite of John Connell's stating the autobiography was the basis for his first volume, could it be that hidden there is the key to the modern one-eyed Sphinx, sometime Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, and his grand strategy? Wavell was too astute and had been too long in the area not to have had one, no matter how myopic London was. And deception, surprise, and a sense of humour were often a part of his plans.

Conclusions


Two clear lessons and one intriguing speculation thus emerge from

38. For Wilson's report see WO 201/95; on the Recce Regiment, which could signal the UK directly though it suspected the security of its cyphers, see Reid, *Last on the List*.

the story of the British decision to aid Greece in 1940-1941. The lessons are that the root cause of the loss was not lack of airpower, but that technically, tactically and mentally the British were simply not equipped for the task. Second, their decision-making process, as I have detailed in my forthcoming book, was faulty, but not for lack of ULTRA. Lastly, and by far the most intriguing, is the question as to why did Wavell go to Greece — who was he out to deceive? And was he successful in pulling off a grand-strategic deception? And to these might be added the failure of the British Higher Direction to have a grand strategy for the Middle East — Eastern Mediterranean theater. If there had been one in February 1941 to guide Eden, it might have had the following priorities governed by the means available:

1. Secure Egypt and the Suez Canal
2. Finish the campaign in East Africa
3. Drive on to Tripoli
4. Secure Crete
5. Take the Dodecanese (*Operation Mandible*)
6. Aid to Greece.

Anyone but King George II, Generals Metaxas and Papagos might ask why put aid to Greece at the bottom of the list. The answer again lies in technical realities. As noted above, the British were not in a position to provide the forces the Greeks needed for an effective resistance against the Italians and the Germans. Moreover, by early February 1941 the Greek army was down to a 60-day stock of ammunition with little hope of replenishment. So its end as a fighting force was not far off because the British were not in the position to re-equip it, though this was discussed. The British could have done much more for the Greek cause by securing Crete which the Germans could not have taken against determined and properly organized opposition. And Crete would have provided an outflanking base from which to provide air cover for the attack on the Dodecanese, which had to be cleared in order to safeguard both the Suez Canal and the Middle Eastern oilfields. Discretion is the better part of valour, while emotion is a poor tool in military planning. By putting the moral myth of classical Greece before the realities of modern blitzkrieg war, the British cost themselves victory in North Africa in the first half of 1941 and left the Dodecanese a thorn in their side until the war ended in 1945. Not long after the defeat in Greece the British action there was also defended



Map I. The view from London.



Map II. The view from Cairo.

N. HAMMOND

MEMORIES OF A BRITISH OFFICER SERVING
IN SPECIAL OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE IN GREECE, 1941

The «Ochi» (No!) of Metaxas to Mussolini's ultimatum and the Greek counter - offensive in the harsh winter of 1940-1941 won world - wide admiration. The offensive was largely an unaided effort. In view of his wide commitments Wavell was able at first to send only a Military Mission and a few squadrons of fighter - aircraft, and later, after the victory in the Western Desert in January 1941, large quantities of captured Italian transport and supplies. The Greeks excelled in mountain warfare; men, women and mules moved their artillery high up above the snow - line, and the Evzones, the Greek Highlanders, charged down with the battlecry of «Aera», and drove off the Italians with the bayonet and the hand - grenade. As we found later, they suffered more casualties from frostbite (*kryopagemata*) than from enemy action. The spirit of the people in Athens was tremendous. Unified behind Metaxas and confident in their achievements, they sang ballads ridiculing the «macaroni - eaters» and their bull - frog of a leader in truly Aristophanic manner, and they showed a sense of purpose and discipline which appeared also in the soldiers and sailors who seemed to be constantly on the march through the streets of Athens. All entertainments were off, except for a night - club or two for foreigners, where British and Germans sat at adjoining tables. For Greece was still at peace with Germany.

S.O.E. in Athens was attached to the Embassy and had offices near it in Merlin St. It was run by two young business men, P. and P., one of whom had had much local experience, and the staff was assisted by girl secretaries, store - keepers and so on — a set - up more akin to peacetime and not what I had been accustomed to in Palestine. At first my task was to deal with the arrival of stores at the Peiraeus and their delivery to Merlin St., and to negotiate at the «Poudrerie», or arms factory on the outskirts of Athens, where we were buying up large quantities of small arms and ammunition. Later I was put on to the training of Greek agents in the use of explosives, which involved driving to remote parts of the coast, blowing up hunks of scrap - iron, and getting away before the police arrived. These activities brought me into touch with some of the leaders of a clandestine organisation in Athens, which had been equipped with wireless

transmitters of the type made by us in Palestine. It was clear to me that a few of these agents and leaders were Venizelist and that the bulk of them were Communists. This was the legacy of a decision which had been taken many months earlier.

The background to that decision had been something like this. It was thought that Metaxas and his fellow - Generals, such as Papagos, having been trained as young officers in Germany, were likely not to resist Germany, with which of course their régime had something in common. As S.O.E. was concerned not with initial resistance to the Axis but with sabotage and resistance after occupation by the enemy, the decision had been taken to train only anti - Metaxas elements. These were of two kinds. The first consisted of senior Army officers and politicians of the Venizelist group, whom Metaxas had ousted at the time of his coup d'état and had not seen fit to employ in senior positions; in general these were elderly men, as the younger Venizelists had joined up to fight against Italy. The others were Communists who had been outlawed by Metaxas and were generally still in hiding. They were highly trained in underground methods, as they had been operating in this way for some years, and they were far more determined characters than the average Venizelist; but their loyalties were to Russia, and at this stage in the war Russia was at peace with Germany.

It seemed to me absurd to train the anti - Metaxas personnel only. The heroes of the war were fighting under the Metaxas Government against the Italians in Albania, and the best of these would fight on in the hills or provide information from the cities, if Greece was occupied. I argued that the basis on which the earlier decision had been taken was no longer valid, and that Greece would resist Germany also, if Germany intervened. I won the argument, and a change of policy was approved; but it came too late. The political scene was changing rapidly. Germany was already in possession of Bulgaria, and the Yugoslav regime was pro - German. On March 27th a revolution brought Yugoslavia over to our side. It was a great opportunity for S.O.E. in Athens. We sent supplies of arms and explosives as fast as we could by rail, so that a Yugoslav resistance movement could be equipped. This was the beginning in fact of the Chetnik movement, soon to be led by Mihailovits. At the last moment our Cairo H.Q. woke up to the possibility of organising a resistance movement in Greece, and a mission headed by Peter Fleming, the Tibetan explorer, arrived only a few days before the German invasion began. Fleming's task

was to select bases for guerrilla warfare and to organise supplies and personnel. He invited me to join his mission, but in my opinion he had come too late in the day. I refused his invitation and advised him to work through official Greek channels and select his bases first in Northern Pindus and in Chalcidice. Needless to say, the plans were still-born and nothing came of the mission.

On Sunday April 6th Belgrade was savagely bombed by the Luftwaffe. On the same day Metaxas said «No» to an ultimatum from Germany. Crowds collected at the British Embassy, singing «God save the King» and «Tipperary»; there were bands and demonstrations in the streets, and flags were flown everywhere. That night the Germans made an air-raid on the Peiraeus. A ship loaded with explosives was hit, and there was a tremendous explosion, which fetched down a bit of the ceiling in my room five miles away. At dawn the next day I drove a lorry down to the Peiraeus and collected S.O.E. stores, which were to be sent off to Yugoslavia.

On April 7th I was sent north with a medium-sized lorry and a small Greek driver. My orders were to meet a party of British and other diplomats who were in flight from Belgrade, and hoped to reach Florina before the German advance from Yugoslavia caught up with them. The one and only main road to the north, via Thebes and Larissa, was devoid of tarmac and heavily pot-holed. On the way I picked up two Greek privates who had been injured through frost-bite, and were now returning from sick-leave. Their one aim was to get back to the fighting line. They were as confident as ever of a quick victory. Their mood was reflected in every village on the journey north until I reached Florina. There it was reported that the Germans were already in occupation of Salonica, having smashed their way through South Serbia and North Macedonia. As the British line lay south of Salonica, the Germans were not yet in contact with our main forces. Another detachment of Germans was expected to enter Florina from the north in a matter of hours. The Greek H.Q. at Florina was in turmoil. The Greek Colonel in command told me he was moving his unit south to Amyntaion behind our front line, but in fact, as I learnt later, he himself with his staff set off for Koritsa in Albania, leaving his troops to fall back to Amyntaion in confusion.

There were already at Florina a number of Serbian refugees, mostly women and children, who had been stopped by the Greeks and refused admission towards the south. I interviewed them and advised them to work their way back into Yugoslavia during the confusion

of the German advance. Most of the women were hysterical and in deadly fear of German planes machine - gunning them from the air. I gave them some food and money, but I doubt if they had the courage to move. Among them were two young officers of the Yugoslav Air Force. Before the change in Government which had brought Yugoslavia into the war, they had taken to the hills and crossed in snow over the Greek frontier, in order to join the Allies. The Greeks had no use for them, but after examining their papers, I said I would take them back to Athens. No one had heard of my party of British and other diplomats, and it was clear that they could not now arrive ahead of the Germans.

When I left Florina, all Greek troops and many civilians had gone, the latter removing their valuables to the hills. The town was very quiet as we set off with our two Yugoslavs and some lightly wounded Greek soldiers. The Serbian refugees watched us go in silence. My driver, a little Greek private, drove at full speed and in great fear to the cross - roads where the Florina road joins the main road from Yugoslavia, down which the advancing Germans might be expected.


When we were on the main road, we found it was so impeded with piles of road metal that it was, in effect, a one - way road. As everyone was going south now, this may not seem to have mattered, but in fact there was general confusion. Some Greek troops had their stores and ammunition dragged by horses or oxen. Others tried to force their way past in rickety buses, converted by a daub of paint into military vehicles, or in large Italian trucks which had been captured in Libya and sent to Greece. One realised the difficulties the Greeks must have had in supplying their front in Albania, and the difficulty they would now have in keeping contact with our mechanised forces. The Greek troops were in good heart. There were no civilians refugees on the road. The only peasant to whom I spoke was hastening south to report for duty, as his age group was due for conscription. His only fear was that he might be too late for the fighting. As we passed through the British outposts at Klidhi, the road was already drilled for mining, and the guns and tanks were deployed. The men were having their tea, and were rather quiet. The weather had been as splendid as only Greek weather in the Spring can be, but at midday it had turned cold and a drizzle was falling. There was still snow on the hilltops. We entered Amyntaion just before dark. The town was full of Yugoslavs and Greeks who were jostling one another as they queued up to catch the train which ran south towards Kozani. On the edge of the town.

a Yugoslav mechanised battery was parked; its officers were resplendent in blue and gold uniforms, and walked with a swagger. They had not been in action, and contrasted strangely with the shabby Greek troops who had seen service in Albania. Greek H.Q. appeared to be in some confusion; no officer of the unit to which my wounded Greek soldiers belonged could be found, and I decided to take them on to Kozani.

When we reached Kozani, rain and sleet had set in. It was clear that many of our deployed M.T. (motor transport) and guns were in danger of being bogged down where they stood. The advanced landing-ground for aircraft at Kozani was said to be unusable. That evening I left Kozani and drove by night through Thessaly where the asphodels on the hillsides were shining like white wax in bright moonlight. We had a picnic at dawn by the roadside, and later we dropped down the twisting road to Lamia — a road which lends itself to demolition. We rested during the day, and we left at dark on the last stage of our journey via Thebes to Athens. I drove at night to keep out of the way of our main forces, which were still moving up from Athens to the forward areas during daylight.

At Athens the head of my department was as confident as ever that he would be wintering in Greece. He sent me out to hire flats for more personnel on a year's lease, the bulk of the rent being paid in advance. I visited a friend in the Intelligence Department of C.H.Q. and suggested to him that the weak point of our main line was west of Klidhi where an undefended route led to Grevena, and that it was possible for mechanised forces to proceed from Grevena via Velemishti or Milia to Kalabaka. He did not think so. Indeed he denied that such a route was practicable for mechanised transport. I consulted Professor Wace, then in the Passport Control Office, who agreed with me in thinking the route possible for mechanised forces. Our friend was unshaken in his opinion. As we heard later, this was the route by which the Germans turned our position along the lower Haliacmon River, reached Ioannina, and caused the Greek collapse. If we had blown up a bridge or two they would not have got through.

In Athens the same enthusiasm prevailed. There were processions in the streets. One of the most popular was a parade of mountain guns; they were carried by mules down Stadium Street, en route for the front in Albania. If there was an air raid at night, everyone went into the streets or on to the roof-tops and cheered when a search-light held a German plane in its beam. On one occasion we saw one shot



down in flames. Excitement ran high in the belief that the British and the Greeks would hold the Germans and the Italians. I had been only a few days in Athens, when the head of my department sent for me and explained that preliminary plans were being made for the demolition of certain targets in the event of a withdrawal. Among the targets allocated to our department was the cotton factory at Lake Copais. He explained that any demolition would have to be carried out without the knowledge of the Greek Government. He wanted me to make a reconnaissance but he considered there was no need for haste, and that I should not take up any explosive. I insisted on leaving at once with explosive, and gained my point. Another officer and I set off on April 21st in a shiny blue Ford pick-up, loaded with explosives, incendiaries and tins of petrol. When I had visited Peiraeus after the great explosion, I had seen wooden barges laden with cotton bales. The barges were burnt away to water level, but the bales were burnt only on the outside. I reckoned I should need a combination of explosives, incendiaries and petrol at Lake Copais, and I expected that we should have to act quickly when the time came.

We left shortly after dawn, and soon saw German planes flying high towards Peiraeus and Patras. It was a clear bright day. We passed many burnt-out trucks on the roadside, and there was little traffic. We watched out for German planes as far as was possible in our shiny Ford with its enclosed driver's seat. We were passing through a hollow with low hills on all sides, and there were some army trucks ahead of us, when I saw four German planes swoop over the hills on our right. I jammed on the brakes and dived for the ditch as the planes opened fire. The truck in front was hit. It blew up in a burst of flame. The planes disappeared in a matter of seconds. We drove on past the gutted truck and reached cover at Haliartus before the next planes came over low and machine-gunned the road. I learnt that an A.A. battery H.Q. was located at the hostel of the Lake Copais Company on a wooded hill-top. I went to visit the C.O., who generously agreed to house my explosives in a larder alongside his mess. As German planes were coming over low every fifteen minutes he asked me to get my conspicuous vehicle off-loaded in one of the intervals. It was off-loaded in time, but in cacking out of a difficult approach to the larder, my off rear wheel dropped into an open drain up to the axle. The car was stuck in the open, its shiny roof reflecting the rays of the sun. By collecting every man within hearing, we lifted it out bodily, and I got it under some trees just in time as the next batch of planes roared over.

The Germans were engaged mainly in bombing the cross-roads at Haliartus, which lay just below us, and they occasionally machine-gunned the village beside the road. The enclosure of the Copais Company factory lay alongside the road and not far from the crossroads. It was surrounded by a high wall. We found that the gate was locked, and the place was deserted. I walked up the hill behind the village, found a peasant, and eventually located a Greek official of the Copais Company. After some delay, he brought me the main keys. I explained that my job was to see what precautions could be taken against fire in the factory, if German bombers should hit it. He was not willing to accompany us to the factory. We reconnoitred it as far as we could. The warehouses were padlocked. We could see into them only by placing ladders against small ventilation windows which were high up in the walls. We found that they contained large stocks of cotton in bale and in slack, wheat in slack, and engine rooms. About lunchtime there was a lull in the German bombing, and we joined the A.A. mess to eat our rations. They told us of the retreat from Thessaly, and of their own need to conserve their A.A. ammunition at present. The German bombing had done almost no damage to the main road. On the other hand, we could see big fires burning in the railway yard at Levadeia to the north. Although none of us knew it, the Greek command in Albania had surrendered that very morning, and the main Greek force was out of the battle. This turned our position on the Greek mainland, for the Germans could and did press on to the Peloponnese, crossing the western part of the Gulf of Corinth. The surrender of the Greek Army was not published on our side until the 27th, by which date the evacuation had begun and the Greek Government had flown to Crete. The intensive bombing of the main road was intended to hinder our eventual retreat. German planes were coming in from the north and from the east from (the Dodecanese), meeting at Haliartus in pursuit of their objectives. We saw enough of German air power on that day to appreciate the danger.

Returning to Athens that evening, I handed in my report. Next day I was sent to Eleusis to transport a magnetic mine from there to Peiraeus in an open lorry. The Eleusis airfield, where I loaded the mine, had just been successfully raided by the Luftwaffe, and several gutted planes were still smoking on the airfield. With the mine I collected an able-bodied seaman, one Saunders, with rabbit teeth, sandy hair, and an engaging grin. He sat astride the mine as if it were a horse, and grinned as we bounced along the pot-holes with a yard or more of

the mine sticking over the tail-board. On the outskirts of Athens the air-raid sirens blew, but I drove on through Stadium Street with Greek police trying to stop me, for the rule was that all traffic should stop during an air-raid. Saunders had a good laugh when he saw them gaping at the tail of the mine after we had passed them. We reached Peiraeus with the «all clear», and I left the mine and Saunders with a young naval officer called Mike Cumberlege.

A couple of days later I joined him for the planting of the mine in the Corinth Canal. It was a very secret operation and had to be done without the knowledge of the Greek authorities. I was required as a Greek-speaking officer, so that we could obtain permission to pass through the Canal in our caique. It proved less difficult than I had expected, because the news of the Greek capitulation in Albania had spread, and the Greek naval officers at the entrance to the Canal were less careful than usual. They went over the caique, but disregarded our dinghy, which was in tow with Saunders and the mine sitting inside it, entirely covered by a large tarpaulin. As we chugged our way through the steep-sided passage of the Canal, we noted faults in the rock, and places where demolition might be possible. After passing below the road-bridge and the Greek guards high above us, Mike joined Saunders in the dinghy, activated the mine and dumped it overboard, while we were still in the deep shadow of the canal side. At the western end of the Canal we asked for some information (to account for our presence there), and then sailed back through the canal and on to the Peiraeus. It was hoped that the mine would sink the first metal-hulled ship to use the canal, almost certainly an Italian naval vessel, but Mike learnt later, that the mine failed to go off.

In Athens, I spent some of the night-hours taking special stores round to our agents in Athens, driving without lights through backstreets, and going quietly into untenanted houses like a footpad. One morning I pressed for orders to undertake the demolition at Lake Copais. The head of my department was now opposed to the demolition, perhaps because the presence of wheat in the stores could be used as a reason for not destroying the cotton. On the other hand, I knew that cotton was much needed by the Germans. In the end, I persuaded him to go with me to see General Heywood, the Commander of the Allied Mission in Greece. An elderly, tired man, he dithered and then decided against demolition. I asked permission to take the matter to the G.O.C., «Jumbo» Wilson. Heywood was displeased, but did not refuse. I caught the G.O.C. before a conference, and explained the position. He decided

immediately that the warehouses should be demolished. I collected five sappers, and set off in the evening for Copais, with another officer under me. We took two cars. We were to report by dawn on the next day but one at a small harbour near the Peiraeus for evacuation by caique. If we missed the caique, we must take our chance.

We reached Haliartus after dark, having passed many more burnt out vehicles than on the last trip. My orders were to contact the advanced H.Q., but we learnt it had already moved to the south of us. I therefore drove up to the A.A. post on the hill - top, which we found deserted, but my demolition stores were intact. We shifted the stores down to the warehouses, and forced an entry with a crowbar, which I had brought with me from Athens. The cotton was in three great warehouses, built of concrete with sliding doors and metal roofs. The bales were packed tight together in stacks from floor to roof, but there were narrow alleyways between the stacks. My plan was to cut the steel tapes of the bales facing the metal doors, and to lay small explosive and incendiary charges in the interstices between the bales; to lay heavier charges among the stacks further inside the warehouses; and to leave charges against the end walls, which would blow holes and create a through draught. We only had a small supply of petrol. This was concentrated beside the bales facing the metal doors. We finished the setting of the charges by 5 a.m. The men had worked in shifts. As one of them was ill, and the officer was no help, I sent them off in one of the cars to Athens. The rest of us lay outside the main warehouse in the sun, all with gellignite headaches and sleepy. Not long after dawn, four planes came over. They circled over the warehouses, and dropped several salvos of bombs. I called out to the men to lie still, but one man jumped up and ran as the first lot dropped. One bomb fell some fifty yards away, and at that moment he slipped and fell in front of a steel door. The door was perforated, but he was untouched. During the bombing, I had heard several of the charges detonate in the adjoining warehouse. As it was intended to make the destruction of the cotton appear to be due either to enemy action or an accident, I had laid small charges only. So no harm was done. But we moved to the outer side of the compound for the rest of the day.

During the day, which was hot and clear, the bombing of the road was fairly continuous, but the bombs were not heavy ones. I found an R.E. officer in Haliartus who agreed to bring me some forty - four gallon drums of petrol from a dump which I had discovered nearby. He sent for me later to help nurse a Greek soldier whose leg had been

almost severed below the knee by shrapnel from a bomb. Like many others who had surrendered with the Greek forces in Epirus, he was walking home to his village and he had been resting near the road after dawn, when the bombing started. There were no medical stores or stretchers. He lay under a tree on a trestle bed in a field. When I talked Greek to him, he was partly delirious and kept repeating the question «pou eene to podhi mou?» «where is my foot»? Later, he told me he was a peasant from a village in the Peloponnese with a wife and children, but he always returned to the same question, however often I said his leg was damaged, but would probably be saved. Eventually, we got a truck and sent him down to a field dressing station. I was violently sick at one stage in the proceedings. It made one feel the pathos of war for a simple-hearted and uneducated Greek peasant whose family would be brought almost to starvation by the splinter of that bomb. He himself was so brave in his pain, and so grateful for the little one could do.

Late in the day, I inspected the damage to the factory and warehouses and chased out some looting Greeks on the pretext that I was responsible for guarding the buildings and preventing fire. By the evening we had the forty-four gallon drums of petrol in place. The retreat was now under way. A solid stream of vehicles began to pass southwards as soon as the light faded. Just before dark a fire started in an outlying warehouse, fortunately the furthest from the road, so that the stream of vehicles was not lit up. The R.E. Officer told me that he would demolish the road bridge at Haliartus at 2 a.m., by which time the last of our forces would have passed. As it would take us five or more hours to reach Athens, we should not catch our caique if we waited until then. I explained the situation to the R.E. officer, and he agreed to fire my charges at 2 a.m. He came over to see the charges and liked the job.

We stayed till 9 p.m. to guard the warehouse. The burning warehouse cast a glow over the other buildings, and we saw no Greeks inside the enclosure. As I was driving out in our small car with my four sappers, an old Greek, whom I has been pottering about during the day, passed in the glow of the fire. I had to decide whether or not to shoot him. He had seemed a bit cracked when I had spoken to him during the day, and my charges were well hidden. So we let him go. On the main road, we fell into the stream of trucks, and drove on through clouds of dust. It was a slow procession of vehicles, nose to tail with dimmed lights, and it moved at little more than walking speed.

When we stopped, we realized that on each side of the road a line of men was walking southwards. They were Greek soldiers who had laid down their arms in Albania. They never asked for a lift. We felt respect and affection for them as they wished us good luck and a happy return to Greece. As Winston Churchill wrote later, «there were no recriminations. The friendliness and aid which the Greeks had so faithfully shown to our troops endured to the end... Greek martial honour stands undimmed». Around 3 a.m. I broke out of the stream and turned off for Athens. Although dawn was near, I had to stop until my eyes were rested once the strain of driving in convoy was over. We passed through Athens, which was as quiet as the grave, and reached the little harbour in the grey light of dawn. I blew the horn and shouted, but we got no reply. I put off in a rowing boat, and found our caique near the mouth of the harbour. They were getting ready to sail in the firm belief that we had not come in time.

By mid-day we were bathing at Hydra. We sailed on down to Monemvasia in Laconia, where we were to take off General Heywood on the 28th. We anchored in a bay north of Monemvasia. Next morning I walked into Monemvasia town where I found a Greek destroyer and merchantman anchored inshore. Entering the cafe alongside, I learnt from some of the crew of the destroyer that they had been in convoy for Egypt when they had been bombed. Some of the ships had gone on, but these two had had a minor mutiny, and had put back. There was much ill-feeling between officers and men, and arguments were still going on. A roar of planes brought us outside, and we saw twelve Messerschmidts diving towards us. We dashed back into the restaurant as the bombs fell, bringing down most of the plaster. I noticed one Greek turning an olive-green to yellow colour, the colour in which fear was expressed in antiquity. As the bombing ceased, a sailor dashed in and hurled himself into a corner. He had been aboard the destroyer by himself (although she had A.A. guns), and he had swum the short distance to the rocks before the bombs came. The destroyer had been hit and was in two parts, her bows cast up into the rocks, and the merchantman was burning. The Greeks were soon going home in twos and threes with their kitbags on their shoulders, officers as well as men. The war had definitely ended for them.

Further inland, I found a British officer who had come ahead to arrange for the evacuation. As I had explored part of the coast, I told him of beaches, and said I would try to bring our caiques round to help in the evacuation next evening. As I was returning to our two

caiques, I was stopped by a car carrying a naval captain and his family, survivors from a ship hit in the Peiraeus. They had got away by sea to the Peloponnese and had taken a taxi to Monemvasia, where evacuation was due the next evening. He told me that General Heywood had been evacuated by plane. On the way to our own anchorage, I stripped and swam out to four seaplanes which lay off-shore in shallow water. I wanted to see if they required demolition. I was on one when I spotted a German plane flying low in my direction. I jumped off and swam as quickly as I could to the shore. As he began machine-gunning the sea-planes, I was lying flat on the beach. It was clear that the vicinity of Monemvasia was a dangerous place for any caique to be. So when I got back to the others, I suggested that one caique should sail at once for Crete with the women and children of the Greek skipper, and with all the stores, and that the second should stay to help with the evacuation, but they decided that both should remain.

Just before dawn I heard engines, and made out small landing-craft coming in all round us. It was clear that they were coming in for the evacuation, and that they had chosen our anchorage as a hide-up. I persuaded the others that our anchorage was now unhealthy. They sailed off northwards to Yeraka, further up the coast while I got ashore and talked to the naval people. Their commander, Rear-Admiral Bailey Gromer, told me his craft were staying for that day and would move into Monemvasia at dusk. I guided one of his officers into Monemvasia to make contact with the Army and arrange a plan for evacuation. We found a Brigadier Galloway with some staff officers, and had a conference. As he was short of small craft, it was agreed that I should bring a caique round to Monemvasia that night. I then walked to Yeraka, passing two villages where bread and good wishes were pressed upon me by Greeks who knew of the Greek surrender, but not of the fate of their sons serving in Albania. On the way I heard bombing and saw planes over Bailey Gromer's force.

Just before I reached Yeraka, I saw a German plane fly low over Yeraka bay and drop its bombs. I could not see the water as a ridge of rock lay between, but I watched the timbers and the brebis flying upwards. Hurrying over the rocks, I saw several caiques sunk, and only one of our two afloat. All the caiques had been anchored in a row along one side of the narrow channel. They offered a perfect target. None of our people was about, but in response to my shouts a Greek of our party emerged from some rocks. I told him to come and help me move the surviving caique to the other side of the channel, where

she would be less exposed. I swam out to her, and after some argument he came to join me. We up - anchored and towed her in with a rowing boat. As I got ashore the Greek owner of the caique went abroad and started a fight with the Greek who had helped me, both parties drawing knives, but I got them apart.

As one of our caiques was sunk, and it proved impossible to engage another caique to help in the evacuation, we all got aboard the survivor, and sailed off after dusk. With the first light of dawn we saw cruiser and destroyers at sea, outlined against the morning sky. The Greeks cried out that they were Italian ships; then planes came over, and the ships and the planes tried at one another, until an exchange of rockets established that they were on the same side. Later, we learnt they were our ships and planes. At the time we hurried into the cover of some desert islands called the Ananas, and brought the caique to anchor in a shady place so that we should be less visible from the air. In the evening, a whaleboat came round the corner of the island. We shouted and waved, and it came towards us. It contained twenty - four survivors of the destroyer «Wryneck», which had been sunk during the evacuation. Some were wounded and all were cold and hungry after thirty - six hours in the water and in the whaleboat. It had been calm all day, but now a wind was getting up. After talking it over with the Greek caique skipper, I decided that we should tow the whaler and jettison all our cargo in order to take the men on board. We gave them food and drink, and dressed their wounds. An engineer petty - officer who was in charge of them kept going despite a stomach wound. One of the crew was a wretched Lascar, half - dead with cold and exposure.

At dusk we set off towards Crete, our hold crammed with the men, and the whaler in tow. It was difficult to keep the men in the hold until we got out to sea, where we ran into big waves. With a following wind and sea, we made good speed, and the whaler towed well with two men to steer her. I slept a bit sitting opposite a Greek sailor, with my head resting on his shoulder and his on mine, and with our legs dangling into the forecastle hatch. Next morning we were picked up by an «A» lighter, which towed us into Souda Bay at noon. We spent several hours arranging for the wounded men to go to an emergency hospital, and for our caique to be moored in a safe place. Then a lift to Canea, a meal in a Taverna and a long sleep under the trees. Next morning I woke to find men of all ranks around me, the flotsam and jetsam of the evacuation from Greece. The wine - shops were the great

attraction. Before the day was out, I was called in twice by wine-shop owners who knew I spoke Greek. On the first occasion I turned out some Aussies who were breaking the shop up, but on the second occasion I was thrown out by the Aussies.

In Canea the usual scramble was going on for the best accommodation. The advance party of my branch had staked a claim on a large house, and expected to occupy it for the winter at least. The company was made up of officers, English girl typists, Greek staff and hanger-on, including a girl from a cabaret in Athens. It was suggested that I should go on to Cairo, but I was eager to stay in Crete. I obtained permission to join Mike Cumberlege, whom I had already met in Egypt and Athens. He was in command of H.M.S. «Dolphin». She was a metal-hulled caique from Haifa. At a distance she appeared to be an innocent caique or Greek sailing-vessel, but in fact she was well armed with two Lewis guns and two Bren guns set on anti-aircraft mountings, and a two-pounder gun in her bows. In Greece she had shot down several enemy planes, and she had done good work in ferrying troops from the beaches at Nauplia and Monemvasia to the destroyers. Her crew was formed by Mike and his cousin Cle, a regular R.A. officer; an able-bodied seaman of eighteen years' service, Saunders, who had ridden on my magnetic mine through Athens; and two Palestinian Jews, Sam and Johnny. I joined her one evening, and the next morning I rowed some three miles in a small dinghy to one of the two small islands where we had a dump of explosives, at the mouth of Souda Bay. Here we had an officer in charge, and there was also a company of New Zealand A.A. machine-gunners camped on the island. After arranging for the transport of stores for the «Dolphin», I rowed back in a flat calm sea with a hot sun. When I was in the middle of the bay, several waves of dive-bombers attacked the shipping at the head of the bay and came out towards the two islands, flying as low as possible to keep underneath the anti-aircraft fire. Sitting in my dinghy, I seemed to be in the centre of the falling shrapnel. My first reaction was to lie down under the thwarts, where I listened to the bangs on the sides of the boat caused by the concussion of the bombs in the sea, and to the splashes of the falling shrapnel. Then it seemed ridiculous to lie down, so I sat up again and tried to row on in seeming indifference. Then once again I would lie down under the thwarts. In this halting manner I reached the first ship as the raid was ending. I was greeted with cheers and catcalls from its crew and gunners, who had had a good laugh at my antics.

Our first job for the Navy was to reconnoitre the beaches on the south coast of Crete for the landing of stores, since Souda was already too dangerous for general purposes. Mike also had in mind the value of such a reconnaissance for a return to Crete, if it was lost to the enemy. Our first trip was by car to Sphakia, a village famous for its brigands, which lies at the foot of a deep ravine and has the smallest of landing places. The road was of the worst. In the southern stretch, it was only partly excavated, and ended abruptly, as so many Greek roads do, a few miles from Sphakia. The Sphakia road looked most unsuitable for the carting of stores. From the road end we walked down a torrent bed within the deep ravine.

From Sphakia we took a small caique to Loutro, a better landing place, but almost inaccessible by land. Several caiques lay there, close together, as they had lain at Yeraka Bay, offering a good bombing target. We heard later that all of them were sunk by bombing in the last stages of the campaign. Returning by Sphakia, we carried up a box of eggs and a crate of fish to our car, and returned to Souda where we handed in a report on Sphakia and Loutro beaches. Next day we sailed along the coast to Heraklion, where we had our engines overhauled, a job which lasted a week. During that time Cle and I crossed the island and reconnoitred the beaches at Matala, Kokkinos Pyrgos, and Ayia Galene, of which only Kokkinos Pyrgos was suitable for landing stores. On these trips we met some of Pendlebury's guerrilla chiefs, usually elderly men of peasant type, dressed in Cretan costume and carrying a variety of weapons. They were perhaps too well-known; for those I met were mostly killed by the Germans soon after the fall of Crete. At Heraklion we had some happy evenings with John Pendlebury. He was eager to find out what the enemy had in store for us. He drew up a plan for a raid on Kato, in which John and his picked men were to take some prisoners from whom information of enemy plans might be obtained. Pendlebury wanted me to join him and stay with him should Crete fall; we left it open until our raid on Kato was made. Meanwhile he gave me some idea of his organisation. The difficulty, as always, was to get arms and ammunition; the rifles and ammunition which had been destined for him had been diverted to Greece and had never returned, so that his force was almost weaponless.

By this time we had seen some of the forces available for the defence of Crete. In Souda, Canea and Heraklion the survivors of the Expeditionary Force which had been evacuated from the Greek main-

land were deficient in equipment; caiques were still coming in with men who did not even have rifles. Some of the Australians were without arms, and some without discipline, drinking hard and talking much of the fifth column. Crete had lost two divisions, one in Albania and one in Thrace, and there were now few Cretans of military age in the island. The people resented the loss of these two divisions and were critical of the Greek Government and Staff. The Commander of a Cretan division and some other officers escaped from Greece and landed near Canea, to be shot by their countrymen for leaving the division behind. But there was no doubt the Cretans would fight with anything we could give them. Apart from the Cretans, there were some Greek regular officers who had escaped from Greece, and a small force of Greek recruits who had been undergoing training in Crete for service in Albania. At Heraklion we had a battalion of the Black Watch and some other units which had not been in Greece, and so were fully equipped; they gave a good account of themselves later. We did not know the situation at Malemi.

At Souda the German Air Force had met with little opposition. It was the same at Heraklion. The «Dolphin» lay in the inner Venetian harbour, close to the stone quayside. We slept on deck. Each day before dawn, as we lay in the moonlight, we would hear an enemy plane come over and circle the harbour and aerodrome. When it turned out to sea as a preliminary to a run - in for bombing, we dashed on shore, the men going to the shelters and the officers to a terrace from which we watched to see if the enemy was laying mines in the harbour. We never saw the mines, but we saw plenty of bombs explode. The German planes came back sometimes at midday, and always at dusk, to blast the aerodrome and machine - gun or bomb the harbour. From the aerodrome two Gladiators went up against thirty - odd Germans; they lasted for a day or two, and then they were shot down. From our position by the quayside we machine - gunned any low - flying planes. They passed like great ducks on their evening flight. As they sped past we peppered them with all we had, while their rear - gunners replied with tracer bullets which always seemed to be coming straight for you. One plane came down in flames, but we were not sure if we could claim it.

In between raids, life was blissful at Heraklion. We bathed in the blue waters of the harbour, breakfasted on the fresh fish killed by the German bombs, and made many friends with the Cretans over a glass of wine or a dish of yiaourti. Saunders adopted me as his buddy. We

went ashore in the evenings. He was devoted to a small nephew, for whom he was always buying presents, and he had many yarns of his naval service, ending with the sinking of a destroyer off Greece, when he was one of the few to survive. The N.O.I.C. at Heraklion was the naval captain whom I had met on the road near Monemvasia. He was nick - named Snow - white. He instructed us to report on the possibility of salvaging the cargo of a sunk steamer at Hierapetra on the south coast. Before we sailed, we rid ourselves of the two Palestinians. They were replaced by Jumbo Steels, who was a Rhodesian serving in the Black Watch, and by a Dodecanesian Greek, Kyriakou Kyriakides, a sponge - diver by trade, who had served in Macedonia as a volunteer in an infantry battalion of Dodecanesians. Jumbo was a first class machine - gunner and could serve as ship's engineer. Kyriakou dived like a fish, knew the coast of Crete and Libya, and had a child - like sense of humour and devotion. He used to brink up all variety of shell fish, crabs and sea - weed from the seabottom, and insist on our eating them, and then laugh at our expressions. Delighted to be on the sea again, he used to clean our dinghy by rolling it round and round in the water, a trick none of us could learn.

On the way to Hierapetra we visited two desert islands, Dia and Elasa, on which a few wild goats were to be seen, and we chose hidden anchorages suitable for a caique. At Hierapetra the ship under the surface lay in shallow water about a mile off-shore. She had sailed from Alexandria with a cargo of A.A. guns, machine guns, mortars, rifles and ammunition, and in consequence, no doubt, of information given to the enemy she had been torpedoed out at sea. She had limbed towards Hierapetra only to be sunk by enemy bombers. If she had reached Souda, or even been beached at Hierapetra, her cargo might have saved Crete from capture. The Germans were taking no chances anyhow; for enemy planes came over Hierapetra throughout the day to watch the wreck. We sent Kyriakou down to examine her hull, but it was clear that nothing could be done to salvage the cargo without equipment from Souda. We sent on westwards and completed our reconnaissance of the coast up to Sudsuro near Matala. Here I rang up Pendlebury and arranged that we should collect his men on May 19th and make the raid on Kaso on the 20th. Near Sudsuro we visited a monastery in a narrow and remote valley where there was one monk. He was daft, and wanted to go to sea with us. It was quite a job to shake him off. Many months later, Mike was to use this valley when he returned to Crete.

From Sudsuro we returned as we had come, and we stopped in the afternoon at the desert island in the Kaso Strait. We intended to cross the channel that night and make a reconnaissance by moonlight of the stretch of the Kaso coast on which we had agreed with Pendlebury to land on the 20th. At Elasa, we held a conference and as we had been having some engine trouble, we decided not to go on to Kaso that evening. Moreover, we were already late for our rendezvous with Pendlebury. Just before dark, when we might have been well on the way to Kaso, a couple of Italian sea - planes flying low scouted the channel. They came over the island of Elasa without spotting the «Dolphin». Shortly after dark firing could be heard in the Kaso channel. It was clear that one of our convoys was fighting its way through the channel; we could see the flashes and flares, and we were glad we were not in the middle of it.

We set off later in the night, and on the morning of the 21st we called at Sitia, a beautiful bay with a calm sea. It was already very hot inshore. I landed to «phone Pendlebury, but found all communication with Heraklion was cut. No one knew why. Here at the request of a Greek officer we took on board an archaic charging engine for W.T. in the form of a bicycle with seat and pedals which worked a dynamo; it was out of order and could be repaired at Heraklion, he said. Then we coasted along the shore for Heraklion. On several occasions we were fired at, especially as we got nearer to Heraklion. We cursed the naval authorities for failing to inform the coastguards, and we praised the zeal of the Cretans at the same time. Just before we came to the port of Heraklion, we were hit by machine - gun fire at long range, and began to suspect that things were seriously wrong on shore. We therefore moored at the seaward end of the long mole which runs out from the inner harbour of Heraklion. We could hear spasmodic firing. Cle and I went ashore and walked together down the mole we were armed with a Mauser apiece. The mole had a high flanking wall on our right so that we could see only the outer harbour on our left. At the end of the mole a Venetian fortress controlled the mole itself, and also the entry into the inner harbour. As we walked towards the fortress we saw we were being covered by rifles and machine - guns from its embrasures. We walked on rather unhappily. We soon reached the outer right - hand side of the fortress where the flanking wall of the mole was broken down. Through the gap we saw the Nazi flag flying on the power - station, about half - a mile away. There was considerable firing from that quarter. As we rounded the fortress to enter

the inner harbour, we saw several British dead, Royal Engineers, lying on the inner side of the flanking wall. Was the fortress held by the German too? While Cle waited outside, I walked through a tunnel entry into the fortress, and found a Greek doctor with some wounded. He told me that the British had evacuated the town and had gone towards the aerodrome. The Germans were on the western edge of the town, and the Cretans were trying to hold them. German parachutists had dropped the day before in considerable numbers. It was now dusk and there was nothing we could do. We passed the word up to the men in the fortress that we were returning to the «Dolphin».

As we sailed out, we were again popped at by a machine-gun. We put in at Dia, the desert island opposite Heraklion, and spent next day with our machine-guns placed among the rocks, guarding the «Dolphin» and having a grandstand view of Heraklion. German planes passed over us all day. At 10 a.m. or so a force of German parachutists and parachuted supplies dropped to the east of Heraklion. Later in the day we could see the flash of artillery fire between that point and our batteries inland of the aerodrome. It was a brilliant day, the rocks grilling in the heat, and we bathed between our turns at the machine-gun. The best sight of the day was in the evening when for the first time only one German plane was flying over the aerodrome. There was one flash from the ground, a flash near the tail of the plane, and down she came in flames, a direct hit with the one and only A.A. round fired that day.

Our plan was to sail after dark towards the position of a German battery near the coast which we had spotted during the day. There was a small island off-shore at that point, and we were to use it as cover for the «Dolphin», coming out to fire at the shore battery with our two-pounder gun and M.G.'s. The least we should do was frighten the Germans and cheer our own side. But the engine would not start. Eventually, after midnight, it started on one cylinder. We decided to abandon our plan, for the German planes would find us there at dawn. Instead we limped off towards Souda, where we intended to report what we had seen at Heraklion, and find out the situation at Souda. With the engine misbehaving, we could not gauge our speed, and we passed the mouth of Souda Bay without realising it. Dawn on May 23rd found us some way round the Akroterion, and we had to put back. Here too we were fired at. We saw two large collapsible rubber boats and one caique in Shore; when we went closer to have a look, we could see men taking cover and firing at us. We were pretty sure they were

Germans, but they got the benefit of the doubt. On the way back to Souda, a Heinkel came low over us and proceeded to circle us. She fired a few rounds; we did not reply. Those of us who were not on the machine - guns following her round, waved enthusiastically. This seemed to reassure the Heinkel, and after firing off a Verey light or two she pushed off to the north. It was clear that some Germans were on the Akroterion, and others were expected by the Heinkel to be on the way there in caiques. As we entered the mouth of Souda Bay, the engine failed completely. Kyriakou and I towed her in, rowing our dinghy. A stiff off - shore wind was getting up. We moored the «Dolphin» between the two islets at the mouth of the Bay and landed on one of them. A strong wind was now blowing, and quite a heavy sea cut us off from the coast. We had been lucky to get in before the engine failed.

We visited the New Zealand company on the other island. They had had no news or orders for three days, but had heard firing and seen many planes. They were armed only with machine - guns, and they had been told to hold their fire. We sat on our island all day, while Jumbo and Mike worked at the engine. There were many wrecks half afloat at the head of the Bay, and many planes circling over Canea and searching Souda Bay, but we escaped their attentions. We made a little home for ourselves inside a cave. Saunders adopted a white rabbit which someone had left behind, and fed it on slops which gave it «the trots», as he put it. Saunders was now known as the «Admiral» and I as «the drunken captain», an unjust nick - name!. Next day, May 24th, Mike, Cle and I rowed ashore and walked into Souda. We saw the Naval Officer in Charge, a Captain Morse, and gave him our reports on the south coast, the wrecked cargo vessel off Hierapetra, the position at Heraklion and on the Akroterion. The N.O.I.C. was not au fait with the situation at Heraklion, which was cut off, but he confirmed that some Germans were on the Akroterion. The main fighting was between Malemi aerodrome and Souda. We walked on to the Royal Marines' lines and arranged for the repair of our engine. They were encamped among the olive groves, and it was a hot still day with no one moving on the dusty main road from Souda to Canea. We returned to our island and got the engine ready for shipment to the Royal Marines' workshop.

Next day, the 25th, Cle and I decided to walk into Canea; we wanted to contact our own firm whose H.Q. was in Canea, and to get one or two more caiques for the removal of the store of explosives which lay in a Venetian powder vault on our small island. We became sep-

arated; I walked into Canea by myself. The town was a wreckage of shattered houses, many still burning, and occasional German planes were bombing and machine - gunning. I took refuge among other places in what was left of the 'Piccadilly', a restaurant once much frequented by the troops. The only man I saw as I went through towards the harbour was a Greek policeman still on his beat. He seemed rather dazed, standing in a street of smoking debris, but he would not leave his post. He told me that I might find people in the caves near the harbour. The first I found was a group of four English privates who had lost their unit and were sheltering until dark. The harbour was full of half - submerged caiques, sunk by machine - gun fire, and the German planes were still at it. I found two caiques afloat. One was little damaged. By going round the caves, I raked together a crew, one of them the rascal «Manoli» who had moved our caique with me at Yeraka. I arranged that they would sail her round that night to our island in Souda Bay, while I walked back to warn Mike. In fact, she never arrived.

I found a tunnel - like taverna, where an old man was sitting over his kitchen. He too was dazed but at his post. He had lost his house and his wife in the bombing, but he gave me a meal. A few other Greeks were busy removing tinned foods from a N.A.A.F.I. store which had received a direct hit. The only troops were the four stragglers, and I revisited them before leaving. They greeted me with loaded rifles made me put up my hands and disarmed me. They said I was a German parachutist in British uniform. They were rattled, and meant business, but finally I calmed them down and persuaded them I was genuine. They refused to move until dark, so I walked out of the wreckage of Canea in the evening light and soon collected a New Zealand private, wounded in the foot, who had been hiding on the edge of the town. I helped him along to a cross - roads, where there were several wrecked German planes. The firing was now close to Canea, and the German planes were flying low over the olives like a cloud of bees. I left the New Zealander with a despatch rider who was able to take him on his pillion, and I pushed on alone for Souda. While it was still light, I was halted by a loud shout from a nearby grove, and asked to identify myself. I called back «I am an English Officer». The reply, «You're a Vawmit» meant that they were Australians. I went over and talked with them. They were leading for Souda but would not move while it was light.

It was 2 a.m. on the 26th when I got back to the mouth of the

bay opposite our island. I slept in a field till dawn when Mile and Cle came ashore. They had entered Canea, but having decided there was no caique available they had returned before dark. We went up to G.H.Q. which we found had moved back to a wooden hollow not far away. There we found the N.O.I.C. who was very glad to see us as our reports on the south coast beaches had been lost. Mike made out another report. While he was at work I came across John May, who had been one of my original companions when we left England; he was on the staff, and I sat with him while I waited. The planes were now passing low over Souda Bay and strafing the road which led towards the south coast. Some troops had already been withdrawn in that direction, and the fighting was now nearing Souda harbour. General Freyberg called for an interpreter. As no one appeared, I went up and was asked to translate a despatch. It came from the Greek G.O.C., saying that ammunition was short and his men could not last much longer. Where, he asked, were the supplies and the reinforcements promised by Churchill over the wireless? He had every confidence in us, but his position was becoming untenable. Freyberg said to another senior officer that we could not help the Greek G.O.C., and that he was still awaiting a reply from London whether or not to evacuate. After another talk with Morse, we went back to our island. On the 27th our first task was to find a ship, as the «Dolphin» was out of action, and Manoli had not arrived with the caique from Canea. As far as we could see, there was only one caique afloat in Souda Bay. She was a small red, wooden-hulled vessel, called the «Athanasios Miaoules», after a famous Admiral of the Greek War of Independence, and we boarded her soon after dawn. The mate was an old man of Sphakia, called Strati, and he wanted us to go off with the ship, as the skipper-owner, whom he evidently disliked, was ashore. However, we managed to find the skipper, «Old Johnny», and he agreed to go with us. We brought the «Athanasios Miaoules» to our mooring by the island and moved our machine-guns and cargo on to her.

We then went to see Captain Morse. The evacuation was in full swing. The Germans, we were told, were likely to be at the head of Souda Bay that evening. Cle and I offered to move some of our explosives down to the shore, so that they could be collected for demolitions on the road; to blow up the rest; and to demolish any engines on wrecked shipping in the bay. Apart from the Dolphin and the Athanasios Miaoules the only vessel afloat was an «A» lighter, cleverly moored alongside a Turkish mole. She had escaped the attentions of

the German planes. We spent most of the day with her commander, a nice chap called Walters. He agreed to collect the explosives from the island. There were also some fifty men, stragglers from various units, hiding in a ruined Turkish building where there was a spring of water near the shore. I tried to persuade them to move on to Sphakia where we knew the evacuation would be made. With a few exceptions they insisted on staying where they were in the hope that the Navy would come into Souda to take them off. They were thoroughly played out. As there were so many planes about, we decided to wait until dusk before crossing over to the island. We sat relaxed on the hillside looking out towards the sea. Just before dusk a caique under sail put out from the Akroterion side of Souda Bay, and headed out to sea. Suddenly an aeroplane swooped down and circled round it several times. We could hear machine-gun fire. The caique was left drifting sideways, its sail crumpled and no sign of life aboard. As the plane rose up, it was shot down by another plane, flying at tremendous speed. A cheer went up for the R.A.F. It was the first plane of ours we had seen for days.

At dark we put off to the island. We carted boxes of explosives down a small criff to the shore. Years before I had had a certilage operation and I ricked my knee several times on this job. Walters collected a load of explosives in his «A» lighter, and we loaded the rest in the «Athanasios Miaoules». We saw several lights on the Akroterion, and a boatload of stragglers tried to seize the «Dolphin». Jumbo persuaded them to push on to the mainland and make for Sphakia. Meanwhile I laid charges in the main dump of explosives and on the engine, the two-pounder gun, and the hull of the «Dolphin». In the small hours of the 28th, Mike said we must sail. There was no time now to go round laying charges on any wrecks. I went up alone to the main dump and broke the glass capsules of acid in the time-delay «pencils». The acid took a certain time, in this case, several hours, to eat through a wire which held back a striker, and then the striker detonated the immediately charge. Sometimes, if a pencil had leaked, an instantaneous detonation would occur when the capsule was broken. I was in a cold sweat as I broke the last capsule in the light of a small torch. Cle and I went crossed over to the «Dolphin» and set off the time-delay there. The «Athanasios Miaoules» weighed anchor and we set off from Souda Bay. Dawn on the 28th found us many miles from Dia, where we intended to hide up. The first excitement was an E-boat bearing down towards us from the north. We changed course

and ran on the same line, hoping she would think us to be a caique of the Germans, and the E - boat later veered off. Three planes passed us flying towards Crete. When they returned, one circled us, while we waved. After firing a Verey light, it left us. On this occasion too, we had changed our course so that we seemed to be sailing towards Crete. We reached Dia about 10 a.m. and Mike insisted on reconnoitering the whole of the island's coast, much to our annoyance. His argument was that one should return one day to a German occupied Crete and need some local knowledge. When we had almost finished, we heard a roar of planes and dived below, all except old Strati at the helm. Seventy - nine troop - carriers flew low overhead without firing a shot at us. The planes were unescorted. After that, even Mike agreed that we had better hide up in a crack in the cliffs. Cle and I climbed the cliff with an M.G. and set up a machine - gun, so that we could fire at any plane which might attack our caique. Later in the day we explored the island. We stayed there till dark, bathing and sleeping. At dusk we set off on the next stage, aiming for the group of islets called the Yanisades. The «Athanasios Miaoules» proved to be very slow. Her engine had only one cylinder, of which the head was badly cracked. We used to fill the crack with pieces of cotton waste every halfhour or so, and we could run the engine for no more than two hours at a time. She made some two knots and belched forth smoke and sparks from her short exhaust funnel. We had a box - compass on board, but there was no fitting or lighting device, so we steered mainly by the stars.

I was on the watch with old Johnny, the skipper, as we were passing east of Heraklion, when we felt the wash of seven or eight fast ships, which I guessed were our own going to Heraklion to evacuate the force there. A few hours before dawn on the 29th we felt their wash again, and we saw a light flashing from the neighbourhood of the Yanisades. We then made out a destroyer heading close towards us. We imagined she thought us to be a German caique. Mike signalled with a lamp, saying who we were and that signals were being shown on the Yanisades. The destroyer passed very close to us without acknowledging our signal. As dawn lightened, we could see the ships off the entry to the Kaso Strait, and then the bombers came out and the squadron disappeared with guns in action. Before the sun was bright, we reached the Yanisades and hid up in a cove. In the afternoon we walked across our island and saw an E - boat lying off the outer island with some men on shore. She had evidently signalled the approach of the squad-

ron. During that day, the 29th, a large ship crossed from Kaso to Sitia.

Mike was anxious to attack the E-boat. We had an anti-tank rifle, and three machine-guns, all without mountings. We were prepared to try an attack, but by the time we had got our engine started and were way, Mike had decided against it. During that night we lumbered slowly through the Kaso Strait. Mike and I were on watch together during the later part of the night, and discussed the chances of making Sphakia in time to help in the evacuation. We had always regarded the Kaso Strait as the most dangerous stage in the trip, but we passed through it without incident. We put in at a small cove below a white-washed monastery just before dawn on the 30th. Opposite us was a small island, Kyphonisi, which seemed a promising refuge, but Mike decided against it as too obvious a place. It suited me to stay on the main coast, as I wanted to learn what was happening in Crete.

After a bathe, I followed the others up to a monastery. There I found that the monks supposed us to be Germans or Italians; they were delighted when we convinced them that we were British. The monastery was two hours from the nearest road, and it was rumoured that a force of Germans had arrived at the road end the previous evening. Soon after dawn a German plane flew low along the coast. Our machine-guns were manned among the rocks to cover the caique if she were attacked, but the plane took no notice of us. Soon afterwards, some planes flew over Kyphonisi, and we heard their M.G.'s firing for some time. The monks said that there had been a naval post there. With old Strati, Cle and I set along the coast to learn where the Germans and Italians were. We might hear something too of Pendlebury's and his men. Cle came some of the way, and then returned to the caique. When we saw peasants or houses, Strati left his rifle with me, and he went ahead while I covered him; he was to wave me on if all was well. He was in civvy clothes, while I was in uniform. Our first encounter was with a group of peasants harvesting. He duly went forward and was soon seen having an argument and threatening them. I went on to join them, and arrived as Strati seized an old man by the throat and hurled him to the ground. I intervened to stop a free fight. It turned out that the old man had suggested that the British would have to evacuate Crete, and had, therefore, been attacked as «a traitor» by Strati. The old man pointed out that he had lost two sons in Albania, and had two more whose fate was unknown. They knew nothing of the Germans.

Strati had dysentery, but he kept going well. We fed at a peasant's hut, and then reached the village of Makri Yialo. The villagers were sullen and suspicious. It was clearly a «bad village», as the Greeks say. They would tell me nothing, and declared that the war was no business of theirs. So I found a telephone and rang up the largest village inland, opening in Greek with the words «Where are the enemy?» to which came the immediate reply «Which enemy?» I then burst into a tirade, saying I was a British officer with a couple of battalions under my command, and the Greeks had only one enemy, the Germans - and - Italians. This seemed to convince the fellow at the other end. He told me that a large force of Italians was at Sitia, and that troops were being sent to Hierapetra; some Germans and Italians in lorries had toured most of the villages, including his own village, but had not occupied them. I told him to keep his spirits up and rang off. We got back in the evening to find that there had been something of a quarrel. Mike had made up his mind to sail on to Sphakia, although it was now the evening of the 30th., and the evacuation was due to finish on the 30th or the 31st. It would take us at least three days to reach Sphakia, and probably four, and in any case, our caique was already full enough and quite unreliable with its cracked cylinder-head. Mike held that it was our duty to go on in case we could help, and he thought the evacuation might be protracted beyond the 31st. Cle had disagreed with Mike, who, being hot - tempered, had said things which he later regretted. Cle, who was a quiet, reserved man, had refused to be drawn into a quarrel. I first learned of this from Saunders; and Jumbo who were manning separate machine - gun posts, when I returned. Saunders was depressed about the whole business, and, most unusually for him, he was pessimistic about our chances either way. Jumbo, who also had a hot temper at times, was annoyed with the «skipper», having himself had a bit of a quarrel with Mike over the same time. When I found Mike, he told me of the choice and asked me to decide. I voted for Egypt, with the condition that, if we got through, we should try to return with a better vessel to Crete. Mike was disappointed' I think, but showed no resentment. We said goodbye to the monks, and put off at dusk. Mike had talked of sailing for Cyprus, but he decided finally to head due south for Libya, aiming at the Bay of Sollum. As in all matters of the sea, we had the greatest faith in his judgement.

Dawn on the 31th of May found us well out to sea. It was calm and hot with a clear sky, and we were all rather tired and sleepy

after a series of night - watches. At 9. o'clock or so, when the heat was oppressive, I noticed a plane very high above us, and gave the alarm (we had no look - out on duty). Cle and Jumbo, our best machine - gunners, took a Bren each in the bows, and Mike took the till-er and a Lewis machine - gun. The four Greeks got into the engine cabin, and Saunders, Kyriakou and I got into the hold, from which we could see a patch of sky through the hatch. Forward of the hold there was a smaller hold full of explosives and detonaters. We heard the plane coming in low and received the full force of her guns. Saunders was hit by two bullets which entered the back of his shoulders. He lost consciousness, but was evidently in pain. I tried to make him comfortable and put blankets on him, while the plane came round again and gave us another series of bursts, to which Cle and Jumbo replied from the bows. After that attack, Mike came to the hatch to say that Cle had been killed outright. He asked me to stay with Saunders, who was twisting and turning in pain. Mike rested his Lewis on the winch by the main hatch. Then the third attack began. When it was over, I came on deck to find Mike wounded in the elbow by an incendiary bullet, but Jumbo was O.K. The plane was flying away towards Crete, low down and with smoke pouring from one engine. Jumbo had had a narrow escape both times. When Cle was killed, Jumbo had seen the plane jerk as it pulled out of a dive to come head - on towards the caique. That jerk had put the hail of machine - gun bullets on one side of the bows, and Jumbo had been grazed on the head by a bullet. In the last attack, Jumbo had hit the plane as it pulled out of its dive. Of the Greeks, one boy had been grazed by a bullet on the side of his head, and was deaf in one ear. Mike had a bullet through his elbow-joint which was very painful later. Saunders was still twisting and tossing, and I gave him some morphia. He died soon afterwards. Mike was sobbing, and we were all near to tears. We wrapped Cle and Saunders in a Union Jack which we had brought over from the «Dolphin», and I read an impromptu service in English and Greek before we slid them into the sea. The phrases of the 102nd Psalm went straight to our hearts. When we started up the engine to resume our journey, it went full - speed in neutral, shaking the boat. I saw the Lewis machine-gun slipping from the winch, and jumping to catch it I fell through the hatch as I stepped on a loose plank, and hit my ribs a nasty crack on a iron bolt. This provided some light if painful relief. We found afterwards that several bullets had passed through the explosives in the bows. As the plane had been firing explosive, incendiary, and ar-

mour - piercing bullets, it was astonishing that our explosives had not been detonated.

By the evening of the next day, June 1st, we thought we saw low-lying land at dusk. Mike had become delirious at times with his wound. I had done most of the steering by day, and all of it by night, as the Greeks could not keep a course. I decided to sail east that night. At dawn on June 2nd we found ourselves off a low coast which we reckoned was the Bay of Sollum, if we had steered correctly. Kyriakou said he recognised the coast from his sponge - fishing expeditions, but he did not know any names which appeared on our chart. In a few hours we put up a reef off shore which I identified from the chart as one in the eastern end of the Bay of Sollum. We also saw bursts of smoke which came from artillery or demolitions inland. We did not know where the Germans were in Libya, as our last news of a week or so ago was that they had retaken Benghazi. Although I wanted to get Mike ashore, I decided to sail on during the night, aiming for Mersa Matruh. Just before dawn on the 3rd two Italian bombers flew over us. Another plane came low over us soon after dawn it proved to be an R.A.F. one, we waved happily. By midday we saw the hill by Mersa Matruh, and later they began to signal to us. I got Mike on deck, and he said they were asking the name of our ship. We felt like replying «The Queen Elisabeth», but we contented ourselves with saying «British», and sailed on to the harbour. As we came in, two naval officers were on the pier; after a look at us, they turned and walked away. Mike and I caught them up. We both knew one of them, a man called Nicholls, who was the Naval Officer in Charge there. He did not recognise us at first; for on seeing us come in he had dismissed us as Greek fishermen, with our growth of beard and our dirty clothes. We handed over the cargo of the «Athanasios Miaoules», and left «Old Johnny» in charge of her. Mike's elbow and my rib were bandaged at a field hospital. Jumbo and I bathed that evening. There were many other men bathing, and it seemed strange to be no longer just our own little company. We rested next day and then we sailed from Mersa Matruh to Alexandria in a three-masted brig which was returning from a supply - run to Tobruk. With a strong off - shore wind and full sail up she made nine to ten knots on the trip. It was a wonderful journey. At Alexandria we were fêted by the Navy as the latest arrivals from Crete, Admiral Sommerville had us to lunch, sat me beside himself and argued that the «Odyssey» had been written by a woman. He was less intransigent on the subject than the Colonel of the 1st

Battalion of the Welch Regiment had been on the Battle of El Aboukir. Mike's arm was going to mend, but it would take time. He and I discussed with the Naval Intelligence Officer at Alexandria ways and means of returning to Crete. In view of our experience, Mike planned to cross to and fro by fast motor - boat, and to use the small islands and the secluded coves of the south coast as hide - ups and bases. The immediate aim was to make contact with the numerous groups of British troops who were said to be still in the mountains, and to collect them for evacuation by submarine. We hoped also to find Pendlebury and his men and arrange for the delivery of supplies. Thus the first plans for a return to Crete were made. But Mike's arm had to mend first. This might be a matter of some weeks, and Crete was of less immediate concern than the situation in Libya and the campaign in Syria. I went up to Cairo to report. There I met up with my bosses at Athens, who were now esconced in the Cairo Office. They arranged for me to meet representatives of the Lake Copais Company, who were anxious to obtain compensation for their cotton stocks at Haliartus from the British Government. The destruction of the cotton had been confirmed. Many months later I found out that the dump of explosives etc. on the island in Souda Bay had also blown up.

ALEXIS ALEXANDRIS

TURKISH POLICY TOWARDS GREECE DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND ITS IMPACT ON GREEK-TURKISH DETENTE

Immediately after the Anatolian War (1919-1922), the Turkish leader Mustafa Kemal Atatürk expressed his readiness to forget old grievances by declaring:

«I could never myself keep on hating a nation for the mistakes of its Government... And towards the Greeks I feel the same. I am confident that we shall soon be great friends, friends as we were before the Powers intervened»¹.

This spirit of conciliation was shared by the former protagonist of the *Megali Idea*, Eleftherios Venizelos, who, after the traumatic experience of the destructive Asia Minor campaign, realised the futility of enmity between the two Aegean neighbours. After his return to power in 1928, the Greek leader embarked on a determined policy of mending fences with Ankara². In this he was seconded by the Turkish premier, İsmet İnönü, with whom he had been closely associated during the Lausanne negotiations (1922-1923)³.

The new spirit of goodwill among leaders in Athens and Ankara led to the signing of the so-called Rüstü-Polychroniadis agreement of 10 June 1930⁴, which liquidated disputed points arising out of the Lausanne Convention for the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Popu-

1. This statement was made during an interview granted to a British journalist, Grace Ellison, soon after the conference of Lausanne had assembled (November 1922), for details see Grace Ellison, *An Englishwoman in Angora*, London, 1928, p. 175.

2. For the exchange of letters between Venizelos and İnönü see Dimitri Kitsikis, «Les projets d'entente balkanique 1930-1934», *Revue Historique*, 98/241 (1969) 117-120; Constantine D. Svolopoulos, «Η Έλληνική Έξωτερική Πολιτική μετά την Συνθήκη της Λωζάνης: Η κρίσιμος καμπή, Ιούλιος - Δεκέμβριος 1928», *Thessaloniki*, 1977, pp. 141-52.

3. For the relationship that developed between the two statesmen at Lausanne see Alexis Alexandris, «Η Συνδιάσκεψη της Λωζάνης, 1922-1923: Η διευθέτηση του θέματος του Οικουμενικού Πατριαρχείου και των Έλλήνων της Κωνσταντινούπολης», in *Δελτίον της Ιστορικής και Εθνολογικής Εταιρείας της Ελλάδος*, 24 (1981) 303-38.

4. For an excellent analysis of the Greek/Turkish *rapprochement* see Ifigenia Anastasiadou, «Ο Βενιζέλος και το Ελληνοτουρκικό Σύμφωνο φιλίας του 1930», in *Μελέτηματα γύρω από τον Βενιζέλο και την εποχή του*, Athens, 1980, pp. 309-426.

lations⁵. The ratification of this agreement by both governments paved the way for a major Greek-Turkish political *rapprochement* that was sealed during Venizelos' visit to Ankara on 30 October 1930. While in the Turkish capital, the Greek premier signed a treaty of neutrality, conciliation and arbitration, a protocol on parity of naval armaments and a commercial convention⁶. The June and October 1930 agreements set the cornerstone of a relationship which was to last throughout the interwar period.

Cordial Greek-Turkish relations were placed on a firmer basis when on 3 October 1931, Premier İsmet İnönü, along with his foreign minister Rüşdü Aras, arrived in Athens to return Venizelos' visit to Turkey a year earlier. The warm welcome accorded by the Athenian population to the Turkish leaders was remarkable, the more so as the crowds were comprised mainly of Anatolian Greeks who had been driven out of Turkey in 1922-1924⁷. At the official level, the two prime ministers held intensive negotiations on 5 and 6 October and succeeded in resolving all but few minor outstanding issues⁸. During a banquet at *Grande Bretagne* hotel, the Turkish Prime Minister expressed his confidence that if a war was to break out, Turkey and Greece would be the two countries that would abstain from taking part in it⁹.

Despite the painful concessions, particularly on the question of compensations for the exchanged Anatolian and Thracian Greeks¹⁰, Greece reaped substantial benefits from the Aegean *rapprochement*. The years of diplomatic isolation after the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 illustrated the vulnerability of Greece as well as its need to find friends who shared her dedication to the preservation of existing

5. Stephen Ladas, *The Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey*, New York, 1936, *passim*; Harry J. Psomiades, *The Eastern Question: The Last Phase. A Study in Greek-Turkish Diplomacy*, Thessaloniki, 1968, *passim*.

6. On Venizelos' visit to Ankara, Clerk, Ankara, to Henderson, 1 November 1930, FO 371/E6088/463; Clerk, Ankara, to Henderson, 4 November 1930, FO 371/E6089/463; Ramsey, Athens, to Henderson, 5 November 1930, FO 371/E6199/463.

7. Ramsey, Athens, to Henderson, 7 October 1931, FO 371/C7834/88; *The Times*, 8 October 1931; William Miller, «The Greco-Turkish Friendship», *The Contemporary Review*, 140(1931) 718-25.

8. On the negotiations between 5/6 October 1931 see the minutes in BMAEV (Benaki Museum Archive of Eleftherios Venizelos)/61.

9. Dimitri Gatopoulos, *Ἀνδρέας Μιχαλακόπουλος 1875-1938*, Athens, 1947, p. 275.

10. For a detailed analysis of this issue see Anastasiadou, *op. cit.*, 309-426.

boundaries in the Balkans¹¹. But, not all her neighbours shared her adherence to the *status quo*. With the signing of the Treaty of Neuilly on 27 November 1919, Bulgaria was deprived of an exit on the Aegean Sea. Sofia refused to come to terms with this loss and sought ways to reverse the clauses of a treaty which was imposed upon her following her defeat in the First World War. Thus, during the interwar period, Bulgaria became the major revisionist power in the Balkans¹².

Unlike Bulgaria, Turkey was satisfied with her borders drawn at Lausanne¹³ and was as anxious as Greece to preserve the *status quo* in the Balkans. As a result, Greek/Turkish friendship acted as a deterrent to Bulgaria's designs at the expense of Western Thrace and Eastern Macedonia. Further, Turkish Premier İsmet İnönü reassured the Greeks that Turkey did not have any territorial ambitions in Western Thrace and that her only concern in the area was the well-being of the Thracian Muslim minority.

Further, the Greek/Turkish détente put an end to the military and naval arms race in the Aegean which was a serious drain on the weak Greek economy. Instead, close ties with Ankara offered considerable commercial opportunities to Greek businessmen and the possibility to redress the existing trade imbalance between the two countries whereby Greek exports to its eastern neighbour did not exceed one-fifth of the imports from Turkey. In a move to strengthen commercial relations on 9 February 1931, the Venizelos government granted to Turkey the status of the most-favoured-nation on condition of reciprocity¹⁴.

Throughout his tenure in office, Venizelos eagerly seized every

11. See Harry J. Psomiades, «The Diplomacy of Eleftherios Venizelos, 1928-1930», in *Essay in the Memory of Basil Laourdas*, Thessaloniki, 1975, pp. 555-68; Panayiotis Pipinelis, *Ἱστορία τῆς ἐξωτερικῆς πολιτικῆς τῆς Ἑλλάδος 1923-1941*, Athens, 1948, p. 19f.

12. Pipinelis, *op. cit.*, 75-110.

13. Halûk Ülman, «Türk Dış Politikasına Yön Veren Etkenler, 1923-1968» (Controlling factors of Turkish foreign policy, 1923-1968), *Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi* (Review of the Political Science Faculty of Ankara University), 23 (1968) 241-73; Mehmet Gönübol, «Atatürk Devrinde Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası» (Turkish Foreign Policy During the Atatürk Era), *Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*, 2 (1961) 210.

14. For a copy of the decree (law no. 3364) of 9 February 1931, FO 371/C15232 88, Ramsey, Athens, to Foreign Office, 25 February 1931. This was reciprocated by Turkey on 5 March 1931, see A.Ş. Esmer and O. Sander, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası* (Turkish Foreign Policy with events), Ankara, 1968, p. 74.

opportunity to promote Greek/Turkish understanding and he even went so far as to proposed the imaginative idea of some kind of union between the two countries, which he discussed at some length with Kemal Atatürk in October 1930¹⁵. This policy of cordial relations towards Turkey was followed by the combined Populist, anti-Venizelist and monarchist forces, who managed to form a coalition government after the elections of March 1933. Soon after assuming power the Panagis Tsaldaris government arranged a meeting between the new foreign minister, Dimitri Maximos, and his Turkish counterpart, Rüstü Aras, which took place in Geneva. This meeting set in motion a new round of negotiations which came to a successful end with the signing of a commercial treaty in Athens on 9 May 1933. The new agreement was negotiated by the Turkish Minister of national economy, Celâl Bayar, and the undersecretary for foreign affairs, Numan Menemencioglu, who paid an official visit to Greece between 28 April and 10 May. The commercial agreement was intended to enable Greece to redress to some extent its adverse trade balance by means of a guaranteed share of freight in Greek ships. Under this agreement Greek exports to Turkey would reach 100 million Dr. annually (as compared to 10 million in 1931) and Greece would be paid 15 million Dr. in freight. In return Turkey would export to Greece goods to a value of 350 million Dr.¹⁶.

On 10 May, Premier Tsaldaris and Foreign Minister Maximos gave account to a special conference of the party leaders (*Μεγάλη Έπιτροπή των Έξωτερικών Υποθέσεων*) of the conversations they had had with the Turkish ministers in Athens and Geneva. The party leaders were also informed that the government intended to conclude a pact supplementary to the treaty of October 1930 which would be signed during an official visit by the Greek premier to Turkey scheduled for September 1933. Opposition leader Venizelos wholeheartedly approved the government's overtures towards Ankara and expressed his conviction that soon Greece and Turkey would establish an «Eastern Federation» (*Ανατολική Ομοσπονδία*)¹⁷.

15. Kitsikis, *op. cit.*, 117-20.

16. Ramsey, Athens, to Henderson, 10 May 1933, FO 871/C4369/2496; *The Times*, 11 May 1933. For a speech given by the Turkish finance minister on the occasion of the signing of the commercial agreement see, Celâl Bayar, *Söylev ve Demeçleri* (Speeches and pronouncements), Ankara, 1956, pp. 61-64.

17. The minutes of this conference can be found in BMAEV/64. See also Kitsikis, *op. cit.*, 117-20; Constantine Svolopoulos, *Τὸ Βαλκανικὸν Σύμφωνον καὶ ἡ Ἑλληνικὴ Ἐξωτερικὴ Πολιτικὴ, 1923-1934*, Athens, 1974, p. 109.

The road to more intimate diplomatic ties was opened in June 1933 when the two foreign ministers met in London while attending an international monetary conference. On his way back to Turkey, Rüştü Aras stopped in Athens on 16 July and held conversations with members of the Greek government¹⁸.

This diplomatic activity resulted in the signing of the Ankara Accord, also known as the Greek/Turkish Friendship Pact, of 14 September 1933 during Premier Tsaldaris' official visit to the Turkish capital. With the new treaty Greece and Turkey mutually guaranteed the inviolability of their common frontiers. This was a diplomatic guarantee limited to the Greek/Bulgarian and Turkish/Bulgarian frontiers in Thrace. Conscious of Italian interests in the area, Greece and Turkey avoided any mention in the treaty of their common Aegean borders¹⁹. Further, the new pact stipulated that Greece and Turkey would consult each other on questions of common interest and would pursue a policy of friendship, understanding and collaboration. Thus, from 1933, the Greek/Turkish bilateral entente constituted a formidable defensive block against a possible Bulgarian attack against Thrace. Commenting on the importance of the new pact, the British ambassador in Ankara, Sir George Clerk, stated that in September 1933 Greek/Turkish relations «attained their apogee»²⁰.

Following the Ankara Accord of 1933, Greek/Turkish exchanges of goodwill became even more frequent. During a short visit to Athens on 23/24 November 1933, Turkish Foreign Minister Aras stated that Greece and Turkey «have almost become one country»²¹. Nor did such exchanges limit themselves to the diplomatic field. In July 1933, the Greek naval training ship, *Aris*, visited İstanbul. This was the first time that a Greek man-of-war entered Bosphorus since the establishment

18. Ramsey, Athens, to Foreign Office, 18 July 1933, FO 371/C6588/2496. See also Gregory Dafnis, *Ἡ Ἑλλάς μεταξύ δύο πολέμων, 1923-1940*, vol. 2, Athens, 1955, p. 241.

19. On Tsaldaris' visit to Turkey, Clerk, Ankara, to Foreign Office, 13 September 1933, FO 371/C8372/2496; *The Times* 15 September 1933.

20. Clerk, Ankara, to Foreign Office, 13 September 1933, FO 371/C8372/2496. See also Hans W. Hartmann, «Les relations Gréco-turques du traité de Lausanne au pacte d'Ankara (1923-1933)», *Les Balkans*, 9 (1989) 333-50.

21. Quoted in *Aydın Tarihi* (Monthly History), Jan. 1934, p. 34. For a statement made by Premier Tsaldaris to *The Christian Monitor*, ibid, May 1934, pp. 88-94.

of the Turkish republic. A year later, the Turkish airfleet was dispatched to Greece to participate in the celebrations on the 10th anniversary of the establishment of the Greek republic²².

Such visits gave rise to a plethora of flattering articles in both Greek and Turkish press which were filled with praise for the Greek/Turkish entente and urged closer collaboration between the two nations²³. Even the foreign press stressed the significance of the Greek/Turkish friendship. Thus, the *Economist* of London, on 20 May 1933, in an article entitled «Sound Sense in the Near East» asserted:

«Indeed the history of Turkish/Greek relations since 1930 ought to be read, marked and inwardly digested by all nations of Europe. For, if the hatchet can be buried by two peoples who have been burdened by the terrible Greek/Turkish heritage of mutual injury and mutual hatred, there is no excuse left for any of the rest of us to confess ourselves morally incapable of performing the same feat».

Between 6 and 10 May 1934, the Greek minister of war, George Kondylis, held talks in Ankara with members of the Turkish government and there were signs that the two countries were about to extend their alliance to the military sphere as well²⁴. During negotiations in Ankara on 4 November 1934, the two sides agreed to enlarge the diplomatic accord of 1933 concerning the defence of the common Thracian border into a full-fledged military treaty. The draft agreement, however, negotiated by the two foreign ministers and scheduled to be signed in Geneva in January 1935 was finally cancelled because General Kondylis expressed opposition to a formal defence alliance with Turkey²⁵.

Instead, Greece and Turkey limited themselves to the signing of a commercial agreement signed on 13 November 1934 by the finance ministers George Pesmatzoglou and Celâl Bayar in Ankara. The prime objective of the treaty was to improve economic ties between the two countries. With it Greece and Turkey sought ways to increase the ex-

22. *ibid.*, p. 75.

23. Greek and Turkish journalists had come to an agreement to promote co-operation between the two nations, see Ahmed Emin Yalman, *Yakın Tarihte Gördüklerim ve Geçirdiklerim, 1922-1944* (Events that I saw and experienced during the recent history, 1922-1944), vol. 3, Istanbul, 1970, pp. 226-27.

24. Dafnis, *op. cit.*, p. 256.

25. Pipinelis, *op. cit.*, pp. 273-74.

port of Greek manufactured articles to Turkey while maintaining the volume of Turkish exports in cereal and livestock to Greece intact²⁶. The commercial pact, according to the *Vakit* of 14 November, illustrated the two nations' mutual interest in each other's economic development. Meanwhile, with official approval, Greek and Turkish businessmen formed an import-export company whose primary aim was to promote commercial intercourse and coordinate trade between the two countries²⁷. On 24 May 1934, a Greek/Turkish commercial bureau, with its central offices in İstanbul, was founded²⁸.

More significantly, the alliance with Turkey became a mainstay of Greek security. Thus, when the abortive Venizelist revolt took place in 1935, it was above all the concentration of Turkish troops in Eastern Thrace that prevented Bulgaria from trying to turn it to her advantage²⁹. In return, Greece expressed sympathy with the Turkish desire to refortify the Straits and the Greek delegate at the Montreux conference, Nicholas Politis, supported wholeheartedly Ankara's position.

Greek/Turkish cordiality was strengthened and enlarged after General John Metaxas assumed power in Greece in August 1936. The Greek leader was aware that Greek and Turkish identity of interest in the preservation of Balkan *status quo* constituted a real guarantee of Greek territorial integrity. Assisted by two able Greek diplomats, Nicholas Mavroudis, the secretary-general of the Greek Foreign Ministry, and Rafail Rafail, the Greek ambassador in Ankara, Metaxas sought to enlarge Greek/Turkish solidarity.

Thus, the new government established a dialogue with the Turkish foreign minister, Rüşdü Aras, who visited Athens in September, December 1937 and January 1938. During these visits Aras gave Metaxas an undertaking in writing that Turkey would collaborate with Greece in resisting any attempt by Bulgaria to raise the question of a terri-

26. The Greek minister arrived in Turkey on 30 October and remained there until 15 November. Pesmatzoglou, who spoke Turkish fluently became a close friend of Kemal Atatürk, see *Ayn Tarihi*, No. 1934, pp. 11-12 and Dec. 1934, pp. 3-4. On the negotiations, Morgan, Ankara, to Foreign Office, 10 November 1934, FO 371/R6316/45.

27. *Ayn Tarihi*, Jan. 1934, p. 34.

28. *ibid.*, June 1934, p. 104.

29. Waterlow, Athens, to Foreign Office, Greece: Annual Report, 1935, Greek/Turkish Relations, FO 371/R1432/1482; John K. Iatrides, ed., *Ambassador Mac Veagh Reports. Greece, 1933-1947*, Princeton, 1980, pp. 109-10.

torial outlet in the Aegean³⁰. The strength of the Greek/Turkish connection was reaffirmed when Premier İsmet İnönü arrived in Athens on 25 May 1937 for a brief diplomatic visit to Greece. On his arrival in the Greek capital İnönü confirmed in no uncertain terms the solidarity of the Greek/Turkish friendship³¹. During an official banquet given for him before his departure from Greece, the Turkish premier conveyed to Metaxas a telephonic message from President Kemal Atatürk. The Turkish leader stated:

«I am happy to tell you that it gives me pleasure as a man and a soldier to declare to you that our frontiers are the same and that the forces which defend them are one and inseparable. The frontiers of the allied Balkan states constitute a single frontier. Those who may have designs on this frontier will expose themselves to the burning rays of the sun and I advise them to beware. Founded on this basis Balkan friendship will gain in plentitude and in humanitarian and civilising influence»³².

The message also described the Greek/Turkish entente as «eternal»³³. Replying to Atatürk's message, General Metaxas stressed that the Greeks shared this sentiment of «deep and unchangeable friendship towards the sister nation»³⁴.

Atatürk's message illustrated the importance that he placed to the formation of a solid front against the designs of the Great Powers in the Balkans. The vision of a Balkan alliance was shared by numerous Greek politicians, and particularly by Alexander Papanastasiou who initiated the movement for a Balkan détente in the early 1930s³⁵. Already an alliance between four Balkan states — Greece, Turkey, Rumania and Yugoslavia — had been achieved on 9 February 1934 with the signing of the Balkan Entente pact in Athens. A treaty of mutual defence, the pact held that should a non-Balkan power attack any of the signatories and be assisted by a Balkan power, the other signa-

30. Waterlow, Athens, to Foreign Office, 10 January 1937, FO 371/R214/214.

31. *Aydın Tarihi*, June 1937, pp. 213-14.

32. *ibid.*, p. 226.

33. Partly quoted in *The Times*, 27 May 1937.

34. *ibid.*

35. For his views see Alexandre P. Papanastasiou, *Vers l'Union balkanique. Les Conférences balkaniques*, Paris, 1934, passim; «L'Union balkanique», *Le Messager d'Athènes*, 22, 23, 24 et 25 January 1930.

tories would also be obliged to go to war against the aggressor³⁶.

The Balkan alliance, however, suffered from serious handicaps. Bulgaria, who in 1919 was deprived of an outlet in the Aegean Sea, became a leading revisionist state during the postwar period. As a result Sofia refused to join the Balkan Entente which stood for non-revision of the postwar treaties. For this reason, the Balkan alliance may be seen primarily as an effort by the «satisfied» Balkan states to oppose irredentist Bulgaria³⁷. Italy's efforts to exploit Bulgaria's dissatisfaction — symbolised by the marriage of King Boris of Bulgaria to princess Giovanna of Italy — added fuel to the fire.

Further, the effectiveness of the alliance was limited by the desire of Greece and Turkey to avoid entanglement in the ambitions of Italy and Russia. At the same time, Yugoslavia, which was at first somewhat reluctant to sign the Balkan Entente pact of 1934, sought to achieve a bilateral reconciliation with Sofia. The movement towards a South Slavic *rapprochement* was illustrated by a meeting between King Alexander of Yugoslavia and his Bulgarian counterpart King Boris in Belgrade as early as 1933. The Balkan alliance was further weakened when on 24 January 1937 Yugoslavia, in violation of article 2 of the Balkan Pact, entered into a separate and far-reaching agreement with Bulgaria³⁸. On 31 October 1938, the premiers of Yugoslavia, Milan Stojadinovic, and of Bulgaria, Georgi Kiosseivanov, met at Nish for secret talks. In a joint communiqué they proclaimed total agreement between the «two brother nations» and their «determination to deepen and widen their cordial relations»³⁹.

Renewed fears about a possible Southern Slavic attempt to dominate the Balkans drew Greece and Turkey even closer. Such apprehensions were intensified by the growing influence of Germany in Bulgaria and by the signing of an Italo/Yugoslavian agreement on 25 March 1937⁴⁰. Further, the German invasion of Austria on March 1938 and

36. The Balkan Entente developed after four meetings held in Athens (1930), Istanbul (1931), Bucharest (1932) and Thessaloniki (1933).

37. Several excellent full-length studies of the Balkan Entente are available see T. I. Geshkoff, *Balkan Union. A Road to Peace in Southeastern Europe*, New York, 1940; R. N. Kerner and H. N. Howard, *The Balkan Conferences and the Balkan Entente, 1930-1935*, Berkeley, 1936; L. S. Stavrianos, *Balkan Federation*, Hamden, 1964, 224 ff.

38. Stavrianos, *op. cit.*, pp. 238-48.

39. *ibid.*, pp. 246-58.

40. *ibid.*

the declaration of *Anschluss* the following month shocked both Athens and Ankara. For the creation of a German/Yugoslav border brought the most powerful revisionist power in the gates of the Balkans. As the situation in Central Europe grew more unstable, Greece and Turkey felt the disturbing pressures of the *Drang nach Osten*.

There is evidence suggesting that as early as 1937 Kemal Atatürk foresaw the approaching Second World War. According to the Turkish foreign minister and close friend of Atatürk, Rüşti Aras, the Turkish leader was convinced that only a strong union of the Balkan states would keep the Great Powers from attacking Southeastern Europe⁴¹. But as the Balkan alliance looked increasingly like a tattered shield, Ankara concentrated its efforts on expanding its bilateral alliance with Greece. Further, Greece's value as an ally had been enhanced in the eyes of the Turks following the re-organization of the Greek army under the leadership of General Metaxas⁴².

As a result, on 2 October 1937 Marshal Fevzi Çakmak, the Turkish chief of staff, was dispatched to Athens where he negotiated a new military pact with his Greek counter part, General Alexander Papagos⁴³. Negotiation continued in Ankara during General Metaxas' visit to Ankara between 18 and 23 October⁴⁴. Finally, during a three-day meeting of the Permanent Council of the Balkan entente, held under the presidency of General Metaxas in Ankara on 25/28 February 1938, Greece and Turkey announced the conclusion of an additional agreement to supplement the existing treaties of 1930 and 1933⁴⁵. The agreement, however, was only signed on 27 April 1938 when the new Turkish premier, Celâl Bayar, and Foreign Minister Rüşti Aras visited Greece on 27 April 1938. Under this treaty, which was to stay in force for ten years, Greece and Turkey promised to remain neutral if one of them was attacked. Each country would prevent the transport of troops, munitions or armaments through its territory to any state attacking either of them.

41. See article by Tevfik Rüşti Aras in the *Milliyet* of 13 March 1971. This view is also supported by another of Atatürk's close associates and minister of the interior, Şükrü Kaya, as well as the Turkish leader's private secretary, Hasan Rıza Soyak, see H. R. Soyak, *Atatürk'ten Hatıralar* (Memories from Atatürk), İstanbul, 1978, vol. 2, pp. 526-31.

42. Waterlow, Athens, to Foreign Office, 5 October 1937, FO 371/R6778/214.

43. *ibid.*; *Ayın Tarihi*, Nov. 1937, pp. 66-67.

44. Morgan, Ankara, to Foreign Office, 23 October 1937, FO 371/R7205/214; Bayar, *op. cit.*, pp. 66-68.

45. *Ayın Tarihi*, March 1938, pp. 34-38.

Each also promised to use her good offices for mediating in case of attack. If, however, war would break out the two states would reconsider the situation and would reach an agreement corresponding to their interests⁴⁶.

Indeed by 1938 the solidarity between the two Aegean neighbours appeared to be deeply-rooted. Nor was this goodwill confined to diplomatic or military purposes. Increasing intellectual, artistic and commercial bonds between the two nations was a tangible result of the Greek/Turkish entente. Soon after the 1930 rapprochement university students, journalists, academics, theatrical companies and football teams exchanged visits. Thus, in September 1934, Professor Dimitris Glinos and the renowned Greek poet Constantine Varnalis were warmly received by Turkish intellectuals and journalists in Istanbul, while three years later Greek sculptor Dimitriadis Athinaios presented to the Turkish nation a statue of Kemal Atatürk as a token of Greek/Turkish friendship⁴⁷. Likewise, in February 1937, Thessaloniki municipality presented Kemal Atatürk his birthplace, situated next to the Turkish Consulate in Thessaloniki, where the Turkish leader spent his youth⁴⁸. To increase Greek/Turkish understanding in the cultural field, exhibitions with emphasis on the costumes and habits of the two peoples were organised in Ankara, Athens, İstanbul and Thessaloniki⁴⁹. In 1938, a chair of Turkish literature was founded at the University of Athens by the Greek government and Turkey reciprocated by creating a chair of Greek literature at the University of İstanbul⁵⁰.

Educational and cultural exchanges were foreshadowed by economic co-operation. In an attempt to foster trading relations a new company, *Société Anonyme Hella-Turk*, was inaugurated in Athens in October 1938. Soon after another company with similar aims was established in İstanbul⁵¹. By the end of 1938 Greece and Turkey had signed a new commercial agreement designed to improve trading exchanges between the two countries⁵². With the approval of their governments, the press

46. Also Waterlow, Athens, 27 April 1938, FO 371/S4407/172; *Ayn Tarihi*, May 1938, pp. 99-102; *The Times*, 28 April 1938.

47. *Ayn Tarihi*, Oct. 1934, p. 6 and March 1937, p. 55.

48. *ibid*, pp. 64-65. Today this building is preserved as a museum.

49. *Ulus*, 7 February 1937 quoted in *ibid*, p. 66.

50. Waterlow, Athens, to Foreign Office, Annual Report: Greece, 1938, FO 371/R9025/509.

51. Waterlow, Athens, to Foreign Office, 31 January 1939, FO 371/R886/886.

52. This agreement was signed in Athens on 15 December after protracted negotiations which started at the end of October 1938, *ibid*.

in both countries eagerly advocated the expansion of Greek/Turkish economic co-operation. In an article published in the İstanbul daily *Tan* of 25 May 1937, the influential Turkish journalist Ahmet Emin Yalman argued that economic co-operation in the Aegean would enable Greece and Turkey to reach economic self-sufficiency⁵³.

Yet, the death of Atatürk on 10 November 1938 was a severe blow to the Greek/Turkish alliance. The Turkish leader was committed to Balkan co-operation and in particular to the Greek/Turkish entente. Thus, the news of his death was received with genuine grief in Greece and Metaxas approached the new president, İsmet İnönü to determine whether Turkish foreign policy towards Greece would remain unchanged. On his return from Ankara, where he had attended Atatürk's funeral, General Metaxas informed the British ambassador in Greece, Sir Sydney Waterlow, that he had no misgivings about any re-orientation of Turkish policy under the new president⁵⁴.

Soon, however, the new president of Turkey brought to bear his well-known innate sense of caution to Turkish foreign policy. The subtle re-orientation of Turkish policy under İnönü was illustrated by the resignation of Rüşdü Aras and his replacement as foreign minister by Şükrü Saraçoğlu in January 1939. Aras had been Turkey's foreign minister since 1923 and was instrumental in the development of a professional diplomatic service⁵⁵. He was one of the architects of Kemalist foreign policy which steered away from alliances led by one of the great powers. Instead, Turkish diplomacy sought to involve the Balkan states into an alliance system which would be able to withstand the pressures of any great power. Just as Kemal Atatürk, Aras viewed favourably the establishment of a Balkan Federation, as a kind of third force, between the rival Axis and Western powers, Turkey, Aras felt, should play a leading role in such an alliance⁵⁶. In 1937, Rüşdü Aras supported Atatürk's tough line on the question of Alexandretta/Hatay and opposed İsmet İnönü's cautious position, who feared that Turkish claims in the region might antagonise French interests⁵⁷.

53. Quoted in *Aydın Tarihi*, June 1987, p. 230.

54. Waterlow, Athens, to Foreign Office, Annual Report: Greece, 1938, FO 371/S886/886.

55. See D. A. Rustow, «Foreign Policy of the Turkish Republic», in Roy C. Macridis, ed., *Foreign Policy in World Politics*, Englewood Cliffs, 1959, p. 316.

56. Esmer and Sander, *op. cit.*, pp. 150-56 and Aras' article in the *Milliyet* of 16 March 1971.

57. For differences of opinions between the Turkish leadership see İsmet Boz-

Meanwhile, Italian and German aggression in the late 1930s demonstrated to the Greeks the inadequacies of the Athens agreement of 1938. Under the terms of that treaty Greece undertook to prevent, by force of arms if necessary, and third power from crossing its territory to attack Turkey. Ankara, on the other hand, agreed to maintain a similar attitude if Greece was attacked from the East. Soon the Greeks realised that it was unlikely they would find a foe in the hinterland of Asia. It was quite evident, particularly after the Italian invasion of Albania in April 1939, that any attack on both Greece and Turkey would inevitably come from the West. Thus, according to the treaty of Athens, which stipulated that Greece had to fight against Italy if that country attacked Turkey, the Turks were not bound to do the same if Italy attacked Greece⁵⁸.

The Greek government pointed out this discrepancy during the visit of the new Turkish foreign minister, Şükrü Saraçoğlu, to Athens on 26 February 1939⁵⁹. A few months later, Nicholas Mavroudis was dispatched to Ankara to discuss the political implications of a possible new military pact⁶⁰. In September 1939, Lieut. Col. Dovas went to Turkey and held talks with the Turkish chief of staff, Marshal Fevzi Çakmak, on the possibility of a Greek/Turkish military convention⁶¹. High level contacts were continued in November 1939, when General Alexander Papagos, the Greek chief of staff, met with two senior representatives of the Turkish General Staff to whom he presented a draft of a military treaty. The Papagos' proposals envisaged the formation of a combined military defence in Thrace to contain an Axis-

dağ, *Bir çağın perde arkası. Atatürk-İnönü, İnönü-Bayar çekişmeleri* (Behind the scenes of an era. Conflicts between Atatürk-Inönü and İnönü-Bayar), İstanbul, 1972, pp. 108-11.

58. It is rather interesting that at the time of the signing of the Athens treaty Metaxas did not seem to give much significance to this point and in a conversation with the US ambassador in Greece, Lincoln MacVeagh, he confidently stated that the pact was simply the extension to the naval sphere of the previous Greek /Turkish agreements (1930, 1933). The new treaty, Metaxas underlined, was intended to bind both countries in the Aegean as already they were bound in Thrace, see Iatrides, *op. cit.*, p. 183.

59. Waterlow, Athens, to Foreign Office, 8 March 1939, FO 371/R1684/1684.

60. Palairot, Athens, to Foreign Office, 11 August 1939, FO 371/R6457/1684; Knatchbull-Hugessen, Ankara, to Foreign Office, 14 August 1939, FO 371/R6527/1684; Palairot, Athens, to Foreign Office, FO 371/R6585/1684.

61. Alexander Papagos, *‘Ο πόλεμος της Ελλάδος, 1940-41*, Athens, 1951, pp. 40-42.

cum-Bulgarian offensive⁶². By the end of December, the Turkish chief of staff replied by expressing the view that such a military alliance existed already among the members of the Balkan pact and therefore he did not see the purpose of a further Greek/Turkish military treaty⁶³. Although negotiations between the chiefs of staff continued during the early months of 1940, the Turks remained non-committal; refusing to become party to a bilateral military alliance with Greece.

Ankara, instead, sought to form with Greece, Bulgaria and Rumania a Balkan front under the auspices of Britain and France. The Italian invasion of Ethiopia (1935) and Albania (1939) and the conclusion of a Nazi-Soviet Pact on 23 August 1939 were dramatic warnings to Turkey that the storm was gathering not far from its borders. This, along with Mussolini's rising interest in the Eastern Mediterranean basin and Hitler's obvious intentions in the Balkans alarmed the Turkish government. Turkish apprehensions about a Soviet-Axis thrust against Turkey were intensified when during Saraçoğlu's visit to Moscow in the Russian foreign minister, Molotov, demanded the modification of the Straits Convention⁶⁴. Consequently, Ankara abandoned its hitherto self-imposed isolation from European affairs and concluded a treaty of Mutual Assistance with Britain and France on 19 October 1939. According to this agreement, Turkey would «collaborate effectively» and lend to Britain and France «all aid and assistance in her power», in case of an act of aggression by a European power which led to a war in the Mediterranean area, or if they had to go to war in fulfilment of their guarantees given to Greece and Rumania in April 1939⁶⁵. Britain and France, for their part, would aid Turkey to the limit of their power if she were the victim of aggression by a European state. The Western powers also committed themselves to assist the Turks

62. *ibid.*, p. 106 ff.

63. *ibid.*

64. Feridun Cemal Erkin, *Les relations turco-soviétique et la question des Détroits*, Ankara, 1968, pp. 177-78; Türkaya Ataov, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1939-1945*, Ankara, 1965, pp. 11-65.

65. On 13 April, Foreign Secretary Chamberlain, in a momentous statement in the House of Commons announced that British had pledged full support to those Balkan countries in the event of any action being taken which threatened their independence. Metaxas accepted the guarantee soon after the Italian invasion of Albania. For an analysis of Metaxas' foreign policy during this period see Dimitri Kitsikis, «La Grèce entre l'Angleterre et l'Allemagne de 1936 à 1941», *Revue Historique*, 91/238 (1967) 85-116.

should they become involved in a war in the Mediterranean area because of their commitments under the Balkan Entente. Protocol No. 2, attached to the treaty, exempted Turkey from any action in case of an armed conflict between her allies and the Soviet Union.

Thus, by late 1939, both Greece and Turkey came under the diplomatic and military umbrella of the Franco-British bloc. With Allied encouragement Turkey submitted a plan for collective self-defence against aggression of any non-Balkan state, with the exclusion of the Soviet Union, during the annual conference of the Balkan entente on 2/4 February 1940⁶⁶. But the efforts to transform the Balkan entente into an effective instrument failed as the more exposed members, such as Yugoslavia and Rumania, were unwilling to join. More significantly, while the Balkan entente was unable to reach an agreement for effective mutual aid, Bulgaria continued to press for a revision of her frontiers and manifested readiness to collaborate with the major revisionist powers in order to achieve her aims.

On 10 June 1940, Mussolini declared war on Britain and France. Officials in London and Paris felt the Italian declaration rendered operational Turkey's obligations under Clause 1 of the second article of the tripartite Anglo/Franco/Turkish agreement of October 1939. As a result, Sir Hugh Knatchbull-Hugessen, the British ambassador in Ankara, was instructed to enquire whether Turkey was ready to take action in accordance with her treaty obligations⁶⁷. There were signs, however, that Turkey did not wish to go to war⁶⁸. On 11 June, during an interview with British Foreign Secretary Lord Edward Halifax, the Turkish ambassador in London, Rüstü Aras, adopted an evasive attitude and stressed that Turkey had to act with prudence⁶⁹.

After a meeting with Turkish Premier Refik Saydam on 13 June, Knatchbull-Hugessen reported that the Turkish government invoked Protocol No. 2 of the tripartite treaty as a reason for adopting an attitude of non-belligerency. The protocol referred to Russian misgivings about Turkey's involvement in the war. Indeed, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov had already made it clear that Moscow disapproved of a Turkish intervention. The fact that Russia used this opportunity

66. For the negotiations see *Les Balkans*, 12 (1940) 118-24.

67. Foreign Office to Knatchbull-Hugessen, Ankara, 10 June 1940, FO 371/R6510/316.

68. *ibid.*

69. *ibid.*

to improve its own military position and revived her «historic» movement southwards was bound to cause alarm in Ankara⁷⁰.

Faced with the reluctance of Turkey to declare war on Italy, the British government instructed Knatchbull-Hugessen on 14 June to suggest that the Turks should add «for the present» in the wording of their declaration about Turkish non-belligerency. Likewise, the British expected the recall of the Turkish ambassador from Rome, the expulsion of the Italian ambassador from Ankara and a formal break off diplomatic relations with Italy⁷¹.

On 17 June, however, the French government collapsed and Marshal Pétain announced his intention to seek armistice terms from the Germans. As a consequence, on 18 June, the Turkish foreign minister, Şükrü Saraçoğlu, informed Knatchbull-Hugessen of Turkey's refusal to enter the war with Britain as its only ally. Turkey, he declared, did not intend to break off diplomatic relations with Italy⁷². Finally, in his declaration to the Turkish national assembly on 26 June, Premier Refik Saydam omitted any reference to the tripartite agreement or a hint that Turkish non-belligerency was only provisional⁷³.

As all diplomatic efforts to persuade Ankara for a more satisfactory statement failed, the general impression in Britain and Greece was that Turkey had moved towards strict neutrality. Apprehensive about Turkey's precise intentions, the British strove to determine what was the Turkish attitude towards Athens in the event of a direct Italian attack against Greece. On 18 August, three days after the sinking of *Elli*, Knatchbull-Hugessen was instructed to explore discreetly the possibilities of Turkish aid to Greece in the event of a Greco/

70. For a detailed analysis of the Turkish foreign policy during the Second World War see Fahir H. Armaoğlu, «İkinci Dünya Harbinde Türkiye» (Turkey during the Second World War), *Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi* (Review of the Political Science Faculty of Ankara University), 13 (1958) 148-57; Altınur Kılıç, *Turkey and the World*, Washington, 1959, pp. 78-113.

71. Foreign Office to Knatchbull-Hugessen, Ankara, 14 June 1940, FO 371/R6459/316. See also memoirs of Faik Ahmet Barutçu, *Siyasi Anılar* (Political recollections), pp. 95-101.

72. Knatchbull-Hugessen, Ankara, to Foreign Office, 18 June 1940, FO 371/R6510/316.

73. For an excellent analysis of Turkey's foreign policy in 1940 see Selim Deringil, «The Preservation of Turkey's Neutrality During the Second World War: 1940», *Middle Eastern Studies*, 18 (1982) 29-52.

Italian war⁷⁴. Foreign Minister Saraçoğlu, however, gave a non-committal reply⁷⁵. Further, after an interview with the Turkish foreign minister on 20 August, Knatchbull-Hugessen reported that Turkey «will certainly not send troops to Greece»⁷⁶. In a reference to Turkish neutrality, the British ambassador expressed his personal view that on balance Turkish belligerency would not be an advantage⁷⁷.

But, the British ambassador in Athens, Sir Michael Palairet, disagreed with the evaluation of his colleague in Ankara. According to Palairet, the question was whether Turkey would fight while Greece was still able to resist Italy, or wait until, after a Greek defeat, to fight under much less favourable conditions⁷⁸. Brushing aside the argument that the Soviets would object to Turkish aid to Greece, Palairet argued that a warning from Turkey might deter Italy from attacking Greece⁷⁹. Expressing his strong disapproval of Ankara's non-committal attitude, the British ambassador described the Turkish policy as «pusillanimous» and «evasive»⁸⁰.

After a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff in London on 23 August, however, the British had already decided to avoid an open dispute with the Turks over their obligations; and they instructed Knatchbull Hugessen to try and get a general declaration from Turkey which might hold back the Italians from attacking Greece⁸¹. The Turks avoided the issue by maintaining that the Italians were simply bluffing and that they did not intend to attack Greece. As a result, the Turks argued, the question of Turkish intervention was unlikely to arise⁸². On 3 September, Foreign Secretary Halifax, in a telegram to Palairet, underlined that it was necessary «to exercise caution in urging Turkey to

74. Foreign Office to Knatchbull-Hugessen, Ankara, 18 August 1940, FO 871/R7058/764.

75. Knatchbull-Hugessen, Ankara, to Foreign Office, 20 August 1940, FO 871/R7211/764.

76. Knatchbull-Hugessen, Ankara, to Foreign Office, 21 August 1940, FO 371/R7274/764.

77. Knatchbull-Hugessen, Ankara, to Foreign Office, 20 August 1940, FO 371/R7224/764.

78. Palairet, Athens, to Foreign Office, 23 August 1940, FO 871/R7254/764.

79. Palairet, Athens, to Foreign Office, 30 August 1940, FO 371/R7400/764.

80. *ibid.*

81. Foreign Office to Knatchbull-Hugessen, Ankara, 28 August 1940, FO 371/R7274/764.

82. Knatchbull-Hugessen, Ankara, to Foreign Office, FO 371/R7396/764.

go any further than she is prepared to go»⁸³. This view was shared by Sir Alexander Cadogan, the permanent undersecretary at the Foreign Office⁸⁴.

Yet, as Axis designs against the Balkans became more evident, the Foreign Office instructed Knatchbull-Hugessen to stress that any weakness demonstrated by Turkey with regards to an Italian attack on Greece would be more than likely to encourage both the Germans and the Soviets to attempt to intimidate Turkey into submission⁸⁵. The Turks, however, were determined to stay out of the war. This became apparent by their refusal to activate the alliance with Britain after Germany invaded Rumania on 7 October⁸⁶. The Turkish reluctance to participate in the hostilities may have strengthened the belief in Rome that Turkey would not help the Greeks if Italy attacked. Thus, ten days after the Nazi occupation of Rumania, the Italian foreign minister, Conte Galeazzo Ciano, boldly stated that «Greece is isolated» and that «Turkey will not move» in the event of an Italian offensives⁸⁷.

Finally, on 28 October Italy invaded Greece from Albania. Once again, the invasion placed Turkey under obligation to declare war on Italy, because of the tripartite agreement of October 1939⁸⁸. But, as in the previous June, the Turks did not fulfil their obligations and remained neutral. On the other hand, although refused to actively involve themselves in the Greek/Italian war, the Turks gave a clear warning, through diplomatic channels, that a Bulgarian attack on Greece would bring Turkey into war⁸⁹. On 1 November, President İnönü, in a speech to the national assembly, declared that Greece's fate was of «vital» interest to Turkey and warned that, although the Turkish

83. Halifax, London, to Palairret, Athens, 3 September 1940, FO 371/R7464/764.

84. Cadogan, London, to Foreign Office, 4 September 1940, FO 371/R7480/764.

85. Foreign Office to Knatchbull-Hugessen, Ankara, 11 September 1940, FO 371/R7529/764.

86. Armaoğlu, *op. cit.*, 148-150.

87. See Count Galeazzo Ciano, *The Ciano Diaries 1939-1943*, New York, 1946, p. 299.

88. It should, however, be pointed out that neither the Greek/Turkish treaties nor the Balkan Entente pact obliged Turkey to declare war on Italy, see Armaoğlu, *op. cit.*, p. 151.

89. This was announced by Saraçoğlu during an interview with the British ambassador on 28 October, see documents FO 371/R8069/764 and FO 371/R8092, /764.

government would not go to war at the present moment, it remained «faithful to its commitments and friends»⁹⁰.

On 28 October, Şükrü Saraçoğlu reassured Rafail Rafail, the Greek ambassador in Ankara, that Greece could count on Turkey in the event of a Bulgarian attack. The foreign Minister elaborated further on Turkey's position by underlining that a Turkish declaration of war at this stage would be counterproductive since it would only antagonise the Bulgarians. Aside from holding Bulgaria in check, Saraçoğlu explained, a Turkish expedition across Macedonia would be small by necessity. On the other hand, by reinforcing the Turkish forces in Eastern Thrace and by notifying Sofia that a Bulgarian attack against Greece would be regarded as a *casus belli*, he pointed out, Turkey had already contained the Bulgarian threat; this enabled Greece to move its troops to Albania from the Thracian front⁹¹.

The same view was expressed by Ambassador Aras when he met Lord Halifax on 30 October⁹². The British foreign secretary, however, drew attention to the gravity of the threat posed by the Italian attack against Greece and went on to suggest that this was the first step in a long - term Italian plan to dominate the entire Eastern Mediterranean⁹³. Concurrently, the British government tried to persuade the Turks to make public the warning that they had given privately to Bulgarians⁹⁴.

On 3 November, the Turkish government clarified its position by proclaiming that Turkey was not obliged to intervene as long as Bulgaria remained neutral⁹⁵. Three days later in an interview with the Greek ambassador, Rafail Rafail, Foreign Minister Saraçoğlu praised the Greeks for rising to the defence of their independence, honour and integrity and hinted that Turkey would fight over any impairment of

90. The full text of the speech in *İnönü'nün Söyleş ve Demeçleri 1919-1946* (Speeches and pronouncements of İnönü 1919-1946), İstanbul, 1946, pp. 847-57 (comments concerning Greece, p. 350).

91. Knatchbull-Hugessen, Ankara, to Foreign Office, 28 October 1940, FO 371/R8069/764.

92. Simopoulos, London, to Foreign Ministry, 31 October 1940, in Constantine Svolopoulos, ed., *Υπουργείο 'Εξωτερικών. 1940-1941 'Ελληνικά Διπλωματικά Έργα*, Athens, 1980, no. 10 (henceforth *GDD*, Greek Diplomatic Documents).

93. *ibid.*

94. Simopoulos, London, to Foreign Ministry, 8 November 1940, *GDD*, no. 17.

95. Simopoulos, London, to Foreign Ministry, 3 November 1940, *GDD*, no. 18.

Greece's northern frontiers⁹⁶. The same view was reiterated by the Turkish ambassador in Greece, Enis Akaygen, in a conversation with his American colleague MacVeagh⁹⁷. On 4 December, Knatchbull - Huggessen reported that the Turkish government seemed prepared to fight if the Germans penetrated Bulgaria⁹⁸. During his tour in Turkey, Col. William Donovan, gathered the same impression and reassured Rafail that in case of a combined German / Bulgarian attack against Greece, Turkey would honour her pledges and take an active part in the hostilities⁹⁹.

Notwithstanding these informal Turkish hints, Greece appeared satisfied with the prudent approach adopted by Turkey during the Greek / Italian war. Thus, Ambassador Rafail held the view that «all that Greece requires or can expect» from Turkey «is a guarantee that Turkey would actively involve herself in the war in the event of a Bulgarian attack»¹⁰⁰. Likewise, Nicholas Mavroudis, the undersecretary for foreign affairs, described the Turkish position as wise and helpful to the Greek effort¹⁰¹.

The Greeks also viewed favourably the encouragement given by the Turkish government to the Constantinopolitan Greek community for its efforts to contribute to struggle against the Italians. Thus, with official approval, the Hellenic Union of Istanbul organised the dispatch of reservists and volunteers from among the members of the Greek minority in Turkey. By early November 1940 hundreds of Constantinopolitan Greeks departed for Greece in order to take part in the Greek / Italian war¹⁰². At the same time, a committee of prominent Turks, Greeks, Armenians and Jews was formed in Istanbul to collect subscriptions for the Greek Red Cross fund and on 18 November, the in-

96. Mavroudis, Athens, to Simopoulos, London, 6 November 1940, transmitting a telegram from Rafail (Ankara), *GDD*, no. 22.

97. Iatrides, *op. cit.*, p. 252.

98. Knatchbull-Huggessen, Ankara, to Foreign Office, 4 December 1940, FO 871/R8697/816.

99. Mavroudis, Athens, to Simopoulos, London, 6 February 1940, transmitting a telegram from Rafail in Ankara, dated 5 February 1940, *GDD*, no. 89. Col. William Donovan, head of the US Office of Strategic Service, toured the Balkans on President Roosevelt's behalf in 1940/1941.

100. Knatchbull-Huggessen, Ankara, to Foreign Office, 28 October 1940, 371/R8069/764.

101. Iatrides, *op. cit.*, pp. 238-40.

102. *The Times*, 10 November 1940.

fluent Turkish journalist Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın gave a lecture on Greek civilization for the benefit of the fund¹⁰³.

More significantly, there is evidence indicating that the Turks indeed checked a probable Bulgarian offensive against northern Greece in the winter of 1940. Thus, when in October 1940, Rome encouraged the Bulgarians to join in an attack against Greece, King Boris appeared reluctant. The Italian foreign minister Ciano attributed this reluctance «to the King's fear of the Turks»¹⁰⁴.

By 14 November, the Greek army, after a heroic defence of its western border, was able to take the offensive and by December had driven the invaders back into Albania. Anticipating Italy's humiliation, Hitler had foreseen the necessity of German intervention in the Balkans. Once the Nazi designs in southeastern Europe began to take shape, the British renewed their efforts to form a front in the Balkans by drawing Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey into a great coalition against the Germans. In response to British overtures, on 19 January 1941, Foreign Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu informed Knatchbull-Hugessen that Turkey would go to war:

- i. if she were directly attacked by any power
- ii. if Bulgaria, or Germany by an advance through Bulgaria, attacked Greece
- iii. if Thessaloniki were threatened¹⁰⁵.

The Turks, however, were only prepared to give these assurances in private and refrained from any public declarations. Throughout the early months of 1941, the British strove to persuade Turkey to declare unequivocally their precise position. On 31 January, in a personal message to President İsmet İnönü, Sir Winston Churchill pointed out that the Germans were consolidating their position in Bulgaria and soon would be in a position to dictate their terms under the threat of invasion. They could, the British prime minister underlined, thus reach Thessaloniki unopposed, secure air bases in Greece and on the Greek islands which would threaten communications between Turkey and the Middle East, deny the use of İzmir to the British fleet, and close the exits from the Dardanelles. To prevent the isolation of Turkey,

103. *ibid.*, 19 November 1940.

104. Ciano, *op. cit.*, p. 299.

105. Knatchbull-Hugessen, Ankara, to Foreign Office, 19 January 1941, FO 371/R481/236.

Churchill proposed that the British should be given similar facilities in Eastern Thrace airfields that the Germans enjoyed in Bulgaria.

Under the protection of British airpower, Churchill assessed, Turkey would probably be able to deter Germany from overrunning Bulgaria and Greece¹⁰⁶. The Turkish answer, however, was unfavourable. President İnönü found the British offer of assistance far too small and reiterated the argument that Turkey was short of essential war material. The entry of Turkey into the war, the president concluded, would be against both Turkish and British interests¹⁰⁷.

Meanwhile, in February 1941, Nazi troops moved without any opposition into Bulgaria. Alarmed by these developments, Ankara hurried to achieve an arrangement with Sofia. Thus, on 17 February, the Turkish and Bulgarian governments issued a declaration reaffirming their pact of friendship and stating that they had agreed on the following points:

- i. the unchanging basis of the foreign policy of both countries was to abstain from aggression,
- ii. the two governments would maintain and develop good neighbourly relations¹⁰⁸.

These developments alarmed both Athens and London. During an interview with Rafail, Saraçoğlu reassured the Greek ambassador that the Turkish government made it clear that the declaration would not prejudice Turkey's contracted agreements with other countries. Expressing his government's grave apprehensions, Rafail stressed that the Turco - Bulgarian agreement would give the general impression that Turkey did not intend to act in the event of German invasion of Greece through Bulgaria¹⁰⁹.

Describing the Turco-Bulgarian declaration as ill - timed, the Turkish ambassador in Athens, Enis Akaygen, admitted that his government had made a «psychological error»¹¹⁰. But, Greece, isolated and vulnerable, had little choice except hope that her powerful eastern

106. Churchill, London, to İnönü, Ankara, 31 January 1941, FO 371/R545/91.

107. For İsmet İnönü's reply and Foreign Office comments see FO 371/R871/274 and FO 371/R898/236.

108. *Une déclaration d'amitié turco-bulgare*, signed in Ankara by Numan Menemencioğlu, and Kioseivanov. For British evaluation of the pact see documents FO 371/R3940/91, FO 371/R 3941/91 and FO 371/R 4370/91.

109. Mavroudis, Athens, to Simopoulos, London, 25 February 1941, transmitting telegram from Rafail in Ankara, dated on 22 February 1941, GDD, no. 138.

110. Iatrides, *op. cit.*, 298-99.

neighbour would provide assistance in case of a German attack against Thrace. Thus, during an interview with the Turkish ambassador in Greece, General Metaxas stated that he was fully confident about Ankara's will to fulfil her obligations¹¹¹.

The British, however, considered the Turco-Bulgarian declaration of friendship a green light for Nazi troops to pass unchallenged through Bulgaria and attack Greece. Further, as Ambassador Knatchbull-Hugessen pointed out to Foreign Minister Saraçoğlu, the declaration would only encourage Bulgaria to adhere to the Axis bloc¹¹². On 22 February, Knatchbull-Hugessen requested a formal clarification of Turkey's position with regards to the Bulgarian agreement. The foreign minister simply noted that this was an attempt to include Bulgaria in the Balkan security system¹¹³.

Concurrently, Turkish diplomacy tried to belittle the Nazi threat against Greece by challenging the view that the Germans had aggressive intentions against the Greeks¹¹⁴. As a result, arguing that there was no German threat, the Turks refused to discuss Nazi invasion of Greece¹¹⁵.

The British, however, who took seriously the German threat to southeastern Europe, continued with their initiatives to form a Greek / Turkish front against the Axis. To encourage resistance against the Germans, they dispatched some 30.000 British troops in Thessaloniki during the early months of 1941. On 22 February, Foreign Secretary Eden and General Dill flew to Athens and after holding talks with the Greek leadership at Tatoi went on to Ankara on 26 February. The British negotiators returned to Athens on 2 March while Antony Eden met once again with the Turkish foreign minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu, in Cyprus on 18/19 March.

During the Tatoi meeting on 22 February, General Alexander Papagos stressed that active Turkish participation in a defence against a German offensive was crucial and urged the British to press for the

111. *ibid.* See also Pipinelis, *op. cit.*, p. 343.

112. Knatchbull-Hugessen, Ankara, to Saraçoğlu, Ankara, 18 February 1941, FO 371/R3941/91.

113. Knatchbull-Hugessen, Ankara, to Eden, 22 February 1941, FO 371/R 4870/91. On 1 March, Bulgaria joined the Axis.

114. Simopoulos, London, to Foreign Ministry, 16 February 1941, *GDD*, no. 109.

115. For a thorough treatment of this issue see Dimitri Kitsikis, *Ἡ Ἑλλάς τῆς 4ης Δεκεμβρίου*, Athens, 1974, pp. 113-19.

establishment of a common front in Thrace¹¹⁶. The British military authorities, as well as the US military envoy Col. Donovan, shared the Greek viewpoint and held that a combined British / Greek / Turkish force in the Macedonian / Thracian front would probably contain a German / Bulgarian attack on Greece¹¹⁷.

On their arrival to Ankara, Eden and Dill found that the Turks were unwilling to risk provoking the Germans even if the Nazis invaded Greece. President İnönü reiterated that Turkey would only fight if attacked. At the same time, due to their inadequate military equipment and the lack of air power, the Turks were not prepared to enter the war. As a result, the Turkish leader repeated that Turkey would serve the «common cause» better by remaining neutral until she had made good these deficiencies and deploy her army with the maximum effect¹¹⁸.

Thus, when on 2 March, Eden met Korizis he could do no more than let him know that the Turks, while not stating categorically that they would not declare war, could not give an undertaking to do so¹¹⁹. Indeed, at this stage the Turks themselves feared a German attack against Eastern Thrace. On 1 March, Saraçoğlu told Rafail that «you will be attacked first, and then it will be our turn»¹²⁰. But, both the Germans and the Bulgarians informed Ankara that the German military built up was not directed against Turkish Thrace but against the British attempt to gain a foothold in Greece¹²¹. This promise acquired a formal character when on 4 March, the German ambassador in Ankara, Franz von Papen, handed to President İnönü a letter declaring

116. The declaration of the Greek premier and foreign minister, Alexander Korizis during the Tatoi meeting on 22 February and the minutes of the talks in *GDD*, no. 123.

117. On the Tatoi negotiations see FO 371/R3870/1109 (1942), annexes 2, and 3.

118. The argument of lack of *matériel* is frequently cited by modern Turkish historians in vindication of Ankara's violation of the stipulations of the tripartite agreement of 1939, see Ataöv, *op. cit.*, pp. 81-89; Kılıç, *op. cit.*, pp. 85-86.

119. The undersecretary for foreign affairs, Nicholas Mavroudis, remarked that the only new element that Eden brought from Ankara was the certainty that if Greece was attacked she could expect no military assistance from the Turks, Iatrides, *op. cit.*, p. 307. For the minutes of the 2 March 1941 meeting see *GDD*, no. 145.

120. *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1946*, vol. 12, p. 277 (henceforth *DGFP*).

121. Mavroudis, Athens, to Pipinelis, Sofia, 4 March 1941, *GDD*, no. 154 and Pipinelis, Sofia, to Foreign Ministry, 4 March 1941, *GDD*, no. 155.

Germany's intention to respect Turkish territorial integrity so long as the Turkish government remained neutral¹²². On 12 March, the Turkish leader replied by affirming his country's determination to preserve its non-belligerent posture¹²³. Under these circumstances, Turkey rejected yet another British proposal, recommended by Palairat, the British ambassador in Greece, that the Turkish government should take over the defence of the Didymoteichon / Alexandroupolis positions in Western Thrace¹²⁴. Further, by mid-March, Turkish forces withdrew from the Çakmak line around Edirne / Kırklareli in Eastern Thrace to the Enos / Midia line further east; this made it even easier for the Germans to occupy the Greek territory between the Maritza and Struma rivers¹²⁵.

Turkish conduct throughout the winter of 1940/1941 did not reassure the Greeks. Yet, while adopting a neutral posture towards the Greek / Italian conflict, the Turks maintained an enigmatic attitude; often hinting at the inevitability of a Turkish involvement in a war against a combined German / Bulgarian attack on Thrace. This impression was gathered by the Greek ambassador in Ankara, Rafail Rafail, as late as 7 April after his interview with Saraçoğlu¹²⁶. Only a three days earlier, the chief of staff, Marshal Fevzi Çakmak, informed the Yugoslavian ambassador in Ankara that a German attack, in concert with Bulgaria at the expense of Greece, would be regarded as a *casus belli*¹²⁷. After frequent meetings with his Turkish colleague, the US ambassador in Athens, Lincoln MacVeagh, believed that the Turks would finally fight along with the Greeks against the Axis¹²⁸.

Whatever guarded optimism this statements may have aroused in Greece was soon dispelled by the invasion of Macedonia and Thrace by the Wehrmacht on 6 April. The same day, Ambassador Papen, in-

122. This letter was dispatched from Berlin on 1 March 1941 and can be found in *DGFP*, vol. 12, pp. 199-200.

123. *ibid.*, pp. 286-87.

124. Foreign Office to Knatchbull-Hugessen, Ankara, 6 March 1941, FO 371/R3870/1109.

125. Knatchbull-Hugessen, Ankara to Eden, London, 13 March 1941, FO 371/R2447/113.

126. Mavroudis, Athens, to Simopoulos, London, 7 April 1941, transmitting a telegram from Rafail in Ankara who described the Turkish position as «not very encouraging», *GDD*, no. 211.

127. Mavroudis, Athens, to Simopoulos, London, 10 April 1941, transmitting a telegram from Rafail in Ankara, *GDD*, no. 219.

128. Iatrides, *op. cit.*, p. 306.

forming the Turkish government of the German declaration of war against Greece and Yugoslavia, reiterated that Berlin would respect Turkish territorial integrity as long as Ankara remained neutral¹²⁹. To the great disappointment of the British, the Turks, pleading lack of *matériel*, complied with the German wishes¹³⁰.

On 8 April, Rafail Rafail met with the Turkish foreign minister and handed him a Greek *démarche* requesting Ankara to clarify its position in the event of a Bulgarian involvement in the hostilities. The Greek ambassador reminded Saraçoğlu that according to the stipulations of the Balkan Entente, Turkey was under an obligation to help Greece, if that country was attacked by Bulgaria or by a third power acting in concert with Bulgaria. He went on to point that Turkey was also treaty-bound to assist Greece if she became involved in hostilities in the Eastern Mediterranean which in turn brought into play the British guarantee and the tripartite agreement of October 1939¹³¹. Turkey, however, declined to reply to the Greek *démarche*¹³². Finally, Bulgaria, with the permission of Germany, occupied Western Thrace and Eastern Macedonia on 17 April. Characteristically, on 26 April, the secretary - general of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Numan Menemencioglu rejected a Greek suggestion that Turkey should repudiate the Turkish / Bulgarian declaration of February 1941, even though he acknowledged that the Bulgarian attack against Greece violated that agreement¹³³.

Ankara's neutrality, inspite of repeated statements that Turkey would help Greece in the event of a combined German / Bulgarian offensive, created a strong feeling of resentment in Greece and marked a turning point in Greek / Turkish friendship. In Greek eyes, the Turkish refusal to honour its commitments towards Greece constituted concrete proof that President İnönü regarded Greek / Turkish friendship in a very different light from that of Kemal Atatürk¹³⁴.

129. Mavroudis, Athens, to Simopoulos, London, 10 April 1941, transmitting a telegram from Rafail in Ankara, *GDD*, no. 212.

130. Mavroudis, Athens, to Simopoulos, London, 10 April 1941, transmitting a telegram from Rafail in Ankara, *GDD*, no. 221.

131. Mavroudis, Athens, to Simopoulos, London, 10 April 1941, transmitting a telegram from Rafail in Ankara, *GDD*, no. 220.

132. Rafail, Ankara, to Foreign Ministry, 14 April 1941, *GDD*, no. 231.

133. Rafail, Ankara, to Foreign Ministry, Chania, 26 April 1941, quoted in Kitsikis, *Ἡ Ἑλλάς τῆς 4ης Ἀπριλίου*, p. 119.

134. On 4 March 1941, the US ambassador in Greece, Lincoln MacVeagh, an

The new Turkish policy towards Greece culminated with the failure to appoint an ambassador to the Greek government after its establishment in Crete in April 1941¹³⁵. It was only in the summer of 1943, that the Turkish government decided to appoint an ambassador to the Greek government - in - exile in Cairo¹³⁶.

At the same time, rumours of Turkish territorial designs deepened Greek suspicions which had already begun to cloud the Greek / Turkish entente. In April 1941, Foreign Minister Saraçoğlu suggested to the Germans that Turkey garrison the Greek islands of Chios, Samos and Mitylene for the duration of the war¹³⁷. In order to justify their position, the Turks hastened to explain to the British that such a move would benefit the Allies and spare the islands the hardships of enemy occupation. Suspecting more sinister motives, the Greeks vigorously protested against such a move¹³⁸. By the end of April, however, German troops occupied all the Greek - owned Aegean islands. A month later, the German ambassador in Turkey, Papen, in his efforts to consummate a German / Turkish alliance, offered to the Turks considerable territorial concessions; including «two or three Aegean islands off the coast of Anatolia»¹³⁹. Keeping his government up - to - date with these developments, the British ambassador in Ankara, Knatchbull - Huggessen reported that, despite statements that Turkey had no expansionist ambitions, the Turks actually coveted a great deal of territory. The Turks, he stated, would try to gain control of neighbouring territory including Samos, Mitylene and other Greek islands, on the grounds that this

informed observer of the situation in Southeastern Europe, remarked: «I must admit that Ismet has always seemed to me to be a doubtful quantity. If only Kemal were alive, I think Turkey would have entered into the game squarely long before this», quoted in Iatrides, *op. cit.*, p. 307.

135. During the 1930s, Greece and Turkey promoted their respective legations to embassies. In 1934, Turkey appointed as her representative in Greece, Rüştü Eşref Ünaydın, a distinguished diplomat and a personal friend of Atatürk. In 1939, Ünaydın was replaced by Enis Akaygen. In 1936, Greece, sent to Ankara, Rafail Rafail, a career diplomat and a staunch supporter of Greek/Turkish entente. Rafail spoke Turkish fluently.

136. Knatchbull-Huggessen, Ankara, to the Foreign Office, 14 June 1943, FO 371/R5292/1417, informs that Ambassador Enis Akaygen was ready to leave for Cairo to assume his duties as ambassador to the Greek government-in-exile.

137. Frank G. Weber, *The Evasive Neutral. Germany, Britain and the Quest for a Turkish Alliance in the Second World War*, Columbia, 1979, p. 82.

138. Emmanuel J. Tsouderos, *Διπλωματικά Παρασκήνια*, Athens, 1950, 79-81.

139. Weber, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

was vital to their security¹⁴⁰. The issue of substantial territorial compensation in return for Turkish participation in the war against the Axis was raised as early as July 1939. On that occasion, the Turkish government suggested to the British that in the event of an Anglo / Franco / Turkish victory Turkey should recover the Dodecanese; a mainly Greek - inhabited group of islands in the southeast Aegean held by Italy since 1911¹⁴¹.

Almost a year later, on 28 May 1940, the Foreign Office instructed Knatchbull - Hugessen to promise the reward of the Dodecanese in exchange for a Turkish declaration of war in the event of a direct Italian attack against Greece¹⁴². Although reluctant to make such a commitment, Rüstü Aras, the Turkish ambassador in London, expressed his country's interest in the future of these islands¹⁴³. Soon after the outbreak of the Greek / Italian war, Aras reiterated the Turkish position and intimated that Ankara considered the Dodecanese, Bulgarian Thrace and Albania as being within her sphere of influence¹⁴⁴. On another occasion, the Turks hinted at the possibility of extending Turkish control over to the Greek port of Thessaloniki. This, it was argued, might be beneficial to the Allied war effort, since it might deter Bulgaria from attacking northern Greece. Assessing the Turkish objectives, Knatchbull - Hugessen felt that such a reward might sway Turkey to enter the war against Italy¹⁴⁵.

These exchanges, however, remained inconclusive as long as Turkey refused to commit herself to the war. The issue of the Dodecanese

140. Knatchbull-Hugessen, Ankara, to Lyttelton, Cairo, 13 July 1941, FO 371/R7421/236.

141. Knatchbull-Hugessen, Ankara, to Foreign Office, 21 July 1941, FO 371/E5247/143 and FO 371/E5248/143, and FO 371/E5315/143, 26 July 1941.

142. Foreign Office to Knatchbull-Hugessen, Ankara, 28 May 1940, FO 371/R6269/58.

143. Halifax, London, to Knatchbull-Hugessen, Ankara, 11 June 1940, and Foreign Office to Knatchbull-Hugessen, Ankara, 14 June 1940, FO 371/R6510/316; Foreign Office to Knatchbull-Hugessen, Ankara, 18 June 1940, FO 371/R7058/764.

144. Foreign Office to Knatchbull-Hugessen, Ankara, 30 October 1940, FO 371/R8130/316.

145. Knatchbull-Hugessen, Ankara, to Foreign Office, 28 November 1940, FO 371/R8697/816. Knatchbull-Hugessen's predecessor in Ankara, Sir Percy Loraine in a report about İnönü described him as a calculating individual determined to see that Turkey not only survived but even profited from the Fascist aggression in Europe, Loraine to Foreign Office, 25 January 1937, FO 371/E657/132.

was again revived during the Stalin / Eden talks in Moscow in December 1941. In a reference to Turkey, the Soviet leader suggested that certain unspecified Aegean islands, the Dodecanese according to the Greeks, should be awarded to Ankara in return for their help in the war against the Axis¹⁴⁶.

Nor did the Germans remain idle. Ambassador Papen advised his government to facilitate the cession of some of the Dodecanese, such as the island of Kastellorizo, to Turkey. The occupation of islands only few miles off the Anatolian coast by Italy, the ambassador remarked, was a standing insult to Turkish sovereignty. Their return to Turkey, Papen concluded, might persuade the Turkish government to sign a lasting alliance with Germany¹⁴⁷.

As the Second World War intensified, Turkish determination to remain outside the war became a major bone of contention. After the elimination of Italy from the war, the British prime minister, Sir Winston Churchill, contemplated the formation of a Second Front in the Balkans, the «soft belly» of the Axis. The British felt that Turkish participation in a Balkan front would be crucial. As a result, in January 1943, Churchill arrived in Adana in an attempt to persuade the Turks to reconsider their neutral position. These developments intensified Greek fears that the annexation of the Dodecanese was Ankara's price for participation in the Second Front¹⁴⁸.

Already, in March 1942, the secretary-general of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Numan Menemencioglu, had told the Yugoslav ambassador in Ankara that if attacked by Germany, Turkey was ready to occupy the Dodecanese¹⁴⁹. On the eve of the Churchill - İnönü meeting in Adana, Rauf Orbay, the Turkish ambassador in London, in a conversation with the Greek premier-in-exile, Emmanuel Tsouderos, probed the possibility of restoring certain Mediterranean islands to Turkish sovereignty. The Turkish ambassador went to great lengths to point out that he was only speaking in an unofficial capacity and carefully avoided referring specifically to the Dodecanese. The Greeks,

146. Winston Churchill, *Grand Alliance*, Cambridge, 1950, p. 628; John K. Iatrides, *Balkan Triangle: Birth and Decline of an Alliance Across Ideological Boundaries*, The Hague, 1968, pp. 75-76.

147. *DGFP*, vol. 6, pp. 544-46.

148. Memorandum on Greek/Turkish relations prepared by the Southern Dept. of the Foreign Office, 2 March 1943, FO 371/R2128/1417.

149. Basil P. Papadakis, *Δικλωματική Ιστορία του Έλληνικού Πολέμου, 1940-1945*, Athens, 1957, pp. 280-81.

however, interpreted this as yet another Turkish attempt to stake a claim over these islands¹⁵⁰.

Finally, given the strong pro - Allied stance of the Greeks during the war and the existence of a predominantly Greek population on the islands, the Turkish government considered it unwise to oppose overtly the merger of the Dodecanese with Greece¹⁵¹. As a result in March 1943, Ambassador Orbay informed his Greek colleague in London, A. Agnidi, that so long as the Greek government remained on friendly terms with Turkey his government would not object to the annexation of the Dodecanese by Greece. This position was reiterated during a conversation between Rauf Orbay and the Greek vice premier, George Roussos, on 26 August 1943¹⁵².

At this stage the Turks were more concerned with the postwar disposition of Cyprus, the strategically situated Mediterranean island with a predominant Hellenic population. The Turks strongly suspected that the British, who governed the island since 1878, planned to transfer Cyprus to Greece as a compensation for the heroic resistance of the Greek people to the Italian and German aggression. Indeed, while still in Crete, after the fall of Athens to the Nazis, the Greek prime minister, Emmanuel Tsouderos, suggested to the British ambassador, Michael Palaret, in a letter on 1 May 1941, that Cyprus «be granted at this moment to King George as a personal present» in order to stimulate Greek morale and encourage unity within the Allied war effort¹⁵³. Michael Palaret did not require much persuasion. As early as December 1940, he had recommended the cession of Cyprus to Greece¹⁵⁴. On 29 September 1941, the Greek government - in - exile submitted to the Foreign Office an *aide-mémoire* demanding that Cyprus, the Dodecanese Northern Epirus be awarded to Greece as part of a postwar peace settlement¹⁵⁵. These national claims were repeated in a memorandum of 12

150. Palaret to Howard, London, 6 January 1943, FO 371/R214/214 Palaret to Howard, London, 14 January 1943, FO 371/R464/464 giving details of the meeting between Tsouderos with the Turkish ambassador in London Rauf Orbay.

151. See Foreign Office minutes on Turkish territorial aspirations in FO 371/6831/55, 8 July 1943 and Knatchbull-Hugessen, Ankara to Foreign Office, 9 July 1943, FO 371/R6011/55.

152. Stephen G. Xydis, *Greece and the Great Powers, 1944-1947*, Thessaloniki, 1963, pp. 25, 562, fn. 62.

153. *ibid.*, pp. 16-17.

154. Palaret, Athens, to Foreign Office, 19 December 1940, FO 371/R397/198.

155. The *aide-mémoire* can be found in Dixon, London, to Eden, 25 November 1941, FO 371/R40112/198.

June 1942 which was delivered personally by King George to President Roosevelt¹⁵⁶.

Both the Turkish government and the vociferous Turkish Cypriot minority found these developments disconcerting, and urged that they would not tolerate a change in the status of the island. To allay Turkish displeasure the Foreign Office publicly stated that no Anglo-Greek negotiation on the future of Cyprus had taken place. At the same time, Foreign Secretary Eden summoned the Greek premier, Emmanuel Tsouderos, and advised him to refrain from referring to the Cyprus issue publicly¹⁵⁷. Thus, during the Second World War, the British government used Turkish susceptibilities as a means of curbing Greek and Greek Cypriot demands for union. The same argument was to be employed in the 1950s when the Greek Cypriots renewed their struggle for self-determination.

It can be safely argued that the present day Greek / Turkish antagonism in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean can be traced to the period between 1940 and 1943. Thus, after the Anglo-Turkish negotiations in Adana in January 1943, the Greek government - in exile feared that the British might come to some bargain with Turkey at the expense of the predominantly Greek Dodecanese. But, even more significantly, they suspected that the British might commit themselves to allow the Turks to play a leading role in the postwar Balkans. This, the Greeks felt, would not serve Greece's interests¹⁵⁸. Accordingly, in a conversation with Foreign Secretary Eden on 1 March 1943, Tsouderos pointed to the comparative weakness of the Greek navy and urged the need for it to be of greater strength than that of Turkey in order to safeguard Greek interest in the postwar Aegean¹⁵⁹. Thus, the future of the strategically situated Dodecanese and Cyprus served only to deepen the mutual suspicions that had already seriously undermined Greek / Turkish friendship.

The darkest shadow for Greek / Turkish relations during the Second World War was cast by the Turkish wartime policies towards the

156. The text in Xydis, *op. cit.*, pp. 698-96.

157. Weber, *op. cit.*, pp. 117-20. See also Simopoulos, London, to Foreign Ministry, 14 April 1941, *GDD*, no. 230.

158. Memorandum on Greek/Turkish relations prepared by the Southern Dept. on the Foreign Office, 2 March 1943, FO 371/R2128/1417.

159. Eden, London, to Palaret, 1 March 1943, FO 371/R1873/1417, giving details of his conversation with Tsouderos and forwarding a copy of a memorandum prepared by the Royal Hellenic Navy.

Greek minority in İstanbul. After the Venizelos / Atatürk *rapprochement* of 1930, the vexing question of the treatment of minorities subsided as both Athens and Ankara adopted a more broadminded attitude towards their respective minorities. Cordial relations had an equally favourable impact on the Ecumenical Patriarchate housed at the Phanar quarter of İstanbul¹⁶⁰. On the whole, the position of the minorities remained stable until the outbreak of the Second World War¹⁶¹.

With the spectacular successes of the Nazis in the Balkans (April / May 1941) and the invasion of the USSR (June 1941), the Germans gained considerable popularity in Turkey. A number of Turkish leaders, including Foreign Minister Numan Menemencioğlu and Chief of Staff Fevzi Çakmak, and some influential Turkish newspapers, such as the *Cumhuriyet* and *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, flirted with the Germans¹⁶². This culminated with the signing of a Turkish / German non-aggression pact in June and a commercial agreement in October 1941¹⁶³.

Intensive use of Nazi propaganda, coupled with adverse economic conditions in Turkey led to the re-emergence of Turkish historical prejudice and mistrust against the non-Muslim minorities in İstanbul. It was symptomatic that just about the time of the signing of the German / Turkish agreement on 18 June 1941, the İnönü government decided to mobilise the entire non-Muslim male population of İstanbul, between the ages of 18 and 45, and intern them in special camps in Anatolia; each camp containing about 5.000 men. There, these İstanbul

160. For a detailed treatment of the minority question between the two countries see my, *The Greek Community of Istanbul: The Minority Question and Greek/Turkish Relations from 1918 to the Present*, in print.

161. *ibid.*

162. Knatchbull-Hugessen, Ankara, to Foreign Office, 19 April 1941, FO 371/R4202/622. See also S. S. Aydemir, *İkinci Adam: İsmet İnönü 1938-1950* (The Second Man: İsmet İnönü 1938-1950), vol. 2, İstanbul, 1967, pp. 183-84. Baskın Oran, «İç ve dış politika açısından İkinci Dünya Savaşında Türkiye'de siyasal hayat ve sağsol akımları» (Turkish political life and right-left tendencies during the Second World War with a view of internal and external policy), *Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi* (Review of the Political Science Faculty of Ankara University), 24/3 (1969) 243-74.

163. Text in Jacob C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record*, vol. 2, Princeton, 1956, p. 231. For Foreign Office evaluation, Intelligence Report, 20 June 1941, FO 371/R6382/622 and Knatchbull Hugessen, Ankara, to Foreign Office, 17 October 1941, FO 371/R 9208/622.

Greeks, Armenians and Jews were instructed to engage in non-combative capacities such as roadbuilding¹⁶⁴.

Understandibly, the concentration of the minority populations in these camps aroused great apprehension in the non-Muslim circles of İstanbul¹⁶⁵. These fears were intensified as rumours of the harsh conditions in the camps and the high mortality rate among the internees reached İstanbul¹⁶⁶. According to the British intelligence reports, the whole operation was aimed at the removal of the minorities from the strategically sensitive zones of İstanbul and the Straits. The Turkish government, the Foreign Office believed, suspected a number of non-Muslims, almost all Armenians, of being involved in «fifth column» activities against Turkey¹⁶⁷. On 8 December 1941, however, internees between the ages of 38 and 45 were allowed to return to their homes, while the rest spent another six months before they were released¹⁶⁸.

The anti-minority policies of the İnönü government culminated on 11 November 1942 with the imposition of an emergency tax measure, the *varlık vergisi*¹⁶⁹. This drastic fiscal measure appeared at first to be a legitimate levy designed to act as a panacea to Turkey's severe economic difficulties. Concurrently, it was expected to tax the abnormally high profits amassed by a portion of the business community in Turkey since the outbreak of the Second World War and to help curb the galloping inflation¹⁷⁰.

In conjuncture with the enactment of the *varlık* tax, however, the Turkish press, with the wholehearted approval of the government,

164. Cornwallis, Bagdad, to Eastern Dept., 2/4 November 1941, FO 871/R 10081/15.

165. Knatchbull-Hugessen, Ankara, to Foreign Office, 19 May 1941, FO 371/R 5357/15.

166. Ankara Chancery to Southern Dept., 4 June 1941, FO 371/R 5813/15.

167. *ibid.* Reports had reached the British Embassy in Turkey that a number of swastika flags had been found in the houses of some members of the Armenian community in İstanbul, who were apparently preparing to accord a friendly reception to the Germans when they finally invaded Turkey. The information was passed on to the Turkish government.

168. Knatchbull-Hugessen, Ankara, to Foreign Office, 19 May 1941, FO 371/R 5357/15.

169. Official French translation of the bill: *Loi de l'impôt sur la Fortune*, no 4305/1942. I have dealt with this question in greater detail elsewhere, see my *The Greek Community*, ch. VIII.

170. *ibid.* See also E. Clark, «The Turkish Varlık Vergisi Reconsidered», *Middle Eastern Studies*, 8/2 (1972) 205-16.

launched a bitter and sustained campaign against the Christian and Jewish business community of İstanbul, accusing the non-Muslims of speculation, blackmarketing and stockpiling. The Turkish people were portrayed as the victims of some unpatriotic and unscrupulous entrepreneurs who abused Turkey's liberal laws and managed to profit from the economic crisis¹⁷¹.

In his authoritative study of the *varlık* episode, Faik Ökte, the director of finance in İstanbul (*defterdar*) during the enactment of the tax, presented conclusive evidence indicating that the tax rates were ordered by Ankara, while the bill itself was conceived by Şükrü Saraçoğlu, who assumed the premiership in July 1942¹⁷². With marked objectivity and thoroughness, Faik Ökte reveals that taxpayers were divided into two main categories, the *M* group comprising those Turks of the Muslim faith and the *G* (*Gayrimüslim*) group comprising the non-Muslim Turkish citizens. Subsequently, two further categories, the *D* category for *Donme* Turks and the *E* (*Ecnebi*) category for the foreign nationals were instituted¹⁷³.

It has been estimated that the non-Muslims' element was assessed at 233.000.000 TL (or nearly 52 per cent) while the Muslims, including the *Dönme* Turks, were assessed at 122.500.000 TL (or 29 per cent). The share of the foreign nationals was estimated at 79.500.000 TL (or 19 per cent). It should be remembered, moreover, that according to the census of 1935 the entire non-Muslim population of Turkey hardly exceeded 300.000 from a total of 16.188.767. Given these fig-

171. In a characteristic article entitled «Yorgi, you will no longer be allowed to do what you wish» the semi-official *Ulus*, on 24 November 1942, accused the Yorgis, Kyriakos, Artins and Salamons, in other words the non-Muslims in general, for bringing about the economic ills which had befallen the country, for a resumé of Turkish press reports, Knatchbull-Hugessen, Ankara, to Foreign Office, 29 January 1948, FO 371/R1242/7.

172. Faik Ökte, *Varlık Vergisi Faciası* (The tragedy of the capital levy), İstanbul, 1951, pp. 73-76.

173. *ibid.*, pp. 49, 77-82. The *Dönme* Turks were members of the Oriental Jewish community centered mainly in Thessaloniki and İzmir. They were converted to the Islam in the seventeenth century and played an important rôle in the development of modern Turkish society. Since the establishment of Kemalist rule in Turkey, the *dönme* Turks had taken over a substantial section of the business and industries abandoned by the Greeks and Armenians in İstanbul and İzmir and had accumulated a great deal of wealth in the process. Faik Ökte reveals that past family records of *Dönme* Turks were investigated in order to determine which Muslims were of Jewish origin, Ökte, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

ures, we can deduce that on average each Muslim Turk paid 8 TL while his non-Muslim counterpart was expected to contribute about 800 TL¹⁷⁴. Beside Ökte's account there is an abundance of documents compiled by the British Embassy in Ankara disclosing the extent of discrimination against the non-Muslim ethnic and religious groups in Turkey¹⁷⁵.

On 7 January 1943, regulations governing forced labour for the non-payment of the *varlık* tax were approved by the Turkish assembly¹⁷⁶. By the end of January, the first group of Constantinopolitan non-Muslim businessmen was deported to a work camp at Aşkale, an inaccessible spot in the mountainous region west of Erzurum. Altogether 1400 persons were interned in labour camps in the interior of Anatolia, while non-Muslim property in İstanbul was arbitrarily seized by the authorities and was hurriedly auctioned during 1942 / 1943¹⁷⁷.

The *varlık* tax met with the vigorous disapproval of the diplomatic community in Ankara, which was particularly critical of the crippling effects of the act on foreign business interests in Turkey. Finally, faced with a sustained clamour against the tax, the Turkish government was obliged to revise the *varlık* assessments of foreign nationals and issued new lists with modified levies for non-Turkish citizens¹⁷⁸.

There was, however, a notable exception. As late as 30 August 1943, the Greek ambassador complained bitterly that he was the only foreign representative who did not receive a list of modified levies for the Hellene nationals¹⁷⁹. Ever since the publication of the tax, it was evident that the harsh treatment accorded the Greek Orthodox Turkish nationals was equally extended to the Hellene Greeks, the largest single foreign group in Turkey. Up to January 1943, there were 3.000 Hellene subjects who had declared to the Greek consular authorities their *varlık* assessments. The total amount of tax assessed for this group reached 18.705.412 TL. Discrimination was particularly visible

174. Memorandum of the Capital Levy prepared by the commercial attaché, N. S. Roberts, Ankara, 1 January 1943, FO 371/R645/7; Clark, *op. cit.*, pp. 208-209.

175. For details see Alexandris, *The Greek Community*, ch. VIII.

176. Law no. 19288/1943 given in *Resmî Gazete* (Official Gazette), no. 5802, of 12 January 1943.

177. Alexandris, *op. cit.*, ch. VIII.

178. Ökte, *op. cit.*, pp. 121-26.

179. Helm, Ankara, to Eden, 30 August 1943, FO 371/R8574/7.

in the case of employees in banks and other similar institutions¹⁸⁰. Hellenes were the only foreign group whose property was confiscated and auctioned extensively. As a result, by August 1943, 6.500.000 TL tax debts of Hellene nationals had been collected by the Turkish authorities¹⁸¹. Commenting on the stringent measures against the Hellenes, on 23 December 1943, Sterndale Bennett of the British Embassy, remarked that «all indications go to confirm the victimization of Greek nationals»¹⁸². The concern of the Greek Embassy was particularly pronounced in the case of Constantinopolitan Hellene wage earners whose aggregate tax amounted to no less than 500.000 TL¹⁸³. According to a comparative list by professions, prepared by the Greek Embassy in January 1943, the difference between the amounts of tax claimed from the Hellenes and Muslim Turkish was tremendous. Accordingly¹⁸⁴:

<i>Professions</i>	<i>Hellenes</i>	<i>Muslim Turks</i>
Importers	10,000/ 75,000	1,000/ 10,000
Exporters	60,000/ 400,000	5,000/ 25,000
Merchants	15,000/1,000,000	1,500/100,000
Industrialists	75,000/ 262,500	500/ 85,000
Grocers	6,000/ 150,000	500/ 10,000
Shopkeepers	12,000/ 160,000	500/ 15,000
Agents	10,000/ 120,000	1,000/ 10,000
Merchant tailors	15,000/ 75,000	1,500/ 17,000
Furniture merchants	6,000/ 140,000	1,200/ 8,000

This discriminatory evaluations were contrary to the principle of international law which forbade a state to tax its foreign residents more heavily than its own nationals. This was particularly unfortunate, for Greece and Turkey had been close friends ever since 1930

Greek resentment to the Turkish action was immense. In a conversation with the British diplomat, Sterndale Bennett on 21 Decem-

180. Memorandum prepared by the Greek consular authorities in Istanbul, 27 January 1943, FO 371/R1110/7. Turkish estimates give the tax imposed on the Hellenes as 19, 861, 350 TL, Ökte, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

181. Knatchbull-Hugessen, Ankara, to Eden, 8 August 1943, FO 371/R7387/1417.

182. Bennett, Ankara, to Foreign Office, 23 December 1942, FO 371/R8890/1574.

183. Bennett, Ankara, to Foreign Office, 31 December 1942, FO 371/R12/7.

184. Memorandum prepared by the Greek consular authorities in Istanbul, 27 January 1943, FO 371/R1110/7.

ber, Greek Ambassador Rafail expressed the view that the tax was «a savage attack on the Greek community as a whole with political rather than fiscal objectives». The taxation demands, he insisted, «meant nothing less than the complete extermination of the Greek community, and represented a preconcerted plan to drive the Greeks out of business and take over their trade»¹⁸⁵. This view was shared by the British commercial counsellor in the Ankara Embassy, who was sent to İstanbul to collect information on the tax. After gathering a mass of information, he concluded that in the case of the minorities and the Greek nationals the «taxation is absolutely crushing»¹⁸⁶. The Foreign Office, too, believed that

«The Turks are determined to eliminate the Greeks from Turkish national life, whether they form part of the Greek minority or are Hellene Greeks who played a large part in the commercial and cultural life of İstanbul»¹⁸⁷.

Although no exact figures on the share of the tax levied on the Greek community itself are available, the Greek consular authorities estimated it to be at least 60.000.000 TL¹⁸⁸. The tax imposed on Greek minority institutions alone was estimated at 400.000 TL. Greek Orthodox priests, schools, hospitals and other philanthropic institutions were held liable to pay the so-called tax on extraordinary «war-profits». Yet, whereas the American hospital of İstanbul, a large and flourishing modern establishment charging 10 TL a bed per night, was assessed at 2.000 TL (another account puts it at 1.500 TL), the Balıklı hospital, a much more modest concern, was down for 68.000 TL¹⁸⁹. Together with the Hellenes, the Greek element as a whole was assessed at no less than 80.000.000 TL. In other words, the Constantinopolitan Greeks, although constituting a very small proportion of the total population in Turkey (approximately 0,55 per cent), was called upon to shoulder just under 20 per cent of the total *varlık* taxation.

The Greek chargé d' affaires, Kapetanakis, a staunch supporter

185. Details of this conversation in Bennett, Ankara, to Foreign Office, 21 December 1942, FO 371/R8837/1574.

186. Bennett, Ankara, to Foreign Office, 23 December, FO 371/R8928/1574.

187. Minute by G. L. Clutton, 23 December 1942, FO 371/R8837/1574.

188. Memorandum prepared by the Greek consular authorities in İstanbul 27 January 1943, FO 371/R1110/7.

189. Archbishop of Canterbury, London, to Eden, 28 January 1943, FO 371/R935/7. Balıklı (*Balıoğlu*) is the Greek Orthodox community hospital in İstanbul.

of Greco-Turkish friendship, described his six month stay in İstanbul as consul-general (September 1942 to March 1943) as «a nightmare owing to the tax»¹⁹⁰. The deportation of Greeks to Anatolia and the daily auction of Greek property and merchandise shocked the community as a whole. The tax did not only embitter the Greeks against the Turkish government but also against the Great Powers, who did not wish to risk the loss of Ankara's goodwill for what was then a basically trivial matter. Thus, the news of the *varlık* was hushed up in the Anglo-American press. The only exception to this was the *New York Times* correspondent in Turkey, C. L. Sulzberger, who in three long and detailed articles, drew attention to the punitive tax on wealth¹⁹¹. Later on, the *New York Times* took up the issue editorially and stressed:

«America and Britain cannot dictate tax laws to Turkey any more than they can to each other. But they could certainly view with some uneasiness the development in Turkey of a narrow nationalism reminiscent, even in a milder way, of that which Germany has imposed on Europe. We hope that as Turkey turns more and more away from the Nazis in other respects she will turn from them in this respect too»¹⁹².

Faced with the refusal of the United Nations block to intervene on behalf of the minorities, the Greek Embassy took upon itself the task of negotiating a better deal for the Constantinopolitan Greeks. Thus, the Greek ambassador, Rafail Rafail, as well as the consul-general in İstanbul, made frequent representation to members of the Turkish government, but with little practical results¹⁹³. A bitter Greek government viewed the *varlık* affair as another step in the Turkish plan to modify the basis of Greek-Turkish friendship. Old suspicions were once again revived and the Turkish failure to assist Greece against the Axis Powers in May 1941 was now described as «the treachery of an enemy who posed as a friend». At the same time, the Greeks were painfully aware of their feeble international position. The removal of the Greek government-in-exile to London and then to Cairo, after the

190. For Kapetanakis' views, Knatchbull-Hugessen, Ankara, to Eden, 8 April 1943, FO 371/R3658/7.

191. *New York Times*, 9 to 12 September 1943.

192. *ibid.*, 17 September 1943.

193. Interview with Greek ambassador, Knatchbull-Hugessen, Ankara, to Eden, 18 March 1943, FO 371/R3392/7.

German occupation of Greece, decreased the influence which it could exercise on Ankara. After the German invasion, the Greeks complained bitterly, and Turkey found favourable conditions for the elimination of the Constantinopolitan Greek element.

It was mainly because of the deterioration of Greek-Turkish relations that the planned visit of Tsouderos to Ankara was cancelled¹⁹⁴. Earlier, on 3 March, in a direct appeal to the Turkish premier, Şükrü Saraçoğlu, Tsouderos stated that he had no doubt whatsoever that Turkey had the right to impose any tax measures on its citizens, including those of Greek origin. However, it appears, Tsouderos remarked, that the new law struck the Greek inhabitants of Turkey with singular vigour causing widespread ruin and misery. He then went on to stress

«Le Gouvernement et le peuple grecs pourront difficilement comprendre qu'à un moment où l'hellénisme subit les dures vicissitudes d'une triple occupation ennemie, la Turquie amie et alliée n'aura pas à cœur de donner des instructions nettes aux organes administratifs turcs pour que ceux-ci apportent les tempéraments nécessaires à l'application d'une loi qui sans cela risque de mener à la misère un élément dont la loyauté à la cause greco-turque est hors de doute»¹⁹⁵.

In his answer Saraçoğlu, after addressing Greece as Turkey's friend and ally, insisted that all taxpayers had been treated equally¹⁹⁶. Similarly, on 16 May, in a speech at the opening of the Institute of International Law at the University of İstanbul, Foreign Minister Menemencioglu reiterated his government's commitment to Greco-Turkish friendship¹⁹⁷. It appears that the Turks failed to conceive the profound bitterness that the *varlık* taxation engendered in official Greek circles. This was made clear by the Turkish prime minister who, while reassuring the British that Greco-Turkish friendship was one of the main points of his country's Balkan policy, he disclosed that when the tax was imposed its effects on this friendship were not considered¹⁹⁸.

194. According to Rafail, the tax was the immediate cause of this cancellation, Knatchbull-Hugessen, Ankara, 22 May 1943, FO 371/R4609/55.

195. Tsouderos to Saraçoğlu, 3 March 1943, FO 371/1957/7.

196. Saraçoğlu to Tsouderos, 7 March 1943, FO 371/1957/7.

197. Knatchbull-Hugessen, Ankara, to Eden, 16 May 1943, FO 371/R4362/55.

198. Memorandum on the Greek/Turkish relations prepared by the Southern Dept. of the Foreign Office, 2 March 1943, FO 371/R2128/1417.

The Greeks, however, were not satisfied with such explanations. Perturbed by the punitive character of the tax, they believed that this indicated a change of policy on the part of the Turkish government.

It is generally accepted that the *varlık* tax constituted the single most serious breach of the minority provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne¹⁹⁹. The whole affair was a betrayal of Kemal Atatürk's genuine efforts to incorporate the minorities into the mainstream of Turkish society. The diplomatic implications of the *varlık* episode were equally significant. By imposing a discriminatory tax on foreign nationals, the Turkish government invited foreign interference in her internal affairs and finally it had to yield under strong diplomatic pressure. It was not coincidental that the interned non-Muslims were permitted to return to İstanbul a week before President İnönü met with Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill in Cairo in December 1943²⁰⁰. A few months later, the İnönü government abolished altogether the oppressive *varlık* tax²⁰¹.

This mitigated to a certain extent the tensions between Greece and Turkey. Indeed, notwithstanding the Greek disillusionment with Turkey's wartime neutrality, her dealings with the Axis and the *varlık* episode, Greek/Turkish détente survived the formidable strains of the Second World War. This was primarily due two generous gestures made by the Turks soon after the Nazi invasion of Greece.

In the winter of 1941/1942 when the Axis occupation had caused widespread starvation in Greece, the Turkish government facilitated the dispatch of foodstuffs across the Aegean. A small steamer, *Kurtuluş*, hired by the *Kızılay* (the Turkish Red Cross) made six trips between October 1941 and January 1942 before it sunk during a storm in the Aegean²⁰². The shipment of grain to Greece was then carried

199. See Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, London, 1968, 2nd ed., pp. 297-300; Geoffrey Lewis, *Modern Turkey*, London, 1974, pp. 134-35; L. V. Thomas and R. N. Frye, eds, *The United States and Turkey and Iran*, Cambridge Mass., 1951, pp. 97-98; Edward Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1943-1945*, Princeton, 1973, pp. 282-36.

200. Nadi, *op. cit.*, p. 178; Aydemir, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

201. *Resmî Gazete*, no. 5657, 17 March 1944. For comments see Ökte, *op. cit.*, pp. 127-28.

202. For a detailed analysis of the wartime starvation in Greece and the significance of the Turkish aid see Dimitri Kitsikis, «La famine en Grèce (1941-1942). Les conséquences politiques», in *Revue d'Histoire de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale*, 19/74 (1969) 17-41.

on by another steamer, the *Dumlupınar*, until the end of August 1942.

By that time, however, significant changes had taken place in Ankara. In July 1942, after the death of Premier Refik Saydam, Şükrü Saraçoğlu took over the premiership, while Numan Menemencioğlu, known for his pro-German views, became foreign minister²⁰³. This, coupled with the deteriorating economic conditions in Turkey, prompted the new government to discontinue the shipment of foodstuffs to Greece in the end of August 1942. Even though only 17.500 of the promised 50.000 tons of grain were actually sent to Greece, the Greek public opinion was grateful to the Turks for their aid, particularly since this was the only noteworthy relief that the starving Greek masses received during the war²⁰⁴.

Equally significant, was the Turkish willingness to permit escapees from Greece, including military personnel, to pass through Turkish territory and reach the Allied forces in Egypt. Thus, soon after the German occupation of Greece the Greek warship *Adrias* found refuge in Turkish territorial waters before reaching the Allied-held North Africa.

It was these instances of solidarity, coupled with the renewed Soviet threat in the Balkans and the Straits, that facilitated the re-construction of Greek/Turkish *détente* after the Second World War. In 1947, the Turks did not oppose the award of the Dodecanese to Greece and the entente between Greece and Turkey culminated in 1952 with the accession of the two Aegean powers to NATO²⁰⁵.

203. For the close relationship between Menemencioğlu and the German ambassador in Ankara see Nimet Arzık, *Bitmiyen Kavga: İsmet İnönü* (The unending quarrel: İsmet İnönü), Ankara, 1966, pp. 110-13.

204. Kitsikis, «La famine en Grèce», pp. 36-41;

205. For an excellent analysis of the postwar relations between Greece and Turkey see Iatrides, *Balkan Triangle*, *passim*.

C. SYVOLOPOULOS

ANGLO-HELLENIC TALCS ON CYPRUS DURING THE AXIS CAMPAIGN AGAINST GREECE

In September of 1939, at the outbreak of World War II, the memory of the 1931 national uprising against foreign domination was still fresh in the minds of the Cypriots and the pressures exerted by the British colonial authorities were being felt¹. The city council elections had been postponed, the Church hierarchy remained without a leader, the teaching of Greek history was forbidden and the state of national emergency was being prolonged without any apparent cause. It is, therefore, not surprising that the news of the Italian attack on Greece, on 28 October 1940, rallied the national conscience and caused the political thermometer of Cyprus to rise. With the passage of time, the gradual increase in intensity and scope of the war coupled with Greece's front-line role against the Axis powers, gave rise to the hope that the pre-war state of affairs would be altered through a generous gesture from Great Britain towards its only true ally in the Eastern Mediterranean area².

After the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, the successive Greek governments had adopted a low-key stance over the Cyprus issue. Their diplomatic efforts were concentrated in attempting to secure the independence and territorial integrity of the country through a de-

1. G. Georghallides, «British Policy on Cyprus during 1931», *Πρακτικά του Πρώτου Διεθνούς Κυπριολογικού Συνεδρίου*, 3d vol., Nicosia, 1974, pp. 95-104; C. Syvolopoulos, «Ἡ στάση τῆς ἐλληνικῆς κυβερνήσεως κατὰ τὴν κυπριακὴ κρίση τοῦ 1931» (Greek Government's attitudes during the Cypriot crisis of 1931), *Ἐπιστημονικὴ Ἑπετηρίδα Π.Α.Σ.Π.Ε. (1976-1977)*, Athens, 1978, pp. 485-511; J. Pikros, «Ὁ Βενιζέλος καὶ τὸ Κυπριακὸ ζήτημα» (Venizelos and the Question of Cyprus), *Μελέτηματα γύρω ἀπὸ τὸ Βενιζέλο καὶ τὴν ἐποχὴ του*, Athens, 1980, pp. 173-292. See also, *Survey of International Affairs: 1931*, pp. 354-394; Sir G. Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, vol. IV: *The Ottoman province. The British Colony, 1571-1948*, ed. by Sir H. Luke, Cambridge, 1952, pp. 539-552; M. Dendias, *La question cypríote aux points de vue historique et de droit international*, Paris, 1934. A general view: G. Ténékidès, *Chypre. Histoire récente et perspectives d'avenir*, Paris-Genève, 1964.

2. The British were obliged to accept the existence of the unionist movement. This movement had been encouraged by some British philhellenes, as well, such as Compton Mackenzie, who in an article in «Rapholds News» maintained that Great Britain should declare her decision to cede Cyprus to Greece (F.O. 371/29902, Mayleay to Nichols, May 27, 1941).

crease in tensions with the neighboring states and balanced cooperation with the major Mediterranean powers. Under these circumstances the escalation of the conflict with Britain would not, on the one hand, serve to resolve the union problem and could, on the other hand, jeopardize both Greece's position on the international scene and certain other issues of national importance. According to this line of reasoning, the resolution of the independence-related issues of Northern Epirus, the Dodecanese and Cyprus was a prerequisite to the strengthening of Greece's international position and the normalization of its relations with the Great Powers³. Already, however, the decisive contributions of Greece in the allied struggle and the unavoidable reorientation towards a new, post-war, international situation, provided the foundation for the return of the Cyprus issue to the international scene.

The Greek government did not link the Cyprus issue with the developments of the military activities on the Albanian front. Its first step was taken on the eve of the imminent German invasion, while the country prepared for that final struggle and harsh trial. On 2 March 1941, in Athens, Alexander Korizis told Anthony Eden:

As the Greek people will be required to offer the greatest of sacrifices, they will need, in order to maintain the excellence of their morale, an immediate satisfaction of their demands. I cannot tell you (I said) how impressive, in these hours of crisis, would a British gesture be whereby Cyprus would be ceded to Greece. I am simply putting forth (I was quick to add) a thought which will require further study and am not demanding an answer⁴.

The British Secretary of the Foreign Office hastily declared that he was unable to speak about such a sensitive and complex issue which, in any case, exceeded his «mandate»⁵. Korizis, however, repeated his proposal when, at the end of the same month, Eden returned to Athens for further talks. During this two-day conference, the Greek Prime Minister once again expanded on the «psychological reasons requiring the cessation of Cyprus to Greece for the heightening of the morale of the warring Greek people». At the same time, he was broach-

3. See: C. Svolopoulos, *Ἡ ἑλληνικὴ ἐξωτερικὴ πολιτικὴ μετὰ τὴν Συνθήκην τῆς Λωζάννης. Ἡ κρίσιμος καμπὴ (Ἰούλιος-Δεκέμβριος 1928)* (Greek foreign policy after the Lausanne Treaty. The turning point, July-December 1928), Thessaloniki (Institute of Public International Law and International Relations), 1928, pp. 95-7, 169.

4. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1940-41. *Ἑλληνικὰ Διπλωματικά Ἔγγραφα* (Greek Diplomatic Documents) [abbr.: *Ε.Δ.Ε.*], A. Korizis (memorandum), 2 March 1941, pp. 123-4.

5. Ibidem.

ing an issue of practical political necessity: the removal of the seat of the Greek government to a secure and free area of Greek soil⁶.

The concentration of strong German forces in the Greco-Bulgarian area had basically preordained, at the end of March 1941, the course of the military conflict on the southern Balkan front. The Greek and British troops which had been placed along the front were arithmetically incapable of definitively blocking the German invasion forces. Thus, the imminent subjugation of continental Greece by the Axis powers required an analysis of the alternatives for the continuation of the struggle from the Greek islands or from abroad. Korizis' opinion, as he presented it to Eden, was as follows:

The government must face as of now the possibility that it may be forced to abandon the capital and remove H.M. the King's seat and its own elsewhere. Naturally, its first thought was to elect to move to the island of Crete. However, due to the island's being in the battle zone and to its proximity to the areas that the enemy will occupy if the Peloponnesus falls, we concluded that H.M. the King's presence on that island would not be satisfactory in terms of his safety. Therefore, we decided that it would be necessary to move him to a safer island [...] only Cyprus [remained]. This solution, however, presents the drawback of the exercise of the royal imperium on free Greek lands from non-Greek lands. Thus (I added), I must once again request that you consider this issue with care and that you propose to the British government that Cyprus be ceded to Greece or, at least, that section which H.M. the King shall inhabit so that the royal imperium may be exercised from Greek soil⁷.

The British Foreign Secretary's reaction, without implying definite rejection of the Greek proposal, did not leave much room for hope. The ensuing conversation, as reported by the Greek Prime Minister, is especially enlightening:

Mr. Eden replied with a smile, that the final victory has yet to come and already we ask to annex lands. I replied that the miracle performed to date by the Greek people surpasses the bounds of a simple victory and justifies any concession. Mr. Eden, agreeing, asked if it would be possible for the King and the government to be moved to the Dodecanese. Naturally, I replied, no, not to Kassos or any other such secondary island but only to Rhodes once it has been liberated. Mr. Eden then replied that the issue of the King's and the government's temporary seat would be considered upon his return to London as well as our Cyprus demands, with all possible goodwill⁸.

6. *E.A.E.*, A. Korizis (note), 1 April 1941, p. 181.

7. *Ibidem*.

8. *Ibidem*.

The developments in the Greek-British talks on Cyprus soon justified the most pessimistic prognostications. As soon as the German invasion began, both the Greek Ambassador to London and the King, the latter meeting with the British Ambassador in Athens, reiterated the demand for the establishment of the Greek government on free Greek soil in Cyprus. Korizis sent Charalambos Simopoulos on a visit to the British Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary with instructions to restate the recent Greek position and to add the following new thoughts:

Even though I have not lost all hope that a gesture of the above-mentioned type is still possible today, I realise that a final solution cannot now be sought, although I understand how much Greece could benefit from this and the extent of eternal Hellenic gratitude toward Great Britain for such an encouragement for new sacrifices. With this in mind, I request, as I have already done of Mr. Eden, that it be considered whether and in what manner it would be possible to cede whatever strip of Cyprus to Greece so that, in case of abandonment of the capital, the King may be safe from the dangers of a war zone and may govern the free part of his country from Greek soil⁹.

In the same telegram, Korizis empowered the Greek Ambassador to make, at his own discretion, one final concession: it would be possible for the Greek demand «to take on a temporary form, giving the British government the prerogative to determine a final solution in the future...»¹⁰. Two days later, King George reiterated the same positions to Palairot. Already, the confining of the Greek position to a temporary solution was becoming official; it was also being projected by the Greek leaders as a very significant concession¹¹.

The initial official reaction from London, as reported by the British Ambassador to Athens and Orme Sargent, Under Secretary of the Foreign Office, was completely negative: the British government was discussing with the Cypriot government the possibility of establishing the King and the Greek government in Cyprus in the same manner as the various allied governments had been temporarily established in London. The British government would not consider ceding any part of Cyprus, even temporarily, to Greece...¹². Korizis held nothing back in his reply, which expressed his disappointment and disagreement with the British position:

9. *E.A.E.*, A. Korizis to Simopoulos, 9 April 1941, p. 200.

10. *Ibidem*.

11. *E.A.E.*, Korizis to Simopoulos, 12 April 1941, p. 205-6.

12. *E.A.E.*, Korizis to Simopoulos, 13 April 1941, p. 207-9.

I answered Mr. Palairët that this reply does not satisfy us. After having stressed that we do not mean to take advantage of this state of crisis to reopen the Cyprus issue, I said that if we ask for a small part of Cyprus to be ceded to us we do so only to secure the King's safety on Greek soil and to enable him properly to exercise the royal imperium. We believe that the King's safety combined with the other reasons we gave totally justify our demand. If the British government refuses, the King will go to one of the Greek islands, regardless of the danger he will face in so doing. However, we believe that the difficult moments Greece is going through justify us in insisting upon our demand, especially since an acceptance will not imply a permanent cession.

The Greek Prime Minister also made his demand known to the high echelons of the British government: Simopoulos was instructed to arrange a meeting with Eden in order to reiterate the demand for the cession of even a part of Cypriot soil¹³.

The Greek Ambassador met with the British Foreign Secretary in London on the following day, April 14, 1941. Simopoulos' account of the meeting is enlightening:

I saw Mr. Eden a short while ago, to whom I announced the disappointment caused by his reply and H. M. the King's decision to go of necessity to a Greek island, and I insistently asked that the government's decision be reconsidered and that our proposal be accepted. Mr. Eden answered that he was sorry his reply was considered unsatisfactory and, referring to two meetings he had with us, told me that he had already made known to us the difficulty of accepting our proposals. He added that he was in a very sad position because it had been his wish to do everything he could for us, and he considered H. M. the King's decision highly dangerous. I insisted that he reconsider this highly critical situation and find a way to satisfy our demands. Mr. Eden told me that he saw no reason why H. M. the King could not exercise his duties from Cyprus in the same manner that any foreign head of state residing there would. I once again insisted that from the point of view of prestige it would be good if, in these difficult times, his government made a gesture. Mr. Eden, apparently ill at ease, replied that he could not give me an answer before consulting with the Cabinet, which would meet that evening and to which he would present this issue; however, he made it clear that I should not be optimistic because this was a complex and sensitive issue¹⁴.

The discussion of the matter in the Cabinet that evening did not result in the acceptance of the Greek proposal but neither did it put an end to the dialogue on the national issue. The negative stance on the request of jurisdiction was underlined but at the same time the

13. *E.A.E.*, Korizis to Simopoulos, 13 April 1941, pp. 207-8.

14. *E.A.E.*, Simopoulos (London) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 14 April 1941, p. 209.

possibility of allowing for certain facilities on Cyprus was clarified. This was in keeping with the views expressed by the Defense Committee the previous day and which had already been forwarded to Athens. At this point, however, the Foreign Secretary informed the Cabinet that «a further telegram had been received which made it plain that the Greek government attached great importance to their having a small piece of territory which they could call their own and in which they could exercise jurisdiction». Thus, he said «the next few days might well be very difficult ones for the Greek government and he was anxious not to send a refusal to a request about which the Greek government felt strongly». Categorically negative was the reaction from the Secretary of State for the Colonies: a strong party, in his view, wanted the island to be annexed by Greece; if the King of Greece were allowed to exercise jurisdiction over part of the island, the Governor's position would become an impossible one: «Why could not the King go to Alexandria or Jerusalem?... After discussion, the Cabinet «agreed that the Foreign Secretary should send a telegram to the effect that we agreed that the right plan was that the Greek government, if they had to leave Greece, should go to Crete in the first instance and that we would be ready to discuss the Cyprus project with them at a later date»¹⁵.

15. CAB. 65/22 (War Cabinet's proceedings, April 14, 1941). The final negative position of the Foreign Office had been conceived earlier, when from Crete Em. Tsouderos, Korizes' successor to the premiership, had come back to the problem of Cyprus as it was revealed in a telegram by Michael Palairet, dated May 3: «*the President of the Council had sent me personal letter suggesting as encouragement to the Greeks in their present disaster, Cyprus should be granted to the King of Greece «as a personal present». For the duration of the War, His Majesty would govern the island through existing British authorities: after the War it would be governed by Greek officials. Thus if he had to leave Crete he could transfer his residence to territory under his sovereignty.*

2. *I have told the King and President of the Council that the proposal does not seem practical to me and that in any case it had been definitely decided that Cyprus would be no safer than Crete. His Majesty agreed with me as to the impracticability of the idea and I said I would prefer not to transmit it to His Majesty's Government but the President of the Council begged me to do so as personal suggestion»* (F.O. 871/29884, Palairet (Canea) to Eden, 3 May 1941).

Antony Eden underlines his replay:

«I entirely approve your reply to the King and the President of the Council as reported in paragraph 2. Quite apart from the fact that, as you pointed out, Cyprus would be no safer than Crete as place of residence for the King and Government,

In fact, the final British reply was given to the Greek government two months later, when Greece was occupied by the German forces. Two memoranda by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Secretary of State for the Colonies resulted in the War Cabinet's final decision. The future of Cyprus had been considered in the light of Great Britain's strategic, political and economic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean area as well as of an eventual German attack against that island. The text of the Cabinet's decision provided that «the Foreign Secretary should not at this stage initiate discussions with the Greek government on the future of Cyprus: if, however, the matter were raised, he could reply that we were prepared to discuss the future of Cyprus with them after the War, as part of the general peace settlement»¹⁶.

In order to discover the real motives behind the attitude adopted by London, we must examine analytically the ideas and views exchanged between the Foreign Office's officials. The discussions were in fact based on the well - documented report prepared at the request of the Foreign Office by the Foreign Research Department of the Royal Institute of International Affairs¹⁷. The writer of the report was H. Beeley; his conclusions were based on an analysis of the political and strategic aspects of the Cypriot issue¹⁸.

The examination of the political factors tended to support the concession of the island to Greece: the gradual intensification of nationalist feelings amongst the Greek Cypriots did not permit «even the concession of self-governing institutions without immediate deadlock»; in any case «it is contrary to the traditions and in general to the interests of the British Empire to keep in political subjugation a people whose social and cultural level justifies the claim to self-determination». The presence of a dissatisfied and potentially hostile population would be a factor of weakness which could, in a moment of

the present moment, when Cyprus is likely to be subjected to attack, is obviously quite insuitable «for considering the possibility of handing over the Island to Greece» (F.O. 371/29884, Eden to Palairot, 6 May 1941).

16. F.O. 371/29846, Extract from War Cabinet conclusions, 2 June 1941.

17. F.O. 371/29846, H. Beeley (Royal Institute of International Affairs) to Nichols, 1941. This memorandum was requested in P. Nichols' (head of Southern Dt) letter of 27 March to Arnold Toynbee (R. 3353/198/19).

18. See the text of the Memorandum by the Royal Institute of International Affairs on Cyprus, above pp. 209-214 (annex I).

crisis, create difficulties for the dominant power or even wipe out the advantages in view of which the island was being held. The constant friction between the British authorities and the Greek population would have an unfortunate effect on Greco-British relations.

In the strategic field, the idea of ceding Cyprus would justify, according to the memorandum's conclusions, more serious reservations. The consequences would have been tied up with the more general developments in the Eastern Mediterranean and the conservation or the loss of other British possessions in this strategic area. However, the British continued to be interested in keeping the island under their control and, on the other hand, in preventing a hostile Power from undermining their position there. Nevertheless, the strategic requirements of the Empire were not in opposition to the cession of Cyprus if the transition of sovereignty to Greece was followed, at the same time, by Greek offers of military facilities to the British, such as naval or air bases on the island, either for a term of years or in perpetuity. A solution along these lines had been suggested by Eleftherios Venizelos, speaking in the Greek Chamber ten years before. «If—the memorandum continued—as seems probable, this solution had as one of its consequences the establishment of friendly relations between the British personnel and the local population, British interests in Cyprus would be more secure than they are at present». It must be pointed out that any proposal to place Cyprus under Greek rule had to take into account the interests of the Moslem minority and the strategic anxieties of the Turkish government. However, any considerations concerning this question, would not affect in any way the international status of the island.

Before presenting his report to the War Cabinet, the British Foreign Secretary studied the memorandum prepared by the Royal Institute of International Affairs; but, at the same time, he seriously considered the comments of the Foreign Office officials. E. R. Warner believed that the cession of Cyprus to Greece before the end of the war or at whatever moment promised the greatest political advantages: «As we are fighting for democracy, it would clearly be extremely difficult for any government in this country to maintain the existing regime in Cyprus after the victory of the democratic cause»; the British government only stood to prejudice its strategic interests by clinging on too long to a political sovereignty which it had very little hope of maintaining after the war. R. J. Bowker also agreed that British interests could best be served by ceding Cyprus to Greece according

to Beeley's conclusion; but, at the same time, he pointed out that the moment was not the most suitable: such a transfer would give the impression that Britain had little hope of retaining the island and preferred to leave to the Greeks the difficult task of defending it and the possible ignominy of having to surrender it to the Germans. P. Dixon, «though much sympathizing with the aspirations of the Greeks», did not consent to tying Britain's hands in any way until the course of the war had shown more clearly what British strategic requirements were likely to be: as a matter of fact through the extension of the air arm in the war and the consequent reduction of distances, Cyprus could become a strong outpost in the extreme Eastern Mediterranean. In the same way, H. Nichols, Head of the Southern Department, repeated the opinion that it was quite impossible to decide on the future of Cyprus before the end of the war. Finally, Orme Sargent, Under Secretary of State, pointed out that it would be «useful to have this memorandum available when the time comes for us to advise as to the future of Cyprus» and excluded any possibility of taking, at present, any decision with regard to this problem¹⁹.

Anthony Eden's memorandum, seriously influenced by the comments of the Foreign Office services, tended, at the same time, to consider the problem in the light of Beeley's memorandum statements. As a matter of fact, he concurred with its basic conclusions and seemed to agree that the possibility of ceding Cyprus to Greece was in no way in opposition to the security requirements of the Empire. Moreover, Eden's views combined the above with the consideration of German attempts to try to occupy Cyprus and, then, declaring their intention of handing it over to the Quisling government in Athens. Finally, he concluded that there was more than one alternative to a possible German initiative. In this connection, he did not rule out a preliminary agreement between the two governments relating to the conditions under which the sovereignty of the island would, after the war, be transferred from Great Britain to Greece²⁰.

However, before these suggestions by the Foreign Office were presented to the War Cabinet, the fate of Cyprus had been sealed by the

19. F.O. 371/29846, [Minutes on Beeley's memorandum].

20. F.O. 371/29846, Memorandum by the Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs, May 31, 1941, above pp. 215-7 (annex II).

intervention of Winston Churchill. In conclusion to all the views and opinions exchanged between the British officials, the Prime Minister emphasized:

It is much better to leave all questions of territorial readjustment to be settled after the war. Once we depart from this principle, many other difficult cases may arise. I do not think we ought to cede an inch of British territory during the war.

It does not follow that Cyprus will immediately be taken. If it is, the Germans will be able, if they choose, to give it nominally to the Greek Quisling government while using it for purposes themselves. This will not make much difference to what happens.

I have followed very closely all that has happened in Cyprus since I visited the island and wrote a memorandum on the Tribute at the end of 1907. I suppose you are aware there is a substantial Moslem population in Cyprus, who have been very loyal to us, and who would much resent being handed over to the Greeks²¹.

21. F.O. 371/29846, Prime Minister's Personal Minute, June 2, 1941.

ANNEXES

I

Memorandum by the Royal Institute of International Affairs

CYPRUS

[F.O. 371/29846]

1. The island of Cyprus was assigned «to be occupied and administered by England», under the Anglo-Turkish Convention of the 4th June 1878, in return for an undertaking to join in the defence of the Sultan's remaining Asiatic territories in the event of any future Russian attack upon them. The prevention of Russian penetration into the valleys of the Tigris and the Euphrates was a British as well as an Ottoman interest, and the Russian occupation of Qars and Ardahan with her claim to Batum, all of which, as Her Majesty's Government foresaw at the time of the Cyprus Convention, were accepted by the Congress of Berlin, brought the danger appreciably nearer. Lord Beaconsfield had accordingly called for reports on the possibility of acquiring some base from which further Russian expansion might be effectively counteracted. Among the sites suggested by his advisers were Muhammerah at the head of the Persian Gulf, Stampalia in the Aegean, and Alexandretta; but the Government's choice fell upon Cyprus.

It would seem that, for the purpose of operating against a Russian army based on Armenia, both Cyprus and Alexandretta were at that time less favourably situated than a position either on the Shatt-al-Arab or closer to the Dardanelles; and that Cyprus offered fewer advantages than Alexandretta. But there were other considerations which favoured a site in the Eastern Mediterranean: since the opening of the Suez Canal, nine years previously, the lack of a British base nearer to its northern outlet than Malta had been felt as a weakness; and considerable attention was being paid to projects for a Euphrates Valley railway, to be constructed by British capital, from Alexandretta or some neighbouring point on the coast of northern Syria to the Persian Gulf. It was anticipated that the possession of either Alexandretta or Cyprus would go far to give Great Britain the effective control of both the existing and the projected short route to India, while the building of the railway would add greatly to the value of either base as a check on Russia. Finally, the rejection of Alexandretta was dictated largely by the realisation of the repercussions which its occupation was likely to have upon Anglo-French relations.

2. Great Britain retained Cyprus under the terms of the 1878 Convention for a little over thirty-six years. During that period, the emergency in foresight of which the island had been occupied did not arise; the Baghdad Railway, with which Alexandretta was linked in 1914, was built under German and not under British influence; and the protection of the Suez Canal was far more effectively assured by the occupation of Egypt in 1882. By 1914, therefore, the control of Cyprus had not conferred upon Great Britain any of those advantages which had been anticipated at the time of its occupation. The Admiralty indeed had opposed the occupa-

tion in 1878, and in November 1912 Sir Edward Grey had told the Italian Ambassador that Cyprus was «of now use as a naval base», and that the naval authorities were constantly pressing for a base in the Aegean Islands.

It was thus possible, in October 1915, to offer the island (which had been annexed when Turkey entered the war) to Greece, as a means of inducing her to engage in hostilities on the side of the Entente. Only the unwillingness of the Greek Government to enter the war averted the withdrawal of Great Britain from Cyprus at that time.

After the Peace Treaties of 1919-23, Great Britain's strategic position in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf as vastly stronger than it had been in 1878. Not only was Egypt still in British hands, but Russia had withdrawn from Qars and Ardahan, while Britain was herself established as a mandatory Power in Iraq, Transjordan and Palestine. Both France and Italy, it is true, had in the interval acquired footholds in the eastern basin of the Mediterranean, but the creation of a British sphere of influence stretching from the Libyan desert to the frontier of Iran was more than sufficient to redress the strategic balance.

In these circumstances, the positive contribution which Cyprus could make to the security of British imperial interests was not substantial. Negatively, however, it was desirable that Cyprus should not be controlled by another Great Power, and this possibility would have been brought nearer, but for the previous British occupation, by the final dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. A second factor tending to enhance the value of Cyprus in the period following the war of 1914-18 was the development of aviation, for the island is topographically better adapted for the construction of an air base than of a naval harbour.

3. Sovereignty over Cyprus was formally transferred to Great Britain by Article 20 of the Treaty of Lausanne, and the island was given the status of a British Colony in 1925. There still remained, however, one restriction upon the freedom of His Majesty's Government to dispose of Cyprus. The French Government had secured the insertion into the «Sykes-Picot Agreement» of 1916 of a stipulation, presumably intended to prevent the effect that France should have a veto upon the cession of Cyprus to a third Power. This undertaking was confirmed by Article 4 of the Franco-British Convention of the 23rd December 1920, which ran as follows:

«In virtue of the geographic and strategic position of the island of Cyprus, off the Gulf of Alexandretta, the British Government agrees not to open any negotiations for the cession or alienation of the said island of Cyprus without the previous consent of the French Government».

4. Another Government which, despite its lack of juridical status in the matter, has followed the fortunes of Cyprus with close attention is that of Greece. Of the total population of the island — 848,000 at the census of 1931 — some four fifths are Greek-speaking Orthodox Christians (the bulk of the remainder being Turkish-speaking Moslems). And the nationalist aspirations of modern Greece have been shared, since 1821 at least, by an increasing number of Greek-speaking Cypriots. At the present time, the desire for the union with Greece is felt by the great majority of Greek priests, school-teachers and lawyers, and by the larger part of the Greek population of the towns, while it is probably making headway in the rural districts.

Between 1878 and 1914 unionist feeling was not a factor of first-class importance in the politics of Cyprus. Since Turkey had not divested herself of suzerainty over the island, the British Administration could not be held responsible for its continued separation from Greece. The situation, furthermore, was in some respects similar to that of the Ionian Islands between 1815 and 1864, when a British Protectorate over Greek islands which had previously formed part of the Venetian Empire had been terminated by their cession to Greece. But when Great Britain, so far from relinquishing Cyprus, asserted and confirmed her sovereignty over it, the demand for self-determination became more insistent and more popular. For many years unionist agitation was treated with great tolerance by the British authorities; until 1929, for instance, the elementary schools were openly used by the Greek nationalists as instruments of propaganda. This policy of toleration was sharply reversed after a sudden outbreak of popular violence in October 1931. The Legislative Council was then abolished, and Cyprus has since been ruled by the Governor with the assistance of an Executive Council consisting mainly of officials.

The Turkish-speaking minority — 64,000 at the census of 1931 — is on the whole content with the existing régime, and would view with apprehension the realisation of Greek hopes.

5. In considering the future of Cyprus after the present war, it is necessary to take into account the following factors:

(a) the strategic requirements of His Majesty's Government. The bearing of the situation in Cyprus upon this interests will depend upon developments in the Eastern Mediterranean generally, and the following paragraphs must therefore be based on certain assumptions as to the British position elsewhere. It will be assumed that the air base at Abu Sueir remains in British hands, and that Great Britain retains a naval base within a short distance of Port Said, either by the maintenance of the arrangements which permit the use of Alexandria or by the substitution for it of Haifa;

(b) the desires and interests of the inhabitants, and the interests of Greece and Turkey so far as they are involved by this factor;

(c) the strategic interests of Turkey; and

(d) the commitment to France of the 23rd December 1920, in so far as it will be possible, when the war is over, to regard this commitment as valid.

In the light of these considerations, there appear to be four policies which it might be possible for His Majesty's Government to adopt,

(a) to maintain the *status quo*;

(b) to retain their sovereignty over the island, while granting certain rights or facilities to one or more interested Powers;

(c) to cede the island to Greece upon conditions designed either to safeguard existing British strategic advantages or to obtain compensation elsewhere; or

(d) to cede the island, without such safeguards or compensation, either in return for guarantees as to its use by Greece in the future or unconditionally.

6. The strongest argument for the first alternative, that of preserving the *status quo*, is that the effective and permanent occupation of Cyprus by Great Britain is the surest guarantee against the eventuality of its use by a hostile Power or combination of Powers. Furthermore, Cyprus is the only territory under British sovereignty in the Eastern Mediterranean. Lastly it has been claimed (contrary to the unfavourable opinions expressed by the Admiralty in 1878 and, subsequently) that Famagusta is capable of development as a naval base; and the development of aerial warfare has altered the relative importance of Mediterranean islands, in particular by introducing a need for flat ground suitable for conversion into an airfield. In this respect Cyprus is superior to certain smaller islands which might previously have been preferred to it because of their more promising harbours. If, however, the assumption mentioned in the previous paragraph (the maintenance of British bases at Abu Sueir and either Alexandria or Haifa) be accepted, these last considerations, particularly in view of the high cost of the suggested development at Famagusta, lose much of their importance.

Against these advantages must be set, in the first place, the probable intensification of Greek nationalist feeling in Cyprus. Whatever view may be taken as to the means by which this feeling is stimulated, as to the reasons for the apparent imperviousness of sections of the Greek population to unionist propaganda, and as to the likely effects of union with Greece on the material welfare of the Cypriots, there seems little reason to doubt that the demand for union will grow rather than diminish. It follows from this that no concession of self-governing institutions can be made without the risk of immediate deadlock, such as was only resolved in the days of the Legislative Council by balancing the official and Turkish deputies against the Greek, by giving the Governor a casting vote, and by frequent resort to Orders in Council. Yet it is contrary to the traditions and in general to the interests of the British Empire to maintain in political subjection a people whose social and cultural level justifies the claim to self-determination. In Cyprus particularly, the presence of a dissatisfied and potentially hostile population would be a factor of weakness which might embarrass the ruling Power in a moment of crisis, or even nullify entirely the advantages in view of which the island was held. Furthermore, constant friction in Cyprus between the British authorities and the Greek population would have an unfortunate effect on Greco-British relations. Finally, the development of a naval base at Famagusta might be resented or viewed with suspicion by the Government of Turkey.

7. The second alternative, that of retaining sovereignty while granting certain rights and facilities to one or more interested Powers, might involve one or both of the following arrangements:

(a) the leasing of a base, at Famagusta or elsewhere, to Turkey. This would remove any objection which the Turkish Government might otherwise have to the continued occupation of Cyprus by Great Britain. But at the same time, by introducing a further obstacle to union with Greece, it would add to the dissatisfaction of the Greek Government and people, unless it were accompanied by

(b) the concession to the Greek Government of some form of protectorate over the Greek-speaking Cypriots.

If the rights of His Majesty's Government in Cyprus were limited by arrange-

ments of this kind, the arguments for retaining the island would be seriously weakened, while the major argument against its retention — the almost certain persistence of the desire of the Cypriot Greek nationalists to substitute Greek for British rule — would not be met by a concession of rights to the Greek Government. Such concessions would stimulate rather than appease the desire for union.

8. If the Anglo-French Convention of the 23rd December 1920 were to retain its validity after the present war, either of the two alternatives already examined could be adopted without the necessity of obtaining French consent. This consent, however, would be necessary before negotiations could be opened for giving effect to either of the remaining suggestions.

9. The first of these is that sovereignty over Cyprus should be transferred to Greece in return for the cession or leasing of sites for naval and air bases. The leasing of bases to outside Powers in territories the sovereignty over which is retained by the leasing Power is a device which is likely, after the precedent set by the Anglo-American Agreement of the 27th March 1941, to be suggested for the solution of many conflicts between the strategic interests of a Great Power and the desires of a local population. The strict application of the Anglo-American analogy, in geographical terms, to Cyprus would dictate the retention of sovereignty by the distant ruling Power, Great Britain, and the leasing of a base to the neighbouring Power, Turkey. But the situation in Cyprus differs in two important respects from that in the British West Indian islands:

(a) even if it could be assumed that the friendly relations of H.M.G. with the Government of Turkey would be as durable as those with the Government of the U.S.A. are likely to be, the security of a Turkish base against seizure by a third Power would not be comparable with that of an American base;

(b) the populations of the British territories affected by the Agreement of the 27th March, unlike the majority in Cyprus, desire to remain under the British flag.

It would seem more natural, therefore, if the device of separating sovereignty from military facilities is to be applied to Cyprus, for H.M.G. to cede the island to Greece in return for such facilities, either for a term of years or in perpetuity. A solution along these lines was suggested by E. Venizelos, speaking in the Greek Chamber, as long ago as November 1931; and there seems to be reason to suppose that the Cypriot Greeks would prefer this solution — as affording them greater security — even to an unconditional assumption of sovereignty by Greece.

If, as seems probable, this solution had as one of its consequences the establishment of friendly relations between the British personnel and the local population, British interests in Cyprus would be more secure than they are at present. Even in the event of Greco-British hostilities at some future date, it is doubtful whether the necessity of defending a land frontier in Cyprus would be a greater liability than a rebellious subject population.

10. It is necessary at this point to notice the close relationship which exists between the problem of Cyprus and the problem of the Dodecanese. If it is proposed, at the cessation of hostilities, to transfer the islands of the Dodecanese, wholly or in part, to Greece, two questions bearing on the future of Cyprus will arise:

(a) Is it possible to recognise the claim of Greece to the Dodecanese without

recognising that her claim to Cyprus is of the same character and of almost equal force?

(b) Is it, at the same time, desirable to obtain for Great Britain, in return for the cession of Cyprus, a base in the Dodecanese?

11. If it were decided in principle to cede Cyprus to Greece while asking for naval and air bases elsewhere on Greek territory, the suggestions which H.M.G. might make as to the location of these bases would depend upon considerations which lie outside the scope of this memorandum. It might be thought desirable on strategic grounds to secure facilities in Suda Bay, in which case the proposal to transfer Cyprus would provide an opportunity to raise this question. If, on the other hand, a smaller island were thought to offer greater security than either Crete or Cyprus, the latter might be exchanged for one of the islands of the Dodecanese. The second course would have the further advantage that the Greek Government would probably be more ready to renounce an island which is not at present in their possession than to relinquish control of Suda Bay.

The same strategic considerations might, however, lead to the conclusion that, if bases are retained in the neighbourhood of Suez, any further territorial outpost in the Eastern Mediterranean would be a liability rather than an asset. If this conclusion were reached, Cyprus could be handed over to Greece without any territorial compensation. It need not follow, however, that the cession should be wholly unconditional; the island might be demilitarised, or Greece might bind herself on the lines of the existing British undertaking to France, not to alienate it to a third Power without British consent. Guarantees of this kind cannot take the place of effective occupation but, on the assumptions made in this paragraph, the policy of abandoning Cyprus would not be determined to any large extent by belief in their adequacy. That being so, it might be thought preferable on political grounds to make the more confident gesture of relinquishing Cyprus without any conditions whatever.

12. Any proposal to place Cyprus under Greek rule would have to take into account the interests of the Turkish-speaking minority and the strategic anxieties of the Turkish Government. The responsibility for inserting adequate safeguards for the former into the Anglo-Greek agreement for the transfer of sovereignty would rest upon H.M.G. The latter issue might be a matter for direct negotiation between the Greek and Turkish Governments, unless, as has been suggested above, the future of Cyprus were considered in relation to the future of the Dodecanese. If the problem of ethnically Greek islands lying near the Turkish coast and now in the possession of other Powers could be dealt with as a whole, the result would presumably be a tripartite agreement which provided substantial satisfaction for the claims of Greek nationalism while meeting the strategic requirements of Turkey and, if any were advanced, of Great Britain. As a last resort, it might be necessary to examine the possibility of a Greco-Turkish exchange of populations, carried out in such a way as to remove both the Turkish minority from Cyprus and the Greek population from one or more of the islands of the Dodecanese; the defect of such solutions — the hardship they impose on individuals — might in this instance, in view of the relatively small numbers affected, be more than offset by the removal of what might otherwise be causes of friction between Greece and Turkey.

II

War Cabinet

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

FUTURE OF CYPRUS

Secret.

WP (41) 118

May 31st, 1941

[F.O. 871/29846]

If the Germans occupy Cyprus, a probable move on their part will be to represent themselves as liberators who intend to hand over the Island to Greece, or rather to the Quisling Government which they have set up in Athens. It would therefore be prudent at once to consider what our attitude should be in such an eventuality in order not to be taken unawares.

2. The problem should be considered in the light of the fact that, quite apart from the necessities of the present crisis, there is a strong *prima facie* case for ceding Cyprus to Greece, subject to safeguards, after the war. This emerges clearly from a memorandum recently prepared at the request of the Foreign Office by the Foreign Research Department of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. This memorandum which forms the annex to this paper recalls that England occupied Cyprus in 1878 to enable her to guard against an emergency, namely Russian penetration into the Valleys of the Tigris and the Euphrates, which never materialised that since Cyprus became a British colony in 1925 the Island, except in the purely negative sense that it has been denied to any other Great Power, has made no contribution to the security of British Imperial interests; that it was offered to Greece in 1915 as a means of inducing her to enter the war on the side of the Entente; and that some four-fifths of the population of the Island are Greek speaking orthodox Christians, whose already fervent desire for union with Greece may grow rather than diminish. The memorandum further shows that, apart from strategic considerations, the only material obstacles to the cession of the Island to Greece are (1) the stipulation in the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916, confirmed by article 4 of the Franco-British Convention of 1920, to the effect that France should have a veto on the cession of the Island to a third Power, and (2) the interests of Turkey in the Island on strategic grounds and in respect of the Turkish speaking minority. The first of these obstacles can hardly be regarded as serious in present circumstances when France is rapidly losing her position in Syria. As regards the second obstacle, it ought to be possible to devise safeguards to secure Turkey's strategic interests, and to solve the problem of the Turkish minority by transfer of population. As for the strategic interests of Great Britain, these would of course have to be preserved, and this could probably be done by the cession to Great Britain of naval or air bases in Cyprus or another Greek island, e.g. Crete, or in the Dodecanese.

3. To meet the eventuality referred to in paragraph 1 of this paper the following courses are open to us:

(i) We might more or less ignore the matter and let the German propaganda do its worst, in the confident hope that the Greek people will not be taken in by it.

(ii) We might anticipate this German move by at once making a public statement to the effect that after the war we intend to discuss with the Greek Govern-

ment the conditions under which we would be ready to cede the Island to Greece (These conditions would presumably have for their object the retention by ourselves of the necessary naval and air bases in the Island, or the cession of bases elsewhere — see paragraph 2 above).

(iii) We might at once without waiting for any German move take the Greek Government into our confidence and consult them as to what line we should both take to counter this possible German move. We should try to persuade the Greek Government that in the event of the Germans making their offer and the Quisling Government in Athens accepting it, they should repudiate the latter's acceptance and state that they refused to consider any scheme which involved Greece receiving Cyprus at the hands of Germany.

4. As regards (i), this is the line of least resistance. But could we really maintain such a policy of silence? Should we not be forced into a dangerously false position which would embarrass not merely ourselves but also the Greek Government? However much the Greek people may dislike and suspect the Germans, they would be more than human if they did not welcome this offer and use it subsequently against ourselves. In any case, it would make, for the time being, admirable material for German propaganda, not only in Greece but in the Greek colony in Alexandria and elsewhere. Incidentally, it would be represented that we were defending Cyprus for purely selfish motives because we wished to preserve it as a British colony. Moreover if we kept silent it would not follow that the Greek Government would be able to do so, since they would have to consider how best to preserve their authority over the Greek people in competition with the Quisling Government which is operating in Athens, and they might well feel that the only way for them to do this would be by giving out a rival statement.

5. As regards (ii), when I was recently in Athens I was asked whether His Majesty's Government would be prepared to announce now their decision to cede the Island after the war. I deprecated discussion of the question in condition which then existed. It might therefore seem inconsistent now to come forward with a definite offer. But quite apart from that, to the world at large it would look like an act of panic on our part to offer Cyprus to Greece at the present moment and in present circumstances. Moreover, we should be making our offer before the Germans had made theirs, and we should be rather hoist with our own petard if, as it turned out, the Germans never had any intention of making their offer.

6. There remains course (iii), i.e. to take up the matter at once with the Greek Government on the lines of proposing that they should repudiate any German offer of Cyprus, if and when made. It may be difficult to pursue this course to a satisfactory conclusion, but I feel that it is the one which we ought at any rate to explore.

7. In order to induce the Greek Government to repudiate a German offer publicly we should probably have to allow them to say publicly that they intend to discuss the problem of Cyprus's future with His Majesty's Government in due course. Even so the Greek Government might feel that, having regard to the strength of Greek public opinion on the subject, they must be able to say something more definite than this. If so, we might have to agree that if the Greek Government would repudiate the German offer, if and when made, we, for our part, would agree to a joint statement to the effect that our two Governments were already agreed to discuss conditions under which the sovereignty of the Island should, after the war,

be transferred from Great Britain to Greece. I realise that this would be open to the same objections as course (ii), i.e. we should appear to be acting inconsistently and under panic. But on the whole it might be worth while in present circumstances to risk these accusations, especially in view of the considerations advanced in paragraph 2 above.

8. Conclusion

That we should at once take the Greek Government into our confidence and consult them as to the line which we should adopt in the event of the Germans occupying Cyprus and declaring their intention of handing it over to the Quisling Government at Athens;

That we should try to persuade the Greek Government that, in the event of the Germans making their offer and the Quisling Government in Athens accepting it, they should repudiate the latter's acceptance and state that they refused to consider any scheme which involved Greece receiving Cyprus at the hands of the Germans;

That, if the Greek Government agreed to this, we should be prepared to allow them to say publicly that they intend to discuss the problem of Cyprus's future with His Majesty's Government in due course, and

that if pressed by the Greek Government we should be prepared to agree to a joint statement to the effect that our two Governments were already agreed to discuss conditions under which the sovereignty of the Island should, after the war, be transferred from Great Britain to Greece.

Foreign Office
May 31st, 1941

D. J. DELIVANIS

GREEK ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL EFFORTS 1940-1941

When comparing the financial and economic policy of the various countries in World War I and in World War II it is easy to note that the results achieved have been better in non occupied countries in World War II. This may be explained a) as the lessons and the experience of World War I had not been forgotten when World War II started, b) as the experience from the policy applied in the thirties in order to face the difficulties created by the great depression in a number of countries and particularly in those which were having a deficit in their current balance of payments and reduced foreign balances had prepared the governments involved to proceed in the appropriate way when the resources available were lower than needed to satisfy both public and private demand.

In this connection Greece belonged to that group of countries which faced great difficulties during the great depression. As a matter of fact Greece had started in the middle twenties a middle term plan of development to be financed by foreign loans. The latter were considered necessary, first to secure the appropriate funds without having recourse to the central bank, second to increase foreign receipts needed to avoid a disequilibrium of its balance of payments. The issue of these loans was not considered problematic under more or less normal conditions but after the failure of the loan issued in the Spring of 1931 it was no more expected possible to issue another foreign loan. This became more evident when Greece did not join the sterling bloc but committed the blunder to reevaluate its currency in terms of sterling in a vain attempt to avoid devaluation of the drachma when countries with a stronger currency and with a smaller deficit of their current balance of payments understood that devaluation was unavoidable.

The Greek current balance of payments could not and even now cannot be in equilibrium without capital transfers as Greece indulges in more inflation and in less deflation than the countries with which both economic and financial intercourse is important. As said before 1931-1939 the Greek Treasury and Greek corporations could not launch foreign loans under the unfavourable influence of the confidence crisis and of the necessity for Greece to default on her foreign debts. On the other hand small capital transfers continued but in order to secure their contribution to the equilibrium of the Greek current balance

of payments they had to be channelled to the Greek banking system and they had not to be affected to private clearings either for capital transfers abroad or for expenses outside Greece for which foreign balances were not given by the Greek banks. This was foreseen by law but the latter could not be enforced without censorship of the foreign mail which was established 1936-1940 and 1945-1951. At the same time imports were reduced by the imposition of quotas and the funds needed abroad for the servicing of foreign debts, both private and public, had been substantially reduced by the devaluation of both sterling and of the U.S. dollar, by the non application of the gold clause after the latter had been declared void by the Supreme Court of the United States of America, by the sharp devaluation of the Greek currency which prevented many debtors from paying punctually and completely their foreign debts, last but not least by the general and substantial price fall of the commodities imported into Greece.

Thanks to all these developments the Greek balance of payments was when World war II started in equilibrium with a very small margin of security and with a rather unimportant foreign balance and a small gold stock. Let me add that the appropriate machinery to handle the relevant problems was available and was operating. Of course at the beginning those in charge did not grasp that in war commodities and services appreciate and that it is preferable to store commodities than to accumulate foreign balances. Gradually those in charge understood the difference but were not able in the fourteen months between the German attack on Poland and the Italian attack on Greece to secure a substantial increase of inventories. It has to be noted in this connection that during the three months preceding the Italian attack the Greek government mobilised partially in the provinces near the Albanian border which increased consumption and did not contribute to greater production.

I

When the war started between Greece and Italy on October 28, 1940, it became pretty soon clear that the Italians were not able to defeat the Greek army except if supported by the Germans. That meant from the economic point of view that the needs of the Greek armed forces and at least the fundamental needs of the civil population had to be satisfied for a relatively long period first by the inventories, both private and public, available, second by current produc-

tion, third by imports from abroad. It has to be stressed that inventories were not excessive, that current production was unfavourably influenced by the mobilisation of many young men, by the necessity of interrupting the production whenever enemy planes appeared, by the growing difficulty of transportation as military needs had to be satisfied first, as many trucks and boats had been requisitioned by military authorities and as the Greek railways do not serve the whole country and particularly not at all Epirus from where the Greek army mainly then advanced Northwards. Of course the people not mobilised, the women and even the children helped a lot and their most famous contribution occurred in the two first weeks of the war by carrying war material through the Pindos mountains in order to avoid a setback not due to the lack of war material but to the difficulty of transport. As far as imports were concerned their volume could not increase as much as needed, as ships could not sail Eastwards through the Mediterranean and as the boats sailing to Greece had to follow the Cape-Suez Canal route. It has to be added that the United Kingdom had to care also for its own needs, that the German bombardment very intensive during the winter 1940-1941 reduced there the production facilities available, that the United States of America were still a neutral country and that imports from Germany and from German occupied countries practically ceased after the Italian attack against Greece.

It was accordingly necessary to avoid as far as possible waste. The increase of prices which was unavoidable with the war raging all over the world, the depreciation of sterling with which the Greek drachma was linked, increased freights and insurance premiums, the non increase of nominal incomes and some minor tax increases reduced the purchasing power of the people. The fear of destructions by bombing, the fear of requisitioning and the fear of the necessity to emigrate induced many people to consume up to a certain degree their stores and even more to abstain from purchases, particularly when the head of the family had been mobilised. Of course in war the greatest consumer is the government and waste in this case is up to a certain degree unavoidable. The government machinery did its best to avoid waste and to reduce the hardships of the people. It succeeded up to a certain degree as far as the latter is concerned except in the case of those North Eastern provinces whose inhabitants were afraid that after a German attack against Greece expected after the entrance of the German army into Bulgaria the Bulgarians would take over. This happened with the greatest part of Thraki and Easter Macedonia 1941-1944. Satisfac-

tory results were also achieved up to a certain degree with the punctual and thorough fulfillment of orders issued.

When referring to Greek imports 1940-1941 it is necessary to consider British help which was granted at once after the Italian attack and amounted to £ 5,000,000 per month. The latter's purchasing power was then despite price rises due to war substantial and their prestige with the Greek people very high. The foreign balances of the Bank of Greece increased substantially during the two first months of war by some 11 millions £ — which strengthened the confidence of the Greek people to their own currency and did not induce them to hoard commodities or gold. This development however proves how little the British aid increased the goods available as the ships from the United Kingdom with goods ordered and expected in Greece started arriving in Suez when the Germans had already invaded Greece. So these goods never reached Greece and were consumed in the Middle East. As long as British goods were not reaching Greece on a great scale even the British Commonwealth forces in Greece had to be supplied by goods available whilst the British paid for same with the proceeds of sterling balances sold to the Bank of Greece. Of course it may be stressed that in this way the Axis troops were prevented from taking the goods which ought to be affected for the satisfaction of Greek needs. The aforementioned delay would not have been important if the gallant fight of the Greek Army supported by British, Australian and New Zealand troops against the Axis powers would have continued.

Thus it may be said that the inventories available in Greece when attacked by Italy were big enough in combination with current production and imports to cover both military and civil needs during the seven months between October 28, 1940 and the end of fighting in Crete at the end of May 1941. This was a rather noteworthy achievement for a poor country as Greece was in the early forties. Of course problems would have arisen if the fighting in Greece would have continued and would have prevented or at least complicated the arrival and even more the unloading and distribution of the stores ordered by the Greek authorities. This does not mean of course that British supplies did not arrive at all. They came in function of the difficulties the British were then facing in the Mediterranean particularly since German air and naval forces appeared there in March 1941.

II

Whilst the supply of goods for both military and civil purposes

proceeded in a satisfactory way thanks mainly to Greek inventories and Greek production until the occupation of the various Greek provinces by the Axis powers, the financial effort of the Greek government and thus of the Greek people was substantially supported by the British aid. The latter allowed the Greek government.

- to claim only on a small scale credits if its central bank which was proved by the increase of the note issue during the two first months of the war only by 33% whilst the velocity of circulation diminished substantially. As a matter of fact military authorities were supplied with substantial amounts of money when leaving for the front in order to be able to pay at once whatever they had to buy. Of course these payments were gradual. It is also known that mobilised soldiers and commissioned officers tried to leave their families with some cash and to take some with them when departing without spending same at once. This was somewhat prevented by the prohibition to withdraw unlimited amounts of money for some weeks from the banks,
- to impose only on a small scale tax increases,
- to forbid any increase of nominal rents, wages, salaries and pensions which meant in view of the price rises a diminution of real incomes; this however was unavoidable in view of the delay of the arrival in Greece of the goods ordered a long time ago,
- to ignore the danger of the development of a foreign exchange black Market as long as in view of the support of the Greek economy by the rather substantial financial aid of the United Kingdom prospects seemed brilliant to the man in the street not only in the military but also in the economic and in the financial sectors.

Of course when the Axis troops gradually occupied the country and tried to remove as much as possible of what they found the conditions prevailing changed suddenly and radically. The supply by the occupation authorities was very limited. They were mainly interested to take under various pretexts whatever was possible and ignored nearly completely their obligations in virtue of the Hague agreements signed by both Germany and Italy before World War I towards the inhabitants of the country they occupied. Even without considering the unfavourable repercussions of the permission granted to Bulgaria to occupy

and practically to annex Eastern Macedonia and Western Thraki which were and are net suppliers of foodstuffs to the other Greek provinces. The interruption of the capital and invisibles flow from abroad, the substantial reduction of imports, last but not least the exploitation as much as possible of the Greek resources by the Axis powers without any compensation worth mentioning led to the great famine of 1941-1942. The latter was felt mainly in the cities and in those areas, particularly in the islands and in Attica where the food production did not cover the needs of the inhabitants. The survival of the Greek people is due to the British American aid which was channelled to Greece by Swedish boats under the very efficient control of the Swedish Swiss Relief Committee under the auspices of the International Red Cross. It operated 1942-1945 very successfully. Before the regular arrival and distribution of these supplies the needs of the Greek economy were covered on a very limited scale and with great interregional differences by the local production increased by whatever the Greek people could remove before the Germans took over from the Greek and British store houses and from what they could secure from same under German control often with the support of their German staff.

Institute of Balkan Studies

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C. M. WOODHOUSE

THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE GERMAN
WITHDRAWAL FROM GREECE IN 1944

After 3½ years the German occupation of Greece ended in October 1944. It was not ended by any action fought in Greece, but forced primarily by the western advance of the Red Army, which threatened to cut off the entire German garrison from its homeland. A secondary factor was the imagined threat of Anglo-American landings in the Balkans from Italy. Hitler believed in this threat up to the last, although it never really existed. He was still ordering reinforcements to be sent to Crete at a time when his Generals were already planning their withdrawal.

The German withdrawal took place at a moment of considerable delicacy and mistrust between the allies. Churchill was reported to be obsessed by the fear of Communism becoming rooted in Greece, either because the KKE would seize power as the Germans left or because the Red Army would reach Greece ahead of the British forces. Churchill and Eden were conducting negotiations with Stalin from May 1944 onwards, aimed at securing the predominance of British interests in Greece, but these did not reach a conclusion until their meeting in Moscow, on 9th October. During the summer and early autumn therefore Churchill felt great anxiety about the fate of Greece.

It has often been suggested since the war that this anxiety affected Churchill's policy towards the Germans in Greece during the last stage of the occupation. In the absence of firm evidence from British sources, the whole matter is speculative, and speculation has taken several forms. The extreme form alleges that there was a formal agreement between Churchill and the Germans to allow the latter to escape from Greece unimpeded; though naturally it was not put on paper. The most moderate form alleges a tacit concurrence of interest between the British and the Germans. The evidence for these alternatives, as well as for intermediate nuances, has recently been examined in articles by two historians of the post-war generation, Hagen Fleischer¹ and Lars Bae-

1. Hagen Fleischer, *The Don Stott Affair, in Greece: from Resistance to Civil War* (ed. Marion Sarafis, London 1980), pp. 91-107.

rentzen², who are free from the faults of prejudice and faulty recollection which have affected some earlier contributors to the argument.

Both their articles deal in particular with the circumstances of the withdrawal of the German garrisons from the Aegean islands to the mainland and the question whether the British naval and air forces deliberately allowed it to take place unimpeded. Baerentzen concludes that there was a surprising failure to impede the withdrawal, but that it was not the result of any secret agreement. Fleischer also discounts the theory of a secret agreement, but argues that there was probably tacit connivance on the part of Churchill. Neither writer deals in detail with the further stage of the German withdrawal, from the mainland itself.

Each of the two articles also deals with particular cases of secret contacts between the British and the Germans in Greece during the occupation, though not with the same ones. Fleischer describes the contacts between Don Stott, a New Zealand officer of the Allied Military Mission to the Greek Resistance, and German officials in Athens during the autumn of 1943, which were unauthorised by the British authorities. Baerentzen describes the authorised contacts in the late summer of 1944 between Tom Barnes, another New Zealand officer of the Mission who was senior liaison officer with Zervas, and the German General Lanz in Epirus; and also between British and German agents in Athens at the same period. As none of these contacts led to a positive result, I do not intend to examine them in detail, apart from a passing comment on each of the two articles.

My first comment is that Fleischer's references to myself in connection with the Stott affair in 1943 were mistaken, as he has subsequently acknowledged in a letter³. My comment on Baerentzen's article concerns what he calls the «general principle» that «documents concerning matters of this kind (sc. reports on secret contacts) (are more trustworthy when reporting enemy statements or offers... than when reporting what had been said or done by one's own side...)»⁴.

This principle leads Baerentzen to infer that when the German

2. Lars Baerentzen, *Anglo-German Negotiations during the German Retreat from Greece in 1944*, in *Scandinavian Studies in Modern Greek*, No. 48 (Copenhagen-Göthenburg, 1980), pp. 23-62.

3. Fleischer, pp. 93, 97, 100; letter to CMW, 12th July 1981.

4. Baerentzen, p. 31, n. 1.

account of the British position on a given point differs from the contemporary British account, the German account is more likely to be accurate; and the converse would also apply. It seems to me more likely that each side sometimes misconceived the position of the other owing to the circumstances in which they were negotiating: at a distance, through intermediaries, with nothing committed in writing, and with three languages involved (German, English, Greek). I have known such misconceptions to arise even in much simpler circumstances: with two parties face to face, using skilled interpreters and only two languages.

I return now to the central question concerning the unimpeded withdrawal of the German garrisons from the Aegean islands. What is supposed to have been the British motive in allowing them to reach the mainland with little interference? There are various versions. One has it that Churchill wanted the German forces to escape from Greece intact so that they could help to slow down the advance of the Red Army further north. A variant of this version has it that the purpose was to hold Thessaloniki against the Red Army until the city could be taken over by the British forces. Another version has it that the object was to retain a considerable German force further south on the Greek mainland, in order to forestall the seizure of power by ELAS on behalf of the KKE. None of these things in fact happened, but it is indisputable that the Germans succeeded in withdrawing from the islands at least as far as the mainland with much less difficulty than they had expected.

How and why did this come about? I am not in a position to make any revelations about secret agreements or understandings because if there were any it was entirely outside my knowledge. The most that I can do is to try to throw some light on an obscure and puzzling episode from my limited first-hand experience, and also to try to introduce the light of reason.

The evidence for the Germans' unimpeded withdrawal from the islands is reviewed in detail by Baerentzen, and is summarised thus by Fleischer: «When at the end of August 1944 the Wehrmacht started to evacuate the Greek islands by means of inadequate and improvised transport, the highly superior Royal Navy und Air Force contented themselves with a close but peaceful observation»⁵. Fleischer gives re-

5. Fleischer, pp. 98, 102.

ferences to a number of German documents, and adds that there are «many other German sources». The point is also made that German shipping losses in the Aegean, which had been heavy in July 1944, were much lighter in August and negligible in September — the very period in which the main evacuation took place⁶.

No evidence has so far been found in British sources. Documentary evidence from British sources is hardly to be expected if this was, as Fleischer argues, a case of «tacit connivance» on the part of Churchill. But even to carry out a policy of tacit connivance, orders would have had to be sent somehow to the officers and staffs of the Navy and RAF who were to carry out the «close but peaceful observation» and to refrain from opening fire. Both officers and other ranks, who must have known of these orders, would have been surprised to receive them without explanation, and they would normally have resented them. It seems strange that in the 37 years since these events, not a whisper of such resentment has ever been heard from any of the British sailors or airmen who served in the Aegean in 1944, and many of whom must still be alive.

It would be interesting to study the naval and RAF records in the Public Record Office to see if it can be ascertained precisely what forces were available in the Aegean during July, August and September, and if possible, what orders they received. One factor worth examining would be the preparations for the allied landings in southern France, which began on 15th August. Presumably these would have had a higher priority than the Aegean for ships and aircraft. Nevertheless, whatever the explanation, the fact remains that there are several recorded cases of ships and aircraft being seen by the German convoys and failing to attack them. This passivity on the British side was also remarked by pro-British Greek observers⁷.

Before examining the reasons for this so-called passivity, it should be noted that the positive evidence for it applies only to the German withdrawal from the islands to the mainland. But that was not an end in itself. What about the next stage of the German withdrawal northwards, by both the troops evacuated from the islands and those already stationed on the mainland? In this case there is no positive evidence of passivity, only speculative assumptions. The basic assumption is that there was either a secret agreement or a «tacit concurrence of

6. Baerentzen, p. 27.

7. Fleischer, p. 99.

interest» that the Germans would follow a course of action suited to British policy. Three of the possible options have already been mentioned: they might escape from Greece altogether, in order to form a front against the Red Army further north; they might hold Thessaloniki against the Russians until the British could take it over; or they might surrender in force on the Greek mainland and help to prevent a seizure of power by ELAS. Could any of these options have been a common interest between the Germans and the British?

Surrender in Greece could not in itself have been an attractive option for the Germans. They would have to be persuaded that it was worthwhile. In fact it is known that attempts were made to persuade them to surrender, both in Athens and in Epirus⁸. There is no evidence that any specially attractive incentives were offered to them, and the British approaches were all rejected. So there was no tacit concurrence of interest, still less any secret agreement, in this case.

The idea of forming a German front to protect Thessaloniki was equally a mirage⁹. If it were to occur at all, it would have had to be the subject not merely of an explicit agreement but of detailed planning. There is no evidence that the formidable problems of supply and communications were ever considered at all. The German retreat did not halt at Thessaloniki, nor did the Red Army ever approach the city. In this case tacit connivance was a pure figment of the imagination.

There remains the last option, that the Germans were to be allowed to escape unmolested from Greece altogether, in order to strengthen German defences against the Red Army further north¹⁰. This could conceivably have been the subject of a tacit concurrence of interest between the Germans and the British. But it would have required some degree of planning within the allied military command. Churchill could not have taken it for granted that the Greek guerrillas, the Yugoslav Partisans, and the allied liaison officers with both, would do nothing to impede the German retreat unless they had orders to remain passive. Indeed, even if they had such orders, they could not have been relied on to do nothing. But in fact their orders, at any rate in Greece, were to exactly the opposite effect.

The operational plan code-named Noah's Ark (in Greek, *Kipotos*) was the last mounted by the Greek Resistance against the occu-

8. Baerentzen, pp. 30-45.

9. Baerentzen, p. 25 (quoting Albert Speer).

10. Baerentzen, p. 24 (quoting Roland Hampe).

pation. It came into effect at different dates around the middle of August, according to the enemy situation in different parts of the country; and it lasted until the last German forces crossed the frontier into Yugoslavia on 1st November. The object was to harass and impede the German withdrawal. I have said elsewhere that the operation was not very successful, but I have also said that it was more successful than I expected. No one has ever suggested that we did not try at all, still less that we were ordered not to try or discouraged from trying.

The evidence does not depend simply on my word for it. The Noah's Ark plan was explicit. Substantial supplies of weapons and ammunition were infiltrated, both to ELAS and to Zervas, in the weeks before the operation was launched. Specially trained units of British and American troops equipped with heavy weapons (the Raiding Support Regiment and the Operation Groups) were infiltrated to strengthen the guerrillas. The Balkan Air Force of the RAF provided air support, and landing grounds were prepared in the Greek mountains on which Mustang aircraft could touch down to re-fuel. Much anecdotal evidence could be collected, both from my own experience and that of other allied officers, and also from the German records, to show that Noah's Ark was not simply an expensive deception.

Let me first give one or two examples from German sources. Baerentzen quotes an interesting case on the authority of the German War Diaries. It appears that «a significant percentage» of the unimpeded movement of German shipping in the three weeks between 25th August and 15th September was to carry men and supplies from Patras to Preveza for an operation against Zervas»¹¹. This came at the height of Operation Noah's Ark, which Zervas had launched shortly before. It is interesting to see in a document also quoted by Baerentzen that on 13th August the German high command in Thessaloniki reported that Lt. - Col. Tom Barnes, the senior liaison officer with Zervas, «has recently returned from Cairo and is at present trying to stop the fighting which has broken out between EDES and the 104 Jg. Div. during his absence»¹². This German report represents the exact reverse of the truth: Barnes had in fact returned to launch Zervas on Operation Noah's Ark.

In the eastern half of Greece, where ELAS was in control of operations, there were also some significant efforts. In the British offi-

11. Baerentzen, pp. 54-55.

12. Baerentzen, p. 32.

cial history of the war, John Ehrman estimated that during Noah's Ark the Germans lost up to 10.000 men killed or wounded and captured, together with about 100 locomotives and 500 vehicles¹³. The locomotives can obviously only have been destroyed in eastern Greece and therefore mainly by ELAS. I have always regarded these figures as considerably exaggerated, but even if they are scaled down they show that there was at least some aggressive effort against the German withdrawal. I can speak also from some personal experience, since I took part myself in two operations, each lasting 48 hours: one against the railway line in Thessaly (27th-29th September) and one against the road from Kozani to Florina (27th-28th October). The evidence seems to me as substantial as in the case of the unimpeded withdrawal from the islands.

At this point it may be helpful if I carry further the account of my personal experience, since this is the only original contribution I can make to the subject. From 15th June to 10th September 1944 I was out of Greece, visiting Cairo, Algiers, London and Caserta. During these visits I met Churchill, Eden, Macmillan (Resident Minister in Algiers), Lord Selborne (Minister responsible for SOE), the Secretary of State for War, the Head of the Foreign Office, Rex Leeper (Ambassador to Greece), the Chiefs of Staff of the three services, the Commanders-in-Chief of the Middle East and Central Mediterranean Commands, as well as all the senior officers and officials of SOE in each place. None of them gave me the slightest hint that there was any other intention than the ostensible one of Noah's Ark, to inflict the maximum damage on the Germans during the final phase of the occupation.

Of course the fact that I was not informed does not necessarily mean that there was no secret plan. There were other matters too about which I was told nothing. I was told nothing by SOE about the secret contacts between Stott and the Germans in 1943, not about the current contacts with the Germans in Athens and Epirus while I was out of Greece. I was told nothing about the negotiations between Churchill and Stalin which eventually culminated in the «percentages agreement» of October 1944. But those were matters in which I was not needed to play any role myself. Allowing or not allowing the Germans to escape unmolested from Greece was a matter in which I could not be entirely excluded from playing any part. Churchill could not rely on

13. John Ehrman, *Grand Strategy*, VI (London, HMSO, 1956), p. 45.

me to ensure that Operation Noah's Ark was a total failure unless I was instructed to do so. I was not so instructed, and it was not a total failure.

What I have described so far coincides with the assessment made at the time by Neubacher, the German Special Plenipotentiary in South-East Europe. In a telegram from Belgrade dated 14th September, addressed to Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister, Neubacher reported that the British «are doing practically nothing so far to impede the transit of our forces by sea and air from the islands to the mainland, but are mobilising the Red Bands against our routes of withdrawal from the mainland»¹⁴. He went on to infer that the British wanted to retain the German forces on the mainland to maintain order until their own forces could arrive and take over the responsibility. That was a reasonable inference, and so far as some of the British authorities were concerned, a correct one. But the Germans had no intention of surrendering in Greece. That result could only have been achieved if they were forced to surrender by superior British (or allied) land forces. The force available for Noah's Ark was insufficient to achieve that result.

Here we encounter another paradox, however. The forces available for Noah's Ark were not the only British or allied forces available for Greece. Independently of Noah's Ark, there was also a small British force under General Scobie. Much of it was never intended to engage in hostile operations, but to prepare the groundwork for relief and rehabilitation of the country. But there was also available in Italy for operations in Greece a miscellany of combat units: elements of two infantry divisions, the Parachute Regiment, the Special Boat Section, the RAF Regiment (a land force), and perhaps others. These were experienced and well-equipped troops. But their impact was minimal. Without exception, whether air-borne or sea-borne, they landed in Greece only in the wake of the retreating Germans. Practically none of them made any contact with the Germans, apart from one unit which allowed me to guide it north to Macedonia by a route which I thought the Germans would not expect to be used.

These dilatory proceedings could again be attributed to secret agreement or tacit understandings, but I think a simpler explanation is to be found in lack of determination and lack of co-ordination between two different headquarters. During September 1944 operations

14. Baerentzen, p. 61.

in Greece were partially transferred from GHQ of the Middle East Command in Cairo to the Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ) of the Central Mediterranean Command in Caserta, under General Wilson¹⁵. Crete, the Dodecanese and other Aegean islands remained under the command of Cairo, and the SOE headquarters in Cairo retained control of Noah's Ark. But all other operations in Greece came under General Wilson. It is interesting that the date of this transfer of control was 15th September. That date was roughly the middle of Noah's Ark; it also coincided with the last phase of the German withdrawal from the islands to the mainland, and the beginning of the evacuation of the mainland. (A minor consequence of the transfer was that all the members of my Mission qualified for two different campaign medals while still remaining in Greece).

The major significance of the transfer was that Greece passed from the control of a headquarters which had no other operational responsibilities to one which was intensely preoccupied with two more serious campaigns, in Italy and southern France. To Brigadier Barker-Benfield, the Commander of SOE in Cairo, the Noah's Ark operation was of the highest importance. He perhaps really believed that the German retreat could be cut off on the Greek mainland. He had been closely involved in the various attempts to induce the Germans to surrender on the spot. He had paid a brief visit to ELAS GHQ, where he had formed an exaggerated notion of the capabilities of the guerrillas to operate as a regular army. At one time he tried to send an order to Zervas, through Barnes, to launch an all-out direct assault on Ioannina while the town was still in German hands. (Barnes quite rightly refused to pass on the order as being beyond the capacity of guerrillas). For Barker-Benfield in fact success in enforcing a German surrender on the Greek mainland was the first and only priority.

But it was not so for General Wilson at Caserta. In his eyes Greece ranked well below the Italian and French campaigns, and even Yugoslavia. In his autobiography he wrote that: «With the limited forces likely to be available a seriously opposed landing could not be attempted and the most that could be undertaken was to harass the retreating Germans and endeavour to cut off their retreat to the north»¹⁶. That disposes of any idea of «tacit connivance», unless Wilson was lying. But the fact is that he showed no great determination in pursuing even

15. Field-Marshal Lord Wilson, *Eight Years Overseas* (London 1950), p. 232.

16. Wilson, p. 230.

the limited objective stated. He wrote further that his object was «to avoid disclosing the weakness of the forces at my disposal and by a good bit of bluffing to induce the German Commander to surrender to supposedly superior forces». In fact his bluffing continued even into his narrative of events, for he spoke of his forces having «seized» various places in Greece from which the Germans had in every case already departed¹⁷.

One could not help feeling at the time that there was a lack of co-ordination between the small but determined units infiltrated for Noah's Ark and the slower-moving units which followed them a few weeks later; but it was not apparent at the time that this was partly because they came under different headquarters separated by several hundred miles. General Wilson himself seems to have been unaware of this lack of co-ordination, for he described a conference at Caserta on 26th September with Zervas and Saraphis, the C-in-C of ELAS, at which he gave them «the task of harassing the German withdrawal»¹⁸. Apparently neither of them pointed out to him that they had already been engaged on it for more than a month.

So we find that operations in Greece during the crucial weeks were in effect divided between a Brigadier in Cairo who believed that it was possible to force the Germans to surrender on the Greek mainland, but had not sufficient forces to achieve his objective, and a General in Caserta who had a larger force available but used it with excessive caution and lack of determination. Thus the Germans escaped, but not by deliberate connivance. There remains the unexplained mystery of the unimpeded escape from the islands to the mainland. Is it possible, in the light of what happened on the mainland, to find a logical explanation of that mysterious passivity?

I believe that a logical account can be constructed, though I confess that I have not much confidence in it. The British found it much more difficult than they expected to impede the withdrawal of the Germans from the islands. Some of the difficulties were described long afterwards by Albert Speer, in an interview with Baerentzen, and by General Korte, the Luftwaffe Commander of the operation¹⁹. The latter scotched the theory of «tacit connivance» by saying that «the British did everything they could to prevent it». But once it was clear that

17. Wilson, p. 232.

18. Wilson, p. 233.

19. Baerentzen, pp. 55-56.

it could not be wholly prevented, there was a case for arguing that it was preferable to let the Germans evacuate the islands with a view to forcing their collective surrender on the mainland, rather than fighting to capture the islands one by one. It might have seemed a reasonable plan in the circumstances, although in practice a failure. But the reason why I have not much confidence in any such theory is that war is not a logical business. A great deal happens in warfare which is quite unplanned and even inexplicable in retrospect.

There is an interesting analogy with another episode in the Mediterranean war, in which the roles were reversed, and so were the spheres of operation between land and sea. It occurred during the battle of Crete in 1941. After the British headquarters had decided to abandon the island, we had to retreat overland to the south coast, rather as the Germans had to make their escape across the Aegean three years later. During our retreat to Khora Sphakion, the Cretan Dunkirk, many of us had the impression that the Germans' efforts to cut off our escape overland were remarkably lacking in determination.

The novelist Evelyn Waugh, who was also there, recorded this impression in the second novel of his trilogy, *Sword of Honour*. In *Officers and Gentlemen* he hinted at a possible explanation²⁰. One of his characters remarked: «I don't get the impression that the Germans are anxious to attack». Another replied: «I think they want to escort us quietly into the ships. Then they can sink us at their leisure from the air. A much tidier way of doing things». *Mutatis mutandis*, that explanation is similar to the one I have explored but rejected in the case of the German retreat in 1944. I suppose that a theory of «tacit connivance» could equally well be advanced. But personally I believe the explanation really lay in circumstances: a combination of muddle and confusion, faulty intelligence, lack of co-ordination between different arms, difficulties of terrain, and shortage of resources on the ground and in the air.

Similarly I think it doubtful that a wholly logical explanation will be found for the «passivity» observed during the German withdrawal from the islands. It seems to me that those who attribute it to conspiracy or connivance have failed to address themselves to one crucial question: if their theory were correct, how was it possible to conceal the real intention from those who were required unconsciously to carry it out? These included a considerable number of officers, some

20. Evelyn Waugh, *Sword of Honour* (Final version, London 1965), p. 497.

of whom, such as General Wilson, Brigadier Barker-Benfield and myself, were led to believe that the intention was totally different. It is possible that research in the naval and RAF documents in the Public Record Office will reveal something significant about the orders sent to the British forces in the Aegean. But until that is done, it does not seem to me possible to conclude anything more definite than that the theory of «tacit connivance» aimed at establishing a German front against the Red Army is untenable. To some this will seem a disappointingly un-Churchiavellian conclusion. But, believe it or not, Churchill was really a very simple man.

Review Essays

ANDONIS DECAVALLES

Zissimos Lorenzatos, *The Lost Center and Other Essays in Greek Poetry*,
Translated by Kay Cicellis. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1980, pp. 194.

Five essays by Zissimos Lorentzatos, one of Greece's most outstanding essayists and critics, in the masterful English translation of the novelist Kay Cicellis, were recently published by Princeton University Press under the title *The Lost Center and Other Essays in Greek Poetry*. This title fails to mention Dionysios Solomos, the national poet and founder of Modern Greek poetry, the consideration of whose work, value and importance lends these essays their unity. As the dates of these essays indicate, ranging from 1945 to 1972 and so covering almost three full post-war decades, long and insistent was their author's concern, his examination and consideration of Solomos' poetic accomplishment, more particularly his poetic theory and his ideology, to eventually serve him as a prism through which to view, and as a touchstone by which to judge the crisis in Modern Greek poetry and intellect as that reflects the current spiritual decline and crisis in the Western World. Solomos, Lorentzatos believes, should have served as the lasting esthetic, ideological, and spiritual foundation on which Modern Greek poetry should have built its development, which it didn't. It is his conviction that Solomos can still serve as its corrective, its remedy.

In his admiration of Solomos to the point of unreserved worship, Lorentzatos is not alone among Greek thinkers and writers whose deep and exclusive reverence for the poet surpasses by far the general respect and affection he has enjoyed in his country. A marvelous coincidence was the fact that the nation's rebirth from its ashes, from its four centuries of slavery under its Ottoman ruler, concurred with its spiritual, its poetic and intellectual rebirth in the figure of Solomos whose *Hymn to Freedom* voiced superbly the heroic battle for that rebirth and its opening stanzas became Greece's national anthem. Of decisive intellectual significance was the fact that Solomos, in being essentially the first poet of genius to choose the people's living *demotic*, versus the artificial *purist* of the ancient-minded, as the language in which to write his verse, he established that language as the nation's literary own.

There is, however, far more than these factors embodied in Solomos' figure and accomplishment which make him for Lorentzatos the still unsurpassed poetic accomplisher, the true voice of the nation's spirit and conscience, in fact the designer of its intellectual orientation, aspirations and goals. With much regret does Lorentzatos delineate the sad results out of the deviation from Solomos' code as a deviation from the uniqueness of the Greek cultural tradition and conscience themselves, a deviation much due to the unfavorable circumstances. Emerging from long extinction, Greece was too small and weak to resist succumbing to the power and influence of the Western World. The nation's fate depended and was shaped by Western views and interests. Its liberation was to some extent indebted to the classically inspired romantic Philhellenism.

Of course, of the Western impact on Greece there were long precedents. Yet it is particularly since the early part of the Nineteenth Century that the Greek intellect has been the reflector and considerably the imitator of the Western, and, consequently, of the latter's decline and spiritual crisis that reached its apex in our days.

It was natural that, on its rebirth, Greece turned anxiously in search of its national and cultural identity, a search as attested by the work of everyone of its major poets. Much material to that search was provided by the people's customs, lore and songs as reflected in the so-called *ethographic* writing of the last and part of this century. Yet that search did not stay unaffected by a disorienting and harmful, a dividing challenge, that of the West's wishing the modern Greeks to prove themselves the descendants of their illustrious ancient ancestors. That was the spirit of classical romanticism gladly fostered by the Greek «purist» intelligentsia, although it did not leave unaffected the demoticists as well. That mentality's wish and fallacy was to ignore the two Byzantine-Christian millenia of which modern Greece was culturally the outcome. Hence the detrimental split, not limiting itself to the matter of the language only, and hence the subjugation to the Western «disease».

As to that disease itself, it was, according to Lorentzatos, «already at an advanced stage [in the West] before it actually began to trouble the patient» (p. 3), a «dehumanization» wrought by long commitment to Humanism and Science, and the «neglect to nourish the soul» (p. 4). Ethics declined and so did the «sense of moderation» and «the professional 'honesty' which an artist needs to make his work 'valid *sub specie aeternitatis*'» (p. 6). Greece itself, in such a development,

had its own additional problem with its peculiar individuality. In us, Lorentzatos states, «are merged the fierce local roots of the Greek and the Jew's knowledge of the diaspora» where we happen to be «the suitors of time, and the outcasts of space» (p. 8).

Uniquely contrasting the several disparities, there stands the figure of Solomos, whose case, however, has its own peculiar strangeness.

Solomos' work poses a problem for which I can find no parallel in any other literature. It is written half in Italian and half in Greek; and the Greek half is glaringly mutilated, unfinished, fragmented. Why? We are mainly concerned here with his Greek writings naturally; they are by far the more interesting. Strange! His Italian was incomparably better than his Greek; yet the poems he wrote in the language of Dante never go beyond the limits of the most banal academism. There is still another group of writings—no more than a few pages—where he uses a language of his own invention, which was probably the language in which he did his thinking: a mixture of Greek and Italian (p. 9).

Strangeness, as to language at least, has not been infrequent in Modern Greek poetry, if we are to think of Calvos and Cavafy, two other outstanding and highly remarkable 'strangers' to the language and its established tradition. They both invented, devised, made their own unprecedented and inimitable poetic language that was to stay as a haunting landmark.

Solomos was brought up bilingual and had his studies in Italy where he stayed for ten years. There he wrote his early verse in Italian and he continued doing so even when he returned to his native Zante. Then he took the decision, urged by his Greek conscience, the great experience that his nation going through, and more particularly by the instigation and help of the statesman and historian Spyridon Trikoupis, to write in Greek, not the «written Greek» which he ignored but the «spoken Greek» of which he became a life-long learner though never a full master. Almost the only «literary» precedents he had in the demotic were the folksongs that he kept collecting and studying in his leisurely manner. Italian remained still the language that was natural to him, which he used mostly in his speaking, thinking, correspondence and note-taking. In Greek he was an experimenter. As his poetic aspirations kept rising together with his perfectionism, there

rose a desperate struggle in his trying to make his limited Greek meet the need of his aspirations, his greater visions. Eventually, near the end of his life, he gave it up to revert to his Italian writing. It is of his desperate struggle that we have the remnants, the fragments where his poetic greatness lies, the superb quality in the Third Draft of his *Free Besieged* together with his prose statements in both Greek and Italian as to the standards, principles and aspirations of his poetics and his poetic projects.

Several have been the reasons attributed to his failure of fully accomplishing those projects. Was it the disheartening litigation he had with his half brother and mother as to the paternal property? Was it the inadequacy of the demotic language itself, in its first ambitious literary use, to meet the rising demands of the poet's later visions? Was it the poet's own inadequate mastery of that language; or was it in fact Solomos' own inadequacy as a poet extraordinarily gifted for the shorter lyrical poem yet unable to bridge the huge gulf between the heights of his poetic theory and vision and their practical implementation, between the greatness of his visions and their poetic embodiment? Or, indeed, was it his leisurely nature, his «laziness»?

Solomos' capacity and value of accomplishment, Lorentzatos does not feel inclined to question or doubt. Solomos, he writes, used «a language of his own invention to provide the still unsurpassed models of our poetry... No one has come closer than Solomos to the true spirit of the modern Greek language in poetry... He set before posterity, once and for all, the complete problem of poetic expression» which was his lifelong «single concern» (pp. 12-16). It was a tormenting concern, a concern for form, in which he saw «something which exceeded the limits of his art and acceded to a philosophy, or rather to a mystic restoration of form that came very near to the conception of Plato of Goethe (in his botanical studies)» (p. 10). Vaguely recalling Schiller, he summed up the problem in his statement: «*E la forma sia l'abito del vero senso profondo d'ogni cosa*» (And let the form be the garment of the true, deep meaning of each thing). This «*forma*», Lorentzatos adds, «tortured him, in the political sense, till the end of his life» (p. 11). And if there is one notion in Solomos that has utmost appeal to the prevalently theoretical mind of Lorentzatos, it is that notion, of form, as being itself the essence, which inspires much of the argument, at least in the earlier essays. «With Solomos», he believes, «the problem of artistic expression enters our cultural life, as the problem of independence entered our national life, and its predominance remains un-

questionable to this day: artists are still made or broken by it» (p. 16. The underlinings are mine). One can hardly think of any other literature of which the artistic have been so closely associated with the national, cultural, political causes. It is on the basis of that association that the modern Greeks insist on judging their literature. Indeed, it is hardly possible to dissociate Solomos' artistic cause in particular from the national one in its shaping the new nation's conscience and its intellectual-cultural potentials and aspirations.

Solomos appeared at a highly critical moment, not only as far as the Greek reality is concerned but also in terms of the European circumstance altogether. The year 1800, «this particular moment in history was unquestionably great, marking the zenith of a culture, in which the different elements were poised in a blessed balance reflected in a rare creative wisdom» of which Lorentzatos sees Solomos as the «epitome» (p. 19) in his having assimilated the cream of what Europe had to offer. Interesting it is to contrast this view with what Popylas, Solomos' close friend and first biographer, critic and publisher, wrote of Solomos' withdrawal and loneliness in his later-Corfu period as due to:

the anti-poetic spirit of our century, which Schiller summed up in his saying that: «The course of events has driven the spirit of the time in a road in which there is danger that it may increasingly move away from the Art of the Ideal. That Ideal's law is to leave reality behind and to rise with modest temerity there where Necessity does not reign; for Art is a daughter of Freedom and submits herself to the necessity of the Spirit, not the violence of Matter. Yet it is Necessity that rules nowadays and drags shackled the declined humanity to its tyrannical yoke. Profit is the great idol of the time, which all the forces hurry to serve and all the minds to adore... Even the inquisitive philosophic mind grasps one realm of Imagination after another, and the limits of Art grow barrower the more science expands its own». (Dionysiou Solomou, *Apanta*, Tomos Protos, *Piimata*, edited by Linos Politis, Ikaros, 1979, p. 29).

Certainly no real discrepancy exists between the two apparently conflicting views, if we are to consider that greatness in thought and art has almost always been accomplished when the greatness of a certain

time is already undermined by its decline; its accomplishment springs from that awareness. Later on Lorentzatos will abide extensively on the decline itself when it becomes the established reality.

Lorentzatos' consideration of Solomos' verse is mostly limited to its technical and grammatical aspects: its language, metrics, prosody and musical laws. It is more its theoretical foundations, its esthetics and poetics, deemed as of the essence, that become our critic's primary focus. There is where an exceptionally wide, in-depth familiarity with European intellectual adventure, its schools and movements, its authors and works, its philosophical orientations since the ancient days, enriches with parenthetical and comparative references and associations the interpretation of Solomos' theoretical pronouncements, especially regarding the accomplishment of Form as Poetry's supreme objective, in Valéry's statement, «la limite de la fonction de l'esprit».

Solomos' advice that the artist should «apply to mental form the history of the plant» is deemed as «testifying» to our poet's «relationship with Goethe» in a morphology as drawn from this latter's *Die Metamorphosen der Pflanzen*. What distinguishes the poet as a poet requires no less than defining the undefinable, what Lorentzatos calls a «virtue» initially existing in him, and what Solomos himself, in his *The Woman of Zakynthos*, does not go beyond calling «a certain something», and elsewhere, as «an overflowing of the soul» which «creates the harmony of a line». With this existing, «the difficulty a writer has to face is not that he must employ imagination and passion, but that he must subject these two things, aided by time and toil, to the meaning of art». Much is the excitement that Lorentzatos draws from this statement for what he reads in it as an attack on «inspiration» and the «Muse theory» behind it in its long practice, until it was finally challenged and denied in the nineteenth century by Gautier, Baudelaire, Flaubert, Mallarmé, and later on by Valéry, Eliot, Joyce and Pound, the «conscious artists». No place here to contrast Dostoevsky's view of Consciousness in his *Notes from the Underground*. Much argument follows against the «mistaken» notion of the poet as a «divinely inspired puppet» (a notion, he believes, that the poets themselves did not share) in favor of «sheer hard work, of clear thinking, sensibility, will power, observation, knowledge, wisdom, in the effort to approach perfection in the art of writing» (p. 37).

It is his modern awareness that Solomos reveals to Lorentzatos. The questioning of the value of inspiration leads our critic's argument

to doubting further Surrealism as a «method of art», deeming it as a «unique regression back to the old Muse theory» (p. 42). On the same foundation, that of the need of consciousness, he calls «fortuitous» the literary merit of the work of the «mystics and other 'inspired' men», and posits the belief that «when a man *consciously* [my underlining] has recourse to mysticism or religion, it is the result of careful logic» (p. 44).

We are possibly dealing with subtleties in an area of no clear borderlines where any excess in emphasis might result into partiality or even distortion at the expense of truth. Rather than rejecting «inspiration», Solomos wishes the *eventual subjection* of «inspiration and passion» to the mastery of a conscious art, and this is understandable and expected. Inspiration should not negate art, nor should art negate inspiration. They are not incompatibles but cooperative forces, each with its valuable function, each with the proper role in the alchemy of creation and the accomplishment of form. As commonplace as this may sound, poets, at least since Homer, have worried vocally or silently as to the kindness of the Muse towards them, including even Mallarmé in his facing that white sheet of paper. Divine visitation or initial spark or what springs from Solomos' «certain something», that «overflowing of the soul», no matter how you imagine or define it, has been there to «start» you, but not without a claim upon your toil to master its offering. In fact, may it not be the spiritual essence of which the absence and necessity Lorentzatos himself will later stress in his discussing the phenomenology of the Lost Center? Romantically «inspired» Keats spent endless sleepless nights to fit consciously the Muse's gift into the perfect form of his Art, to mention just one instance. As for Surrealism, hasn't Elytis, among others, with his unswerving commitment to it as a liberating concept and force, managed through the undeniable consciousness of his art to discipline the impulsive and rich effusions of the unconscious to the lovely accomplishments of his poetry, thus transcending that movement's initial orthodoxy of mechanical recording?

Lorentzatos also considers the recourse to mysticism and religion to be «the result of careful logic», yet isn't this, at least apparently, contradicted by his stating elsewhere that «logic itself has always prevented us from attaining such a knowledge» (p. 40), the «empirical» knowledge in the works of art? Is John's Apocalypse a logical recourse to religion, to mention a characteristic instance, and is it artistically valueless if it depends considerably on a divine visitation or the explo-

sion of a dream? Is Coleridge's «Kubla Khan», whatever its value, a product of its creator's conscious logic? How does Lorentzatos' statement agree with his other statement that «the art of writing lies at *the most extreme limits* [my underlining] of human consciousness» (p. 42)? Wasn't Rimbaud, mentioned among the conscious craftsmen (as indeed he was to some extent), the precocious *voyant*, the 'miraculously' inspired child-visionary? Highly perceptive and interesting is what Lorentzatos says of him: «In the mid-nineteenth century, poetry, at the center of which we must place the strange figure of Rimbaud, begins to enter the sphere of the irrational, urged on by parallel tendency, in the field of knowledge, to emphasize the mystery of existence through the channels of the emotions» (p. 45). Romanticism had committed its uncontrolled emotional and wordy excesses. Parnassianism came to control with artful consciousness in tight moulds the torrential romantic emotionalism. Partly a Parnassian offspring, Baudelaire wrote «de la vanité et du danger de l'inspiration» (as quoted by Lorentzatos, p. 41), one assumes to condemn the Romantic evils. From Baudelaire and Verlaine Symbolism branched into the close-to-paralyzing consciousness of Mallarmé and his meticulous artifice on the one hand, and the intuitive, dream-like though no less painful, much subconscious effusions of Rimbaud's visions, his «illuminations» on the other. Those preambled Surrealism with Apollinaire as intermediary. As for the matter of the mystics in particular, that will be given our critic's attention in a later issue.

We need to understand Lorentzatos in his almost excessive emphasis on the artistic value of consciousness when his central concern appears to be *method*, technically speaking, as that is to *eventually* control and validate what «inspiration» provides in the accomplishment of form. To identify essence (a word he is highly hesitant about) with inspiration, and form with art, would be equal to effecting a simplistic, doctrinaire division, rather detrimental upon the marvelous unity that a work of art is to accomplish. As Lorentzatos himself asserts, after Eliot and others before him, «form and content... conjoin in a *tertium quid*» (p. 49) where several matters get into play and exchange as to become inseparable and so make the works of art «resemble chemical compounds» (ibid.). I do not know whether there is any reference to Dante's *Commedia* or even *Vita Nuova* in our critic's deeming the poem «an organism that is mathematically elaborated» (p. 48), which once again stresses a kind of scientific consciousness involved. In conclusion, what Lorentzatos seems wishing to emphasize is Solomos' con-

siderable modern artistic awareness as expressed in his *subjecting* inspiration and passion to the meaning of art:

This digression, upon which I have purposely persisted, may help us to see more clearly that Solomos belongs to that category of artists who believe more in work than in inspiration; if we had to classify him, his place would be among the family of the great, who perpetuate the poetic tradition in our own age. (p. 45).

If the height of his artistic consciousness itself turned inhibitive to his creation, the exquisite poetic fragments and the haunting theoretical statements of his poetics should, we assume, alleviate our regret. Suffice the principles, the objectives and the initials of greatness.

A technical matter to which Lorentzatos, after Palamas, contributes much argument as to its centrality and importance in Solomos' giving a new and original vigor to the demotic in his verse, is the extent to which he moderated the use of synizesis in the Third Draft of *The Free Besieged*, with synizesis being a long established practice in Modern Greek poetics. As narrow as the matter may appear, it involves, our critic argues, no less than Solomos' overall approach to and handling of the language in a way that gave the first practical and decisive answer to the crucial conflict between the demotic and the purist. To quote Lorentzatos:

If we should next consider that synizesis threatened to invade the new poetry which was growing out of the demotic idiom, in contrast to the purist idiom which forbade its use and allowed only elision, we shall see that Solomos, solitary and far-seeing, was able to understand something we are only just fully realizing: that it is unwise to discard either of these two conflicting traditions, for they continually counterbalance each other and provide a unique basis upon which the intellect can operate fruitfully through the interplay of opposites.

In his final, mature views of the problem of artistic expression, Solomos accomplishes a synthesis of the two traditions; he rejects the negative elements and makes use of the positive elements in each one (p. 59).

To, this he adds:

After the long journey of Greek poetry from the Alexandrians to the great burst of *The Erotokritos* in seventeenth century Crete, the application of these ideas [the selective synthesis of the two traditions] in Draft C should be seen as *the greatest discovery* in the annals of poetic expression in our country, and *the only real discovery* prior to Cavafy's introduction of prose elements in our poetry. (pp. 59-60, my underlinings).

It is in the last stage of Solomos' creativity, the Draft C, where the selective befriending of the demotic with the purist is attempted, and one might in fact wonder as to whether that might have been a matter of necessity where the demotic sensed its shortcomings in meeting the poet's expectations, and called for the purist's help. There have been the orthodoxies, mostly after Solomos, as to the division between the two languages, and there have also been the moderations as to the extent of mixture that would not hurt the ear and taste through 'bilingual' discrepancies.

Solomos' final selectivity, which meets with Lorentzatos' appreciation and praise, would appear as a concession of his earlier, more orthodox stand as that was expressed in his *Dialogos*, to the discussion and evaluation of which the critic devotes a whole later essay, comparing it with Dante's *De Vulgari Eloquentia*, its influential precedent and striking parallel. The extent of concession depends on the extent that one would identify the demotic with the «common», the «spoken» language, and would identify the purist with the «written» of the literati.

In both the *De Vulgari Eloquentia* and the *Dialogos*, the first a treatise and the second a dialogue, the issue is the right choice of a nation's literary language. In their respective and considerably similar circumstances, though by four centuries apart, both works plead for the language of the people, the common, the living speech, the *vulgaris locutio*, in its supposed vulgarity more noble than the artificial and conventional «*grammatica locutio*», the «written» language (the Latin for the Italians and the purist for the Greeks). In their respective choices, «Dante was the founder of the language of Italian literature as Solomos was the founder of the language of modern Greek literature» (p. 151). The instruction he gives in the *Dialogos* as to the user's right approach is: «First submit to the language of the people, and then, if you are able, master it». As to the way of that «mastering», in a letter of his

(in Italian) to his friend Tertsetis, referring more particularly to the language of the Klephtic songs, he explains that the poet: «ought to use it in its essence, not merely formally ... And as for poetry ... it is certainly good to tread in those tracks, but not to stop there: one must raise oneself up perpendicularly» (pp. 153-4) so as to lend nobility to that language, yet without modifying it. Later artistic necessity in its rise, as we have remarked, made Solomos widen his approach to the demotic through grafting to it, selectively, elements from the purist, yet without reducing the foundational value of the living demotic as his language and that of the nation. There is in Lorentzatos' essay a critical survey of the language problem in its growth since the First Century B.C. to which Solomos gave his creative solution.

Of the essays in the volume, the one that offers the most challenge and would raise most of the reader's questionings is possibly the one that has lent its title to the volume itself, one assumes as to indicate its central importance. It is the widest in the range of its coverage, the most comprehensive and most adventurous in its prevalently traditional views, even the most combative. Essentially, in the light of the spiritual, literary and cultural crisis of the Western World altogether and its precedents, it projects Lorentzatos' own beliefs as to what modern Greek poetry has been, should have been and should become, — in essence and not merely in form, technically speaking. As he explains in his «Preface», after the consideration of «the technical or esthetic side of the poet's art, the «philological elements», and the exploration of «a definition of style» in its general significance, topics that preoccupied the preceding essays, this, «the third essay is openly concerned with the broader foundations of art, which remain always spiritual or metaphysical — in other words, directed toward the eternal». If Solomos is not still the obvious focus of this essay, one senses in it his presence in terms of his creative and ideological orientation and principles, in fact of his Modern Greek conscience as a touchstone through which to judge the crisis, a precious heritage that modern Greek intellect should have kept faithful to in order to avoid succumbing to the crisis.

In the prevalently adventurous and highly parenthetical unfolding of his earned prose and argument, an initial consideration of Seferis' poetic modernity deviates into the sad general attestation that:

It is from Europe [as if Greece were not part of it]
that we in Greece have received our models, whether

we like it or not. Since the War of Independence (1821), we have been copying Europe in a considerable number of fields, including the arts. We have been continuously producing identical miniature imitations of European models. (p. 87).

He wishes to see Solomos as a brilliant exception to this rule, yes, one assumes, in a particular sense, for he too absorbed much of the European spirit and intellect of his time, the German philosophic and poetic idealism and a great deal more. It is the specific orientation of his absorptions that counts. He grew up in the Ionian Islands which were themselves «a striking exception to the general cultural climate of Greece» (pp. 88-9), once again in terms of its European flirtations, and he therefore:

harks back to Dante, to a tradition diametrically opposed to that of the Renaissance, the Reformation, the *Erklärungszeit*, and the classicizing ideal of the French Revolution. It is through Dante, in other words through the metaphysical tradition of medieval Western Christendom that Solomos came home to the metaphysical tradition of Eastern Christendom. (p. 89).

For his insistence on the value and necessity of a spiritual, metaphysical re-orientation of the Greek intellect that inspires this essay and the following «Ultima Verba», as expressive of his mind, Lorentzatos would hardly avoid his appellation as a «Neo-Christian», a term applied in our days to those nostalgic of the great days of Christendom, the Middle Ages as centered round their faith in God, and this with a belief that their blessed state could be recaptured. Such a notion has had an equal appeal upon T. S. Eliot, Paul Claudel and others, with Dante as the supreme voice of those times. This essay of Lorentzatos and his «Ultima Verba» are both thickly studded with biblical references and quotations.

Such a re-orientation, as far as Greece is concerned, involves a wider matter: a consideration or reconsideration of the modern country's cultural relationship with its ancient past and its closer predecessor, the Byzantine-Christian world, in terms of identity. It is Lorentzatos' view that:

During the reign of romantic classicism in Europe we signed our own death warrant. We signed it the moment we agreed to take part in the European debate about whether or not we Greeks were the true de-

scendants of the ancient Greeks. As if we did not exist in our own right ... We were no more than mandarins, dried up scholars who were totally unaware of the spiritual tradition we had inherited from our fathers over a period of almost two thousand years. (pp. 91-2).

Obviously involved in the issue is, therefore, the perennial conflict between the classically-oriented «purists» and the Byzantine-oriented «demoticists» with their notion of «Romiosyne», although the division is not as simple as thus stated, and has had its endless variations.

Regarding the Ancient world itself and its cultural message, Lorenzatos' conviction is (and he is not alone in this conviction) that this world's message was fatally misunderstood, misinterpreted and misapplied, in fact it has been constantly and increasingly perverted by the Western World since the Renaissance with the emphasis on Humanism, on the «absolute independence of man from the not-purely-human, the divine element» (p. 124). As he further states it: «Our civilization has replaced the metaphysical center, the 'rule of heaven with man': man is the supreme law» (p. 125). The tragic fallacy was the anthropocentrism round which the Western World has mostly developed, and it is that anthropocentrism, that humanism that has caused our modern world to lose «the immemorial metaphysical *center of life*» (p. 125, my underlining). It is the utilitarian mis-fostering of the Classical World's message that has been imposed upon Greece itself by the West and through the West-educated and enlightened Greek literati, and this at the expense of Greece's own genuine tradition.

We never lacked tradition; and we have known nothing like the Inquisition, the Renaissance, the Reformation ... Quite simply, we knew the ancient Greeks had their own spiritual tradition, their own sacred universe, in the same way as we have ... Whatever was meant to remain alive from the Hellenic tradition was channeled into the Christian tradition, and there it still lives in 'another form'. That which we call Greece, that which was spiritually viable and therefore survived Greek antiquity, is not to be found, as some people believe, in Schleiermacher, Shelley, or Keats (Ode on a Grecian Urn), but in the sanctuary of the Christian spirit, as it was passed on to our Orthodox forebears by the Fathers of the Eastern Church and

all those who safeguarded through the ruthless centuries, the same metaphysics. (pp. 130-1).

It is mostly in the light of this spirit that Lorentzatos passes judgment on Modern Greek poetry altogether, with particular focus on some of its most outstanding figures and landmarks, like Cavafy, Karyotakis and Seferis. What was the nature of Cavafy's and Seferis' undeniable originality and modernity and what positive Greek answer did it give to the spiritual crisis?

Cavafy, we are told, «had not been subjected to the intoxication of the new demotic idiom» (p. 93), a reference to the practice of the so-called New Athenian School under Palamas' leadership. He «showed us the way to keep on discovering new aspects of the Greek spirit» (p. 8). Much like Solomos, he «chose a course which for a long time to come cannot help but be our own course as well» (p. 39). He «extended the horizon of art ... with his 'Hellenism' or his 'hedonism'; but his real effect on poetry was achieved by his use of subtle, distilled rhythms, his borrowing from prose, which he was the first to introduce in Greek poetry, and his condemnation of synizesis, which was an innovation that Solomos was first to try out» (p. 43). He did not follow the purist metrics and was one of the few in Greece who could really «keep up with contemporary thought and art» (p. 64). He was «able to see that the lethargy that had overtaken poetry written in purist Greek ... was now attacking poetry written in demotic as well» (p. 92), and was able to liberate himself from the increasing deadness. His «grafting prose elements onto poetry», as the mark of his liberation, is, however, deemed by Lorentzatos as a characteristic feature of the European poetic crisis itself. The answer that he, and Seferis after him, gave to that crisis seems, erroneously, to «stem from the belief that the impasse in the art was transitory, or merely technical matter. So they tried to apply new methods to poetry; but it was still the same poetry, the same art as before» (p. 111).

His younger and tragic contemporary, Karyotakis, was the very signaller himself of the crisis within the Athenian demotic tradition, the sharpest expression of that crisis. His suicide in 1928 soon followed the publication of *Elegies and Satires* where «we have the extreme point of dissolution in normal metrics... a kind of St. Vitus' dance» (p. 96) that closes the tradition and opens the void.

It is the consideration of Seferis' accomplishment that practically opens and closes this essay. Rather than his much acclaimed *Turning Point* of 1931 (no more than «a demonstration of his appren-

ticeship» in the tradition), it is his *Mythistorima* of 1935 that Lorentzatos deems as the real turning point which makes Seferis «the first poet to provide an answer to the crisis» (p. 86) in his departure from the old poetics and the opening of a new era. Lorentzatos, however, still deems the short *Cistern*, of 1932, as Seferis' «farthest - reaching work from the spiritual point of view», a point that «he did not substantially surpass» in his second period, i.e. after he encountered Eliot (pp. 97-8). The critic's view as to the *Mythistorima* is that «regardless of its worth... it did not help to bring the cause of poetry one step forward, whether in the direction of the great yawning abyss at the beginning of the world, or towards what may be the true solution» (p. 105), i.e. regarding the spiritual crisis, the lacking center, «the lost vision without which nothing can be accomplished» (p. 107), the vision of God that inspired Dante and Solomos. Other critics, George Savidis among them, viewing Seferis' work in a different light, saw in its prevalent pessimism a temperamental relationship with Karyotakis if not really an influence. To Lorentzatos, neither he nor Cavafy «put into question poetry itself» (p. 111). They only revised and brought up to date the methods of poetics, ignoring the poetry's function. Seferis' approach to Attic tragedy reflects Western «humaneness» rather than its essential Greekness. He, on the whole, «engages his heart in exhausting the whole gamut of natural or cosmic love», but does not extend love into its «metaphysical, apocalyptic sense» (p. 132), although he himself as a person and his verse brim with compassion. Lorentzatos takes strong exception to his relevant statement and belief that «we are a people who have great Fathers of the Church, but no mystics», counterposing extensively his view that «we Greeks... more than any other Middle Eastern people... have been the main vehicle of the great tradition of Christian mysticism», (p. 141) and that, denying mysticism to the Greeks «has always been the humanistic fallacy in Europe» (p. 142). He concludes his long consideration of Seferis with the statement that «Seferis' main concern was our language, for he saw it as the poet's last hope of salvation in the great shipwreck that was to come» (p. 145).

If the matter of poetic method occupied the two previous essays, method in this one is put aside as only secondary to the contents of poetry, its orientation for the sake of a spiritual recovery in the recapture of the essence that makes poetry the means of regaining the lost center, God and faith in him. The following lines are quintessential of his conviction and advice:

Each one of us must try to solve the problem on his own, until that time-when the solution can become generalized and reach the whole society [Might this remind us of Eliot's *The Idea of a Christian Society* of 1939?] What I am trying to say is that it is necessary for each one of us to start going through a total, radical change, the true metamorphosis or «change of mind» — *μετά-voia* — which is «needful», which has always been «needful», before we can proceed to help others in a really effective and creative manner. We must first change the way art functions; from the aesthetic function we have today, we must move to a metaphysical function, which is the way that art always functioned before the Renaissance. It may seem the wrong way about, but in order to «save» art, we must first «close» it. (pp. 105-6).

To his respectable sermon he adds:

If poetry (*o altra arte*) is to grow fruitful and strong once more, it must somehow renounce itself in its present function, plunge into the abyss that gapes at the beginning of the world... In the abyss, poetry will find again the source and the roots from which it has strayed; only thus can it be brought back to the living light. Art must turn into the serious undertaking it used to be. Art must be baptized in the waters of faith. (p. 109).

This emotional, moved and touching thinking of Lorentzatos as to the evils plaguing modern intellect, poetry in particular, as reflecting wider evils in the loss of spiritual direction and ethical and other values, may, at times, have frequented the minds of lots of us. We may even have shared his wish as to a possible solution in terms of a recovery. We may have expressed silently or vocally the spirit of his advice, his urging. We do not question the correctness of his views as to what constitutes the cultural heritage of modern Hellenism. Highly perceptive are his remarks as to the Western World's mis-inheriting much of the Ancient spirit, although his condemnation of Humanism might cause some wider reservations. His attitude towards it may only be too partially exclusive. There must be several Neohellenists, I am sure, who would disagree with his criticism of Cavafy's and Seferis' accomplishment, although he is certainly right in his belief that no

matter how original and valuable their technical novelty has been, the world of their poetry is either enslaved to the body's and its pleasure's decline, or abides under the heavy cloud of historical awareness with its sorrow and despair, with no supernal light from above to offer it some uplifting solace and hope. Both poets remained ingeniously faithful recorders of their time's reality as to the promise that it did not offer.

But to return to Lorentzatos's advice itself with its instructions-his homily. We should not expand on arguing its correctness and advisability with regard to poetry and the national conscience as a way, in fact *the* way of recovery. No matter how knowingly and thoughtfully argued, it much reflects a personal taste and opinion, and as such it should be considered and respected, theoretically speaking. Several would be those among Lorentzatos' peers, with concerns and worries of the same and similar width and grandeur, that would question or even oppose his views in principle; their attitude towards the Ancient heritage (Lorentzatos, let us mention, is the son of one of the most distinguished Greek classical scholars and Homerists), or towards the post - Renaissance European intellect as it influenced the modern Greek mind, or with regard to the spiritual re - orientation they wish to foster and propagate in times of burning social, sociological and materialistic problems and issues. As to Orthodox Christianity itself, strange as this may appear to an outsider, hardly any important modern Greek poet, including Varnalis, Vrettakos and Ritsos, to mention three of several with a leftist conviction, has failed, out of an unavowed metaphysical need, or in moments of emotional strain, impulsively or even conventionally, in agreement with the traditional, cultural, Byzantine heritage, the Romiosyne of the people whose their verse addresses, to address or invoke or refer to Virgin Mary or Christ or God. This, nonetheless, does not take care of the major spiritual void as Lorentzatos views it in Modern Hellenism and the European world at large.

His wish for the recovery of the Christian faith in its purity, the medieval faith in God as supremely expressed in Dante (and reflectively shared by Solomos), has had an outstanding modern precedent in the similar wish of T. S. Eliot as voiced in several of his writings and above all in his *Four Quartets*. Yet no matter how deep is our critic's respect and admiration for Eliot as a poet and thinker, as this is shown in several references to him as well as in his obvious influence on the mind and manner of Lorentzatos, when it comes to Eliot's version of Christianity as embodied in the *Four Quartets*, strong oppo-

sition is expressed for its belonging «to the tradition of abstract European philosophical thought, or Western scholasticism, evils from which our own spiritual tradition was more or less protected as long as we lived under Islamic rule and had not been 'discovered' by the scholars of Europe» (p. 109) Seferis was of the same mind as to the *Four Quartets*. In short, Eliot, the pious Eliot, could not serve the Greek intellect as an exemplary model in an approach to Christianity, nor are there any other Western models available. Orthodox Christianity has its own character.

To repeat again, the correctness and advisability of Lorentzatos' advice and urging are not presently to be further argued about. What we would still, naturally, question and doubt is the practical feasibility of its fulfillment in our Twentieth Century and the centuries hereafter as our globe keeps shrinking to its «global humanity» contemplating and touching yesterday's mystery of the stars and the numberless galaxies. Could his advice indeed be taken as other than a theoretical (he is much the theorist), contemplative, Quixotic, «pious wish», an εὐσεβὴς πόθος? Is the Lost Center still recoverable in its old sense, although we do not doubt its primeval and eternal necessity? Is it recoverable, except as a wish in the privacy of an individual soul like that of Lorentzatos or T. S. Eliot or others select few, if theirs is really a recovery more than theoretical (let us remember Lorentzatos' statement that «recourse to mysticism and religion... is the result of careful logic»), or principle? Can it transcend the quandaries of our modern awareness? Are we still able, with all the blinding fascination of our scientific and technological discoveries, revelations and advancement, to recover our faith in our traditional, our biblical God, to recover genuinely the spirit that «built the medieval cathedrals»? Are we possibly wrong in reading in his advice a nostalgic retrogression as recommended, and could culture (if still extant after Spengler) be planned in its present and future development? Can we retrace our steps through effacing what centuries, even millenia have brought upon us? Can we deviate from those ominous 2000 - year gyres of even a visionary like W. B. Yeats? And can we tell the poets what their mind should be, what they should create? Isn't there a theoretical blasphemy committed? And does the genuine poet indeed accomplish his greatness through conscious planning? Was Socrates wrong in his *Apology* and in *Ion* on that matter?

A wish is one thing, and reality is another—a truth that even the most idealistic among us are eventually obliged to painfully re-

cognize. We assume that it has been Lorentzatos' fervent wish to fight that recognition in a contemplative isolation, and this, among other matters and virtues reflected and reflected upon in this volume, makes its reading a fascination and a challenge besides the learning and perception that it amply provides.

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La Macédoine, Recueil de documents et matériaux, Sofia, éd. BAN (Institut d'histoire. Institut de langue bulgare), 1980, pp. 893.

In 1978 the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences produced a Bulgarian and an English edition of a weighty tome of documents relating to the general area of greater Macedonia from the time of the Slavs' invasion there (VIth century) up until the Second World War. A French edition was published in 1980, essentially unchanged apart from certain omissions regarding the identity of some of the documents and in the explanatory notes.

The book comprises a collection of historical material of all kinds, a total of 452 extracts from documents and texts dealing with the political, economic and cultural life of the Slavo-Bulgarians in various parts of Macedonia. The material is divided, in strict chronological order, into four lengthy chapters:

I. *VIth century - 1762* (pp. 19-113, 71 extracts). This first part covers the medieval and Ottoman periods, beginning in the VIth century with the Slavs' establishment in the Balkans and ending at the dawn of the Bulgarian national awakening (*Văzraždane*). The 71 extracts in this section basically concern Bulgarian presence and activity in various parts of Macedonia. The chief sources for the earlier period are Byzantine - ecclesiastical texts, lives of saints, chronicles and historical texts, referring to the Bulgarians' establishment in the Balkans and their struggles to strengthen their position on Byzantine territory in Macedonia. Byzantine writers provide increasing information about the Bulgarians after the latter embraced Christianity (second half of the IXth century) and particularly from the XIth century onward. For the later period extracts are used from works by western European historians and travellers (Fucher, Wilhelm de Tyr et al.), who were familiar with the region, extracts from the works of Turkish travellers (Haji Kalfa, Evliya Chelebi, et al.), one extract from a register in Zo-graphou Monastery giving the names of the Monastery's financial benefactors from various parts of Macedonia, excerpts from books etc.

II. *Period of National Awakening 1762-1878* (pp. 115-359, 170 extracts). This period begins with the writing of the «Slavo-Bulgarian History» by Pajsij Hilendarski in 1762 and ends with the Berlin Treaty of 1878 and covers the Bulgarians' national awakening and their struggle for a national Church and educational system. A large number of the extracts in this section are from the personal correspondence and the works of eminent Bulgarians who were active on behalf of the Bulga-

rian ecclesiastical, political and educational Renaissance, principally in the north and also in the central belt of Macedonia: amongst these notable men were the brothers Dimităr and Konstantin Miladinov, R. Žiznifov, K. Šapkarev and Gr. Părličev. Another large part of the material in this section comprises journalistic reports in the Bulgarian and Serbian press of the time (including quite a large number of letters written by Bulgarians and providing information about events and people in their own areas). There are also documents from the Russian archives, chiefly consular reports from the Russian consuls in Monastir (Bitola), excerpts from Russian, Bulgarian and Serbian books, registers of the names of Bulgaro-Macedonian students in Moscow and Odessa, petitions to the sultan from members of Bulgarian communities from Macedonia.

III. *Struggles for national liberation: 1878-1918* (pp. 361-673, 143 extracts). This third part covers the period from the Berlin Conference in 1878 to the end of the First World War. It contains a multitude of documents, as well as press reports and letters from Bulgarians from various communities, chiefly in northern Macedonia; the subjects covered are the Bulgarians' reactions to the provisions of the Berlin Treaty, the Kresna - Razlog uprising, resistance to «Macedonism», which was Serbia's attempt in 1885 to make the whole population Serbian, the establishment and activities of IMRO and IMARO, the Ilinden uprising and the reaction of the Bulgarian organizations to the Young-Turk Revolution.

A wealth of journalistic material is included, but this section comprises mainly documents from the Bulgarian revolutionary organisations.

IV. *Macedonia during the inter-war years* (pp. 675-860, 69 extracts). This section of the book is of particular interest in that it ceases to regard Macedonia as part of the Ottoman Empire and refers to the area as Greek and Serbian Macedonia. Journalistic reports, excerpts from books, protests and reports from Bulgarian organisations (IMRO) etc. endeavour to prove that the Greek and Serbian authorities applied pressure to the Bulgarians remaining in Macedonia after the exchange of populations, with the intent of bringing about their assimilation. It should be noted that some of the documents published here were purloined from the Bulgarian fascist authorities occupying Greek Macedonia during the Second World War (p. 847, doc. 67; p. 843, doc. 65; p. 840, doc. 63; p. 836, doc. 61).

The book begins with an eleven-page foreword (pp. 5-15) which makes a clear and straightforward statement of the present Bulgarian position on the Macedonian question. At the end of the book there is an index of personal names, newspapers and periodicals (pp. 851-871) and an index of geographical names (pp. 872-893).

The division of the material according to historical periods follows the general lines of the chronological divisions of Bulgarian history, though it deals exclusively with the Macedonian aspect. The main aim of the book is to lay the foundations for the view that from the time it first appeared in Macedonia the Slav element was and is essentially Bulgarian and directly refutes the well-known position of the Federal Republic of Macedonia concerning the existence of the «Macedonian Nationality». Nowhere in any of the sources is there any mention of a «Macedonian» Slav people, and the term Macedonia has a purely geographical significance. In recent times some of the chief exponents of «Macedonism», such as Goče Delčev (doc. 52, p. 430; doc. 58, p. 444), Kr. Miširkov (doc. 32, pp. 744-746) and Dimităr Vlahov (doc. 60, pp. 846-849), have referred in their writings to their own Bulgarian national consciousness.

It must be emphasised here that this book makes an useful collection and presentation of a rich volume of material, much of it little known and hitherto inaccessible. However, one must not lose sight of the fact that the very nature of the collection — i.e. a rich but nevertheless selective presentation of documents considered from a specific viewpoint — necessarily limits its significance. The book would be more effective without the foreword, in which general conclusions and opinions are drawn and maintained on the basis of the fragmentary documents and the inadequate evidence in the main body of the work. In order to support these conclusions satisfactorily, all the conflicting views and all the other sources would have to be cited and a critical commentary provided. The book has no such lofty ambitions and consequently its authority is somewhat impaired by such conclusions in the foreword as that, for example, encountered on p. 13, where it is noted that «Les documents de la période des années 30 prouvent à l'évidence que sous le pouvoir serbe et grec et jusqu'à la Seconde Guerre mondiale, les Bulgares de Macédoine restent la principale population autochtone...». We cannot apprehend what is the meaning of the word *autochtone*!

The following review points out some of the book's weaknesses, on the basis of the conclusions reached and stated in the foreword.

a) The documents differ widely in character and the value of the evidence they provide varies considerably: Byzantine sources, Old Slavonic texts and archive material are presented alongside press reports, personal correspondence, extracts from book etc. All this material is massed together and divided up into chronological order without the least critical evaluation, so that all the historical evidence it contains is presented as if it were of equal importance.

b) Different interpretations are frequently put upon geographical or administrative terms. For instance, with no mention of the fact that for Byzantine writers the term Bulgaria was often of purely geographical significance within the context of the Byzantine state, the term is used here in a purely ethnological sense. In doc. 55, p. 88, for example, mention is made of Gregory, Archbishop of Ochrid and All Bulgaria, whose signature is to be found on documents from the XVth century. The use of the title «and All Bulgaria» alone is the justification for including the document. However, the archiepiscopate of Ochrid owed its second title, «and All Bulgaria» to the brief existence of Samuel's Bulgarian state and to the Byzantine bureaucracy which had retained it ever since an edict of Basil the Bulgarslayer. C. J. Jireček¹, notes that Ochrid was a bastion of Hellenism from the XIIth century onwards.

Let it also be noted that when Neofit, the Metropolitan of Serres, wrote on October 18, 1878 that two-fifths of the population of the district of Serres were Slavophone, he certainly did not mean that they were Bulgarian, as the title to his letter in the book implies (no. 129, p. 276-278). It is obvious the language is not the prime determining factor of a people's national identity, which is a well-known fact in that particular area as his text expressly indicates and especially in border areas where there are always bilingual.

It must be pointed out that in the English edition of 1978 all the towns of Macedonia are referred to only by their Slavonic version of names (Solun, Lerin, Kostur, Sjar, etc.)—even with regard to the period when they were already part of the Greek state (1913 onwards). In the French edition the situation is somewhat different: Thessalo-

1. C. J. Jireček, *Geschichte des Bulgaren*, 1876, p. 211. Gelzer, *Byzantinischen Zeitschrift*, 1893, p. 42-43. Concerning the activities of the Greek community in the Archbishopry of Ohrid, see S. Varnalidis, 'Ο ἀρχιεπίσκοπος Ζωσιμᾶς (1686-1746) καὶ ἡ ἐκκλησιαστικὴ καὶ πολιτικὴ δράσις αὐτοῦ, (The Archbishop Zosimas (1686-1746) and his ecclesiastical and political activities), Thessaloniki, 1974.

niki appears throughout as Salonique or Thessalonique, whereas the towns of Florina and Kastoria are still referred to as Lerin and Kostur.

c) Certain testimonies are of such a kind that their value as evidence is limited and the significance of the information they provide is therefore greatly reduced; by such testimonies we mean the reports by Bulgarian newspaper correspondents and other journalistic information furnished by Bulgarians (doc. 16, pp. 710-712; doc. 19, p. 715-717; doc. 20, pp. 718-720; doc. 21, p. 721; doc. 24, pp. 725-729; doc. 30, pp. 736-741; doc. 33, pp. 746-747; doc. 36, p. 351; doc. 39, p. 763; doc. 48, pp. 793-795). We may also include exclusively Bulgarian documents and petitions which are given without signatures or without stating the number of petitioners (cf. doc. 85, pp. 229-230; doc. 84, p. 229) extracts from Bulgarian books containing general and unproven assertions and statistics with no accompanying comparison with contemporary opinions and figures (cf. doc. 40, p. 411) and official and unofficial texts written by organizations under Bulgarian control (IV - doc. 1, pp. 661-662; doc. 3, pp. 668-671; doc. 5, pp. 674-676; doc. 6, pp. 676-684; doc. 7, pp. 684-691; doc. 10, pp. 695-696; doc. 13, pp. 701-707; doc. 17, pp. 712-714; doc. 34, pp. 747-748; doc. 37, pp. 752-754; doc. 38, pp. 755-762; doc. 51, pp. 798-805; doc. 55, pp. 816-819; doc. 56, pp. 819-822), representatives of Bulgarian political parties (IV - doc. 11, pp. 696-698).

d) There are numerous barbs directed against Hellenism and in particular against the Greek clergy and the Patriarchate (doc. 28, p. 152; doc. 38, p. 162; doc. 40, p. 168; doc. 53, p. 183). A closer scrutiny of these same documents, however, might present a somewhat different picture: let us use document no. 16, pp. 141-142 as an example, which is a letter of thanks from the notables of Bačno to Al. Exarh for sending aid. It is mentioned that the aid was given through Auxentius, Bishop of Belessa, who was a Patriarchist and whose activities were anything but anti-Bulgarian. It should, by the way, be noted that in what is nowadays Greek Macedonia no exarchal episcopacy was ever established. As far as the period of the Bulgarian Renaissance is concerned, which is principally taken up with documents regarding education and the ecclesiastical question, it must be emphasised that, directly or indirectly, the dominance of Greek education in this area is made quite obvious by the documents themselves.

For an indication of this, cf. the report submitted by the Russian consul in Monastir (dated 23rd January, 1870), in which he himself points out that Bulgarian educational propaganda had had little effect,

since the Slavophone element wrote Greek and attended Greek schools. Moreover, the Bulgarian communities in Monastir and Thessaloniki were in no position in 1875 to maintain even one school, despite the Exarchy's subsidies and the free education which was offered (doc. 152, p. 315), whereas the vast majority of pupils, as we know, attended the Greek schools, which were flourishing. In north-east Macedonia the Bulgarian schools were quite undeveloped up until 1885². Greek education made a great contribution to the Bulgarian Renaissance, since all the leading lights of this renaissance had, without exception, been nurtured on it and frequently expressed themselves much better in Greek than in Bulgarian. And this is why it is out of place in this day and age to insist on re-publishing views which may have been perfectly well justified in their time, considering the negative aspects of the Greek educational system and the Greek Church, but which have long been considered exaggerated³ and are now being re-examined in a new light.

e) The editors of the book have selected their sources, isolating certain excerpts and details which advance Bulgarian views. Since, however, they are not published in a purely scientific way — accompanied, that is, by references to other, frequently more numerous and better known, testimonies and sources of evidence — they can lead the uninformed reader to hasty conclusions and erroneous impressions. Isolated from their contemporary, local and ethnological context, without vital objective criticism, the extracts from Byzantine texts are selected to give the impression that Macedonia was dominated by the Bulgarian element and that other nationalities were limited in number, if not quite unrepresented. But there is no question about the fact that the Greek element was very much present in Macedonia; more numerous and dynamic than the Bulgarians, the Greeks left their mark on the

2. For details concerning the Greek educational activities in Macedonia, see St. Papadopoulos, *Εκπαιδευτική και κοινωνική δραστηριότητα του ελληνισμού της Μακεδονίας κατά τον τελευταίο αιώνα της Τουρκοκρατίας* (Educational and social activities of the Greeks in Macedonia during the last century of Turkish occupation), Thessaloniki, ΕΜΣ, 1970. For the Bulgarian cultural presence in Macedonia, see among other publications, Α. Α. Ταχιάος, *Η εθνική αφύπνισις των Βουλγάρων και η εμφάνισις της βουλγαρικής εθνικής κινήσεως εν Μακεδονία* (The national awakening of the Bulgarians and the appearance of the Bulgarian national movement in Macedonia), Thessaloniki, ΕΜΣ, 1974.

3. J. Ivanov, «Grăcko-bălgarski otnošenija predi cārkovnata borba» (Greco-bulgarian relations before the ecclesiastical controversy), in *Sbornik o čest na prof. L. Miletic*, Sofia, 1912, p. 163-164.

whole Byzantine period, both politically and intellectually. The extracts from Old Slavonic texts quoted here also move in the same sort of direction.

A typical example is the excerpt from the Old Slavonic *Life of Cyril*, written in the XIIth century (doc. 30, p. 64) in which reference is made to the Bulgarian origin of the man who brought enlightenment to the Slavs; the views of eminent slavists, both westerners and Slavs themselves, are ignored (F. Dvornik, B. Gaffenauer, Aug. Leskin, A.-E. Tachiaos), though they have used earlier sources, both Byzantine and Old Bulgarian, to demonstrate that the two brothers Cyril and Methodius were unquestionably Greek. Through some of the extracts from Turkish sources (docs. 62, 63, 64, 65, pp. 105-107) Macedonian towns and communities are presented as being purely Bulgarian, which during the Turkish occupation kept their Greek character very much alive — Edessa, Kastoria, Florina, Monastir, among many others. An excerpt from the Travelogue of Evliya Chelebi is included in the book in this connection; elsewhere, however, he speaks plainly of the dynamic Greek element in these areas⁴.

The documents published for the period 1918-1940 reflect the attitude of the Bulgarians and their great hopes and disillusionments. Their purpose is using linguistic argument to demonstrate that the Slavs living in Macedonia were indeed their brothers. The published material continue to refer and describe the oppression and discrimination to which the Bulgarians in Greek Macedonia were allegedly subjected by the Greek authorities. The editors wish to convince the people that in the period between the two World Wars the population of Greek Macedonians remained primarily Bulgarian in spite of Greek suppressions and terror. And this was accomplished, as stated, without any propaganda or influence from outside, but was the logical result of the historical development throughout the centuries (Doc. 20, p. 718-720, Doc. 41, p. 766-778, Doc. 43, p. 780-782, Doc. 47, p. 788-793).

The documents, however, do not make any reference to the fact that exchanges of population between Greece and Bulgaria and Turkey had made Greek Macedonia a homogeneous region. The treaty of Neuilly, which ended the state of war between Bulgaria and her adversaries, provided for the voluntary exchange of minorities between Greece and

4. See V. Dimitriadis, *Ἡ κεντρικὴ καὶ δυτικὴ Μακεδονία κατὰ τὸν Ἐβλιγιὰ Τσελεμπή* (Central and Western Macedonia according to Evlija Tselembi), Thessaloniki, 1973, pp. 163, 176, 272 et passim.

Bulgaria. Approximately 30.000 Greeks left Bulgaria while 53.000 Bulgarians departed Greece. To these figures one should add 16.000 Greeks and 39.000 Bulgarians who had fled to their respective homelands during the war⁵.

According to the statistics of the League of Nations, the ethnological composition of Greek Macedonia in 1926 was as follows:

Greeks	1.341.000	88,8%
Moslems	2.000	0,1%
Bulgarians	77.000	5,1%
Various	91.000	6,0%

The same source shows that in 1912 the Greek, comprised the 42,6% of the population (513.000) and the Bulgarians 9,9% (119.000)⁶.

The official Greek census of 1928 corroborating the findings of the League of Nations showed that out of a population of 6.032.761, there were only 81.984 Slavophones⁷.

The majority of these slavophones lived in Western Macedonia. Greece classified them officially as Greeks who spoke a Slavonic dialect and refused to place them under the minority treaties of the League of Nations. As a large number of them had a Bulgarian consciousness, they had not emigrated to Bulgaria, as they could, but remained in Western Macedonia, either from pressure exerted by the I.M.R.O., the natural attachment of the peasant to his land, or the attitude of certain Greek Macedonian politicians who, in the hope of winning Slavophones votes, prevented their emigration to Bulgaria⁸.

For the period preceeding WWII an attempt is made by the editors to indicate that in spite of the fact that the Bulgarians living in Greece were subjected to suppression and terror their national consciousness and aspirations were not altered, since the population of Greek Macedonia was basically Bulgarian. The documents, however, used do not have any demonstrative proof, they are simply memoranda

5. Stephen Ladas, *The Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey*, New York 1932, p. 105.

6. League of Nations, *Greek Refugee Settlement*, Genova 1926, as quoted in E. Kofos, *Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia*, Thessaloniki 1964, pp. 47 and 88.

7. *Annuaire Statistique de la Grèce*, Athens 1928.

8. Kofos, *Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia*, p. 48.

of Bulgarian organization from abroad (no. 64, p. 841-843, no. 66, p. 844-847). Moreover the use by the editors of official Greek documents (no. 61, p. 837-838, no. 63, p. 840, no. 65, p. 843-844, no. 67, p. 847), which were taken by the Bulgarian forces during WWII when parts of Macedonia were under fascist Bulgarian occupation, do not in any way support the Bulgarian allegations.

In the documents presented nothing is mentioned of the fact that as was the case in the First World War, it was the Axis promise of restoring the frontiers of Great Bulgaria, including all of Macedonia and Western Thrace, that inevitably led the expansionist Bulgarian government into its Axis partnership.

During the War, in 1941, Eastern Macedonia and Western Thrace came under Bulgarian occupation and the Bulgarians started a policy of suppression and Bulgarization of the Greek population. Illustrative of the policy of suppression followed by the Bulgarians in this area is an American report of Burton Berry, second Secretary of the Rome Embassy who had visited Greece in October 1941, in which is stated: «... in the villages of Eastern Macedonia the Bulgars indulged in wholesale arrests, deportations and murder. The massacre was so ruthlessly staged and the destruction of property so callously carried out, that a German Commanding Officer at Cavalla privately expressed himself as being horrified... From the time of the occupation of the district the Bulgarian authorities constantly have exerted pressure upon all Greeks to move away when economic or physical pressure on individuals has proven insufficient to maintain the exodus at a desirable rate, the authorities to accelerate the «voluntary» exodus, have resorted to mass arrests, deportations and slaughter...»*.

Moreover a report of the Office of Strategic Services of 8 February 1945 states: «... from the moment of the occupation it became clear that the Bulgarians planned to annex permanently the areas under their control. About 90.000 Bulgarian colonists were brought into Thrace and an equal number into Eastern Macedonia, while about 137.500 Greeks were forced to emigrate from the Bulgarian - held areas to Central and Western Macedonia, Asia Minor, and the Aegean and Cyclades Islands. Furthermore, the Bulgarian government decreed that all Greeks in the Bulgarian controlled areas would become Bulgarian citizens unless they declared to the contrary before 1 April 1943, in which case they would have to leave «Bulgaria» meaning those

9. DS 868.00 / 1186, Berry to Department of State, Rome, 14 November 1941.

parts of Greece under Bulgarian occupation. This process of Bulgarization was halted only by the withdrawal of the Bulgarian occupation forces in the autumn of 1944...»¹⁰. In spite, however, of this forced bulgarization in eastern Macedonia and western Thrace, it has to be emphasized that the population remained overwhelmingly Greek and this Greek preponderance did not diminish during the Bulgarian occupation of 1941-1944.

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10. DS, Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Branch, No. 2662, Washington, 8 February 1945, p. 29.

Book Reviews

Tsangadas, Byron C. P., *The Fortifications and Defense of Constantinople*. East European Monographs, No. LXXI. New York: Columbia University Press, 1980, pp. 327.

The successful defense of Constantinople against Avaric and Arabic attacks in the seventh and eighth centuries insured the later flowering of Byzantine culture and civilization. The great walls built by Anthemius in the reign of Theodosius II enabled Constantinople to withstand these repeated attacks. Though the walls and topography of Constantinople have been examined, and the sieges studied in detail, these topics have not been jointly investigated previously. The present work combines these subjects, and thus offers new solutions to old problems.

Part I, «The Fortifications of Constantinople», examines the walls themselves: their layout and structure, location of gates, repair, and building materials. Special attention is given to the identification of poorly known or disputed city gates, and to the complex of fortifications in the Blachernae district. The fortifications in the Blachernae are an especially difficult problem since walls of Heraclius, Leo V, and Manuel Comnenus have been detected here. T. argues that the Theodosian Walls joined a pre-existing fortification enclosing the Blachernae, which completed the city's defensive circuit (pp. 24-25). This area, however, proved vulnerable to attack; in 626 Avaric cavalry skirted the walls and attacked the city from the Golden Horn nearly destroying the Church of St. Mary of Blachernae. Heraclius' wall enclosed this Church and the surrounding area, and brought it within the walls. This discussion also identifies the so-called Pteron. Convincing arguments, drawn from evidence of the Avaric siege, show that this wall was a freestanding defensive structure, i.e. *proteichisma*, that blocked the northwestern approach to the walls at Blachernae. It was this fortification that the Avaric cavalry flanked in its attack on the city as the Chagan's forces withdrew.

Other discussions examine the sea walls along the Golden Horn and Sea of Marmara, the location of gates and harbors here, and periods of rebuilding. In this region, as elsewhere in the city, the term «Imperial», used to identify gates and palaces, sometimes leads to confusion since these are also known by names. T. notes (pp. 37-38) that during Constantinople's long history a number of imperial residences were built, and the identification of gates changed accordingly as the activities of imperial families gave new distinction to old places.

Maintenance of the walls was a constant imperial concern, but the Emperor Theophilus sponsored more work on the walls than any other emperor. Numerous dedicatory inscriptions show that «no emperor did more to strengthen and improve the existing walls» than Theophilus (p. 65). T. argues (p. 60) that the building and repair of the walls was a civic duty incumbent upon the whole population of Constantinople. Though sources attest this (e.g. *Codex. Theod.* 8.22), it might be debated how rigorously such laws were enforced as the rich and influential escaped this burden through privilege and corruption.

T. argues that the work of constructing the walls was «entrusted» to the factions, which later cooperated in the rebuilding of the walls after the earthquake of 447 (pp. 9, 60). It is unfortunate that T. did not discuss the views of A. Cameron, *Circus Factions* (Oxford, 1976), pp. 111-12, who rejects the idea that the factions would be entrusted with such work. Perhaps T. will address this point in his forthcoming work on the administration of defense in Constantinople.

Discussion of the topography of Constantinople, particularly the city walls and gates, is made difficult by the map of the city accompanying the text (Map I). This map is so reduced in size that it offers no guide at all (in contrast to Maps III-V which are useful). Though production costs surely led to the map's reduction, any responsible editor would have omitted the map rather than subject any reader to its minute print or so poorly serve his author.

Part II, «The Defense of Constantinople, A.D. 565-867», provides an extensive investigation and account of the great sieges of the seventh and eighth centuries. This section is of particular interest since T. introduces new arguments based upon his investigation of the fortifications, and treats related topics such as the development of Greek Fire.

Several such arguments are offered in the analysis of the Avaric-Slavic siege of July, 626, the first significant test of the Theodosian Walls. The Chagan of the Avars mounted an attack along the length of the land walls, but his goal was to breach the walls at the so-called Mesoteichion in the Lycus Valley where the terrain favored the attacker. Sources state that the Chagan massed engines «from Brachialion to Brachialion». This passage has troubled authorities, e.g. Barisic and Janin, but T. plausibly argues (pp. 92-93) that the term refers to the reinforced fortifications around the Gates of Polyandrion and Pempton, located in the Lycus Valley, and probably to each military gate along the walls (see p. 251, n. 82). T. correctly argues that the Chagan would seek to concentrate his attack, and his discussion here of the siege and walls is persuasive.

The first Arabic siege of Constantinople occurred in 674-678 when the Caliph Muawiya launched a massive attack on the city. Perhaps the single most important development during this siege was the employment of Callinicus' Greek Fire, which insured the Byzantine victory. Though the composition of Greek Fire has been extensively discussed, its ingredients remain uncertain. The most debated point focuses on the use of saltpeter, which some authorities, i.e. Partington, deny. T. argues for the use of saltpeter in Greek Fire, and the evidence, e.g. the *Russian Primary Chronicle Tactica Leonis XIX 51*, supports his argument. The Russians described Greek Fire as «lightning from heaven», which implies a flash made by an explosion. Saltpeter was known in antiquity and T.'s arguments for its use in Greek Fire are persuasive. T. also seems correct to note that such a weapon as Greek Fire would require development and experimentation, and his discussion of its refinement offers an attractive and plausible reconstruction. The first employment of the Callinicus-prepared Fire probably occurred at Cyzicus, the staging area used by the Arabs, and here the new weapon destroyed the Arab fleet, breaking the siege.

The last Arabic siege of Constantinople (717-718) ended in the victory of Leo III, and T.'s account of this siege focuses upon Leo and his dominant role in these events. Leo clearly outwitted and deceived the Arab generals Suleiman and Maslama in Asia and again when they surrounded Constantinople. Weather aided

Leo's schemes, but credit for the victory remains his. Destruction of the relief fleet from Egypt soon after its arrival contributed also to the Byzantine victory. T. argues (p. 298, n. 67) that the Egyptian Christian sailors who defected and reported the arrival of the Arab fleet did so because Leo's religious views were similar to their own. It is left unclear, however, how Leo's religious views, presumably his iconoclasm, would be known to these Egyptians, or why this would encourage them to defect.

In the ninth century the fortifications of Constantinople were assaulted three times: by the Bulgarians under Krum in 813-814, by Thomas the Slav in 821-823, and by the Russians in 860. The attacks of Krum and Thomas revealed deficiencies in the defensive circuit, and afterwards these were remedied. Leo V strengthened the fortifications in the Blachernae by building a wall parallel to the Pteron, which joined the wall of Heraclius (p. 155). Thomas' siege revealed the weaknesses of the walls along the Golden Horn. In the following years the Amorion emperors, especially Theophilus, rebuilt whole sections of walls and strengthened others. These measures enabled the city to withstand the Russian attack in 860 despite the emperor's absence with much of the imperial army (though it should not be construed that the city was defenseless; those troops manning the walls would not have accompanied the emperor). Against the refurbished walls of Theophilus the Russians could make no significant threat, and departed after raiding the city's suburbs.

This work provides a valuable contribution to the study of Byzantine Constantinople, its topography and fortifications, and the crucial sieges of the seventh and eighth centuries. Prospective readers, however, should be alert to the numerous errors in the Greek texts (and elsewhere in the work) that result from poor copy editing unexpected from this press.

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LAWRENCE A. TRITLE

Gabriel Ștrempel, *Catalogul manuscriselor românești*, B.A.R. (Biblioteca Academiei României), 1-1600, Editura Științifică și Enciclopedică, București 1978, p. 429.

La parution de ce volume consacré à la description des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque de l'Académie Roumaine (B.A.R.) se situe dans le cadre d'initiative prise par divers centres scientifiques roumains pour le rassemblement des manuscrits trouvés dans les pays roumains. Le livre de M. Ștrempel nous donne les premiers résultats de cette initiative et constitue un manuel de base contenant une bonne part des trésors de la tradition spirituelle roumaine. Dans ce catalogue sont décrits 1600 codes entrés à la Bibliothèque au cours des cent-dix ans de son existence. Les riches fonds de la Bibliothèque de l'Académie Roumaine sont constitués par des donations privées, par des achats, ou proviennent d'autres petites bibliothèques monastiques. La Bibliothèque s'enrichit aussi par l'entrée d'autres codes de provenances diverses. La description de M. Ștrempel ainsi que les autres qui vont suivre dans le proche avenir apportent des informations utiles sur l'importance de la tradition littéraire médiévale ou contemporaine de la Roumanie; ainsi

le chercheur sera guidé dans la recherche de la problématique que pose la diffusion des manuscrits dans les pays roumains, l'évolution et la particularité de l'écriture cyrillique, le style des miniatures, l'école des copistes. L'évaluation de ce travail important ne figurera pourtant pas avant que tous les volumes soient parus.

La démarche dans la description des codes suivie par le rédacteur porte sur les principes de la méthodologie: 1. numéro du code, datation, pagination, dimensions, 2. titre de l'œuvre ou titre figurant entre crochets (intervention du rédacteur), 3. notes des copistes de contenu historique, météorologique, notes des lecteurs, 4. jugements sur le caractère de l'écriture, de la décoration, de la légature et de la provenance de code. Chaque description s'accompagne d'une bibliographie concernant le code (p.ex. édition antérieure ou publication partielle du code). Le souci du rédacteur de respecter la numérotation des codes pourrait justifier cette classification; il serait pourtant souhaitable qu'elle soit complétée par une deuxième classification par ordre des matières traitées: littéraires, juridiques, médicaux etc. Par ailleurs le présent ouvrage est d'un intérêt certain pour l'étude des relations du monde grec avec les principautés roumaines à l'époque en question. Une première lecture pourrait en témoigner: manuels de grammaire, dictionnaires, anthologies, textes littéraires, classiques ou religieux, traductions en roumain, des œuvres de la littérature neohellénique. Le mérite de cet ouvrage nous fait espérer la parution prochaine des volumes suivants.

Institut d'Etudes Balkaniques

ATH. E. KARATHANASSIS

Michael B. Petrovich, *A history of modern Serbia, 1804-1918*, New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1976.

Michael Boro Petrovich's exhaustive narrative of the frenetic and complicated history of the Second Serbian Kingdom is as laden with facts as the chests of the Kingdom's rulers were with medals, and, as with the military decorations, the result is an effect that is both splendid and cluttered. The two-volume work, sponsored by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, is said to be the most thorough chronicle of the short-lived Balkan republic in any language, and it is difficult to imagine one more so. Every battle and border skirmish, every change of government, the details of every new constitution (seven in 102 years) as well as every facet of the countless political intrigues, any one of which makes Watergate look simple by comparison, are related, along with long intermittent sections on the cultural and economic affairs of Serbia, not to mention its complicated position in world politics.

Although a comprehensive approach may have been necessary to tell the story of a country in an almost impossible situation, that of a province of the Ottoman empire that, through a series of revolutions, wars, and political machinations, became the first autonomous — and later, the first independent — state on the Balkan peninsula, later to become the focus of the international posturing among the European Powers that culminated in the First World War, Petrovich's work may prove too long and convoluted for the casual reader. Also, his writing style, while admittedly tested to the extreme, grows monotonous, particularly in the thick of the political developments. Petrovich sticks almost exclusively to straight narrative,

and only occasionally uses other historical writing techniques such as the reconstruction of conversations, making his book difficult to read straight through. As a reference work, or for someone deeply interested in Serbian history and culture, however, the book is quite useful and abundant.

Petrovich, an American of Serbian descent, writes from a Serbian viewpoint. One can feel his distaste for Serbia's Ottoman oppressors, his delight in Serbia's establishment as a separate principality after the Congress of Berlin in 1878, his rage at Austria-Hungary's arrogant commercial ploys and ultimata toward Serbia just prior to World War One, and his slight tinge of regret as he tells of Serbia's loss of national identity as it became part of the new Yugoslav state in 1918. While such a viewpoint does color his interpretation (one wonders what a history of Serbia by a Russian or Austrian writer would be like), it does provide him with a focal point that saves the book from becoming sterile.

Petrovich sets the stage for Serbia's modern emergence in his first chapter, describing the medieval state of Serbia, which broke from the Byzantine Empire, then in its early stages of decay, in 1180. Under its most renowned ruler of this period, Stephan Dušan, Serbia conquered lands from Bosnia to Greece, and from the Adriatic to the Aegean seas. After his death, however, this healthy empire disintegrated, and became fair game for the expanding Ottoman Empire. Fierce battles took place between these two proud and utterly different peoples — the Serbians and the Turks — the bloodiest of which was the famous Battle of Kosovo in 1389. The ignominy of this defeat and the subsequent Ottoman rule was kept in Serbian memory for over four hundred years through the Serbs' strong tradition of epic poetry. The memory of this event served as a stimulant to later Serbian nationalistic movements.

Under Ottoman rule the Serbs were kept under a reactionary Muslim government, in a barbarous form of militaristic feudalism. Serbia missed out on the development of mercantilism and capitalism, and all social classes, with the exception of peasants and clerics, were effectively wiped out. The Serbian church, in fact, became the one social structure that was genuinely Serbian, and it was the church that helped to keep nationalistic feelings alive. Also, the Serbs did have their own form of local government in the *zadruga*, or rural cooperative village.

In the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, Serbia's position vis-à-vis the Ottoman Empire improved as Turkey was weakened by wars with the Austrians. One outcome of the decay of the Ottoman Empire was the increasing independence of the imperial cavalry, or the janissaries. As the janissaries became harder for the Porte, as the Ottoman government was called, to control, they confiscated the lands of the Serbian peasants and extorted rents in addition to what the Serbs were paying their feudal lords, or *sipahis*. The janissaries called their expropriated lands *çifliks*, and they were another source of rage on the part of the Serbian peasants. The Ottomans, in a fateful attempt to control their once crack soldiers, sponsored a Serbian army to help control the janissaries, but Napoleon's Eastern European campaigns frightened Sultan Selim III who made peace with the janissary leader Pasvant-Oğlu. Serbian discontent grew quickly, and, in response to a bloody purge by the janissaries of suspected revolutionaries, the Serbian people revolted against janissary rule in February of 1804. The leader of the revolt was Karadjordje Petrović, who was to become Serbia's first member of one of its two rival dynasties.

After the Serbs defeated the janissaries, Karadjordje turned his attention to «throwing off the yoke that the Serb has borne since Kossovo». Russia declared war on the Porte in 1807 and this brought about the Russo-Serbian alliance. Petrovich shows his disillusionment with the ambiguity of Russian foreign policy when he writes of the Russian sellout of Serbia in the truce between Russia and the Porte, in which Russian promises for Serbian independence was forgotten. He seems rather unforgiving to the Russians in view of the fact that their position was forced on them by Napoleon.

Karadjordje then turned to Austria, which offered help on the condition that Serbia be annexed to it, a plan that was later dismissed at the Conference of Erfurt. The power play between Austria and Russia for dominance in the Balkans in general and Serbia in particular is one of the themes of Serbian history.

Another theme is the perpetual struggle for power between Karadjordje and his successor princes and kings and those who wanted a more constitutional form of government. Under Karadjordje, the government was extremely autocratic — it consisted of the supreme leader (Karadjordje), a cabinet, and a supreme court, both of which were puppets of the supreme leader. Although he admires Karadjordje, Petrovich, to his credit, consistently sides with Karadjordje's constitutionalist opponents and their counterparts in successive generations.

The First Serbian Insurrection was only temporarily successful, as the Ottomans regained the land they lost. Karadjordje escaped to Austria, and the Turks exacted their revenge cruelly. In 1815, the second Serbian Insurrection began under the leadership of Miloš Obrenović, who was later to become Serbia's first prince and leader of Serbia's other dynasty.

Petrovich has an ambivalent attitude toward Miloš. On the one hand, he describes him as autocratic, and there is much evidence of this in his ruthless punishments and duplicitous maneuverings, not only among the members of his own government and opposition, but in his dealings with the Great Powers. Yet he gives him credit for helping Serbia along to a modernized economy, with a growing merchant class, of which Miloš was a member. Also, Miloš is given credit for agrarian reform, including a free land tenure system.

To make yet another of Serbia's long stories short, the Second Insurrection was a limited success, and Miloš was able to proclaim himself prince of Serbia, and in 1829, after another Russo-Turkish War, the Treaty of Adrianople granted Serbia her autonomy within the Ottoman Empire. Miloš, who had no scruples in this regard, bribed the Ottomans to make him hereditary prince. All Muslims except military personnel were made to leave, and Serbia was awarded six districts it had lost after the first Insurrection. Other concessions, such as the right of Miloš to maintain his own army, were granted. In 1831 the Serbian church, heretofore under Ottoman-appointed Greek domination, was granted autonomy.

An 1834 plot against Miloš's life by Mileta Radojković and others precipitated a constitutional crisis. In early 1835, Miloš presented a new constitution to an assembly of his deputies. This «Presentation Constitution» gave more power to the Council, and provided for a popularly elected Assembly, which had only dummy powers. Party lines were drawn between supporters of Miloš and the Constitutionalists. Miloš himself revoked the constitution shortly after he presented it.

In 1838, the Ottomans, with the complicity of Miloš's opponents, proclaimed what was to be known as the «Turkish Constitution», in which a new council was

formed, no member of which could be dismissed without proof, satisfactory to the Porte, of his having committed a crime against the laws of the land.

Despondent, his power thwarted, Miloš made a feeble attempt to avoid abdication by crossing over to Zemun, in Austria, on the pretext of seeing his son. Members of the Council and others demanded he return or be deposed and Miloš, the same man who had ordered the exiled Karadjordje decapitated and sent to the Porte for the Sultan's pleasure, meekly returned to Serbia and abdicated, in favor of his eldest son Milan.

The sickly Milan died 26 days after assuming the throne, and Miloš's sixteen-year-old son Michael took over. The poor lad had to contend with not only the opposition Constitutionalists, but the supporters of his own father, who also opposed him. In 1842 Toma Vučić-Perišić, backed by between three and four thousand armed Constitutionalist sympathizers, marched on the town of Kragujevac. Prince Michael, in order to avoid bloodshed, ordered his troops to retreat and tried to negotiate, but to no avail. Vučić's forces were victorious, and Michael fled to the Austrian town of Zemun.

Not daring to rule the peasant people of Serbia without an identifiable figurehead, the Constitutional clique, who had assumed control of the council years before, chose Alexander Karadjordjević, son of Karadjordje, to succeed Michael. An electoral assembly, despite pressure from Russia, voted unanimously for Karadjordjević. Deposed prince Miloš plotted against the Karadjordjević regime constantly, even going to the extent of sponsoring a rebellion by a handful of his sympathizers dressed in Austrian hussars! Miloš hoped to have the insurrection blamed on the Austrians.

It was during the reign of Alexander that Serbia's expansionist policies first began to germinate. There was some clamoring among the intelligentsia for a Pan-Slavic state, an idea 75 years ahead of its time, but it was Minister of the Interior Garašanin's idea of a greater Serbia that finally took hold. The idea of a sort of Pan-Serbianism also took hold, as many Serbs volunteered to join the Serbs fighting against Hungary in the revolution of 1848. The issue of whether to side with Russia or Austria was hotly debated. Prince Alexander favored Austria and Vučić was a Russophile. There were even advocates for alliances with France and the Porte!

During the sixteen years of Alexander's reign, there was a constitutional tug-of-war between the prince, who wanted more absolute power, and the Council, who wanted a hand in administration as well as legislation. The upshot of all this maneuvering was the St. Andrew Assembly, called on the urging of the Constitutionalists in 1858. So-called because it took place on November 30, St. Andrew's Day, the Assembly was also anticipated by supporters of the Obrenović family and by the young intelligentsia. Alexander was presented with a demand to resign by the Assembly. He asked to be given 24 hours to formulate his answer, and this was granted. Later that day, he was shocked to see an armed guard of several thousand march on his palace. At that same moment, Garašanin arrived with a carriage at the back entrance which the prince boarded and rode to the safety of the Turkish pasha. It was later speculated that Garašanin had engineered the demonstration and escape. On December 28, 1858, Miloš Obrenović was — again — proclaimed prince of Serbia. This was due to less a desire for return to his rule than a desire for a unifying force. This pattern repeats itself in Serbian history.

Miloš, while retaining his old dictatorial ways, spent most of his second term

playing the Liberals and Conservatives, as the two new political parties were called, against each other. Miloš did, however, purge the evergrowing bureaucracy of corrupt officials, as well as ingratiate himself with the peasantry in other ways. Miloš died of natural causes in 1860 and his son, Michael, became prince, again for the second time. It was the first orderly transfer of power in Serbia's history.

Michael's reign was characterized by an emphasis on war with the Porte and the creation of a South Slav state. He pushed to ratification two laws that gave him virtual control over the government, making the Council and the Assembly rubber-stamp bodies. This was ostensibly to give him room to maneuver for his proposed campaigns. These never occurred. He did, however, negotiate the removal of Turkish garrisons from Serbian soil, and set up the Balkan alliance system with Greece, Romania, and Montenegro. His domestic policies, however, were so repressive that he quickly became unpopular. Prince Michael was assassinated in 1868 by Pavle Radonavić, in an unsuccessful coup.

Miloš's grandnephew, Milan Obrenović, was installed in office after a military coup by Milivoje Blaznavac, the minister of war. In 1869, yet another constitution, this one giving more power to the assembly and granting such reforms as trial by jury, was put in effect. This constitution was the first for Serbia without any Turkish interference.

The efforts that the Serbs put into fighting the Serbo-Turkish wars of 1876-1878 were rewarded in the Treaty of San Stefano, in which Serbia became an independent principality, although the huge amount of territory granted Bulgaria caused great bitterness among the Serbian people.

After a shaky start in independence economically, Serbia and Austria-Hungary signed the Trade Treaty of 1881, an agreement that made Serbia a virtual economic vassal of Austria-Hungary. However, Serbia needed the quick capital that Austria-Hungary had to offer.

A Major blow to Serbian prestige was their defeat in the Serbo-Bulgarian War. An unpopular war, undertaken after the Bulgarian annexation of Eastern Rumelia it could be called a textbook example of overreaching. Serbia's defeat, severe domestic opposition, especially from the new Radical party, and the desire for a divorce from his meddling wife Natalia caused the 35-year-old King (for Serbia was now a kingdom) Milan to abdicate in 1889.

Milan's son Alexander took the throne, commencing a new government, this time made from the Radical party, under *yet another* constitution! This one offered secret elections for the first time in Serbia's history.

Petrovich goes into the details of Milan and Natalia's interference with the regime a bit too much for my taste, but admittedly they did try to steer the course of his reign to fit their desires. Apparently Alexander eventually got fed up, for in his inauguration of the Djordjević cabinet in 1897 (Serbia's thirteenth government in eight years) he vowed to put an end to «(this) fruitless political partisan struggle». This speech marks the beginning of what is called the personal regime of King Alexander.

In 1901 still another constitution, this one urged on by Russia, who wanted to have more power in the Radical-laden assembly, was adopted. The «April Constitution» allowed for a bicameral legislature, with an appointed and elected senate along with the assembly.

In the midst of severe economic troubles with Austria, which were to event-

ually culminate in the «Pig War» of Tarriffs, King Alexander and his wife Draga were gunned down in their bedroom by several junior army officers, who feared that the childless royal couple would be succeeded by one of Draga's hated younger brothers. Alexander was the last of the Obrenović dynasty.

The last chapter, by far the most interesting, delves into the question of World War One and the extent of Serbia's role in causing it. Petrovich absolves the Serbian government but does admit complicity on the part of various members of Serbian military.

The book would have been easier to read if it had been pruned, although its volunimity could be a boon to some. The illustrations are clear and well-chosen, but there are altogether too few maps to illustrate the complex territorial gains, losses and quests of the hardy Serbian people, who are remarkable not so much for having created the kingdom of Serbia but for having survived it.

JOSEPH K. SAURIS

Δοκανάρη Ν. Στ., *‘Ο Βορειοηπειρώτης αγωνιστής Κωνσταντίνος Παλάσκας, σελ. 62, ‘Ιωάννινα 1980.*

Παπαδοπούλου Γ. Χ., *‘Η εθνική ελληνική μειονότητα εις τήν ‘Αλβανίαν καί τὸ σχολικόν αὐτῆς ζήτημα (ιστορικὸν ἀρχεῖον 1921-79), σελ. 296, ‘Ιωάννινα 1981.*

Τζιόβα Π. Δ., *Γερβάσιος ‘Ωρολόγας, Μητροπολίτης Κορυτσᾶς Βορείου ‘Ηπείρου, σελ. 156, ‘Ιωάννινα 1980.*

These three volumes have been published by the Institute of North Epirus Research, Ioannina, which has started the publication of the results of research carried out in 1976. Its aim is to investigate all aspects of the life, of the activity and of the civilisation of the approximately 200.000 Greeks living in Northern Epirus. The latter has been incorporated in Albania by a decision of the great European Powers of 1914 confirmed in 1921 despite its liberation by the Greek Army and despite the supremacy of the Greek element which unanimously favoured the union with Greece.

The book of Mr. Dokanaris deals with the life and the activity of Constantine Palaskas who served his country from early youth to death wherever and whenever this was possible.

The book of Mr. G. Ch. Papadopoulos, a retired official of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who has served in Northern Epirus before 1939, is very useful because it includes all documents dealing with Northern Epirus and adds some statistical data, both with the appropriate comments. He proves on the basis of official documents and data how little Albania complied with the obligations assumed towards minorities by international treaties, to the decisions of the International Law Court of the Hague and to the recommendations of the League of Nations and how little the European Great Powers were justified in incorporating a nearly 70% Greek area in a foreign country.

The book of Mr. Tziovas deals with the activity of a very efficient Greek churchman Gervasios Orologas. He was 1895-1900 and 1902 bishop of Koritsa and 1900-16 bishop of Ioannina. The analysis of his successful activity and of the conditions

prevailing under Ottoman domination until 1912 in these two provinces which the Patriarch of Constantinople entrusted him gives a picture of the possibilities of the Greek prelates when able and when dedicated to their duty and of the vitality of the Greek communities despite tremendous difficulties created by the Ottoman authorities and by the propaganda of foreign powers pursuing imperialistic aims and not deprived of the appropriate financial means.

Northern Epirus was freed three times 1913, 1918 and 1940 by the Greek Army but the latter has always been obliged to withdraw in the two first cases on the order of the Greek Government which had to comply with the decisions of the Great European Powers and in the third owing to the evolution of World War II in the Balkans. Despite these very unfavourable developments the Greek spirit survives in the area involved.

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D. J. DELIVANIS

N. Todorov, *La ville balkanique aux XV-XIXes siècles. Développement socio-économique et démographique*. Bulletins No XV-XVI des années 1977-78 de l'Association Internationale des Etudes du Sud Est Européen, pp. 1-495.

Il s'agit d'un ouvrage digne de mention dont la publication dans les Bulletins en rubrique a été très utile. On serait tenté de relever que les villes bulgares y jouissent d'un traitement privilégié mais les autres villes balkaniques ne sont pas complètement oubliées. L'étude de la question n'était pas aisée faute d'informations et de données statistiques suffisantes. On obtient une idée de l'insuffisance de ces dernières si on note que le premier recensement de la population a été effectué dans l'Empire Ottoman en 1831. L'auteur a essayé et est parvenu à donner une synthèse satisfaisante de la matière traitée et a pu incorporer dans son texte toutes les données statistiques qu'il a pu réunir tout en admettant qu'elles sont souvent incomplètes, qu'elles ne facilitent guère les comparaisons et qu'en ce qui concerne l'importance de l'élément hellénique elles essaient de la diminuer. Aussi en ce qui concerne les données en termes monétaires l'auteur les indique en akçe et en piastres sans donner des explications sur ces unités monétaires, sur leur évolution du point de vue de leur pouvoir d'achat et du point de vue de leur valeur en or ou en devises, enfin sur leur relation avec la livre turque. Par contre il fait une classification des revenus et de la valeur des propriétés urbaines et rurales ce qui permet au lecteur de concevoir les relations entre eux.

En étudiant les actions et les omissions du gouvernement ottoman on constate combien l'histoire se répète. En effet l'auteur se réfère à l'expulsion de la population hellénique de Constantinople en 1453 et à son remplacement non seulement par des Turcs venus d'Asie Mineure mais aussi par des Grecs attirés d'autres régions. L'auteur attribue cette action au désir de maintenir une population hellénique à Constantinople, mais on se demande alors dans quel but ceux qui y étaient établis en 1453 ont été forcés de partir. Il semble que la réponse est similaire à celle qu'on aurait donnée en essayant d'expliquer l'expulsion quasi totale des habitants de Pnom Penh, il y a quelques années, et des nombreux bourgeois de Budapest dans les premières années qui ont suivi l'établissement en Hongrie d'un

gouvernement communiste. L'auteur relève aussi la migration massive de Turcs dans les provinces européennes de l'Empire, comme fait de nos jours la Turquie dans le Nord de Chypre. L'auteur s'occupe beaucoup de la tendance systématique du gouvernement ottoman à réglementer l'activité économique en général et les prix en particulier sans néanmoins s'étendre sur l'importance des abus des fonctionnaires, d'autant plus qu'ils sévissaient contre les ressortissants des nations soumises, la non application des décisions administratives et l'importance des transactions du marché noir. L'auteur relève l'importance dans l'Empire Ottoman des corporations et de leur soutien par l'administration, sans néanmoins relever les abus que soit seules, soit en collaboration avec l'administration elles faisaient aux dépens de leurs membres et des clients de ces derniers. Il ne semble pas que l'auteur ait raison en constatant qu'il y ait eu développement économique digne de mention dans les provinces européennes de l'Empire Ottoman aux XVII-XVIII^{es} siècles. Il se base sur l'augmentation des créances et des disponibilités dans les inventaires dressés après la mort de plusieurs Musulmans, mais il semble oublier la contribution à ce sujet de l'inflation presque permanente dans l'Empire Ottoman. Par contre il explique très bien pourquoi les investissements industriels n'étaient ni populaires ni indiqués dans l'Empire Ottoman. En exposant les charges fiscales des habitants de ce dernier l'auteur crée l'impression que l'administration fiscale y était satisfaisante, ou au moins correcte, ce qui ne semble pas avoir été le cas. Il est très intéressant que les migrations à l'intérieur de l'Empire et entre les professions étaient importantes et que Thessaloniki en attirait beaucoup, comme il arrive aussi de nos jours, que la polygamie était relativement rare parmi les Musulmans et que 81% des familles n'avaient que 1-3 enfants, enfin que beaucoup d'agriculteurs provenaient des villes ce qui confirme l'auteur dans son opinion que ces dernières servaient de lieu de transit épongeant les surplus de la main d'œuvre rurale. La non participation des Musulmans dans le développement économique est fort justement remarquée. Je me demande pourquoi il en serait autrement puisqu'ils pouvaient s'attribuer tout ce qui appartenait aux ressortissants des nations soumises au joug ottoman.

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D. J. DELIVANIS

John O. Iatrides, editor, *Ambassador MacVeagh Reports: Greece, 1933-1947*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980, pp. 757.

Ambassador MacVeagh Reports: Greece, 1933-1947, edited by John O. Iatrides, is an invaluable contribution to the literature dealing with Greece's recent history and more specifically with the subject of Greek American relations. This large volume of nearly 800 pages is a painstaking work of synthesis by John Iatrides' fine editorial hand working on Lincoln MacVeagh's colorful and insightful descriptions of events in Greece where MacVeagh spent the most fruitful ten years of his interesting diplomatic career.

The editor has processed a voluminous assortment of MacVeagh's intimate wartime diaries, hundreds of diplomatic reports and other documents prepared by the prolific and cultured American ambassador, and about seventy well-balanc-

ed letter summaries written by MacVeagh to President Franklin D. Roosevelt. In Iatrides' words, his primary aim as an editor was to «preserve in its original form source material, and to help capture the psychological climate of the times».

MacVeagh's diplomatic career included posts in countries such as Iceland, South Africa and Portugal. But, Iatrides, as the book's title indicates, focused mainly on materials dealing with Greece. As a result, diary entries during the relatively brief wartime periods MacVeagh spent as ambassador to Iceland and then to South Africa are digested and summarized by Iatrides. The story ends in 1947 with MacVeagh's transfer from Greece to his next post in Portugal.

In reading this volume one quickly realizes that Iatrides' contribution well exceeded the standard expectations of pure editorial duties. The editor did much more than sort, logically organize, select and present in meaningful sequence the most relevant passages from MacVeagh's work. Rather, Iatrides composed well over 100 pages of introductory, transitional and concluding essays which have added a sense of coherence and continuity to the raw data. In addition, he provided a very large number of carefully researched reference footnotes containing useful back-ground and explanatory information on numerous personalities, places, acronyms, organizations and events that parade through the colorful pages of this flawlessly edited work.

The volume should attract audiences from a variety of disciplines and orientations including those focusing on diplomacy, negotiations, U.S. foreign policy, and Greek politics and foreign policy. The students of these orientations will find in MacVeagh a wealth of insights into the life, style, trials and tribulations of a very able ambassador. The intimate diary entries for example, shed light into the frustrations of a hard working diplomat who is often left uninstructed by his home office for long weeks, especially in the mid and late 1930's when the role of the U.S. in Greece was that of a sympathetic observer with commercial and humanitarian interests, while Britain was fulfilling the role of the primary external interventionary power.

In reading this volume one constantly shares in a number of MacVeagh's professional disappointments: His yearning for a more «important» assignment, especially in Turkey, which MacVeagh considered a more challenging post than Greece; his impatience with the «bureaucrats» back in Washington who were insensitive to the human needs and expectations of those serving them abroad; his steadily growing self-perception of marginality given that FDR (MacVeagh's hero figure) apparently had no time to prepare substantive responses to his devoted ambassador's long and information-packed personal letters.

MacVeagh's professional diplomatic style — which eventually cost him his job in Greece* — is obvious throughout the narrative. In effect, the ambassador's belief was that a good diplomat should know intimately the host country, its people,

* MacVeagh's duties in Athens were terminated following a serious disagreement with Dwight Griswold, chief of U.S. Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG). Griswold, contrary to MacVeagh, believed in less disguised and more direct intervention in Greek politics. The Truman administration «sacrificed» MacVeagh in order to keep the republican ex-governor of Nebraska busy in Athens and out of U.S. national politics in the 1948 elections.

language, history and traditions. If he represented a major power in a smaller state, he should possess qualities of sensitivity and balance to create the appearance at least of respecting the sovereignty and independence of the local leaders. Reading through MacVeagh's diary entries, one realizes that the British-in the ambassador's view-violated this principle with impunity in the 1930's as well as during the war years and immediately after Greece's liberation. Eventually, when the U.S. inherited the British role in Greece, after the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine, MacVeagh realized that his own country's treatment of Greece was neither more subtle nor more responsive than that of their predecessors.

Reviewing the substance of MacVeagh's voluminous writings, this writer discerned two major themes emerging from the historical narrative: The first theme is that Greece of the 1930's reflected the traumatic experiences of a small, weak and strategically located country for which the busy (strategically and globally oriented) leaders of great powers had little time to spare. Rather, they tended to view it as a valuable piece of real-estate to be conveniently «secured» without much patience or concern for local conditions and political realities. Thus, the fate of Greece became sealed by distant, impersonal forces that were pulling the strings of history. Characteristically, the ambassador viewed the descent of Greece into the cauldron of World War II as «inevitable» given the geopolitical realities of the time. MacVeagh argues convincingly that after Czechoslovakia's collapse and Italy's occupation of Albania, Greece realized that «...its head now is right in the jaws of the advancing axis powers while its feet dangle in the Mediterranean where Britain is still powerful. Isn't this being between the devil and the deep blue sea with a vengeance?» (p. 158). In short, given the great magnitude of Metaxas' political dependence on Britain, MacVeagh suggests that the Greek dictator had no available option of remaining neutral during the second World War. In Metaxas' own words to MacVeagh, «... Greece will make no move in foreign affairs without England's approval» (p. 166).

The second major theme relates to the origins of the Greek civil war (1943-1949). The reader once again notices the pattern of tragic inevitability. MacVeagh in hundreds of pages suggests that the civil conflict in Greece was in large part the product of a number of sins of omission and commission by Great Powers and Greek politicians alike. There were five major factors accounting for the Greek tragedy of the late 1940's as far as MacVeagh was concerned: The first was Winston Churchill's (strongly backed by FDR) bullheaded support for the restoration of an unpopular monarch (King George II of Greece). This blunt instrument policy contributed to political polarization in occupied Greece and strengthened the anti-monarchist left at the expense of centrist and republican elements. A second factor was the British inability or unwillingness to land credible expeditionary forces in Athens in October 1944. This provided a highly misleading signal which tempted the well organized EAM/ELAS forces to seek a military solution to the Greek question. A third factor was the abysmally inadequate AngloAmerican response in supplying foodstuffs to the war-starved Greeks shortly after the liberation, and the grossly ineffective support for the post-war Greek governments' lame efforts to resuscitate the war ravaged economy. Predictably, economic conditions were maintained at a level of despair which contributed to chaos and revolution. The fourth factor was the low quality of Greek leadership — politicians left and right of the spectrum, the military and the King. Invariably, according to MacVeagh,

they systematically managed to put their short-term power calculations over the requirements of compromise and national unity. If one were to add to all this the fifth factor, a heavy dose of mutual misperceptions of the Soviets, British and Americans in post-war Greece, one has completed a ready-made recipe for the Greek civil war.

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THEODORE A. COULOUMBIS

Brenda L. Marder, *Stewards of the Land, the American Farm School and Modern Greece*, Boulder, Colorado, *Eastern European Quarterly*, 1979, pp. XI+284.

In the checkered history of American involvement in Greece one of the proudest chapters is the accomplishments of American educators. Motivated by religious, humanitarian and pedagogical impulses, they founded private schools in the early years of the present century which flourished and exerted extraordinary influence upon Greek society. The subject work tells the story of the founding and early development of one of these remarkable institutions, the American Farm School, officially the Thessaloniki Agricultural and Industrial Institute.

There are various ways to tackle the history of an institution. The authoress has chosen to trace the founding and development of the American Farm School within the context of the dramatic political events which convulsed Greek Macedonia during the first half of the twentieth century. This approach has the merit of introducing the layman reader to the political history of this troubled region, a history which repeatedly impinged upon the Farm School. Within this carefully limned setting the work seeks to explain how its special spirit and sense of mission enabled the school not only to survive the conflicts which wracked this region throughout the Balkan Wars, two World Wars and the Greek civil war, but to become a haven for afflicted Greeks and an inspiration to both ministered and ministering. Founded in 1904 on unpromising land near the city of Thessaloniki and initially housing ten orphaned boys in a single makeshift building, the school grew to become one of the most respected vocational academies in Greece.

The special ethos of the Farm School is attributed to the religious devotion, humanistic principles and extraordinary energy of its first two directors and their wives, the founder, Protestant missionary John Henry House and Susan Adeline House; and House's son and successor, Charles Lucius House, who with his wife, Ann Kellogg House, led the school from 1929 to 1955. Not only did these dedicated individuals establish and nourish an experimental school unlike anything which had existed in Greece, but they succeeded also in infecting with their enthusiasm and sense of mission their Greek colleagues and students. Consequently, the school's unique ethos passed from being a foreign innovation to take firm root as a revered Greek-American achievement. One factor accounting for the survival and success of the school was its leaders' scrupulous avoidance of political attachments in a highly politicized environment. Aside from political pitfalls, they had to contend also with material deprivation, indigenous diseases such as malaria and dependence upon funding from private sources in the United States which became especially uncertain during the depression of the 1930's. The House women played indispensable roles in the Farm School drama, sharing the responsibilities

of leadership and creating a warm domestic environment for students and staff.

It was the ingenious concept of the founder that a school informed by Christian ideals of brotherhood and service should face the problems of an impoverished land by training students in modern agricultural techniques and community leadership. This close interplay between religious faith and practical objectives formed a constant theme in the life and work of the House family. Over the years, the evangelistic fervor of the founder gave way to the more humanistic orientation of his son, corresponding also to changing conditions within Greece. The younger House was particularly successful in drawing able Greek colleagues and supporters to the school and in inducing them to share his deep commitment, resulting in «an ingrained pattern of behavior that was the result of forty years of conditioning». This sense of purpose enabled the school to survive World War Two and the turbulent years of civil strife in the late 1940's, including a kidnapping of forty-one boys by guerillas in 1949. The authoress closes her account at the end of that stormy period, when United States government assistance helped the school to rehabilitate its facilities. A brief epilogue relates the major developments since that time.

Brenda Marder brings admirable qualifications to this treatment of a complex and unusual institution. Long a student of Greece, she has lived and worked at the Farm School and undertook to assemble its archives, a task which led to this narrative. Her style is crisp and readable. She takes a cautious approach to such controversial questions as the Macedonian issue and the Greek civil war, since her purpose is to outline the political background of the school's development rather than to offer new historical interpretations.

The preface acknowledges that the book «tells more how the spirit of the school was forged than how it was absorbed by the students». However, one wishes that it had included some information about the school's success in meeting its goal of producing community leaders, some examples of graduates putting the Farm School creed into practice. It also seemed to this reviewer that in view of the character and purpose of this agricultural vocational school, the work might have included some discussion of the changing agriculture of northern Greece during the half century and of the Farm School's contribution to that evolution. Finally, the dimension of the organization on the other side of the Atlantic is given short shrift. Even though «Policy making and fund raising, the real power base, was vested in the American Board members», very little is said about the personalities or activities of the school's trustees.

Nevertheless the authoress has accomplished the purpose she set herself. She has told well the inspiring story of educational pioneers who brought a new type of school and new hope to the barren fields and ravaged villages of northern Greece, a school which furthermore exemplifies the finest qualities of Greeks and Americans working together for a common purpose.

Anatolia College

WILLIAM W. MCGREW

Παντελής Καβακοπούλου, *Τραγούδια της βορειοδυτικής Θράκης*. Ίδρυμα Μελετών Χερσονήσου του Αίμου, Θεσσαλονίκη, 1981.

En 1956 Pantelis Kavakopoulos publiait, en annexe au 21^e volume de l'*Ag-*

χρίον τοῦ Θρακικοῦ λαογραφικοῦ καὶ γλωσσικοῦ θησαυροῦ, et avec la collaboration de Polydoros Papachristodoulou et de Kostas Romaïos, la première grande collection de chansons thraces parue en Grèce. Ces chansons, diffusées par les studios de la Radiodiffusion hellénique, avaient été recueillies pour la plus grande part auprès des réfugiés de Thrace orientale et de Thrace du nord, la Thrace occidentale n'étant représentée que par sept chansons de l'éparchie de Soufli dans le nome d'Evros. Dans le volume que vient de publier l'Institute for Balkan Studies, ce ne sont pas moins de 145 chansons d'une autre éparchie du même nome, celle de Didymoticho, dont Pantelis Kavakopoulos nous offre la transcription. Presque toutes sont dues à un seul informateur, le chanteur Chronis Aidonidis, dont les parents, originaires de Karoti et de Vryssika, étaient venus se fixer à Athènes. On y trouve des variantes de presque toutes les chansons de Soufli qui figuraient dans le premier volume et nous aurons l'occasion de revenir sur les différences de notation qu'elles présentent.

Sur ces 145 chansons, 16 seulement (nos 122-137) sont des «chansons de table». Parmi celles-ci, trois chansons rimées — l'une (no 124) en vers de 13 syllabes, les deux autres (nos 128 et 134) en vers trochaïques de 15 syllabes — ne doivent pas être antérieures au XIX^e siècle. Toutes les autres sont en vers poltiques, et on y remarque la fréquence des strophes englobant deux vers et non pas un vers et demi comme c'est le cas dans la plupart des chansons de table de Grèce continentale et des manuscrits athonites du XVII^e siècle. Le fait que la chanson: 'Εγὼ 'μαὶ ὄρφα-νὸ πικρὸν présentait, dans le recueil de 1956 (no 7, de Saranda Ekklisies), la strophe habituelle d'un vers et demi et qu'elle passe, dans le recueil de 1981, à la strophe de deux vers suggère l'hypothèse qu'il pourrait s'agir d'un développement de date relativement récente et propre peut-être à la chanson de Thrace.

Dans leur grande majorité les chansons du recueil sont donc des chansons de danse et, comme le note P. Kavakopoulos (p. 9), un assez grand nombre s'apparentent à des chansons de Thrace orientale, des côtes d'Asie mineure et des grandes îles de l'Égée. C'est le cas des *syrti* (nos 65-84), des *syrti-hassapika* (nos 85-100), des *hassapika* (nos 101-105) et des *antikrista* ou *karsilamades* (nos 117-119). On ne considérera pas non plus comme proprement thraces les rares chansons qui présentent le rythme du *syrtos kalamatianos* (nos 138-140).

Restent les *synkathista*, les *mandilata* et les *zonaradika*. Les *mandilata* (danses du mouchoir) sont des danses à trois temps inégaux comme le *kalamatianos*, mais où le temps long n'est pas le premier mais le troisième. Ainsi que l'indique l'auteur (p. 35), le *mandilatos* ne porte des paroles chantées que lorsque son tempo est relativement lent; dans ce cas, les sept unités qui constituent la mesure (2+2+3) sont encore nettement perçues. Le *mandilatos* instrumental est beaucoup plus animé. Sur les enregistrements dont je dispose, dans une mesure notée à 7/8 (♩ ♪ ♪.), l'indication métronomique est: ♩ = 320 lorsque la mélodie comporte des paroles alors qu'elle est: ♩ = 420 pour le *mandilatos* instrumental. C'est sans doute une faute d'impression que l'indication: ♩ = 208 dans les *mandilata* instrumentaux transcrits par Kavakopoulos (nos 144-145); il faut lire: ♩ = 208, qui correspondrait à: ♩ = 416. Il s'agit d'un rythme propre à la Grèce du nord et particulièrement répandu en Bulgarie (*rdtchenitsa*) et dans la Roumanie méridionale et orientale¹.


1. Nicolae Radulescu, «Chorelos alogos» (Ἑπετ. τοῦ ΚΕΕΑ 20-21 (1969), p. 171-182), p. 172.

Le *syrtos synkathistos* a également une mesure à temps inégaux, mais à 4 temps dont le dernier est allongé. Beaucoup plus rapide que l'*antikristos*, lui aussi à 4 temps inégaux, il ne comporte jamais plus de quatre syllabes par mesure, alors que les exemples d'*antikristos* notés par Kavakopoulos en présentent jusqu'à sept ou huit. Ici encore (nos 106-116) les indications métronomiques devraient être contrôlées; sur l'enregistrement que je possède du *synkathistos* «Μὲ γέλασαν τὰ πουλιά, tout à fait semblable à celui qu'a transcrit Kavakopoulos (no 114), le tempo d'une mesure à 9/8 (♩ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪.) est de: ♩ = 300 et non pas: ♩ = 162.

La danse la plus abondamment représentée dans le recueil (nos 1-64) est le *zonaradikos*, la danse «de la ceinture», qui doit son nom au fait que le danseur tient ses voisins de gauche et de droite par leur ceinture (*zonari*). Cette tenue, inhabituelle dans le reste de la Grèce — où, lorsqu'ils entrecroisent leurs bras, les danseurs saisissent les mains non de leurs voisins immédiats mais des danseurs suivants — est très fréquente en Bulgarie² et en Roumanie dans les *brîul* (*brîu* = ceinture)³. «Le *zonaradikos* est la danse nationale des Thraces comme l'est pour les Grecs de l'ancien Royaume le *kalamatianos*» (Kavakopoulos, p. 18). L'auteur en donne les pas ainsi qu'il a soin de le faire pour toutes les danses du recueil. La période chorégraphique est de trois mesures binaires, les pas principaux marquant le rythme: 2/4 ♩ ♩ ♩ | ♩ ♩ ♩ | disposition commune à quantités de danses en chaîne, tant grecques⁴ qu'étrangères, à commencer par le «branle simple» décrit dans l'*Orchésographie* de Thoinot Arbeau (1588). Dans son recueil de 1956, Kavakopoulos, transcrivant des mélodies de *zonaradikos*, avait réuni deux mesures en une seule; lorsque la période «musicale» comporte un nombre pair de mesures, c'est effectivement ainsi qu'elle est perçue instinctivement par l'auditeur. Lorsque en 1959 ou 1960 (Kavakopoulos, p. 11-12) l'auteur eut l'occasion de voir danser le *zonaradikos* à Karoti, le village natal du père de Chronis Aidonidis, il se rendit compte que sa notation était incompatible avec la période «chorégraphique», qui se trouvait débiter alternativement sur le premier et sur le second temps de la mesure;



A juste titre, il décida alors d'adopter la notation:



Cette notation avait en outre l'avantage de faciliter la transcription des périodes musicales lorsque celles-ci auraient comporté, avec le premier système de notation, un nombre impair de temps, ce qui est le cas dans plusieurs mélodies de *zonaradika*.

A Karoti, en même temps qu'il, a vu le *zonaradikos* dansé par les villageois, l'auteur l'a entendu joué sur l'*outi* par Karyophillis Doitsidis. Celui-ci, pour donner plus de vivacité à son accompagnement, au lieu de se borner à deux battements par temps, avait adopté le rythme: 6/8 ♩ ♩ ♩ | ♩ ♩ ♩ |

2. Raina Katzarova-Kukudova et Kiril Djenev, *Bulgarian folk dances*², Ann. Arbor, 1976, p. 83.

3. Tiberiu Alexandru, *Romanian folk music*, Bucarest, 1980, p. 77.

4. Π. Φορμύζης, «Τὸ ἔργο τοῦ Ἀργ. Ν. Ἀνδρεόπουλου» (*Διογραφία* t. X, p. 503-513).

(Kavakopoulos, p. 20). Dans sa conviction que «des instruments de musique populaires sont toujours le guide qui entraîne les chanteurs populaires à une exécution rythmique correcte de la mélodie» (*ibid.*, p. 11), Kavakopoulos entreprit donc de récrire à 6/8 tous les zonaradika qu'il avait jusqu'alors notés en mesure binaire.


Un exemple fera mieux comprendre de quelle manière il a procédé. L'une des chansons communes aux deux recueils de 1956 et de 1981 est celle qui a pour paroles :

Ποιά θάλασσα, ποιός ποταμός, ποιά βρύση δὲ θολώνει;
Ποιά πεθερά, ποιός πεθερός, ποιά νόφη δὲ μαλώνει;


Dans le recueil de 1956 (no 67, p. 116) elle est notée⁵ :



et dans celui de 1981 (no 48, p. 115) :



Il se trouve que la chanson figure sur une cassette anonyme que j'ai achetée en Thrace et qui doit être un démarquage de disques d'Aïdonidis et de Doitsidis. Les instrumentistes jouent effectivement à 6/8 une sorte de tarentelle, mais le chanteur reste fidèle au rythme binaire :



On regrettera donc que l'auteur ait cru devoir «normaliser» conformément à une interprétation instrumentale des chansons qui, à l'origine, étaient essentiellement vocales.

Quant au fait que, le plus souvent, comme c'est le cas ici, il n'y ait pas concordance entre la période musicale, obéissant à la «carrure» (phrases de 4, 8, 16 mesures), et la période chorégraphique, de trois mesures, il n'appelle, lui non plus, aucune normalisation. Le phénomène est extrêmement fréquent et n'est pas ressenti comme un inconvénient par les chanteurs-danseurs. Même s'ils ont peut-être conscience que la mélodie n'est pas exactement celle qui convient à la danse, ils se bornent à constater, comme les paysans bulgares cités par Raina Katzarova⁶, qu'il ne s'agit que de «danser un ancien *horo* sur une nouvelle mélodie ou de nouveaux pas sur une ancienne chanson».

Si je suis ainsi en désaccord avec l'auteur sur le rôle des instrumentistes, qu'il tient pour bénéfique, alors que trop souvent les semi-professionnels me paraissent dénaturer la chanson traditionnelle, je tiens à souligner l'intérêt exceptionnel de son ouvrage. C'est, à ma connaissance, le premier recueil qui soit consacré au répertoire d'un seul chanteur. Le classement des chansons par type de danses et, à l'intérieur de chaque section, par ordre alphabétique du premier mot des chansons est tout à fait approprié; le texte complet des chansons a été mis au point par un collaborateur du Dictionnaire historique de l'Académie d'Athènes, Nik. Kontosopoulos; un lexique donne le sens de la plupart des mots dialectaux; les pas de cha-

5. Il n'est pas tenu compte des mélismes mais uniquement de la durée totale de chacune des syllabes.

6. *op. cit.*, p. 23.

cune des danses sont indiqués aussi exactement qu'il est possible sans recourir à une sémiographie accessible aux seuls chorégraphes. Mais il suffit de comparer les photographies du *zonaradikos* dansé en plein air par des femmes de Karoti (p. 21) et en studio par un groupe folklorique (p. 180) pour saisir tout ce qui sépare une danse populaire dans sa forme originelle et ce que W. Wiora a appelé sa «seconde existence».

J'ajouterais que le livre de P. Kavakopoulos confirme une hypothèse que j'avais hasardée⁷ sur une particularité de la chanson thrace: la fréquence dans la cadence finale de la mélodie du dessin: tonique-quarte supérieure-tonique (*ré-sol-ré*). Il apparaît en effet dans 21 des 62 *zonaradika* du recueil des «Chansons de la Thrace occidentale du nord».

Genève

SAMUEL BAUD-BOVY

Τίτου Π. Γιολχάλα, Τὸ Ἑλληνο-Ἀλβανικὸν Λεξικὸν τοῦ Μάρκου Μπότσαρη, (Φιλολογικὴ ἔκδοσις ἐκ τοῦ αὐτογράφου), Ἀθῆναι 1980 (Πραγματεῖαι τῆς Ἀκαδημίας Ἀθηνῶν).

Für das Albanische als eine spät überlieferte Sprache sind Denkmäler vom Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts von großer Bedeutung für sprachhistorische und dialektologische Untersuchungen. Dies gilt in besonderer Weise auch für das Wörterverzeichnis des Μάρκος Μπότσαρης (= alb. Marko Boçari, im folgenden M.B.) von 1809, das in Dh. Shuteriqis chronologischem, Vollständigkeit anstrebendem Verzeichnis der albanischen Sprachdenkmäler — darunter auch bloße Erwähnungen und Glossen — immerhin erst die Nummer 226 einnimmt (Dh. S. Shuteriqi, *Shkrimet shqipe në vitet 1802-1850*. Tiranë 1976). Bisher war dieses in der Pariser Nationalbibliothek aufbewahrte Werk lediglich in einer für wissenschaftliche Zwecke völlig unbrauchbaren, 1926 erschienenen Ausgabe von Lumo Skendo zugänglich.

Nach einer kurzen Einleitung, einem Abkürzungsverzeichnis und einer umfangreichen Bibliographie der benutzten Schriften bietet der Herausgeber Titos Jochalas (im folgenden T.J.) einen Überblick über die neugriechisch-albanische sowie albanisch-neugriechische Lexikographie, an deren Beginn das hier publizierte Verzeichnis von M.B. steht. Besondere Erwähnung verdienen ein bisher noch unediertes, 1226 Manuskriptseiten umfassendes griechisch-albanisches Wörterbuch von Π. Κομπιτῶρης (1821-1881), das ebenfalls von T.J. zum Druck vorbereitet wird, sowie ein ebenfalls noch nicht veröffentlichtes, auf dem Fjalor i gjuhës shqipe [Wörterbuch der albanischen Sprache] (Tiranë, 1954) beruhendes Wörterbuch von Θ. Παπαδήμας (1684 handschriftliche Seiten). Doch auch zur Geschichte und präzisieren Beurteilung der bekannten albanisch-griechischen Wörterbücher von K. Kristoforidhi (K. Χριστοφορίδης, postum 1904), K. Tasi (K. Τάσης, 1928) und der griechisch-albanischen Wörterbücher von T. Νερούτσος (1896 durch G. Meyer herausgegeben), N. Τσέτσος (1959) und N. Gjini (Tirana 1971) sowie zu einigen kürzeren Glossaren bringt T.J. neue, z.T. sehr wichtige Erkenntnisse.

7. S. Baud-Bovy, «Δύο Θρακικά τραγούδια» (*Θρακικά Χρονικά* 35 (1979), p. 71-75), p. 74.

Im ersten Kapitel — Allgemeines — werden behandelt: eine kurze Biographie des aus dem griechischen Freiheitskampf wohlbekannten, aus Suli im Epirus stammenden M.B. (1790-1823), der für die Balkanologie auch dadurch interessant ist, daß sowohl bei den Griechen als auch bei den Albanern zahlreiche historische Volkslieder über ihn gesungen werden. Anschließend behandelt T.J. den Zustand des Manuskripts in der Pariser Nationalbibliothek, in die es als Geschenk F. Pouquevilles, ehemaliger französischer Generalkonsul in Janina am Hofe des Ali Pascha von Tepelena, gelangt ist. Es folgt eine Darstellung über Zeit, Ort und Anlaß für die Niederschrift des Glossars sowie eine Erörterung der Verfasserschaft. Hier betont T.J., daß in der Tat M.B. die Wortliste 1809 in Kerkyra niedergeschrieben hat, als Verfasser sind jedoch, wie aus einer Bemerkung Pouquevilles hervorgeht, auch M.B.s Vater, sein Schwiegervater und sein Onkel zu betrachten. Die bisher umstrittene Frage, weshalb M.B. diese Arbeit vornahm, kann der Herausgeber lösen: der französische Konsul hatte Interesse am Albanischen und brauchte Material für ein franz. - alb. Glossar von ca. 500 Wörtern, das er seiner Darstellung «*De la langue Albanaise ou Schype*» im Rahmen eines großen Sammelwerks «*Voyage dans la Grèce*» (veröffentlicht in Paris, Bd. II 1820, Bd. I 1826) beifügen wollte. T.J. weist nach, daß es sich dabei vor allem um albanische Lemmata aus M.B.s Glossar handelt. Aus diesem Grunde bringt der Herausgeber auch am Schluß seiner Ausgabe Pouquevilles Verzeichnis im Faksimile und vergleicht es mit M.B.s Material.

Der Verfasser geht dann dazu über, die bisherigen Ausgaben von M.B.s Verzeichnis zu behandeln. Neben der Veröffentlichung einzelner Proben durch Σ. Αδμ-
 πρως kommt die oben bereits erwähnte Publikation von L. Skendo in Betracht. T.J. weist überzeugend nach, daß sie für wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen gänzlich ungeeignet ist — nicht nur wegen der zahlreichen Druckfehler, sondern vor allem durch eigenwillige Zusätze, ganz abgesehen davon, daß die Liste M.B.s, die weder alphabetisch noch nach anderen Gesichtspunkten geordnet ist, ohne Indizes herausgegeben wurde, so daß es bisher sehr zeitraubend war, die für wortgeschichtliche oder dialektologische Untersuchungen relevanten Lemmata herauszufinden.

Von dieser Tatsache ausgehend hat T.J. auch die Konzeption für seine eigene Ausgabe entworfen: Er bringt das Glossar in der ursprünglichen Reihenfolge, nummeriert jedoch die Zeilen. Die laufende Nummer ermöglicht das Auffinden der Wörter anhand der von T.J. sowohl für das griechische als auch für das albanische Material angelegten alphabetisch geordneten Listen. Er hat das handschriftliche Dokument jedoch auch unter vielerlei anderen Aspekten zum ersten Mal erschlossen. Neben den beiden Spalten mit der ursprünglichen, höchst inkonsequenten Orthographie (die zweite Spalte zeigt die Schreibung des Albanischen mit griechischen Zeichen) stehen zwei weitere Spalten — die eine mit der gültigen griechischen Schreibung, die andere bringt eine auf der heutigen alb. Rechtschreibung basierende Transkription. Beim Albanischen mit seiner relativ spät einsetzenden schriftlichen Tradition ergaben sich besondere Schwierigkeiten, da ja dieses Glossar in der Mundart von Suli, die inzwischen ausgestorben ist, aufgezeichnet wurde. So mußte T.J. ihre Lautung teilweise rekonstruieren; dazu hat er die Mundarten der in der Nähe liegenden Ortschaften 'Ανθοῦσα und Κονιάκιον verwendet, in denen er selbst in den 60-er Jahren Material gesammelt hatte. Da dieses Material höchstes dialektologisches Interesse beanspruchen darf, hat der Verfasser in einem Kommentar unter dem Wörterbuchtext neben der Form des betreffenden Stichwortes in der alb. Literatursprache der Gegenwart auch die Entsprechungen in beiden Ortsmundarten

angeführt, und darüber hinaus stellt er noch Vergleiche mit den Angaben in den beiden bisher zum çamischen Dialekt erschienenen Darstellungen, den Arbeiten von H. Pedersen und Q. Haxhihasani an. Zur Kommentierung der ngr. Dialektformen wurde unveröffentlichtes Material aus dem Archiv des Historischen Wörterbuchs der Akademie zu Athen benutzt.

Der griechische Teil des Wörterverzeichnisses von M.B. erweist sich, wie T.J. auf den Seiten 63-66 darstellt, für die Sprachwissenschaft als wenig ergiebig, weil er ein buntes Gemisch von Dhimotiki — und Katharevusa — Formen neben einigen Dialekteigentümlichkeiten aus dem Epirus und von den Ionischen Inseln bringt. Bemerkenswert sind immerhin einige Unregelmäßigkeiten hinsichtlich des Genus (maskuline Formen statt neutraler).

Für das Albanische hingegen ist dieses Sprachdenkmal von großer Bedeutung, sowohl für die Geschichte als auch für die Dialektologie dieser Sprache. Zahlreiche alb. Lexeme sind hier zum ersten Mal belegt, dennoch ist dieses Material in der bisherigen Forschung wegen der oben angeführten Gründe kaum genutzt worden. Unter anderem ist bemerkenswert, daß M.B. in einigen Fällen die Länge der Vokale bezeichnet hat (was in der Folgezeit bei çamischen Texten selten geschehen ist, auch nicht durch Pedersen), vgl. u.a. $\kappa\acute{\alpha}\alpha = k\bar{a}$ (236), $\beta\acute{\epsilon}\epsilon\pi\alpha = \bar{o}\bar{r}\bar{e}$, $\bar{o}\bar{r}\bar{a}$ (718 und 795), $\zeta\acute{\epsilon} = \bar{z}$ (542 und 768), $\kappa\eta\upsilon\zeta\epsilon = k\bar{i}z$ (748), $\lambda\omicron\upsilon\omicron\mu\epsilon = l\bar{u}m\bar{e}$ (810). Im übrigen hat T.J. zwar auf diese Tatsache hingewiesen, sie jedoch in seiner Transkription nicht berücksichtigt, denn die Zahl der Belege mit Langvokalen ist relativ gering, und man müßte nach dem von Haxhihasani gelieferten Material in Fällen wie *dhe*:, *ka:lë*, *flë*:, *bru:me*, *de:it*... lange Vokale erwarten, alle diese Wörter sind jedoch bei M.B. ohne Quantitätskennzeichnung. Die Mundart von Suli erweist sich gerade durch die Quantitätskorrelation als typisch çamisch, d.h. sie unterscheidet sich hier von den graecoalbanischen Mundarten im engeren Sinne, mit denen sie sonst — etwa in der Übernahme griechischer Laute wie χ und γ , in der Nichtexistenz von y , in der Bewahrung von *klund gl-* usw. übereinstimmt.

T.J. hat das Material nicht nur vom phonetischen Aspekt her beleuchtet, sondern auch, soweit dies beim Fehlen zusammenhängender Texte möglich war, auf morphologisch-syntaktische Besonderheiten aufmerksam gemacht. So weist er u.a. im Bereich des Genus griechischen Einfluß auf die Sprache M.B.s nach, z.B. *dunja i ri* (mask.) - lit.-spr. *dynja e re* (veraltet) / *bota e re* (beide Konstruktionen feminin) - beeinflußt durch das ngr. $\delta \nu\omicron\upsilon\mu\acute{\iota}\delta\alpha\varsigma$, $\delta \kappa\acute{o}\sigma\mu\omicron\varsigma$; *shi e madhe* (fem.) - beeinflußt durch ngr. $\beta\omicron\chi\omicron\eta \mu\epsilon\gamma\acute{\alpha}\lambda\eta$ - alb. lit.-spr. *shi i madh* (mask.). Ob in den Fällen mit einer untypischen, je oft falschen Wortstellung tatsächlich der Zustand in der Mundart von Suli widergespiegelt wird, scheint uns zweifelhaft. Wir haben vielmehr den Eindruck, daß M.B. die einzelnen Konstruktionen der griechischen Vorlage Wort für Wort, bisweilen ohne Berücksichtigung des syntaktischen Zusammenhangs, übersetzt hat, man vergleiche $\phi\iota\lambda\omicron \acute{\alpha}\sigma\pi\acute{\iota}\zeta\omicron\mu\alpha\iota$ (lfd. Nummer 163) *mik puth* (statt *e puth mikun* / *mikun e puth* oder dgl.), auch $\gamma\epsilon\phi\acute{o}\rho\iota \pi\epsilon\pi\acute{\nu}\omega$ (1745) *urë shkojte* (statt *shkoj / e kaloj urën*). Dasselbe zeigt sich nämlich gehäuft auch bei Konstruktionen, die aus Substantiv und Attribut (Substantiv im Genitiv oder Adjektiv) bestehen, für die im Alb. die Stellung Substantiv + Attribut charakteristisch ist. So finden wir (901) *serasqeri nam*, (1721) *e vohël gjatim* in der Reihenfolge der griechischen Vorlage $\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon\pi\acute{\eta}\gamma\omicron\upsilon \phi\acute{\eta}\mu\eta$ bzw. $\mu\alpha\chi\rho\acute{\nu}\omicron \phi\alpha\rho\gamma\eta\tau\acute{o}\nu$, aber - umgekehrt - (1722) *gur i fortë*, (893) *mapa shqipisë*, wo die Stellung in der griechischen Vorlage ($\pi\acute{\epsilon}\tau\tau\alpha \tau\{p\}\alpha\chi\epsilon\acute{\iota}\delta$ bzw. $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\tau\omicron\varsigma \sigma\pi\iota\tau\acute{\eta}\sigma\iota\omicron\varsigma$) dem zu erwartenden albanischen Sprachgebrauch entspricht.

In einer Reihe von Fällen hätte man in den Anmerkungen unter KA (= Kовъ 'Албанскъ) auch die literatursprachlichen Formen, welche den bei M.B. verzeichneten Einheiten eher entsprechen, als Dubletten erwartet, z.B. hätte bei *fare* (41) unter KA neben *krejt* auch *fare* angeführt werden sollen, ebenso (1178) neben *çerdhe* auch *fole*, (47) neben *i papjekur* auch *aguridh*, -e, (251) neben *orimë* auch *birë*. Alle diese Wörter sind im neuesten normativen Wörterbuch des Albanischen (Fjalor i gjuhës së sotme shqipe, Tiranë, 1980) als literatursprachlich anerkannt. Weiterhin verzeichnet, wenn auch als veraltet markiert, sind in diesem Wörterbuch die von T.J. gleichfalls nicht angeführten Synonyme *i syrgjynosur* zu *i internuar* (177), *bajrak* zu *flamur* (178) usw.

Der Wert des Buches wird noch dadurch gesteigert, daß T.J. unter anderem Listen der griechischen, türkischen und anderer Lehnwörter im albanischen Wortgut bringt, das interessante Wortmaterial der beiden genannten Ortsmundarten in Griechenland alphabetisch auflistet und sowohl das Manuskript M.B.s als auch die Handschrift Pouquevilles in technisch einwandfreien Faksimilewiedergaben beilegt.

So gebührt Titos Jochalas das Verdienst, in der vorliegenden, prächtig ausgestatteten Ausgabe für die Albanologie und Balkanologie ein hochwichtiges Denkmal erstmals mit philologischer Akribie erschlossen zu haben.

Berlin (DDR)

ODA BUCHHOLZ, WILFRIED FIEDLER

David E. Bynum (ed.), *Serbo-Croatian Heroic Songs*. Vol. 6, Collected by Milman Parry (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1980), pp. 834. Vol. 14, Collected by Milman Parry, Albert B. Lord, and David E. Bynum (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1979), pp. 529.

Each of these two volumes of original oral epic material occupies a distinct and invaluable place within the Texts and Translations Series of the ongoing Publications of the Milman Parry Collection. A living archive, this collection is the result of a unique research project formulated by Milman Parry almost half a century ago. Through the efforts of his successors, the original project has grown into an intensive intellectual enterprise. This has consisted of several scientific expeditions to the Balkans in order to collect heroic songs over a thirty-year period (from 1933 to 1963), and of the subsequent process of translating and interpreting the texts and circumstantial information pertaining to them obtained in the field. The material results of this project possess value in direct proportion to the high degree of scholarly integrity, precaution and methodological self-awareness followed since its beginning. The publication of the fruit of this intensive labor has continued since the appearance of the first volume in this series in 1954, issued jointly by Harvard University and the Serbian Academy of Sciences.

The initial inspiration that led to the collection of these South Slavic oral epic texts was the result of the chance interaction of refined logical rigor in classical literary scholarship and the development of modern empirical methods in the study of oral poetry. As a student in Paris during the 1920s, Parry analyzed the style of epithets in the Homeric texts and formed a general conclusion about the nature

of epic composition: the high degree of formulaic style in Homer must be traditional. Thus far, he was taking the immediate elements observed in his analytical studies as fundamental principles; the set concepts such as «formula» and «tradition» according to which he deduced his data were themselves induced from the grapho-centric bias of the literary scholar. At this point there occurred one of those fortuitous instances of intellectual contact that mark the fortunate evolution of man's theoretical endeavors. Just as Parry was concluding his studies at the Sorbonne, a series of lectures on Yugoslav folk epics was given there by Matija Murko, the Slovene Slavist who held the Chair of South Slavic Languages and Literatures at Charles University in Prague. Through this exposure to recent investigations of a still living corpus of heroic songs, he came to understand the essentially oral character of traditional epic style. Thus, the very concept of tradition, which had been a fundamental objective «given» of epic as initially studied by Parry, itself came under active consideration and qualification. Henceforth, the exemplary objects of investigation were to be the subjective circumstance of formulaic singing. Epic tradition itself could now be treated as the collective rubric for specific acts of oral composition.

Parry had been led to make the same kind of «inductive leap» in the field of epic scholarship as had been taken by Bacon in physics and Darwin in biology. As long as the literary researcher regarded each specific heroic song as a discrete instance of performance within a fixed epic tradition, his theoretical considerations could only proceed from the viewpoint of the singer himself, who regarded the event of the song as isometric with the structure of the collective oral lore it presented. But once Parry came to regard the concept of epic performance itself as explicable, a structural theory of oral poetry became the conceptual framework, and so the way was cleared for the analysis of heroic poetry in terms of the dynamics of oral composition manifested during performance.

Parry undertook extensive fieldwork in Yugoslavia, where a tradition of epic performance was still alive, in order to collect a body of evidence as the basis for an exact characterization and understanding of oral style in general and the formulaic nature of Homeric style in particular. During two trips made between 1933 and 1935 he succeeded in gathering in hand or electronically recorded form almost seven hundred oral epics performed by more than a hundred carefully selected singers in two dozen locations throughout Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Hercegovina. Following Parry's premature death in 1935, texts were added to the collection as a result of field trips made in 1950 and 1951 by Albert Lord, who continued the project, and in 1963 by Lord and Bynum.

By carefully formulating his criteria for selecting singers, Parry was able to record those with a substantial repertory who had considerable singing experience and who enjoyed a firm reputation among their peers. Volume Six of the series contains two songs from Avdo Medjedović, a Montenegrin Moslem and one of the most exceptionally fluent and talented oral epic singers: *Ženidba Vlahinjić Alije* (The Wedding of Vlahinjić Alija), in two versions, one spoken for dictation, the other sung and recorded; and *Osmanbeg Delibegović i Pavičević Luka*. This second song was recorded entirely by phonograph and is distinguished by being the longest continuous text of oral poetry to be found in any European tradition since Homer. Its length of 13,826 verses makes it somewhat longer than *The Odyssey* and shorter than *The Iliad*. The remarkable circumstances of the production of

this song illustrate both the painstaking inventiveness of Parry's experimental scholarly technique and the creative integrity of Avdo's flexible oral epic technique. The singing of the song was intentionally interrupted and the singer caused to sing three completely different epics and to converse about other epics and events of his own life before resuming and completing the song many days later. Nevertheless, his extraordinary capacity to compose this complex, richly detailed verse epic freely and unaffected by such disturbances is apparent from the rapid rate of his composition: during the eleven hours of performance, he produced more than twenty epic lines per minute, or one every three seconds.

The precise, explanatory information given by David Bynum in his prolegomena qualifies this volume as an important part of a working series which will aid further research into oral epic theory. The burden of each intricately plotted story, both of which are set in the sixteenth century at the time of the Ottoman Emperor Suleiman the Magnificent, is carefully elaborated. The presence of Iliadic echoes and the Achillean type common to many epic stories in the Yugoslav tradition are pointed out in the second song. (The heroine, who is the world's most beautiful woman, is Jela, the Serbo-Croatian for 'Ελένη; Luka, the hero, is habitually called *slavni*, a Serbo-Croatian equivalent and etymological cognate of the Homeric epithet *κλειτός*). Other useful editorial helps are: the use of italics devised to indicate phonic or morphological features at variance with the common language and to denote stylistic peculiarities of the oral singer's performance; graphic use of spaced lines to reflect as accurately as possible any unusual fluctuation in the speed of the oral performance; and detailed textual notes explaining idiosyncracies of rhetorical style and versification and irregularities in narrative logic (*lapsi mentis*), delivery (*lapsi linguae*), and composition (*lapsi metricus*). Words of foreign derivation, especially Turkisms, are translated and obscure terms are meticulously explained. The specialist, even of modern Serbo-Croatian, would benefit from a more thorough glossing of dialectal and idiolectal diction (such as Avdo's unusual use of *majdan*, noted in line 7431 of the second song). The usefulness of these songs to the non-specialist will be greatly increased when the English translations of the texts are published in the fifth volume of the series.

Volume Fourteen presents the oral epic tradition of the district of Bihać in northern Bosnia, which is the sixth center of Parry's field collecting. It contains eight complete epics from four traditional singers. The texts are edited so as to illustrate certain main facts about this tradition and a 75-page prolegomenon offers the latest considerations about the genesis of the poetry, the singers, the singing, and the songs. Bynum's comments about the feasibility of an autochthonous Balkan oral narrative tradition ascending to the time of the Homeric epics are cautious, in keeping with the state of modern scholarship, which lacks a coherent theoretical pattern upon which to base the conclusions of finite observations. The editing has been done with extreme respect for the sung presentation and with the conviction that the integrity of the epic is «composition *during* oral performances». In contrast to most Serbo-Croatian oral tradition, the singing of Bihać is not stichic hut strophic. The present volume is the first publication in the hundred-year history of scholarship on the subject to recognize this fact and to document it with a textual format that indicates this. Melodic analyses based on painstaking graphic plotting of the rhythmic delivery reveal the extent to which the accentual and metrical discipline of a particular singing style is distinct from that in the cul-

ture apart from it even as it exhibits universal principles of composition. In providing synopses of the songs, Bynum usefully illustrates the processes of multi-formity and modulation as vital mechanisms of oral tradition. This volume contains a multiform cognate of the lengthiest narrative presented in Volume Six, which gives the researcher a unique opportunity to compare different texts of the same tale collected by Parry.

There is primary material here for the student of musicology, linguistics, anthropology, folklore, and many other disciplines. One may wish to approach the oral epic text as a basis for investigating melodic structure, phonetic distribution, metrical form, diction, rhetorical imagery, compositional technique, thematic coherence. Or one may choose to study information about the epic performers, the performing process, or the social milieu of the performance. Whether the particular approach is intrinsic or extrinsic, it is the concept of tradition that qualifies these heroic songs as both oral and epic. Through this denominator of «hand ing down», the act of telling and the form of the told become indistinguishable from one another in the *common instant*. The notion of tradition makes this synthesis paradoxical, one that is both concrete and abstract. The oral epic is concrete by virtue of the eminence of a process of live, immediate verbal transmission in the present; it is abstract by virtue of the immanence of a storied state of the past re-told. But it is this duality that has led to a new, productive formulation of the Homeric Problem. No longer is the epic narrative seen as owing its existence either to the vatic virtuosity of a *sui generis* literate «genius», or to the fabricative ingenuity of an amorphous collective of common «folk». Its properties are not those of a finished product, but of the processes of poetic language stylized — according to the mimetic exigencies of live, social presentation — by a unique individual who is both *poeta vates* and *poeta faber*. The oral epos is created from the interaction between the idiolect of the rhapsode and the intellect of the ethos. It is a result of the cultural contract between singer and society, between invention and convention. On the one hand, it owes its existence to the inventive drive of the singer and to the listeners' demand for interesting invention. On the other, it is governed by the performer's aesthetic necessity so sely on a conserving mnemonic capacity to remember conventionally and by the audience's conservative need to re-experience a story communally through its thematic stability.

The Parry Collection is an important laboratory, one in which we have been educated to understand in time the timeless vitality and the sophisticated potential of a particular form of creative human expression. Homer led to its founding, and the study of the body of material it contains leads us back to Homer as the foundation, the eponymous *ἀοιδός*, of heroic singing.

Harvard University

RALPH BOGERT

Alexandru Duțu, *European Intellectual Movements and Modernisation of Romanian Culture*, Bucharest, Editura Academiei, 1981, 195 p. (Bibliotheca Historica Romaniae, 64).

L'intérêt particulier du nouveau livre d'Alexandru Duțu consiste dans l'effort

de marquer le caractère européen des courants de pensée développés dans le Sud-Est européen à l'époque moderne, tout en soulignant leurs traits spécifiques. Le témoignage des livres est associé aux relations des arts plastiques afin de permettre à l'auteur de déceler la marche profonde des mouvements intellectuels affirmés dans une zone qui a été trop négligée par l'histoire des civilisations modernes. La persistance des clichés mentaux issus des conflits entre l'Ouest «latin» et l'Est «grec», ainsi qu'une attention exclusiviste accordée aux courants intellectuels qui ont innovés, au détriment des courants traditionalistes, ont obturé une vie intellectuelle d'un intérêt insigne. Alexandru Duțu ne cache pas le caractère parfois polémique de son livre, puisque les premières pages semblent être des réponses données à une provocation : «par rapport au Baroque, au Classicisme, au Néo-Classicisme perpétue-t-il le Sud-Est européen une peinture issue des mêmes centres médiévaux et une technique qui se refuse toute dérogation d'un modèle préétabli?», demande-t-il, en continuant : la culture écrite est-elle confinée dans les monastères et complètement insensible aux acquis intellectuels nouveaux? Les réponses de l'auteur prennent en charge la vie intellectuelle développée dans les grands centres du Sud-Est européen, ainsi qu'elle se reflète dans la culture écrite et le langage figuratif des 17^e-19^e siècles, aussi bien que dans bon nombre de synthèses parues ces dernières années dans cette partie du continent ou la concernant. Saluons cette documentation précise et riche, ainsi qu'un genre d'études qui passent de plus en plus de la monographie à la synthèse et des idées reçues à une vision plus juste et mieux intégrée.

De toute évidence, un seul livre ne peut résoudre un problème très complexe ; mais ce problème est posé dans des termes clairs et convaincants, grâce surtout à la démarche qui part d'un ensemble — l'époque humaniste, telle qu'elle a été définie par Delio Cantimori —, pour arriver aux ressorts du mécanisme de la formation des hommes, au 18^e siècle, et aux modèles culturels assez divers à l'époque des Lumières sud-est européennes ; ensuite, l'analyse se penche surtout sur les réalités roumaines, regardées sous un angle comparatiste (de préférence en partant des relations greco-roumaines), pour faire ressortir les traits spécifiques de l'humanisme roumain développé au 17^e siècle, des Lumières roumaines et du Romantisme qui est apparu dans le contexte de nouvelles relations culturelles, orientées vers l'Europe dans son ensemble. Le livre revient à la fin sur les traits spécifiques de l'Humanisme et des Lumières qui ont modernisé une culture sud-est européenne, en précisant les traits de ces courants qui sont issus des milieux culturels baignés dans une oralité traditionaliste, ayant ces propres normes et ses valeurs. Sur ce trajet, le lecteur découvre le destin d'une culture et les transformations des mentalités survenues dans un ensemble ayant des caractères qui ne sont pas identiques aux traits distinctifs que nous découvrons d'habitude dans ce que nous nommons la civilisation occidentale. Dans ce sens, il faut souligner le rôle que l'auteur accorde à l'héritage byzantin dans la perpétuation de la «forme» post-byzantine et même dans la parution des «modèles» nationaux.

Alexandru Duțu a toujours en vue les réalités grecques, lorsqu'il essaye de surprendre les aspects dominants des courants qui ont modernisé les cultures sud-est européennes. Il parle des typographies de Glykis et Theodosiou, de Venise, des études sur la diffusion des livres grecs, des peintres qui ont innové, comme Panayotis Doxaras de Corfou. Il remonte vers les sources et regarde le modèle qui a souvent inspiré les écrivains et les peintres : la civilisation byzantine. De cette

manière, les éléments transmis par la «longue durée» sont associés aux éléments nouveaux et la synthèse qui en a résulté dévoile les traits spécifiques d'un développement culturel. Retenons, dans ce sens, la définition du mouvement affirmé au 17^e siècle dans les cultures roumaine et grecque: la modernisation a été une conséquence de l'avance de la raison dans les cercles — «intérieur» et «extérieur» — de la sagesse, tels qu'ils avaient été contournés par la pensée byzantine. «Humanists made mental excursions into the «outer» world and subjected it to the scrutiny of their reason. Since «inner» wisdom was not negated, we describe this moment as the assertion of an *Orthodox Rationalism*» (p. 15). En étudiant les traductions roumaines de l'œuvre de Restif de la Bretonne, par le truchement des versions de Rigas, l'auteur se demande si on peut démarquer une période préromantique dans les deux cultures ou s'il n'est plus exact de parler de l'invasion de la déléctation dans le schéma de pensée élaboré à l'époque des Lumières. (Rappelons qu'une première version de ce chapitre qui prend en charge les valeurs sentimentales affirmées à la fin du 18^e siècle a paru dans «Balkan Studies» en 1972).

La conclusion du livre nous semble être digne d'être retenue: l'humanisme civique affirmé dans les cultures sud-est européennes est semblable à l'humanisme pratique occidental, tout comme les lumières balkaniques se sont orientées vers les valeurs qui ont dominé la pensée occidentale. Mais la tradition médiévale sud-est européenne, qui n'est pas identique à la culture médiévale occidentale, ainsi que les objectifs sociaux et nationaux de ces mouvements ont mis leurs empreintes sur l'humanisme et les lumières parus dans cette partie du monde. La modernisation a été un effort de renouvellement fait dans le cadre d'une série de cultures où la tradition orale a joué un rôle insigne. De telles conclusions mettent en relief l'originalité et l'intérêt de ce livre qui nous offre une bonne lecture.

Institut des Etudes du Sud-Est Européennes

GĂTĂLINA VELCULESCU

Alexandru Duțu, *Romanian Humanists and European Culture-Contribution to Comparative Cultural History*, Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste România, București 1977, pp. 196.

L'auteur de cette monographie est bien connu pour ses travaux sur l'histoire de la vie culturelle du Sud-Est européen. Une de ses récentes publications ouvre une nouvelle voie dans la recherche des rapports de l'humanisme roumain avec la culture européenne; Mr. Duțu cherche à mettre en évidence les rapports du monde roumain avec l'Europe et à établir les traits caractéristiques qui les définissent. Le livre est composé de trois grands chapitres divisés en sous chapitres. Dans le premier sous-chapitre intitulé *The part and the whole* (p. 8-36) Mr. Duțu s'applique à démontrer les facteurs de l'humanisme occidental, à savoir la Renaissance, et par ailleurs à examiner l'humanisme byzantin et son influence dans les pays roumains. Cette influence justifie, d'ailleurs, la formation d'une pensée rationnelle de l'orthodoxie (*orthodoxe rationalisme*) des principautés roumaines durant le XVIII^e siècle. L'auteur étudie l'évolution de l'esprit humaniste depuis le XIV^e siècle jusqu'au XVII^e siècle et met l'accent sur les différences de conceptions entre les deux mondes. Mais l'influence du Moyen Âge se fait claire dans le cadre spécifi-

que du pays défini par un ensemble beaucoup plus large: la vie intellectuelle de Sud-Est européen. Or, l'humanisme roumain émerge de l'ensemble (*the whole*) avec ses particularités (*the part*). Au deuxième sous-chapitre intitulé *Expansion and concentration* (pp. 37-51) Mr. Duțu examine les «facteurs de changement» et les «facteurs de stabilité». Les uns avaient facilité l'expansion culturelle, les autres avaient contribué à l'irradiation de la concentration culturelle et tous les deux avaient favorisé la création de la culture roumaine. Les «facteurs de stabilité» semblaient dominer dans la vie intellectuelle, mais l'époque de Constantin Brîncoveanu (1688-1714) ouvrait de nouvelles perspectives. Les «facteurs de changement» adoptaient l'idéal occidental qu'ils essaient de ménager avec leurs idéaux nationaux. Dans le troisième sous-chapitre *The Rhythm of cultural contacts* (p. 52-66) l'auteur présente les conditions sous lesquelles l'humanisme sud-est européen a pris contact avec l'humanisme européen. Celui-là toujours influencé par l'humanisme européen persuadait l'Europe qu'il n'avait jamais été «schématique» et qu'il ne s'était pas laissé influencer par l'empire ottoman. Dans ce domaine le rôle de C. Cantacuzino et de D. Cantemir était tout à fait essentiel aussi bien que celui des imprimeries de Venise, de Vienne, riches en publications, qui témoignaient de l'évolution culturelle dans cette contrée. La seconde partie, dont le premier sous-chapitre est intitulé *The Word, the book and the image* (p. 68-111) le livre de Mr. Duțu porte sur les structures (traditionnelles, contemporaines, occidentales) qui ont été à la base de la culture roumaine. Le mouvement naissant associait les valeurs nationales à l'idéal des pays européens contemporains. Un des plus grands agents de l'évolution de ce mouvement était C. Cantacuzino, qui, par sa politique, par ses relations avec les milieux culturels européens, contribue puissamment à la création du «nouveau style valaque» (*the new vallahian style*). Les manifestations de ce «nouveau style» sont exprimées dans les divers domaines de l'art et de l'architecture. La littérature orale s'enrichit de nouveaux éléments: livres et manuscrits et plus spécialement ceux qui affichaient un caractère populaire s'inspiraient presque tous des événements historiques du pays. Ce sujet est examiné minutieusement par Cartoian et par Duțu lui-même. L'historiographie, science qui se développe au XVIII^e siècle en Roumanie, recherche les origines du peuple roumain et ses relations avec les pays voisins. La signification du mot «patria» et le caractère de leur conscience orthodoxe relèvent des préoccupations des ces auteurs qui figurent, à juste titre, au premier rang, dans l'historiographie roumaine. Le deuxième sous-chapitre de la seconde partie, *The knight, the humanist and the scholar* (p. 112-134), s'occupe de l'homme médiéval type, à savoir l'homme ecclésiastique, le chevalier qui était succédé par le courtisan (l'honnête homme, le gentleman et l'humaniste) lettré qui se révèle par ses combats sociaux, constitue, finalement, «the exemplar man», qui concentre les caractères du chevalier et du lettré, exprimés par sa sagesse et par ses textes.

Le troisième, et dernier, sous-chapitre intitulé *The image of European culture* (p. 135-165) traite des éléments comparatifs entre l'univers spirituel européen, d'une part, et roumain, de l'autre. Cette comparaison, fondée sur l'étude des textes, met en valeur ces relations que les érudits européens ne soupçonnaient point. Les lettrés roumains faisaient connaître à l'Europe que le peuple roumain était le dépositaire de la tradition latine et hellénique, cultures qu'il a su développer par ses propres forces. Pourtant Mr. Duțu ne devait pas négliger le grand rôle que avaient joué les phanariotes dans l'expansion des lettrés dans les pays roumains à cette époque-là.

Dans *Connexions and Reconsiderations* (p. 167-190), chapitre qui conclue l'ouvrage, Mr. Duțu présente l'historiographie roumaine pendant les dernières décennies du XIXème siècle et l'image de l'histoire politique et celle de la littérature, de la langue, du livre populaire, de l'histoire des idées, dans la vie culturelle du Sud-est européen. Mr. Duțu cherche à tisser le fil créateur de ce phénomène culturel: les lettrés, étrangers ou indigènes, les imprimeries, l'influence des milieux de la Grande Ecole Patriarchale de Constantinople et de l'Université de Padoue, l'art oriental et occidental, voilà ses principaux facteurs. Et enfin, nous ne saurions conclure ce compte rendu sans souligner une fois de plus la valeur de la recherche et de l'ouvrage auquel il se rapporte.

Institut d'Etudes Balkaniques

ATH. E. KARATHANASSIS

Abstracts

J. S. KOLIOPOULOS

UNWANTED ALLY: GREECE AND THE GREAT POWERS, 1939-1941

Greece's international position and national security in those years have, until recently, been examined mainly from the point of view of contemporary official Greek policy. This has led to the development of a semi-official Greek historiography, essentially as an extension of war and post-war Greek foreign policy and its requirements. The purpose of this paper is to examine, on the basis of sources newly made available, the governing assumptions and premises of this historiography, and to pursue a re-evaluation of contemporary developments, free from a number of these assumptions and premises, which are not supported by evidence and which have generally misguided scholarship. The main thesis of this paper is that the Greek government in that period failed, for reasons that had to do with the policy of Britain and Italy in the eastern Mediterranean as well as with the nature of the ruling regime in Greece and Greek appraisals of the country's strategic value, to secure an alliance with Britain to ward off an Italian attack, and accepted such an alliance against Germany at the insistence of the British government.

Z. N. TSIRPANLIS

THE ITALIAN VIEW OF THE 1940-41 WAR. COMPARISONS AND PROBLEMS

The aim of this study is a critical examination of the Italian historical sources and their comparison with Greek views. The writer points out that a great many relevant works were published in Italy

immediately after the Second World War with the intention of clarifying the reasons for the war, describing events, and emphasizing the outcome from the time of the clash between the Greeks and the Italians in the mountains of Epirus and Albania (October 1940 - April 1941).

The evidence of the Italian writers is arranged and compared with the Greek views under the following three chronological and thematic headings: 1) The diplomatic incidents according to the memoirs or the diaries of Emanuele Grazzi, Luigi Mondini, Galeazzo Ciano and Francesco Jacomoni, and on the basis of the documents published by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; 2) The military events as they are presented in the memoirs of the Italian generals (Pietro Badoglio, Sebastiano Visconti Prasca, Mario Roatta, Francesco Pricolo, Quirino Armellini, Ugo Cavallero), in the recent three-volume publication of the history section of the Italian General Staff, in the censored letters of the ordinary Italian soldier and citizen, and in the Italian army songs; 3) In journalistic, chronographical, and historical writings produced after the war, such as the works of Mario Rigoni Stern, Gian Carlo Fusco, Aldo Lualdi, Carlo Baudino, Mario Cervi, Jeanne Baghiou, et al.

The writer reaches certain conclusions with regard to the reasons behind the Italian defeat and the Greek victory, compares the numerical strength of the opposing forces in terms of men and arms, and assesses the positions of Italy and Greece in international terms in October 1940.

D U Š A N L U K A Ć

AGGRESSION OF ITALY AGAINST GREECE AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE OF ITALIAN EXPANSION

Basic motives of the Italian October 1940 aggression against Greece are reviewed and analyzed in this article, together with the results and consequences of Greek victories over Italians which were relevant for the development of events in the Balkans in 1941.

Successes of Germany in the West and its fast penetration to the South-East, and particularly the entering of German troops in Rumania at the beginning of October 1940, stimulated Mussolini to attack

Greece. He believed that the attack will be successful and that the war will quickly end in favour of Italy.

Due to preparations of Germany for the attack against the USSR, Hitler's interest was not the expanding of war to the Balkans. That is why he tried to persuade Mussolini not to attack Greece. But when the attack began, Hitler believed that Italy shall soon overcome Greece, so that he aimed all his efforts to prevent the intervention of some neighbouring countries into the conflict.

However, the Greeks — unified and determined to defend themselves as much as they could — not only did not give in but instead succeeded to defeat a much more numerous Italian army, while seriously challenging to throw out the occupation armies from Albania and the Balkans.

Even new offensives by the Italian army did not bring to Mussolini any success. The other Axis power — Germany, therefore had to engage itself in oppressing the resistance of the Greek people.

Heroic resistance of the Greek people during the six month period against one of the Axis powers had deeply influenced further developments and relations at the South-East of Europe. The victory of Greek arms discovered to the world the weakness of the block of totalitarian powers, while at the same time contributing to the weakening of internal confidence between Germany and Italy. The resistance of Greek people against a powerful aggressor contributed to the strengthening of anti-fascist powers in the neighbouring countries, as well as to reviving the faith that even the small countries are able to resist the aggression by the great powers. By its bravery and unity in the struggles against more numerous enemy, the Greek people confirmed its permanent adherence to the traditions of the liberation struggle.

ROBIN HIGHAM

BRITISH INTERVENTION IN GREECE, 1940-1941: THE ANATOMY OF A GRAND DECEPTION

After the Italian attack on Greece at the end of October 1940, the British responded with limited air support and some supplies from their meagre stocks in the Middle East. In January General Wavell

was ordered to make a larger offer, which was limited to artillery, and this Prime Minister Metaxas properly refused. But after the latter's death, Churchill and Eden in London pushed aid and active British support into the Greek government. Wavell was a realist and an expert at deception of the Allenby school, as he had already demonstrated with his Western Desert defeat of the Italians. Understanding the technical problems of making a stand in Greece, a country then devoid of proper communications and especially of airfields and defendable ports, he engineered a grand deception to send a token British force to the Aliakmon Line hoping that the Germans would attack long before they could be in place and thus save his resources. His object was to deceive Churchill and thus prevent another Norway, Dunkirk and Dakar.

N. HAMMOND

MEMORIES OF A BRITISH OFFICER SERVING IN SPECIAL OPERATIONS
EXECUTIVE IN GREECE, 1941

The author is better known as a historian of ancient Macedonia and Epirus. Than as a wartime soldier, whose familiarity with pre-war Greece and with the Greek language brought him into the Greek theatre of operations in 1941. He enjoyed unusual freedom of movement and a wide range of experience, because he was attached first to the Special Operations Executive in Athens and then to its «paranaval» branch in Crete. Immediately after the war he wrote down his memories for members of his family to read. (It is these memories which are published here on the initiative of the Director of the Institute for Balkan Studies).

ALEXIS ALEXANDRIS

TURKISH POLICY TOWARDS GREECE DURING THE SECOND
WORLD WAR AND ITS IMPACT ON GREECE-TURKISH DETENTE

The outbreak of World War II had a major impact on the Greek-Turkish friendship which throught out the 1930 became a pillar of

stability and a starting point for the development of a spirit of cooperation among the Balkan nations. Adopting a strict interpretation of its Treaty obligation towards Greece, Ankara refused to participate in the Struggle of the Greek people against Fascist and Nazi aggression in 1940-41. Greek disappointment with Turkey intensified when in November 1942 Ankara enacted the infamous Varlik taxation. Nor did some minor turkish gestures of assistance such as the despatch of foodstuffs to the starving urban masses of Greece managed to overcome Greek disenchantment with the overall attitude of Ankara during the War. Yet, the Turks were determined to avoid involvement in the War, which meant that they were prepared to risk dissatisfy the Greeks.

C. SVOLOPOULOS

ANGLO-HELLENIC TALKS ON CYPRUS DURING THE AXIS CAMPAIGN
AGAINST GREECE

The recent publication of the Greek Foreign Ministry «Greek Diplomatic Documents 1940-1941» (Athens 1980), brought forward interesting new material relating to the proposals of the Korizis government (Mars-April 1941) for the cession of Cyprus to Greece. The large number of references allows for a close examination of the conditions and arguments used by the Greek Government, and for the British reaction. The British position, however, is made sufficiently clear from additional research at the Public Record Office, which showed the negative attitude of the British Government, and the final refusal in the beginning of June 1941.

D. J. DELIVANIS

GREEK ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL EFFORTS 1940-1

Greece was able to master the economic and financial problems connected with fighting the Italians 1940-1 and the Germans 1941 thanks to the stocks accumulated in peace time. War material, foodstuffs, raw materials, fuels and manufactured goods needed for the fighting forces, both Greek and Commonwealth, dispatched from the



United Kingdom did not reach Greece on time as they had to be carried via the Cape Town and the Suez Canal. On the other hand the U. K. financial aid promised when the war started was punctually remitted and contributed a lot to increase the confidence of Greek people to their currency despite the war and facilitated the covering of war expenses abroad.

C. M. WOODHOUSE

THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE GERMAN
WITHDRAWAL FROM GREECE IN 1944

The relative ease with which the German forces were able to withdraw from the Aegean Islands and the Greek mainland in the late summer of 1944 has been the subject of much speculation. It has been suggested that there may have been «tacit connivance» on the part of Churchill to allow an unhindered withdrawal by the Germans with a view to confronting the Red Army advancing from the East. The present article examines evidence relating to this subject advanced by Dr. Hagen Fleischer and Dr. Lars Baerentzen.

It is pointed out that such a decision by Churchill could not have been made effective without the knowledge of many subordinate officers. Of this there is no evidence, either anecdotal or in writing. Military operations against the retreating Germans were in fact ordered to be carried out both by allied forces based in Italy under General Maitland Wilson and by guerrilla forces in Greece, reinforced by allied teams. These operations were of limited effect, but were never deliberately discouraged or countermanded.

Naval operations in the Aegean were also of limited effect. In some cases British ships and aircraft were reported to have withheld fire on German convoys, but it is not known why. The main purpose of the British high command seems to have been to compel the surrender of the entire German force once it was concentrated on the German mainland. Contacts with the Germans took place for this purpose, but the object of the latter was to secure agreement to an unhindered withdrawal. Both sides failed to achieve their object. The Germans were nevertheless able to force a successful retreat, but without any connivance — so far as the evidence goes — on the part of the British.

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DAN IONESCU

UN MANUSCRIT DE DIONISIE ECLISIARHUL AU MONASTÈRE DE BARLAAM

1. Première mention du manuscrit

En visitant, dans les années trente, le monastère de Barlaam aux Météores, Marcu Beza y trouva un registre écrit en roumain, qu'il décrit de la manière suivante:

Il a vingt-quatre feuilles. [Sur] la première, avec bordure à fleurs de couleur verte et rouge: un ange déploie une toile sur laquelle s'inscrit le titre, en caractères cyrilliques, rouges: Condica / Sfintei Mănăstiri Bucovătu. / Ce iaste închinată la Mănăstirea / Sfintului Varlaam dela Meteora. (=Le registre du saint monastère de Bucovăț, qui est soumis au monastère de Saint Barlaam aux Météores).

Sur la deuxième et la troisième feuille, on a dessiné à la plume, en encre noire: «S. Nicolae, Hramul Mănăstirii Bucovătu» (=Saint Nicolas, le vocable du Monastère de Bucovăț); «Toți Sfinții, Hramul S. Mănăstiri Varlaam dela Meteora» (= La Toussaint, le vocable du saint monastère de Barlaam aux Météores). [Beza donne ensuite la liste des six documents transcrits dans le registre, dont le premier est un privilège du prince Radu Șerban, datant de 1609]¹.

Dans la deuxième édition de *Urme românești în Răsăritul Ortodox* (=Vestiges Roumains dans l'Orient Orthodoxe), on reproduit quatre pages de ce registre (*condică*). Une planche en couleurs, entre les pages 84 et 85, présente la page de titre du registre (fig. 1). La bordure à fleurs en vert et rouge semble indiquer qu'il s'agit de la première feuille du cahier manuscrit (voir la description ci-dessus). Pourtant, la représentation de *l'ange déployant une toile*, mentionnée par Beza n'y figure pas. Sur la page 83, deux photos dans le texte rendent la deuxième feuille du registre (Saint Nicolas), ainsi que la troisième (La Toussaint). A la page 84, une dernière photo reproduit une autre

1. Marcu Beza, *Urme Românești în Răsăritul Ortodox*, deuxième édition, București 1937, p. 88.

feuille du manuscrit, avec le commencement du privilège de Radu Vodă, page ornée d'un en-tête héraldique.

2. *Spéculations sur l'identité du copiste*

Après avoir décrit d'une façon sommaire l'aspect et le contenu du manuscrit, Beza fait des suppositions concernant le copiste du registre:

Il s'agit exclusivement des documents relatifs au monastère de Bucovăț. Qui les a transcrit si joliment dans ce registre? Sans doute, un moine connaissant le roumain, qui n'a pas laissé son nom. Un Macédonien, peut-être, car, en examinant une liste des moines qui ont revêtu la dignité de supérieur du couvent de Barlaam entre 1513 et 1803, j'y trouve que bon nombre provenait de villages purement roumains [...]².

Cette tentative de déterminer l'auteur du registre contient implicitement la conviction que le manuscrit aurait été rédigé *au monastère de Barlaam*, par un moine possédant le roumain.

A l'occasion d'une séance de l'Académie Roumaine (le 5 octobre 1934), N. Iorga fait des commentaires sur les découvertes de M. Beza aux monastères de Météores, sans toutefois se préoccuper de la provenance ou de la paternité du registre. D'ailleurs, à cette époque-là, le nom même du monastère valaque fournissait encore des surprises:

Il y en a également trois documents relatifs à un monastère Coșuna de Valachie, un monastère soumis sans doute aux Météores, mais dont — je l'avoue — je n'ai rien su jusqu'à présent, lorsque je retrouve, dans les mêmes documents, l'équivalence de Coșuna et de Bucovăț³.

Le monastère de Bucovăț (ou Coșuna) fut érigé en 1572 près de Craiova, dans le village de Mofleni / Dolj, par le grand sommelier (*clu-*

2. Beza, *op. cit.*, même page.

3. N. Iorga, *Legături descoperite de D.M. Beza, cu mănăstirile Meteorele din Tesalia. Cu o notă despre Nicolae-Vodă Petrașcu, fiul lui Mihai Viteazul*, tirage à part de *Analele Academiei Române, Memoriile Secțiunii Istorice*, Seria III, T. XVI (1934), p. 2. L'identité Coșuna - Bucovăț était pourtant connue avant cette date. Voir I. L. Athanasescu, *Mănăstirea Bucovăț, zisă Coșuna zisă Bucova din cătunul Mofleni, județul Dolj*, dans *Ion Maiorescu*, II, 1932, no. 1-2, pp. 57-68.

cer) Stepan et par son fils, Pirvu⁴. Les parois de son église sont recouvertes de fresques qui ont attiré l'attention des spécialistes⁵, tant pour leurs qualités artistiques, que pour leurs particularités iconographiques, en particulier pour la suite des portraits princiers du naos. La notoriété du monument est accentuée davantage par un ample texte slavon, inscrit sur la paroi ouest du naos, au-dessus des têtes des princes. Ce texte, daté du 1574, est connu sous le nom de «chronique peinte de Bucovăț» et il constitue une source importante pour l'histoire roumaine de la seconde moitié du XVI^e siècle⁶, notamment pour le règne d'Alexandre II Mircea (1569-1577) en Valachie, ainsi que pour les débuts du premier règne (1574-1577) de son frère, Pierre («le Boiteux») en Moldavie. Le monastère de Bucovăț fut «dédié», en 1588 déjà, au monastère de Barlaam, fait important pour nos observations.

Si l'identification de Coșuna à Bucovăț a permis d'élucider certains détails de l'histoire de cet établissement religieux, les problèmes soulevés par le registre conservé à Barlaam ont continué à rester en suspens.

Un progrès dans ce sens ne surviendra que plus de trente ans après, dans un travail publié par A. Sacerdoțeanu⁷. On y examine le privilège (*hrisov*) du 29 mars 1609 de Radu Vodă, dont l'original slavon se trouve dans les collections de l'Académie Roumaine, ainsi que les traductions successives de cet acte d'une importance particulière pour le monastère de Bycovăț.

Une première traduction du privilège se retrouve dans l'ancien registre du monastère, rédigé en 1741⁸. Une deuxième date de 1812

4. Données bibliographiques sur le monastère chez Nicolae Stoicescu, *Bibliografia localităților și monumentelor feudale din România, I- Tara Românească (Muntenia, Oltenia și Dobrogea)*, vol. 1, [Craiova:] Mitropolia Olteniei, 1970, pp. 103-105.

5. Voir dernièrement Carmen Laura Dumitrescu, *Pictura murăla din Tara Românească în veacul al XVI-lea*, București, Ed. Meridiane, 1978, pp. 61-63, avec bibliographie dans les notes.

6. Le texte de cette chronique dans *Cronicile slavo-române din secolele XV-XVI*, publiées par Ion Bogdan, édition revue par P.P. Panaitescu, București 1959, pp. 194-196.

7. A. Sacerdoțeanu, *Dionisie Eclisiarhul traducător al hrisovului din 1609 pentru mănăstirea Bucovățul*, dans *Mitropolia Olteniei*, an XIX (1967), no. 11-12, pp. 941-947.

8. Archives de l'Etat de Bucarest, ms. no. 722, ff. 606-614. Voir Ion G. Fănuică, *Indice Cronologie Nr. 7*, București 1949, p. 57, document no. 95.



appartient à Dionisie Eclisiarhul. Elle est écrite sur un rouleau de papier épais, conservé aux Archives de l'Etat à Bucarest⁹. Une note finale fait la précision suivante: «Ce document fut traduit mot à mot d'après le *hrisov* slavon authentique, le suivant en roumain à la lettre, par moi, Dionisie *eclisiarhu* de langue slavone, en l'an 1812»¹⁰.

Une troisième traduction du même acte, due également à Dionisie, se retrouve dans le registre «nouveau» (1813-1816)¹¹ du monastère et diffère en quelque sorte de la précédente (la copie volante de 1812).

Dans ce contexte, c'est-à-dire en s'occupant du registre «nouveau», Sacerdoțeanu fait une remarque pertinente sur le manuscrit de Barlaam et son auteur probable:

Nous croyons qu'on a fait d'après ce même registre un extrait de documents, *dû peut-être également à Dionisie Eclisiarhul* [italiques de D.I.] dans un registre qui se trouve aux monastères de Météores en Thessalie. Le texte du *hrisov* de 1609, copié dans celui-ci [registre «nouveau» - D.I.] correspond entièrement au texte de ce dernier registre [de Barlaam - D. I.], les rubriques y incluses¹².

Il s'agit de l'opinion d'un archiviste avisé, mais d'une opinion basée, ainsi qu'une note le prouve bien¹³, exclusivement sur le *texte* du registre de Barlaam *translittéré* par Iorga. L'aspect du manuscrit, ses particularités paléographiques et artistiques ne semblent pas avoir intéressé Sacerdoțeanu, car il ne mentionne pas le livre de Beza avec ses précieuses reproductions. Or, c'est justement cette mise en pages qui peut donner la clef d'une attribution sûre du manuscrit.

3. Arguments formels en faveur de l'attribution du manuscrit de Barlaam à Dionisie Eclisiarhul.

Les registres écrits par Dionisie pour différents monastères valaques respectent pour leur plupart — et ils en sont nombreux¹⁴ — un

9. Archives de l'Etat de Bucarest, collection «Suluri» no. 1. 312×37,5 cm.

10. Sacerdoțeanu, *op. cit.*, p. 947.

11. Archives de l'Etat de Bucarest, ms. no. 443, ff. 10-15. Fănuică, *op. cit.* même page, même document.

12. Sacerdoțeanu, *op. cit.*, p. 942.

13. *Ibidem*, note 6.

14. Dans la préface au registre du monastère de Govora (1796), Dionisie dresse un premier bilan des *condici* écrites en dix-sept ans d'activité laborieuse: dix

schéma décoratif qui se retrouve dans le manuscrit de Barlaam également: page de titre; représentation en pleine page du vocable du monastère respectif; divers ornements dans le corps proprement dit du registre, soit comme en-têtes des documents copiés, soit comme vignettes finales, à la place du sceau appliqué sur les actes originaux. Parfois la décoration introductive, hors-texte, est amplifiée de l'image plus ou moins stylisée de l'église, d'un portrait de l'hégoumène etc.

Dans le cas du registre de Barlaam, il faut rappeler de nouveau la présence des deux compositions patronales mentionnées (Saint Nicolas et la Toussaint).

Le meilleur terme de comparaison pour la décoration de ce dernier manuscrit en est offert par le manuscrit no. 443 des Archives de l'Etat de Bucarest (le registre «nouveau» du monastère de Bucovăț), dont l'auteur est sûrement Dionisie Eclisiarhul, ainsi que sa signature l'atteste (f. 5v.).

Les pages de titre des deux manuscrits présentent des similitudes allant jusqu'à l'identité des détails (voir les figures 1 et 2). Leurs cadres rectangulaires, bien que formés de fleurs différentes, sont conçus et exécutés de manière analogue. La page de titre du registre de Bucarest (f. 6 r.) est plus richement colorisée, car ses fleurs sont peintes en rouge, jaune et bleu, tandis que les tulipes stylisées du manuscrit de Barlaam sont uniquement de couleur rouge, d'un rouge vif, contrastant avec le vert des feuilles et des tiges (voir la planche en couleurs de *Urme românești*, dont on a fait déjà mention).

Les titres respectifs sont calligraphiés en encre rouge, en caractères parfois identiques. Celui du registre de Barlaam est plus développé, mettant en évidence le rapport de soumission du monastère vallaque à celui de Météores.

pièces. Voir Ion Virtosu, *Date noi despre Dionisie Eclisiarhul*, tirage à part de *Biserica Ortodoxă Română*, an LV (1937), no. 5-6, p. 5. Jusqu'à 1820, donc pendant les vingt-quatre ans suivants, le nombre de *condici* s'est accru sans cesse. I. Virtosu a essayé d'identifier au moins celles conservées aux Archives de l'Etat de Bucarest (*op. cit.*, p. 3, note 3). A ce type de manuscrit il faut ajouter d'autres encore, dont le plus répandu est sans doute l'obituaire (*pomelnic*). Une riche collection d'obituaires se trouve à la Bibliothèque de l'Académie Roumaine, section «Manuscrits et livres rares». A part ces ouvrages en forme de livre ou de cahier, Dionisie a exécuté de nombreuses copies volantes d'après divers documents.

La liste la plus complète des manuscrits de Dionisie ou attribués à lui (52 titres) fut donnée récemment par Radu Constantinescu dans sa monographie *Dionisie din Pietrari, miniaturist și caligraf*, București, 1982, pp. 60-62. Le registre de Barlaam n'y figure pas.

Une dernière observation sur la page de titre: l'allusion que Beza fait à un ange y déployant une toile, bien que contredite par la reproduction photographique, rappelle un type de page de titre assez fréquent chez Dionisie, en diverses variantes (voir, par exemple, les registres no. 1 et 3 du monastère de Bistrița, ainsi que celui du monastère de Govora, datant respectivement de 1795, 1796 et 1797 et conservés aux Archives de l'Etat de Bucarest sous les cotes mss. 192, 193 et 442).

La représentation du vocable du monastère de Bucovăț - Saint Nicolas - est à son tour très similaire dans les deux manuscrits (fig. 3 et 4). Les inévitables différences de détail ne diminuent en rien la parenté évidente des deux images. Le saint est figuré en pied, de face, en pose rigide. Sous ses pieds s'étend un terrain accidenté, tandis que dans la partie supérieure de la composition, Jésus et la Vierge apparaissent à mi-corps sur les nuages. Le cadre rectangulaire à fleurs du ms 443 est plus compliqué que celui purement géométrique du manuscrit de Barlaam; en plus, les fleurs colorées en jaune et bleu ajoutent un accent opportun à une image dominée par le noir de l'encre et les gris du lavis d'encre. L'inscription accompagnant le Saint Nicolas de Barlaam est plus explicite, précisant qu'il s'agit du vocable du monastère de Bucovăț; l'explication supplémentaire ne surprend pas dans un manuscrit destiné au monastère-patron, situé à des centaines de kilomètres de la Valachie.

Une troisième image de Saint Nicolas, elle-aussi à peu près identique aux deux précédentes, se retrouve dans l'obituaire du monastère de Bucovăț, conservé aux Archives de l'Etat de Bucarest (ms. 460). Le manuscrit porte la signature de Dionisie et la date de 1813 (f. 2v.). Malheureusement, nous n'en avons pas de photo, mais il faut dire que le miniaturiste y emploie la même technique, notamment celle des contours nets, remplis parfois de lavis d'encre ou de couleur jaune paille (l'auréole du saint, des taches sur ses vêtements). La légende en est concise: «St. Arhiereu Nicolae» (=St. archevêque Nicolas).

La présence de la Toussaint dans le manuscrit de Barlaam nous semble particulièrement significative. Elle prouve bien que le registre n'a pas échoué par hasard parmi les documents du monastère grec, mais qu'il fut conçu comme un extrait destiné expressément à ce même monastère.

Le registre de Barlaam, extrêmement réduit par rapport à son modèle de Bucovăț / Bucarest (24 feuilles contre 276) a eu donc dès le début la fonction assez insolite d'un document de présentation et de

représentation auprès du monastère-patron. Il ne joue pas, à vrai dire, le rôle d'un véritable registre monastique, mais plutôt celui des lettres de créance, pour utiliser un terme emprunté à la diplomatie.

Nous ne connaissons pas d'autres représentations de la Toussaint dans le répertoire d'images de Dionisie. C'est pour cela que nous offrons comme terme de comparaison à cette scène complexe (fig. 5) une autre composition à plusieurs personnages (fig. 6), notamment le vocable du monastère d'Arnota, exécuté en pleine page (f. 4 r.) dans le registre de ce monastère, datant de 1804¹⁵.

Quant à l'en-tête héraldique ornant la transcription de la charte du prince Radu Șerban en faveur du monastère (fig. 7), il nous semble opportun de faire la remarque que la traduction volante de ce même document, que nous avons déjà mentionnée, est ornée à son tour d'un en-tête similaire. En l'absence d'une reproduction photographique de l'acte, nous nous contentons de la description détaillée de Sacerdoțeanu: «Frontispice en couleurs: écu rond au corbeau la croix au bec, timbré d'une couronne fermée avec épée et masse d'armes, le tout soutenu par deux lions [...]»¹⁶.

Il s'agit d'ailleurs d'une composition assez répandue dans les manuscrits de Dionisie, que nous exemplifions avec une variante plus soigneusement exécutée (fig. 8), tirée du ms. 192 des Archives de l'Etat de Bucarest (registre no. 1 du monastère de Bistrița, en Olténie; 1795).

La tradition de ce type d'emblème remonte au moins à un document émis le 10 mai 1669 par Antonie Vodă à Bucarest, acte sur lequel les tenants zoomorphes qui soutiennent le médaillon à corbeau s'enchêvêtrent dans des rameaux rappelant les entrelacs des frontispices traditionnels dans l'illustration des manuscrits¹⁷.

5. *Dionisie et la monastère de Bucovăț*

Dans les pérégrinations du moine valaque¹⁸, le séjour à Bucovăț

15. Bibliothèque de l'Académie Roumaine, Section «Manuscrits et livres rares». Reclassé comme document, sous le sigle CMXIV.

16. Sacerdoțeanu, *op. cit.*, p. 947.

17. Archives de l'Etat de Bucarest, collection «Peceti», no. 75. Reproduit dans *Din tezaurul arhivelor. Album de documente*, București, Direcția Generală a Arhivelor Statului din Republica Socialistă România, fig. 43. Détail avec le frontispice: fig. 44.

18. Une tentative de reconstituer son itinéraire, chez I. Vîrtosu, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-6.

paraît avoir représenté un moment de calme. De santé fragile, Dionisie s'y rejouissait de «l'air pur [favorable] à la santé» qui l'attachait encore plus à ce monastère, situé «près de la ville renommée de Craïova»¹⁹. Les détails de ce séjour formèrent l'objet d'une étude de Ion Donat²⁰, qui publia à cette occasion la préface (*proïmion*) du registre «nouveau» de Bucovăț, c'est-à-dire du ms. 443 (ancienne cote 146) des Archives de l'Etat de Bucarest.

La postface du même registre, publiée par Ion Vîrtosu²¹, témoigne de l'application avec laquelle Dionisie continuait à se dédier à ses activités favorites: copier des documents, traduire des originaux slavons, rassembler en ordre les actes dans des registres. Cette postface est datée le 30 novembre 1813.

L'année 1813 figure également, en encre rouge, auprès de la signature de Dionisie dans l'*Obituaire* de Bucovăț (ms. 460 des Archives de l'Etat de Bucarest, f. 2 v.). L'extrait destiné à Barlaam pourrait donc avoir été transcrit soit parallèlement au registre proprement dit et à l'obituaire, soit aussitôt après l'achèvement de ceux-ci, c'est-à-dire au cours de l'année 1813 ou au début de l'année suivante.

Le lien particulier qu'attachait Dionisie au monastère de Bucovăț ressort au plus clair des donations généreuses que le moine fit à cet établissement, donations notées par lui-même dans le *Pomelnic* de 1813²²: presque 800 *taleri*, somme considérable pour quelqu'un qui, sept ans plus tard, sollicitait au *divan* de Craïova un subside de la caisse de charité (*cutiia milostivirii*), afin de pouvoir terminer sa vie de manière décente²³.

Ces donations situaient Dionisie parmi les bienfaiteurs du monastère, lui conférant le droit d'inscrire les noms de ses proches parents dans le *Pomelnic*²⁴. Cette liste a servi à reconstruire dans une certaine mesure le *background* familial de Dionisie²⁵.

19. Notations reprises par Ion Vîrtosu, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

20. Ion Donat, *Dionisie Ecclesiarhul și mănăstirea Bucovăț. — Un «proïmion» și pomelnicul mănăstirii*, dans *Arhivele Olteniei*, XV (1936), no. 83-85, pp. 22-39.

21. I. Vîrtosu, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-20.

22. Archives de l'Etat de Bucarest, ms. no. 460, f. 15v.

23. I. Vîrtosu, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-23 (pièces no. 12, 13 et 14).

24. Archives de l'Etat de Bucarest, ms. no. 460, f. 15r.

25. Ion Donat, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

6. Une remarque iconographique

L'illustration des manuscrits que Dionisie a écrits pour le monastère de Bucovăț nous a confronté - par ricochet - à une question d'iconographie, soulevée par les fresques de l'église conventuelle. Il s'agit de la présence insolite de la Toussaint (ou la Deuxième Parousie) dans la conque de l'abside sud de l'église²⁶.

Carmen Laura Dumitrescu remarque, dans sa synthèse sur la peinture murale en Valachie au XVI^e siècle, que cette scène n'a pas de réplique dans le répertoire iconographique de l'époque²⁷. Elle ne semble d'ailleurs pas avoir gagné en faveur à une époque ultérieure non plus, en jugeant, par exemple, d'après un riche cahier de modèles (XV^e-XIX^e siècle); publié par Teodora Voinescu²⁸.

En tout cas, la place d'honneur que la scène occupe dans le naos incite C. L. Dumitrescu à chercher une explication adéquate de cette particularité iconographique. Sa théorie est séduisante, au moins à la première vue: l'*Anastasis* de la conque nord et la *Toussaint* de la conque sud seraient «deux thèmes d'un caractère triomphal bien marqué» dont la mise en correspondance aurait exprimé une «intention sans équivoque» de «souligner la victoire terrestre des voievodes [Alexandre II en Valachie et Pierre de Boiteux] en Moldavie] par la commémoration de la victoire divine»²⁹. Une analogie aux mosaïques de Torcello, construite à l'aide d'une citation d'André Grabar, devrait dissiper — dans la vision de l'auteur — les doutes du lecteur devant une interprétation par trop politisée (pourtant, à Torcello, les allusions politiques sont inexistantes).

La présence du politique à Bucovăț est indiscutable, ainsi que les portraits princiers et la «chronique peinte» le prouvent bien. La question est de savoir si la recherche des significations politiques ne risque parfois d'aller trop loin³⁰. Nous en avons la conviction que tout

26. Carmen Laura Dumitrescu, *op. cit.*, photo 33.

27. *Ibidem*, p. 62.

28. Teodora Voinescu, *Un caiet de modele de pictura medievală românească*, dans *Pagini de veche artă românească*, III, București, 1974, pp. 147-276. La Toussaint n'y figure pas. Cependant, le motif central de la Toussaint de Bucovăț, c'est-à-dire la préparation du trône du Jugement (avec Deisis) se retrouve assez souvent dans le cahier, en tant qu'élément de l'iconographie du Jugement Dernier *Catalogue*, no. 33, 68, 143; fig. 147.

29. C. L. Dumitrescu, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

30. Dans l'introduction au livre cité (p. 7), C. L. Dumitrescu dévoile la source

rapprochement — quelque voilé qu'il fût — entre la Descente aux Limbes ou la Deuxième Parousie et une victoire militaire contemporaine aurait frisé, à la fin du XVI^e siècle, le sacrilège.

Même si les fresques du naos avaient représenté un ex-voto, à la suite de la bataille de Roșcani entre Pierre le Boiteux et Jean l'Arménien ou le Terrible (rebaptisé «de Brave» dans l'historiographie récente³¹) — telle est la thèse de C. L. Dumitrescu —, l'intervention des donateurs dans le programme iconographique n'aurait certainement pu revêtir de telles formes excessives.

La *Toussaint* de Bucovăț ne représente, à notre avis, que le vocable du monastère-patron, c'est-à-dire du monastère de Barlaam (Ἁγίου Πάντων) aux Météores, sans aucune connotation politique. Elle est donc une «déclaration de vassalité» monastique en image.

Conclusion logique: la scène n'appartient pas à l'ensemble de 1574; elle fut exécutée *après* la subordination de Bucovăț à Barlaam (1588, selon Stoicescu³²; 1591, selon C. L. Dumitrescu³³), mais en tout cas *avant* 1834, lorsque l'église fut cédée à la communauté villageoise, à la suite de l'édification d'un couvent neuf dans la proximité de l'ancien³⁴.

Lors de nos visites à Bucovăț, nous avons été frappé par les différences de style entre cette scène et les registres inférieurs de la décoration du naos. Ni une éventuelle participation de deux peintres à

de ses conceptions méthodologiques: «Les recherches de Sorin Ulea, consacrées à la peinture des monuments moldaves, à la peinture extérieure en particulier [...] ont jeté — dans notre historiographie de l'art — les fondements d'une nouvelle méthode d'investigation du phénomène artistique médiéval, du langage iconographique, méthode conformément à laquelle le facteur socio-politique du moment de la fondation reçoit un poids nouveau et déterminant. De cette méthode d'interprétation, nous nous réclamons à notre tour». La plus susceptible de provoquer des mutations théoriques nous semble la première partie d'une étude de Sorin Ulea sur *Originea și semnificația ideologică a picturii exterioare moldovenești*, dans *Studii și cercetări de istoria artei*, X (1963), pp. 57-93; version française dans *Revue Roumaine d'Histoire*, II (1968), no. 1, pp. 29-71, sous le titre: *L'origine et la signification idéologique de la peinture extérieure moldave*.

31. Dinu C. Giurescu, *Ion Vodă cel Viteaz*, București, Editura Științifică, 1968; idem, *Ion Vodă cel Viteaz*, București, Editura Militară, 1974.

32. *Op. cit.*, p. 103.

33. *Pictura de la Bucovăț*, dans *Buletinul Monumentelor Istorice*, XL (1971) no. 4, p. 66.

34. Stoicescu, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

la réalisation de l'ensemble³⁵, ni des repeints ne pourraient justifier de telles différences flagrantes.

C'est une banalité de rappeler que la peinture des coupoles, des conques ou du plafond d'une église est tout particulièrement exposée à la dégradation. Il suffit de regarder les déploiements iconographiques de l'église de Bucovăț pour vérifier ce lieu commun³⁶. «Dans la conque et sur la voûte du bēma, la peinture est détruite» — remarque, à cette même église, C. L. Dumitrescu³⁷. *L'Anastasis* de la conque nord est à son tour «malheureusement assez détériorée et altérée par des repeints», tandis que la conque sud est «massivement repeinte»³⁸. Ailleurs, elle observe que «les scènes et les représentations de la partie supérieure de l'édifice sont altérées par les repeints du XIX^e siècle»³⁹.

Dans ces conditions, il est naturel de supposer que la *Toussaint* eût remplacé à une date difficilement à préciser — en jugeant d'après le style, dans la seconde moitié du XVIII^e siècle ou plutôt dans le premier tiers du siècle suivant — une scène détériorée, appartenant à l'ensemble initial. Le choix du thème fut probablement dicté par la volonté d'un hégoumène zélé d'afficher à la vue de tous la dépendance du monastère valaque de celui thessalien.

Il en reste un problème à élucider, notamment les différences iconographiques considérables entre la *Toussaint* peinte à l'intérieur de l'église valaque et celle ornant le registre abrégé du monastère. L'illustration due à Dionisie est très approximative au point de vue de l'iconographie, d'une conception hésitante, en contraste avec la rigueur qui préside la peinture murale de Bucovăț. L'élément central de la scène, c'est-à-dire le trône du Jugement flanqué de la Vierge et de Saint Jean, est absent dans la miniature de Dionisie: son rôle est assumé par une table-autel, placée en premier plan, devant la procession des saints et en l'interrompant. La croix que Saints Constantin et Hélène devait soutenir leur est «échappée des mains» et s'est réfugiée derrière la table, entre deux anges.

Autres différences entre le schéma de la peinture murale et celui

35. C. L. Dumitrescu, *Pictura murală din Țara Românească în secolul al XVI-lea*, éd. cit., p. 79.

36. *Ibidem*, pp. 38-39.

37. C. L. Dumitrescu, *Pictura de la Bucovăț*, éd. cit., p. 66.

38. *Ibidem*, p. 67.

39. *Eadem*, *Pictura murală din Țara Românească în secolul al XVI-lea*, éd. cit., p. 79.

de la miniature: mandorle flanquée par deux anges en vol — mandorle flanquée par le tétramorphe; procession des saints sur deux gradins — procession sur trois gradins; Adam et Saint Constantin à gauche, — Eve et Sainte Hélène à droite — Eve et Sainte Hélène à gauche, Adam et Saint Constantin à droite.

Il est évident que la miniature eut un autre modèle que la peinture murale. En figurant cette scène inhabituelle, Dionisie aurait pu éviter les confusions et les maladresses, s'il avait eu la possibilité de voir la représentation monumentale au naos de l'église conventuelle. Une telle possibilité lui fit défaut, selon toute vraisemblance. Cela s'expliquerait soit par une détérioration avancée de la peinture, au point de la rendre illisible (à la suite, par exemple, de l'incendie de 1781 ou d'une autre catastrophe), soit par *l'inexistence* de la scène à cette époque.

Nous croyons plutôt à la seconde hypothèse, d'autant plus qu'en 1813 on se préparait à repeindre l'église en collectant de l'argent ou l'on était peut-être déjà en train d'exécuter la nouvelle peinture. Parmi les donateurs à ce propos figure aussi Dionisie, ainsi qu'une notice insérée par lui-même dans l'Obituaire de 1813 le proclame: «Tot acest Eclisiarh au dat ajutor la zugrăvirea besericii tal[eri] 600» (Ce même Eclisiarh a contribué à faire peindre l'église avec 600 *taleri*)⁴⁰. Somme forte, en jugeant d'après la dépense que Dionisie faisait pour une lampe en argent à pendre devant l'iconostase: 20 *taleri*, donc seulement 1/30 du montant destiné à la peinture⁴¹.

7. Conclusions

Le registre du monastère de Bucovăț, conservé au monastère de Barlaam aux Météores, est un extrait d'après le registre proprement dit qui se trouve à présent aux Archives de l'Etat de Bucarest.

L'écriture, la mise en page et l'illustration du manuscrit révèlent son auteur, notamment Dionisie Eclisiarhul, fameux copiste, miniaturiste, traducteur et chroniqueur à la fin du XVIII^e siècle et au début du siècle suivant en Valachie. Les arguments de l'histoire de l'art et de la paléographie confirment ainsi une intuition antérieure, basée

40. Archives de l'Etat de Bucarest, ms. no. 460, f. 15v.

41. *ibidem*, même page.

exclusivement sur les similitudes textuelles entre le registre complet et sa version abrégée.

Le manuscrit de Barlaam fut écrit à Bucovăț, très probablement en 1813, lorsque Dionisie exécuta deux autres manuscrits — le registre «nouveau» et l'obituaire du monastère — les deux signés et datés par leur auteur. Ce même cahier avait plutôt un caractère de parade, étant destiné au monastère-patron, ainsi que la figuration du vocable de cet établissement le montre.

Le vocable du monastère de Barlaam — la *Toussaint* — justifie en même temps la place d'honneur qu'une intervention ultérieure accorda à cette scène assez inaccoutumée au point de vue iconographique dans le naos de l'église conventuelle de Bucovăț, modifiant de cette manière l'ensemble de 1574.



Fig. 1. *Registre abrégé du monastère de Bucovăț. Page de titre Monastère de Barlaam (d'après M. Beza).*




Fig. 2. *Dionisie Eclisiarhul: registre «nouveau» du monastère de Bucovăț, 1813. Page de titre. Archives de l'Etat de Bucarest ms. no. 443, f. 6r.*



*Fig. 3. Registre abrégé du monastère de Bucovăț. Saint Nicolas, composition en pleine page.
Monastère de Barlaam (d'après M. Beza)*



*Fig 4. Dionisie Eclisiarhul. registre «nouveau» du monastère de Bucovăț, 1813.
Saint Nicolas, composition en pleine page.
Archives de l'Etat de Bucarest, ms. no. 443, f. 7r.*



Fig. 5. Registre abrégé du monastère de Bucovăț. La Toussaint, composition en pleine page.
Monastère de Barlaam (d'après M. Beza).



Fig. 6. Dionisie Eclisiarhul: registre du monastère d'Arnota, 1804. Les Saints-Archanges, composition en pleine page. Bibliothèque de l'Académie Roumaine, section «Manuscrits et livres rares», CMXIV, f. 4r.




Fig. 7. Registre abrégé du monastère de Bucovoş. Copie d'une charte émise par le prince Radu Şerban en 1609.
Monastère de Barlaam (d'après M. Beza)



Fig. 8. Dionisie Eclisiarhul: registre no. 1 du monastère de Bistriţa en Olténie (1975).
En-tête d'un document, détail.
Archives de l'Etat de Bucarest ms. no. 192.

ATHANASSIOS E. KARATHANASSIS

L'EXEMPLE D' UN ÉRUDIT GREC EN MOLDOVALACHIE: ALEXANDRE AMIRAS (1679-1740 ci.)

En 1728-9, Grégoire Gkikas, quitta ses fonctions de drogman à la Sublime Porte et arriva à Iași consacré, déjà, prince de Moldavie; dans ce voyage il était accompagné par de nombreux phanariotes qui allaient être nommés hauts fonctionnaires de sa cour. A ces phanariotes de Constantinople allaient s'ajouter quelques autres courtisans et des fonctionnaires, autochtones phanariotes ou indigènes, jusqu'alors au service de son prédécesseur Mihail Racovitsa (1716-1729). Un de ces derniers était Alexandre Amiras, personnage remarquable à l'époque, mais peu connu aujourd'hui, lequel constitue un cas représentatif du climat phanariote dans les principautés danubiennes. Alexandre Amiras est un lettré distingué par son esprit cosmopolite, phénomène courant dans les premières décennies du XVIII^{ème} siècle. Sa carrière professionnelle s'étend dans les cours d'un roi exilé et de deux princes de Moldavie (un autochtone et un grec phanariote). Il a laissé deux œuvres (et une autre encore qu'on lui attribue avec des réserves), œuvres, qui constituent des sources précieuses d'informations sur l'époque. Malgré son activité tellement riche et intéressante, Alexandre Amiras et son œuvre sont restés jusqu'ici presque inconnus. Nous croyons, donc, que l'étude qui suit sera considérée comme une première ébauche d'étude de sa vie et de son œuvre¹.

Sur sa vie nous ne possédons que d'indirectes témoignages dispersés dans son œuvre sur le roi suédois Charles XII. Particulièrement pour les deux premières décennies l'inexistence de témoignages rend impossible la connaissance de son milieu familial, de ses études, de ses maîtres. Un document tiré par E. Legrand des Archives du Col-

1. Le premier qui s'occupa de la personnalité d'Alexandre Amiras fut N. Iorga qui édita sa chronique sur la vie du roi suédois Charles XII, voir *Studii și Documente cu privire la Istoria Românilor* [Études et Documents concernant l'histoire des roumains], București 1906, pp. 41-124. Une petite contribution sur Amiras fut écrite par D. Russo, *Studii Istorice Greco-Române - Opere Postume*, [Études Historiques greco-roumaines - Oeuvres Posthumes] éd. Ariadna et Nestor Camariano, vol. I, București 1939, pp. 198-203. Récemment Andrei Pippidi, remarqua qu'Amiras était une personnalité «qu'on devrait étudier plus attentivement» — A. Pippidi, *Hommes et idées du Sud-Est Européen à l'aube de l'âge moderne*, București - Paris 1980, p. 159 note 169.

lège Saint Athanase à Rome nous informe qu' Amiras est né en 1679 à Smyrne et nous donne les noms de ses parents, à savoir de son père Christophoros Amiras et de sa mère Anna Pangalou². Amiras a dû y fréquenter une école pour ses premières études qu'il poursuivit à Rome au renommé Collège Catholique de Saint Athanase. Nous rappelons ici que Smyrne et la périphérie d'Asie Mineure, de même que les îles d'Archipel, constituaient, à partir du XVII^e siècle, les régions de l'expansion de la propagande des missionnaires catholiques. Les études d'Amiras dans ce Collège ne furent pas couronnées de succès, puisque peu après son entrée au Collège il en fut chassé (août 1704); on attribue son expulsion à sa mauvaise conduite pendant son bref séjour en qualité de boursier au Collège. Le volontaire, ou bien involontaire, départ de jeunes grecs du Collège Papal de Rome était courant d'ailleurs, dû, le plus souvent à leur réaction face à la propagande catholique. Le document, trouvé par Legrand, est la seule source, qui nous a donné ces peu nombreuses informations sur la vie d'Amiras; tout d'abord, le document montre l'inquiétude des dirigeants du Collège quant au cas d'Amiras et d'autre part nous présente un Amiras homme difficile qui ne peut pas vivre dans le cadre étroit du Collège. Le Collège avec ses agents suivra par la suite le bref vagabondage de son ancien élève en Italie; le même document nous informe qu'Amiras, ayant revêtu le froc, passa premièrement par Naples et de là à Messina (18 sept. 1704), où le prêtre de l'église orthodoxe de Saint Catherine des Grecs, Athanase Kavalis, lui donna l'hospitalité. Ce dernier, toujours selon les informations du Collège, fit chasser Amiras, après avoir compris son mauvais caractère.

La suite n'est pas connue. Probablement Amiras, âgé déjà de 24 ans, passa à Smyrne ou à Constantinople où il travailla comme drogman dans une cour diplomatique pendant la période 1705 ci. — 1708. En 1709 nous retrouvons Alexandre Amiras au service du roi suédois Charles XII qui, à cette époque — là, séjournait à Bender, et attendait l'appui turc pour pouvoir prendre la revanche de sa défaite par Pierre le Grand à Poltava (1709). L'année 1709 est la première présence

2. Une copie de ce document est conservée dans les Archives de l'Institut Néohellénique de la Sorbonne, *Katálouga* (Restes) E. Legrand - *liasse Documents grecs-Collège grec du Rome*. Je note ici une probable parenté d'Alexandre Amiras avec Mihail Damiral (Μιχαήλ Δ. Ἀμυρά) qui fréquenta pendant les années 1699-1702 le Collège grec d'Oxford — E. D. Tappe, *Alumni of the Greek College at Oxford, 1699-1705*, en *Notes and Queries*, 200, series 2, 1955, p. 110.

témoignée d'Alexandre Amiras à Bender; nous devons cette mention à Serapheim Mytilinaios³, un autre lettré grec, épris de cet esprit de vagabondage, qui, en 1732, arrivant en Russie, fut arrêté par les autorités russes, soupçonné comme agent de Charles XII. Sérapheim répondant à l'interrogatoire russe mentionna, entre autres, la présence d'Amiras auprès de roi suédois à Bender⁴. Nous ne saurions comprendre les circonstances qui conduisirent Amiras au service des suédois, si surtout nous tenons compte du fait qu'à l'époque l'Hellénisme mettait tous ses espoirs en Pierre le Grand, ennemi ardent de Charles de Suède. Au service de Charles Amiras resta jusqu'en 1716, date où la vie agitée du roi prend fin, pendant le siège de la cité norvégienne de Friederichstat (Frederikshall). Toutes les impressions d'Amiras sur sa collaboration avec le roi passeront dans une chronique, écrite par lui-même, probablement un peu avant sa mort (1740). A partir de cette date (1716) Amiras entra au service de Mihail Racovitsa, prince de Moldavie en sa qualité de Grand Portar (Μέγας Πορτάρης)⁵, dignité d'une importance secondaire dans la hiérarchie de la cour. Mais après l'ascension au trône moldave de Gkikas le lettré phanariote Amiras améliora

3. Serapheim, originaire de Mytilène, était un aventurier connu de l'époque, un ecclésiastique habile, un lettré; il vécut longtemps à la cour de Pierre le Grand et après entra au service de Charles XII. Un autre érudit de l'époque, ennemi ardent de Serapheim, Alexandre Helladius écrivit beaucoup contre Serapheim, qu'il accusait d'espionnage en faveur de Charles XII. «*Num etiam ego talis nebulo esse desiderem, qualis fuit Seraphimus, qui post tot accepta a Rege Petro beneficia, jam Benderae, apud Regem Sueciae, interpretem ageret*»; voir Helladius, *Status praesens ecclesiae graecae* [Nuremberg] 1714, pp. 226-292 (et particulièrement pp. 249-292 et 287 (pour la citation). Les russes se rappelèrent toutes ces accusations quand vingt ans après Serapheim visita leur pays, 1732; ils l'arrêtèrent et l'interrogèrent. Serapheim était considéré suspect de collaboration avec les Suédois. A ce sujet voir K. Palaiologos, 'Ο Έλλην κληρικὸς Σερᾶφιμ [L'ecclésiastique grec Serapheim] dans la revue *Parnassos* 4 (1880) 28-51 : il s'agit de la traduction de l'étude de G. Gesipov, dans la revue *Ancienne et Nouvelle Russie*, 1876, n° 4 - cfr. K. N. Sathas, *Littérature Néohellénique*, Athènes 1868, pp. 451-452.

4. Dans un rapport (1732) concernant son activité précédente Serapheim mentionne qu'il était allé, en 1709, à Constantinople accompagnant un certain Neygebauer, ex ambassadeur de Charles XII à Constantinople, lequel fut remplacé par le commandant Fug qui présenta à la Sublime Porte une demande du roi afin que ce dernier puisse continuer la guerre contre Pierre le Grand. Les documents présentés aux Turcs furent accompagnés d'une traduction en latin faite à Bender par Amiras ou par un certain Garvison — voir Palaiologos, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

5. *Cronica Chiculeștilor*, éd. Nestor Camariano et Ariadna Camariano-Cioran, București 1965, p. 200-la citation se réfère à l'année 1717.

sa place nommé, cette fois, par Gkikas *mare sluger* de sa cour princière⁶. En tout cas, selon les recherches de D. Russo, Amiras ne fut pas nommé *postelnic*, comme N. Iorga l'avait soutenu⁷. Un peu après l'arrivée de Gkikas⁸ à Iași son *mare sluger* et, en même temps bon *connaisseur des choses*, fut chargé par le prince de traduire du roumain ou bien du moldave en grec moderne les chroniqueurs moldaves Miron Costin (1633-1691) et son fils Nicolas Costin⁹ (1660 ci.— 1712), dont les chroniques s'étendent des périodes 1601-1661 et de la fondation de Moldavie jusqu'au 1601 respectivement. Les chroniques des Costin, père et fils, est complétée par une autre chronique attribuée à Alexandre Amiras¹⁰; mais

6. Ce titre d'Amiras est mentionné en tête de sa traduction de l'histoire de Moldavie (1729).

7. Russo, *Studii Istorice Greco-Române*, p. 201-203.

8. Pour les Gkikas voir l'étude récente de Stefan S. Govorei, *Observații noi într-o controversă veche (familia Gkica din Moldova)* [Nouvelles remarques sur une ancienne discussion—Famille Gkika de Moldavie], dans *Annuarul Institutului de Istorie și Arheologie, A. D. Xenopol* 15 (1978) 315-324.

9. L'amour de Gkikas pour l'éducation passe dans la chronique des Gkikas, p. 286: «Τούτος δ' αὐθέντης, τῷ δευτέρῳ χρόνῳ τῆς αὐθεντίας του, διὰ μέσου τοῦ Πατριάρχου τῆς Ἱερουσαλὴμ κυρίου Χρυσάνθου, ὁποῦ ἐνρέθη εἰς τὴν Μολδαβίαν, ἐδίδαξε Σχολὰς εἰς τὸ Γιάσι δι' ἐξόδων ἰδίων ἑλληνικὴν καὶ κοινὴν καὶ μολδαβικὴν διὰ νὰ μαθαίνωσιν ἀδωροδοκῆτως ὅχι μόνον τὰ παιδία τῶν πτωχῶν, ἀποὺ δὲν ἔχουσι νὰ πληρώσωσι τὸν διδάσκαλον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ παιδία τῶν ἀρχόντων, μεγάλων καὶ μικρῶν, καὶ ἀκόμη ἀπὸ ξένους τόπους ἤρχοντο διὰ νὰ μάθωσι, διὰ τὰς ὁποίας σχολὰς οὐκ ὀλίγον μνημόσυνον τοῦ ἀπέμεινε, διότι περισσότερα σπάνη γραμμάτων λογιζώ νὰ μὴν ἦτον εἰς ἄλλους τόπους ἀπὸ τὴν Μολδαβίαν [Ce prince, pendant la seconde année de son règne finança la fondation en Moldavie d'une école de langue grecque ancienne, moderne et moldave laquelle fonctionnait sous les hospices du patriarche de Jérusalem Crysanthé Notaras, afin que les enfants pauvres puissent y étudier gratuitement, aussi bien que les enfants des seigneurs. Ces écoles étaient fréquentées par des enfants venus de l'étranger et assurèrent une glorieuse carrière à Gkikas car à mon avis la Moldavie se trouvait en retard par rapport aux autres pays du point de vue éducatif...]. Cfr. A. Camariano-Cioran, *Les Académies Princières de Bucarest et de Jassy et leurs professeurs*, Thessalonique 1974, pp. 88-91.

10. Ce désir fut exprimé avant le commencement du siècle des phanariotes dans les principautés danubiennes. Le savant Ioannis Komninos, maître à la cour princière de K. Kantémir à Iași, demanda au métropolite d'Adrianople Neophyte Philaretos (ci. 1683) de se charger de l'envoi des livres concernant l'histoire des pays roumains; «... Καὶ τίποτα ιστορίας τοῦ τόπου ἐδῶ ἂν ἤθελεν σὰς τύχη ἢ ἄλλοθεν ποῦ ἤθελες εἶρεν, κοινολογῆστέ της καὶ εἰς ἡμᾶς ὁποῦ ἔχομεν πόθον πολὺν περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ιστορίας [... Et s'il vous tombait entre les mains quelques histoires de ce pays, ou que vous en preniez connaissance d'autres qui paraissent ailleurs, communiquez-nous-les qui sommes avides de les connaître.] — voir *Bibliothèque de l'Académie Roumaine, Codex Kritiou*, t. 284^v.

ici se pose le problème de la paternité de cette troisième chronique, qui a occupé les chercheurs roumains. Et pour finir avec sa vie, Amiras était installé à Constantinople vers 1739, et habita avec son épouse à Peran, à savoir ce quartier très connu comme résidence des diverses missions diplomatiques auprès de la Sublime Porte¹¹. Nous ne connaissons pas la date de sa mort qui doit être située après 1740. Quant à ses descendants dans les pays roumains nous citerions, avec certaines réserves, le cas d'un Athanase Amiras, qui a fait une carrière de haut fonctionnaire en Valachie comme vel-serdar (1745) et vel medelnicer (1751-1753)¹².

L' OEUVRE D' AMIRAS

Sa principale œuvre est la traduction de l'histoire de Moldavie des Miron et Nicolas Costin, parachevée en 1729; l'autre œuvre, sa chronique sur Charles XII, a dû être écrite après 1730. Le titre complet de la traduction en grec moderne est le suivant: *Βιβλίον Ιστορικὸν περιέχον τὰς ἡγεμονίας, καὶ διαγωγὰς τῶν ἐν Μολδαβίᾳ ἡγεμονευσάντων αὐθέντων, καὶ ἐτέρων γειτνιαζόντων κατασποράδην, ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ τοῦ Δράγοσι βόδα καὶ καθεξῆς περατούμενον μέχρι τοῦ νῦν. Συντεθὲν μὲν πρῶτον παρὰ τοῦ Μεγάλου Λογοθέτου Μυρῶν Κωστήν εἰς μολδαβικὴν γλῶτταν. Μεταφρασθὲν δὲ διὰ προσταγῆς τοῦ ὑψηλοτάτου καὶ θεοσεβεστάτου αὐθέντου καὶ ἡγεμόνος, πάσης Μολδοβλαχίας κυρίου, κυρίου Ἰωάννου Γρηγορίου Γκίκια βοεβόδα. Εἰς τὴν ἡμετέραν ἀπλὴν διάλεκτον παρὰ τοῦ ἄρχοντος πρώην μέγα σλοντζάρου Ἀλεξάνδρου Ἀμηρᾶ τοῦ Σμυρναίου. Ἐν Γκισαίοις Ἐν ἔτει ἀπὸ Χριστοῦ ἀρχῶν κατὰ μῆνα Φεβρουάριον* [Livre historique contenant les règnes et les gestes des princes régnant en Moldavie et d'autres voisins à commencer par le voivode Dragosis et ainsi de suite jusqu'à nos jours, tout d'abord rédigé par le Grand Logothète Miron Costin en moldave et traduit par la suite sur l'ordre du très grand et très pieux seigneur, prince de toute la Moldovalachie Sr. Sr. Ioannis Grigorios Gkikas voivode, en notre simple dialecte par le notable ex grand sluger Alexandre Amiras, originaire de Smyrne. A Iași, 1729 après J. C. en février].

11. Constantin I. Karadja, Deux lettres du drogman Alessandro Amira, dans la revue *Revue Historique du Sud-Est Européen*, Paris - Bucarest 6 (1929) 336-339.

12. Theodora Rădulescu, Sfatul domnesc și alți mari dregători Tării Românești din secolul al XVIII-lea — Liste cronologice și cursus honorum [Le conseil princier et d'autres grands dignitaires du Pays Roumain du XVIII^{ème} siècle—Catalogues chronologiques et un cursus honorum], dans *Revista Arhivelor* 34 (1972) 453, 461, 407.

La traduction en question provoqua quelques problèmes du point de vue littéraire et historique qui intéressent plutôt la recherche roumaine, examinés, d'ailleurs, dans le passé par des roumains philologues et historiens¹³. Cette traduction d'Amiras subsista dans deux manuscrits: le Suppl. grec 6 de la Bibliothèque Nationale de Paris et le deuxième, qui appartenait à la collection du médecin Kambanis, à Andros (Cyclades), fut présenté par Spyridon Lambros dans *Neos Hellénomnemon* (1914)¹⁴. J'ignore le sort du deuxième code. Plus accessible à la recherche j'ai consulté le code parisien, déjà décrit qu'il est, par le dr. Charles Astruc dans son catalogue, encore inédit, sur les manuscrits grecs de la Bibliothèque Nationale de Paris¹⁵. Le manuscrit d'Amiras qui se trouve à Paris, lequel n'est peut-être pas un autographe d'Amiras¹⁶, est passé de bonne heure dans des mains françaises. Le missionnaire royal pour la collecte des manuscrits en Orient Sevin écrivait au ministre Maurepas que le prince de Moldavie Grégoire Gkikas... «plein d'envie de faire plaisir au docteur Fonseca, a donné l'ordre qu'on fouillât dans les monastères de son petit Etat, qui, par malheur, ont été pillés à différentes reprises. Il doit au premier jour nous faire présent d'une histoire de Moldavie et des provinces voisines, composée en langue du pays; elle n'a point encore vu le jour et en parle comme d'un chef-d'oeuvre»¹⁷. Face à cette information nous devons être réservés, puisque ici il va de soi que les soins de Gkikas vont à la collecte des manuscrits des chroniques des Costin et non à la traduction d'Amiras. En tout cas cette probabilité montre l'intérêt du prin-

13. Je pense qu'à cette époque-là circulèrent divers manuscrits-copies de cette traduction d'Amiras. Cfr. les informations que Boscovich avait eu de l'higoumène du monastère Cernauji, à savoir qu'à Iasi existait «un manuscrit qui contient l'histoire de la Moldavie, qui n'a pas encore été publié. Elle a été compilée par les ordres de Grégoire Gkikas, prince de Moldavie, il y a trente-six ans». Voir Boscovich, *Journal d'un voyage de Constantinople en Pologne, fait à la suite de M. Porter, ambassadeur d'Angleterre*, Lausanne 1772, p. 255.

14. ΚΩΔΙΞ 'Αλεξάνδρου Ἀμυρά ἐν Ἀνδρῶν [Code d'Alexandre Amiras à Andros], dans *Neos Hellénomnemon* 11 (1914) 183-185.

15. Je lui adresse tous mes vifs remerciements.

16. Spyridon Lambros, *op. cit.*, p. 183, a soutenu que le code d'Andros «ἔχει πολλά διασβέσματα καὶ διορθώσεις, ἐξ ὧν ἀποδεικνύεται ὅτι εἶνε αὐτόγραφος, τοῦ μεταφραστοῦ Ἀμυρά» [«a beaucoup de ratures et corrections, d'où il résulte que le code est autographe du traducteur Amiras»].

17. H. Omont, *Missions archéologiques françaises en Orient aux XVII^e et XVIII^e siècles*, Paris 1902 (*Collection de documents inédits sur l'histoire de France*), vol. I, p. 502 — lettre du Sevin à Maurepas de 18 sept. 1729).

ce phanariote pour l'histoire de la Moldavie, un intérêt dû, peut-être, à son collaborateur de Smyrne. A ce sujet le secrétaire de l'ambassade française à Constantinople Charles de Peyssonnel (1700-1757) écrivait au Marquis de Gaumont: «*La fille d'Alexandre Mavrokordato fut mariée à un Gika, qui a eu deux enfants; l'aîné, appelé Grégoire Gika, est actuellement prince de Moldavie et avait été drogman de la Porte, emploi qui est aujourd'hui rempli par Alexandre Gika son frère, qui est celui dont j'ay eu l'honneur de vous dire un mot dans ma première lettre. La vôtre m'a donné la curiosité d'approfondir la généalogie de cette famille; j'en ai parlé au drogman, qui flatté de ma curiosité, m'a envoyé un manuscrit en grec vulgaire, qui contient l'histoire moderne des principautés de Valachie et de Moldavie*»¹⁸. Le commissaire royal Peyssonnel, qui était aussi chargé de la localisation et ensuite de l'achat, des manuscrits avait, semble-t-il, gardé en sa possession ce manuscrit pour une dizaine d'années; on sait encore qu'il avait chargé un autre ecclésiastique français, *versé dans le grec vulgaire*, un certain Nicolas Genier, habitant de Smyrne à l'époque, de le lui traduire en français. Certainement, après avoir effectué cette tâche il le ferait parvenir à Gaumont. Selon Peyssonnel, cette traduction «*pourra fournir des faits curieux, que les historiens du siècle dernier peuvent avoir ignorés*». Du travail de Genier résulta le manuscrit français 1409 de la Bibliothèque Nationale de Paris; Genier avait, semble-t-il, terminé ce travail à Ankara¹⁹. En ce qui concerne le sort du manuscrit grec, à savoir la traduction d'Amiras, il entra à la Bibliothèque Nationale de Paris vers 1752, ou, du moins à cette époque là il fut enregistré parmi les livres et manuscrits de la Bibliothèque par la main du bibliothécaire l'abbé Sallier²⁰. *Envoyé par Mr. Peyssonnel et remis par Mr. Marie le 1^{er} de Juillet 1752, S(allier)*, note au verso de la première feuille²¹.

18. Omont, *op. cit.*, p. 741.

19. Au ce sujet voir C.C. Giurescu, Les manuscrits roumains de la Bibliothèque Nationale dans *Revue Historique du Sud-Est Européen*, janvier-mars 1925, p. 2. Traduction française du manuscrit (Suppl. grec 6), faite par Nicolas Genier de Smyrne, p. 53-54.

20. Sur le bibliothécaire Claude Sallier voir Alfred Franklin, *Les anciennes bibliothèques de Paris, églises, monastères, collèges etc.* vol. 2, Paris 1870, p. 212.

21. M. Hase, *Notice d'un manuscrit de la Bibliothèque du Roi, contenant une Histoire inédite de la Moldavie, composée en moldave par Nicolas Costin, grand logothète à la cour d'Iassy et traduite en grec moderne par Alexandre Amiras*, publiée dans la série *Notices et Extraits des Manuscrits de la Bibliothèque du Roi et autres bibliothèques*, vol. 11, Paris 1827, pp. 274-394.

Le savant helléniste M. Hase présenta ce manuscrit aux cycles des spécialistes, avec une étude très étendue, en 1827; lui-même il l'avait présenté un peu avant, en 1816, à l'Ecole des Langues Orientales en commençant ses cours de langue néohellénique²². Mais l'érudit français avait fait une grave erreur croyant que toute l'œuvre traduite par Amiras était sortie de la plume de Nicolas Costin. Nous donnons ensuite une description du manuscrit d'Amiras pour pouvoir examiner aussi ses problèmes.

ff. I-V blanches

f. VI. La note: Envoyé par Mr. Peyssonel et remis par Mr. Marie le 1^{er} de juillet 1752, S(allier).

ff. VII. Le titre du manuscrit avec l'emplème de Moldavie (la tête d'un veau couronné, étoile et deux épées en croix et les initiales Ι(ωάννης) Γ(ρηγόριος) Γ(κίρκας) Β(οεβόδας).

ff. VIII - X blanches

ff. XI-XII "Έλεγχος του πρώτου βιβλίου της молδαβικής ιστορίας [Liste du premier livre de l'histoire de Moldavie]

ff. XIII-XIV blanches

ff. 1-6. Πρόλογος της молδαβικής ιστορίας της επιμελώς μεταφρασθείσης παρά 'Αλεξάνδρου 'Αμυρά [Préface de l'histoire de Moldavie, soigneusement traduite par Alexandre Amiras].

ff. 7-67. 'Αρχή Περί κτίσεως κόσμου [Principe De la création du monde]. Le premier livre de l'histoire de Moldavie arrive jusqu'au f. 67, jusqu'au «ἕξ χιλιάδας ὀκτασίους ἑβδομήντα τέσσαρας χρόνους» [6874]. ff. 65-67 Περί τοῦ πότε ἔγινεν ἡ δευτέρα μετοικεσία τῆς Μολδαβίας κεφάλαιον ἱστον [Sur le temps de la deuxième émigration de Moldavie, chapitre XVIème]

ff. 68-80 blanches

22. Cfr. ce renseignement chez Alex. Ciorănescu, *Correspondance de Daniel Dēmētrius Phillipidēs et de J. - D. Barbié du Bocage (1794-1819)*, Thessalonique 1965, p. 132-133 note 50. L'érudit français Hase cita que Villoison avait dédié un cycle de cours de la langue néohellénique basé sur ce manuscrit d'Amiras.

ff. 81-80 (olim 68-72). Πίναξ γενικὸς περιέχων πάσας τὰς αὐθεντίας, τοὺς τε πολέμους, καὶ τὰ ἐν ἐκάστη κατὰ καιροὺς συμβάντα ἀπὸ τὸν Δράγοση βόδα μέχρι Γρηγορίου Γκίκα βοεβόδα [Index général contenant tous les règnes, les guerres et les événements survenus sous chaque règne, depuis le règne du Voivode Dragos jusqu' à celui du voivode Grégoire].

ff. 26-92 blanches

ff. 1-544. Ἱστορία τῆς Μολδαβίας. Περὶ τῆς αὐθεντίας τοῦ Δράγοση Βόδα

[Histoire de Moldavie. Sur le règne de voivode Dragos]. Cette histoire contient: ff. 1-242 la chronique de Nicolae Costin depuis la création de l'état moldave jusqu'en 1601: f. 242 la note: Ἔως ἐδῶ τοῦτος ὁ χρονογράφος ἐγράφη ἀπὸ τὸ αὐθίβολον ὅπου ἔγραψεν ὁ μακαρίτης Νικολάκις Κωστήν, ὅστις ἐχρημάτισε μέγας λογοθέτης [Jusqu'ici cette chronique est tirée de l'original écrit par feu Nicolas Costin, l'ancien grand logothète; des vers mortuaires suivent, lesquels ont ajouté tous les copistes voir M. Kogălniceanu, Opere M. Costin, vol. I, 496, note I, où la publication de ces vers en roumain. Les ff. 243-410 contiennent la chronique de Myron Kostin depuis 1601-1661. Au f. 242 la note: «Ἀπ' ἐδῶ ἀρχίζομεν νὰ γράφωμεν τὴν ἱστορίαν ἀπὸ τὸ αὐθίβολον τοῦ μηρῶν Κωστήν Λογοθέτου, Περὶ τοῦ θανάτου τοῦ Μιχαήλ Βόδα [Nous commençons ici d' écrire l'histoire nous basant sur l'original du logothète Myron Costin, Sur la mort de voivode Mihail]. Voir et les ff. 409-410: «Ἔως ἐδῶ ἐγράφη ἡ ἱστορία ἀπὸ τὸ πρωτότυπον τοῦ μακαρίτου μυρῶν Κωστήν μεγάλου λογοθέτου [Jusqu' ici l'histoire est basée sur l'original du feu grand logothète Myron Costin].

Les ff. 410-412 contiennent: Ἐδῶ γράφομεν τὰ ὀφφίκια, ἤγουν τὰς ἀξίας ὅπου κατέστησαν ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος βόδας ὁ λεγόμενος ἀγαθός, καὶ γέρων [Où il est question des dignités (offices), à savoir, les valeurs qu' avait instituées le voivode Alexandre, surnommé le Brave et le Sage].

Les ff. 412-544 contiennent la chronique attribuée premièrement à Alexandre Amiras (ce qui fut nommé chronique du Pseudo-Amiras ou chronique anonyme), qui

commence sous le règne du voivode Davize (f. 412) et qui s'achève (f. 543-544) avec un chapitre intitulé: Ἐδὼ γράφομεν διὰ τοὺς ἀχαρίστους, καὶ λαιμάργους πὼς ὁ θεὸς διὰ τὰς ἀμαρτίας τοὺς τοὺς παιδεύει, καὶ ἀποδίδωσιν αὐτοῖς τὰ ἴσα [Nous mentionnons ici les ingrats, les gourmands et comment Dieu les punit conformément à leurs péchés. En bref, Alexandre Amiras a traduit, tout d'abord, la chronique de Nicolas Costin, qui s'étend de la fondation de l'état moldave jusqu'en 1601 (f. 1-242) et puis la chronique de Miron Costin qui commence en 1601 jusqu'en 1661 (ff. 243-220) ce qui permet au traducteur d'assurer une suite dans le temps, et, enfin, une autre chronique qui commence à l'époque du voivode Davize (1661) et arrive jusqu'aux premières années de l'hégémonie de Grégoire Ckikas (sept. 1729). Dans la troisième partie de la chronique se pose le problème de savoir si Amiras est son rédacteur ou le traducteur d'une autre chronique moldave, dont l'auteur reste, encore, anonyme. L'historiographie moderne roumaine considèrerait Amiras comme traducteur; ainsi P.P. Panaitescu, en 1958, tenta de prouver qu'Amiras a utilisé pour sa traduction une compilation des chroniques des Costin et d'un autre anonyme, le chronographe de cette troisième partie²³.

Dernièrement, en 1975, le Professeur Dan Simonescu, éditeur de cette chronique de Moldavie, critiquant ses divers témoignages, a soutenu l'opinion qu'Amiras n'était pas le rédacteur de la chronique. La sympathie du chroniqueur envers les princes indigènes et les boyards moldaves et, au contraire, sa position équivoque envers les grecs ont persuadé le Prof. Simonescu de soutenir l'opinion, qu'il est impossible d'identifier le chroniqueur, avec un grec (dans notre cas avec Amiras), et qu'il faudrait, logiquement, attribuer même la traduction à un lettré roumain inconnu jusqu'ici. Toujours, selon l'opinion du Prof. Simonescu, la contribution d'Amiras à la rédaction de cette chronique devrait se limiter à l'aide que le grec

23. P.P. Panaitescu, *Miron Costin Opere*, București 1958, p. 346-348.

aurait fournie à ce chroniqueur relativement aux informations contenues dans les sources turques ou tatares, que l'érudit grec connaissait très bien vu sa qualité de drogman en langues orientales auprès du prince Gkikas²⁴. En effet les événements nous montrent qu'Amiras avait de bonnes relations avec des tatares, et, par ailleurs il était un bon connaisseur des leurs coutumes et de leur langue; mais les témoignages que nous possédons sont indirects²⁵.

En tous cas l'hospodar phanariote chargea Amiras d'assumer cette tâche estimant sa connaissance du pays et sa formation générale; n'oublions pas de noter que le prince aurait pu charger un des professeurs de l'Académie Princière de Iași²⁶ ou bien un autre érudit de son milieu de l'élaboration de cette traduction. Il ne faudrait d'ailleurs pas oublier l'opinion de N. Iorga qui veut que l'auteur (chroniqueur) de cette troisième chronique soit Amiras²⁷. Nous ajoutons, encore, une autre remarque relative au titre de la traduction qui ne correspond pas avec le contenu du code; autre détail très curieux: pourquoi Amiras a-t-il noté que l'auteur de la chronique qu'il a traduite était seulement Miron Costin, tandis qu'il savait qu'il y avait aussi un autre chroniqueur, Nicolas Costin. Cette affirmation d'Amiras a amené Hase à attribuer à Miron toute l'Histoire de Moldavie. Alexandre Amiras, de son côté connaît bien et note, toutefois dans sa traduction les chapitres qui

24. Dan Simonescu éd., *Cronica anonimă a Moldovei (1661-1729) (Pseudo-Amiras)*, *Studii și ediție critică de Dan Simonescu*, București, éd. de l'Académie Roumaine; p. IX (de l'Introduction).

25. N. Iorga a soutenu qu'Amiras arriva dans les pays danubiens à travers du han tatar — *Studii și Documente*, p. 42. Dans la chronique de Gkikas, p. 272, Amiras est mentionné comme courtisan à la cour de Racovitsa qui, en 1717, a eu un rôle décisif pendant les pourparlers avec les tatares qui avaient envahi la Moldavie. Amiras, lui-même, parle longuement des tatares dans son histoire de Charles XII; cfr. N. Iorga, *op. cit.*, p. 75-76.

26. A cette période-là à l'Académie Princière de Iași enseignaient, comme professeurs, des personnes, plus ou moins, inconnues, voir Camariano-Cioran, *Les Académies*, p. 88-91.

27. Voir l'introduction de N. Iorga à l'édition de *l'Histoire de Charles XII*, p. 42.

appartiennent à Miron et celles qui appartiennent à Nicolas Costin. Une autre remarque concerne le contenu même du récit où suivant le titre les événements présentés vont jusqu'en février 1729, tandis que dans la traduction le récit détaillé des événements s'étend jusqu'en septembre 1729²⁸.

Mr. Astruc, dans la description des manuscrits de son catalogue, encore inédit, estime qu' Alexandre Amiras a dû ajouter à la fin de la première partie de l'oeuvre traduite des événements dont le matériau lui était fourni ultérieurement sans pour autant en avoir le souci de le mentionner dans le titre de sa traduction.

La valeur de l'oeuvre d'Amiras, en dehors de son importance en tant que source contemporaine, présente un intérêt linguistique, puisque nous possédons un témoignage de la langue grecque parlée dans les principautés danubiennes. D'autre part, certains de ces textes, qui passent dans la traduction d'Amiras, comme citations d'autres auteurs, sont traduits avec succès par Alexandre Amiras. Nous donnons un exemple, à savoir comment le lettré grec traduisait les vers de Dionysios Perigitis, *Orbis Descriptio*, vers 302-305.²⁹

Τοῦ μὲν πρὸς Βορέην τετανυσμένα
φῦλα νέμονται.

Πολλὰ μάλ' ἐξείης, Μαιώτιδος ἐς
στόμα λίμνης,

Γερμανοί, Σαμάται τε, Γέται θ' ἄμα,
Βαστάρναι τε

Δακῶν τ' ἄσπετος αἶα, καὶ ἀλκήμεντες
Ἀλανοὶ

Ἔθνη πολλὰ κατώκησαν Μαιώτιδος
εἰς τόπους

Νέμτζοι, καὶ Γέται, Σάρμαται, ὁμοῦ
μὲ τοὺς Βαστάρτους

καθέδρα πάλοι τῶν Δακῶν ὁμοῦ μὲ
τοὺς Ἀλάνους

Ὅποῦχαν στήθη δυνατὰ καὶ θώρακας
μεγάλους.

(Traduction d'Amiras, chapitre
premier, f. 26, Suppl.grec 6, Bib.
N. Paris).

28. Hase publica des fragments de la préface avec une traduction en français, voir *Notices etc.*, pp. 289-294.

29. Publiés tous les deux par Hase, *op. cit.*, p. 280.

Plusieurs nations ont habité les lieux de Maiotides allemands, gètes, sarmates, et des vastartes aussi, l'ancienne capitale des Daces, et des alanes qui avaient de fortes poitrines et de grandes cuirasses

Ailleurs Amiras traduit les vers d'Ovide, Epist. ex Ponto, lib. IV, el. IX, vers 75-78.

Praefuit his, Graecine, locis modo Flaccus, et illo Ripa ferox Istri sub duce tuta fuit	Autrefois les gètes dominaient sur cette précieuse rive du Danube, où maintenant l'infaible Flaccus règne
Hic tenuit Mysas gentes in pace fide- li;	Sous sa domination les peuples de Mysie furent pacifiques et fidèles
Hic arcu fisos terruit ense Getas	et de là chassa les gètes victorieusement

(Partie A, f. 39).

Dans un chapitre le chroniqueur moldave cite, entre autres «στíχους νεκρώσιμους» (vers mortuaires); ces vers Amiras les traduisit avec succès, car il ne faudrait pas oublier que le traducteur vivait dans un siècle anti-poétique (XVIIIème siècle), à un moment où les limites entre la poésie et la prose n'étaient pas encore bien précisées. Le lettré grec avait, semble-t-il, une certaine sensibilité poétique, comme il en résulte des vers suivants:

Στίχοι νεκρώσιμοι

‘Ο θάνατος ἴσα πατεῖ τὰ σπήτια τῶν αὐθέντων	La mort visite aussi bien les mai- sons des seigneurs
καὶ βασιλέων τε ὁμοῦ, καὶ ὄλων τῶν ἀρχόντων,	que celles des rois, et des notables,
πλουσίων τε, καὶ πτωχῶν κόπτει τοὺς τὴν ζωὴν τοὺς	des riches, et des pauvres et tran- che leur vie
Πάντοτε ὥς ἐπίβουλος θηρεύει τὴν ψυχὴν τοὺς.	Toujours perfide elle s'empare de leur âme



Ἄστατος, εὐμετάβλητος, κανένα δὲν ἀφίνει	Inconstante, variable elle n'en laisse aucun
Ἀπὸ τὸν θάνατον λοιπὸν τις ἤμπορεῖ νὰ φύγῃ;	Qui peut donc échapper à la mort?
Ἐσὺ μὲ τὸν καιρὸν λοιπὸν ὅλα τὰ ἀφανίζεις	Toi donc, avec le temps, tu détruis tout
Καὶ τίποτες αἰώνων εἰς τὸν κόσμον δὲν ἀφίνεις	et rien des siècles passés ne survit dans ce monde
Σὺ Πάτερ πάντων, βασιλεῦ, Κύριε, σύ γὰρ μόνος	Toi, Père de tout, Roi, Seigneur, toi seul
Περνᾷ(ς) ἔτη ἀμετρα εἰς αἰῶνα αἰῶνος,	tu passes des années inombrables dans les siècles des siècles
Σὺ τοὺς καιροὺς ἐπρόσταξες, πάντ' ἄστατοι νὰ εἶναι.	C'est Toi qui ordonnes, que les temps soient toujours incostants
Πρᾶγμα αἰώνιον ἐδῶ εἰς τὸν κόσμον νὰ μὴν εἶναι,	et que rien ne soit éternel dans le monde
Ἦτον πολλοί, εἶναι πολλοί, καὶ πολλοὶ ἀπανδέχουν	Ils étaient plusieurs, ils sont plusieurs et ils sont plusieurs à espérer
Τοῦ κόσμου τὰς μεταβολὰς καὶ γλυτωμὸν δὲν ἔχουν	les changements du monde mais ils n'ont pas de salut

Néanmoins Hase avait des réserves sur la qualité de la traduction d'Amiras, puisque, souvent, dans son étude sur le manuscrit du lettré phanariote, il accuse le traducteur grec et d'autres copistes d'avoir déformé le texte des Costin. L'érudit français cite, par exemple, les noms des auteurs utilisés par Costin, lesquels sont complètement déformés par la plume d'Amiras. Je cite quelques noms de ces auteurs et leurs œuvres comme ils sont transcrits par Amiras: Βερόσιος, Περὶ ἐθνῶν, Βίων ἐν τῇ ζωῇ τοῦ Τραπεζοῦ, Εὐτρόπιος, Ἰούλιος Καπητόλιος, Βερνάνδ, Βομφήν Τοπελτίν, Ἰωάν. ὁ μέγας, Ἰσφάμφιος, Κρόμπερ Στρικόβσκη, Βαρώνιος Καριὼν Καβάτζιους, Βλουῆχος ὁ λέχος, Βέλσκης Μεχόβιος Βάποβσκη⁸⁰. Le

80. Hase, *op. cit.* p. 295 a essayé d'identifier ces auteurs en citant: on sait que les écrivains cités en premier lieu sont Bérosee, Dion Cassius, Eutrope et Jules Capitolin. Je crois reconnaître ensuite Bernard Vaporius, Bonfin, Laurent Toppeltin, (il s'agit, probablement de L. Toppeltin de Medgyes qui écrivit l'œuvre, Origines et occasus Transylvanorum, Lyon 1667, et Vienne 1752), Jean Magnus archevêque d'Upsal, Nicolas Istvanfi, Martin Cromer, Matthias Strykowski, Ba-

chercheur roumain P. Panaitescu a remarqué encore qu'Alexandre Amiras ne traduit pas dans sa langue les divers titres de la hiérarchie moldave pendant l'époque féodale mais qu'il les transcrit de la langue roumaine en néogrec, par exemple: țara (le pays)-τζάρα, curteanul (le courtisan)-κουρτᾶνος, vataful de aprozi (chef des servants)-βατάφος τῶν ἀπρόδων, țaran (le paysan)-τζαράνος, vornic - βοννίκος etc.³¹.

Les lettrés grecs des dernières décennies du XIX^e siècle et du début du siècle suivant qui s'occupaient de la littérature néohellénique ont exprimé un certain intérêt sur la fortune de la traduction d'Amiras. La présentation faite par Sp. Lambros mise à part, un autre érudit grec Konstantinos Sathas avait vu et avait donné une description du Suppl. grec 6 (parisinus) dans sa lettre à Kampanis (posesseur du code d'Andros); un autre homme des lettres de la même époque, Sophocles Oekonomou, renseignait Sp. Lambros sur l'étude de Hase dans une lettre publiée par Ep. Stamatiadès; ce dernier dans son livre sur la vie de Jakovos Vasilikos, Samos 1904, pp. 10 et suiv., 114 et suiv., avait publié aussi le chapitre Περί τοῦ δεσπότη Βασιλικοῦ (Sur le souverain Vasilikos), tirée du code d'Andros. Et enfin, le rédacteur de la chronique des Gkikas (Cronica Chiculeștilor), rédigé en néogrec, avait utilisé comme source, cette œuvre d'Amiras³².

Passons, maintenant, à la seconde œuvre d'Alexandre Amiras sur la vie du roi suédois Charles XII, pendant son séjour en Turquie, d'une durée de cinq ans et trois mois (*Ἀθηναικὴ Ἱστορία τοῦ Καρόλου 12ου, βασιλέως Σουηδίας, κατὰ τὴν ἐν Τουρκίᾳ διαμονὴν αὐτοῦ, διαρκέσαν ἔτη πέντε καὶ τρεῖς μῆνας*). Malheureusement, la version grecque de ce texte a disparu; au contraire, fut conservée sa traduction en italien laquelle fut publiée, avec des commentaires, par N. Iorga en 1905. Le titre de la version italienne est le suivant: *Autentica istoria di Carlo XII, Ré di Suezia, nel tempo della sua dimora in Turchia, la quale duro per cinque anni e tre mesi; ricavatta esattamente dar ragguaglio fattone dal Sig. d'Amira, che lo hà servito in tutto suddetto tempo per suo primo interprete*³³. Le texte italien de l'édition de N. Iorga fut tiré

ronius, Carion, auteur de la Chronique contribué à Gaspar Peucer, Jean Obligoss de Niedzielsko, Martin Bielski, Matthias de Michovie.

31. Panaitescu, *op. cit.*, p. 363.

32. Lambros, *op. cit.*, p. 184-185.

33. Cronica Chiculeștilor, *op. cit.*, p. XV.

34. N. Iorga, *Studii și Documente cu privire la Istoria Romnilor, IX*, București 1906, p. 41-124.

par le manuscrit 969 de la Bibliothèque des Archives de Vienne; le même annonçait, en 1929, la découverte d'un second manuscrit contenant le même texte d'Amiras, mais avec diverses différences en comparaison avec ce premier³⁵. Nous ne savons pas si Alexandre Amiras ou un autre de ses amis, connaisseur de la langue italienne, élaborait la version italienne de l'histoire du Charles XII écrite par Amiras. Nous possédons quelques renseignements sur la fortune de l'œuvre d'Amiras qui jettent le jour sur son caractère. Ainsi nous savons que l'auteur adressa une lettre à un officiel suédois, resté inconnu, le 12/23 mars 1739, rédigée en italien, dans laquelle il parlait de l'achèvement de l'histoire de Charles XII. Il lui ferait parvenir le texte qu'il confierait, à deux courtisans suédois, les C. F. von Höpken et E. Carleson, qui voyageraient alors en Suède. Je note ici que le texte fut dédié à la reine suédoise Ulrica Eleonora, sœur de Charles³⁶. Une deuxième lettre d'Amiras, datée du 20 novembre 1739 écrite à Péran, était adressée au ministre suédois des Affaires Etrangères, qui venait de recevoir sa nomination. La même lettre était accompagnée d'«... *un livre des mémoires du séjour de S. Majesté le Roy Charles 12- me en Turquie...*» destiné à la reine de Suède³⁷. Malheureusement dans ces lettres d'Amiras n'est pas mentionné la langue dans laquelle fut écrite l'histoire de Charles XII. Quant à la version italienne, éditée par N. Iorga, citons qu'elle commence en l'année 1702, à savoir quand le tsar russe Pierre le Grand déclare la guerre à Charles XII et finit par la mort du roi suédois (1716). L'œuvre cite minutieusement les combats de Charles XII, ses opérations militaires, sa défaite en 1709, à la bataille de Poltava; à partir de 1709 l'œuvre se réduit en un récit détaillé des événements, puisque à partir de ce moment son auteur entre à la cour impériale suédoise, alors en exil, en qualité de

35. «Un autre manuscrit, que nous pensons publier depuis longtemps est à Upsal» - N. Iorga — voir Karadja, *op. cit.*, p. 338 note 2.

36. Karadja a soutenu que, finalement, cette lettre fut envoyée, par voie terrestre par un courrier qui fut arrêté par les Russes près de Breslau; selon Karadja les Russes lui ont confisqué, entre autres, l'œuvre d'Amiras, qui aboutit, nous ne savons pas comment, aux archives de Vienne, Karadja, *op. cit.*, p. 338. On peut, donc, supposer que cette œuvre d'Amiras aboutit à Vienne après le mauvais sort qu'avait eu son courrier, tandis que la deuxième copie, à savoir celle qui fut envoyée, modifiée un peu, accompagnant la deuxième lettre d'Amiras arriva en Suède et aboutit à la Bibliothèque d'Upsal, comme nous l'assurait N. Iorga il y a cinquante années déjà.

37. Karadja, *op. cit.*, p. 337-338; cfr. Russo, *op. cit.*, p. 198-199.

premier interprète en langues orientales. Certes, c'est l'époque où Charles se trouvait à Bender, près des frontières moldavo-tatares et essaya de prendre contact avec la Sublime Porte, afin de poursuivre sa guerre contre les Russes. Le rôle d'Amiras pendant tous ces pourparlers fut de tous points vues déterminant; Amiras, d'ailleurs, participa aux aventures du roi provoquées par les tures.

En bref, l'histoire de Charles écrite par son collaborateur grec est une source remarquable, puisque, comme le cite Amiras lui-même, cette histoire est basée sur les témoignages personnels, sur les documents, sur la correspondance, matériel qu'il rassembla soigneusement, pour écrire ses mémoires du séjour de Charles à Bender. Citons, encore, qu'à la même époque, la personnalité éclatante de Charles occupa un autre lettré grec, à savoir le dignitaire de la cour valaque, le phanariote Ioannis Afendoulis, qui représentait à Bender les années 1712-1714 l'hospodar valaque Constantin Brincoveanu (1688-1714). De la plume d'Afendoulis sortit une petite chronique intitulée *Ἱστορία Μερικῇ τῶν συμβάντων τῷ Ρηγί Σβέκῳ Καρόλῳ μετὰ τὴν ἐν τῷ Προύτῳ ἀποτελεῖωσιν τῆς ἀγάπης τῶν Ὁθωμανῶν μετὰ τῶν Μόσχων, διατρίβοντι ἐν Μπεντερίῳ ἐπὶ Ἀφεντούλῃ Κωνσταντινουπολίτου Κλοντζάρη ἐν Οὐγγροβλαχίᾳ* [Fragment d'Histoire concernant le roi suédois Charles, sejournant encore à Bender, après la conclusion de la paix entre les ottomans et les moscovites à Pruth, écrite par Afendoulis, originaire de Constantinople, clucer en Hungrovalachie]; cette chronique fut éditée par Athanasios Papadopoulos - Kerameus³⁸. Je pense que ces deux chroniques rédigées par deux grecs de l'époque, à savoir Amiras et Afendoulis, constituent une source précieuse pour la connaissance de l'époque. L'édition, en 1731, de l'Histoire de Charles XII, roi de Suède, écrite par Voltaire, pose le problème de savoir si Amiras fut influencé par l'écrivain français; néanmoins les chapitres V, VII de l'époque voltairienne traitent du séjour du Charles à Bender³⁹. L'époque est critique pour l'histoire de

38. Dans la série Eudoxie de Hurmuzaki, *Documente privitoare Istoria Românilor*, — *Ἑλληνικά Κείμενα χρήσιμα τῇ Ἱστορίᾳ τῆς Ρουμανίας* — *Συλλεγμένα καὶ ἐκδιδομένα Μετὰ Προλόγου καὶ πίνακος ὀνομαστικοῦ ἐπὶ Α. Παπαδοπούλου - Κεραμέως, Βουκουρεστίον 1909* [Textes grecs utiles à l'histoire des Roumaines, collectionnés et publiés avec une préface et un index nominatif, par A. Papadopoulos - Kerameus, Bucarest], p. 50-76. Au sujet de Afendoulis voir la monographie de I. Ionascu, *Despre cronicarul Afendulis din Țara Românească* [Au sujet du chroniqueur Afendoulis du pays roumain (Valachie)] en *Studii* 22 (1969) 875-885.

39. Voltaire conçut l'idée d'écrire la biographie de Charles XII après son ar-

la culture européenne, parce que à cette époque Voltaire conçoit l'histoire, comme il résulte de son œuvre sur Charles XII, «comme une variante en prose de l'épopée ou de la tragédie»^{39a}.

L'intérêt de l'intelligentsia hellénique, d'ailleurs, pour cette œuvre de Voltaire fut exprimée quelques décennies après, quand Konstantinos Tzizaras traduisit et publia l'Histoire de Charles XII de Voltaire (imprimerie Théodosiou, Venise, sous les hospices d'Anthimos Gazis)⁴⁰, sans mentionner le nom de l'auteur, bien connu, d'ailleurs, à l'époque⁴¹. C'est l'époque où le milieu ecclésiastique considérait l'auteur français comme dangereux pour les sentiments religieux du peuple grec.

Le savant D. Russo a posé le problème de savoir si Alexandre Amiras était l'auteur d'une autre œuvre intitulée «*Ἀρχὴ τῶν σάαχιδων ἢ φανέρωσις καὶ πόσον καιρὸν ἐστάθησαν σάαχιδες*» [Le début des chahs, leur apparition et la durée de leur règne]; il s'agit du code grec 887 de la Bibliothèque de l'Académie Roumaine⁴². Je n'ai pas pu examiner ce code, mais la mention que la traduction appartient à Alexandre, l'ex grand portar, nous mène à Alexandre Amiras, qui fut, d'ailleurs, grand portar à la cour moldave pendant l'époque de l'hospodar Mihail Racovitsa⁴³; ajoutons qu'Alexandre Amiras fut interprète en turc auprès de Charles XII et, particulièrement, auprès de Racovitsa et Gkika. N. Iorga attribua à Amiras un autre œuvre⁴⁴; il s'agit de la traduction de l'italien en néogrec de la vie de Pierre le Grand, qui, en réalité, fut effectuée par Alexandre Kanghellarios sur l'original écrit par Antonios Katiphoros sous le titre *Vita di Pietro il Grande*;

rivée en France de l'Angleterre (1780); notons que la personnalité, vraiment éclatante de Charles, avait impressionné ses amis et ses adversaires; ainsi Voltaire composa cette biographie basée sur un matériel inédit et des témoignages originaux.

39a. Jean Ehrard, *Littérature française, Le XVIII^e siècle, I, 1720-1750*, Paris 1974, p. 155.

40. Δ. Γ. Γκίνης, Βαλέριος Γ. Μέξας, *Ἑλληνικὴ Βιβλιογραφία 1800-1863*, vol. I, Athènes 1939, p. 69 (n° 418).

41. K. Th. Dimaras, *Νεοελληνικὸς Διαφωτισμὸς* [Aufklärung grecque], éd. Hermes, Athènes 1977, p. 107.

42. Nestor Camariano, *Catalogul manuscriselor grecești* [Catalogue des manuscrits grecs], vol. 2, Bukarest 1940, p. 18.

43. Au f. 248 du code la note: *Τὸ παρὸν βιβλίον ἐμταγλωτίσθη ἀπὸ τοῦρκικα καὶ ἐγραψθῇ εἰς αὐτὴν τὴν ἀπλὴν φράσιν διὰ χειρὸς ἐμοῦ τοῦ ταπεινοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου πρῶτη μεγάλου πορτάρη εἰς τοὺς 1754 Μαΐου 10* [Ce livre fut traduit du turc et écrit dans ce langage simple (à savoir néogrec) par la main de l'humble Alexandre, ex grand portar, en 1754, 10 mai].

44. Iorga, *Studii și Documente*, vol. 9, p. 42.

D. Russo démontra, ailleurs, qu'il ne faut pas confondre Alexandre Amiras avec Alexandre Kanghellarios⁴⁵. Alexandre Amiras, donc, a vécu une grande partie de sa vie aventureuse dans les principautés danubiennes, soit dans la cour impériale suédoise en exil, soit à la cour moldave des hospodars Racovitsa et Gkika. Sa qualité de lettré et ses fonctions de haut dignitaire à la cour lui donna la possibilité de bien connaître non seulement la langue du pays, mais aussi les mœurs, les mentalités et surtout de s'intéresser à l'histoire de la Moldavie. Il traduisit la chronique des deux Costin, père et fils, et composa, si finalement Amiras en est le rédacteur, la suite de la chronique des Costin. L'époque du savant dignitaire de la cour moldave se détermine par un changement de la mentalité et une volonté d'accumulation et expansion de nouvelles connaissances. On en est, alors au point où les lettrés s'occupent de l'histoire, une réalité à cette époque-là (XVIII^{ème} siècle) pour la littérature néohellénique dans les principautés danubiennes, où cette nouvelle approche de la réalité historique avait attiré l'intérêt des milieux intellectuels phanariotes aussi bien que les milieux intellectuels de Venise où les érudits Antonios Katiphoros, Spyridon Papadopoulos, Agapios Loverdos, Spyridon Vlandis menaient la fortune littéraire. Ainsi les œuvres d'Amiras restées inédites, s'adressent à un public qui a le goût de l'éducation et de l'histoire; elles ne sont pas écrites, à mon avis, pour amuser les lecteurs, mais pour leurs faire connaître les événements du passé sans apporter aucune critique. L'histoire de Moldavie et l'histoire des Charles XII penchent vers l'historiographie, mais, d'autre part, présentent le style d'un amateur, malgré l'usage du matériel inédit. La traduction de l'histoire de Moldavie doit être considérée comme un simple moyen pour faire savoir aux milieux phanariotes de Iasi et aux futurs hospodars de Moldavie vivant à Constantinople l'histoire de ce pays qui leur était presque inconnue.

L'histoire de Charles XII ne s'adressait pas, semble-t-il, au public grec, qui, naturellement d'ailleurs, ne s'intéressait pas à la vie d'un homme, grand ennemi de la Russie orthodoxe, qu'ils considéraient comme un pays protecteur de leur misérable nation. C'est une œuvre riche en observations, en travaux, en matériel inédit et en remarques dispersées dans le texte qui montrent, par ailleurs, un attachement de notre auteur à la monarchie. Comme dans l'histoire de Moldavie Alexandre

45. Russo, *Studii etc.*, p. 199-201.

CONSTANTIN PAPOULIDIS

UN DOCUMENT CARACTÉRISTIQUE DE GABRIEL CATACAZY TIRÉ DES ARCHIVES DE LA POLITIQUE EXTÉRIEURE DE RUSSIE

Même pour ceux qui n'ont pas particulièrement étudié la politique extérieure de la Grèce du XIX^e s. et principalement l'époque de la monarchie absolue, il est notoire que l'ambassadeur, d'origine grecque, de l'Empire Russe à Athènes, Gabriel Catacazy, intervenait scandaleusement¹ dans les affaires intérieures du petit «royaume de Grèce».

Le document publié ci-après met en évidence combien était important l'intérêt qu'il y portait.

La famille de l'ambassadeur Catacazy, originaire de Mani, avait émigré à Kichinev² en 1770. De nombreux membres de cette famille ont fait partie du corps diplomatique de l'Empire Russe. L'expéditeur du document en question est Gabriel Catacazy (1793-1867)³, membre de l'*Hétairie*, qui a commencé sa carrière diplomatique à l'Empire Russe en 1812. En 1833, il a été nommé ambassadeur de l'Empire Russe à Athènes⁴, où il a considérablement renforcé le parti russophile à l'époque de la monarchie absolue⁵. Il est intervenu dans les problèmes

1. E. Driault - M. Lhéritier, *Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce de 1821 à nos jours*, t. II, E. Driault, *La Règne d'Othon - La Grande Idée, 1830-1862*, Paris (PUF) 1925, pp. 117, 138 n.1; Pan. Pipinelis, *Ἡ μοναρχία ἐν Ἑλλάδι, 1833-1843*, Athènes 1932, p. 124; Barbara Jelavich, *Russia and Greece during the Regency of King Othon, 1832-1835, (Russian Documents on the First Years of Greek Independence)*, Thessaloniki 1962, pp. 31, 68, 73, 74, 75, 79, 80, 86, 92, 115, 152 (Institute for Balkan Studies, No. 55); *Ἱστορία τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ Ἔθνους*, t. 18: *Νεώτερος Ἑλληνισμός ἀπὸ 1833 ὡς 1881*, Athènes (Ekdotiki Athinôn) 1977, p. 64.

2. *Ἱστορία τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ Ἔθνους*, t. 13, op. cit., p. 74.

3. E. Amberger, *Geschichte der Behördenorganisation Russlands von Peter dem Grossen bis 1917*, Leiden (Brill) 1966, p. 197.

4. E. Amberger, op. cit., p. 461; J. A. Petropoulos, *Politics and Statecraft in the Kingdom of Greece, 1833-1843*, Princeton, New Jersey (Princeton University), 1968, pp. 184, 295.

5. F. Lenormant, *Le compte André Metaxas et le parti Napiste en Grèce*, Paris 1861; N. Vlachos, *Ἡ γένεσις τοῦ ἀγγλικοῦ, τοῦ γαλλικοῦ καὶ τοῦ ρωσικοῦ κόμματος ἐν Ἑλλάδι, Αρχαίον Οικονομικὸν καὶ Κοινωνικὸν Ἐπιστημὸν* 19 (1939) 25-44; *Ἱστορία τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ Ἔθνους*, t. 13, op. cit., pp. 291-303.

économiques de la Grèce en 1835, en 1838 et en 1843⁶. Il a enfin prit part aux événements de 3/15 Septembre 1843⁷, qui ont obligé Othon à admettre la Constitution. Il est notoire que Catacazy pronait qu'Othon devait être destitué parce qu'il était Catholique Romain et qu'il fallait au trône de la Grèce un roi Orthodoxe. En 1843, Catacazy était contre Othon, parce qu'il pensait que celui-ci allait finalement démissionner et quitter la Grèce, laissant sa place à un candidat Russe. Dans son raisonnement comme dans ses projets, il s'est lourdement trompé puisqu'en définitive Othon a admis la Constitution et l'Empire Russe a perdu la face vis-à-vis des autres puissances par l'attitude de son ambassadeur⁸. C'est pourquoi l'Empire Russe a été obligé de le destituer⁹. Plus tard, Catacazy a été nommé au Ministère des Affaires Intérieures de l'Empire et il a servit en tant que gouverneur général de la province de Charkov, de 1856 à 1857¹⁰.

Le destinataire du document que nous publions est Lev Grigorievič Senjavin (1805-1861), qui a été de 1837 à 1848, directeur du département Asiatique du Ministère des Affaires Extérieures de la Russie Impériale¹¹.

Ce document est révélateur de l'esprit de l'ambassadeur de l'Empire, à Athènes, connu comme cellule vivante des intérêts russes dans les affaires grecques. Par cette lettre il apparaît combien il devait activement s'y ingérer et à quel point il suivait attentivement et en détail, entres autres, les faits et les gestes du consul général de Grèce à Odessa, Manos. Manos, peut-être Georges Manos, qui a été en service au début de sa carrière en tant que cadre politique supérieure aux Principautés Danubienne et suivit Ypsilanti durant l'insurrection grecque. G. Manos, après la libération de la Grèce, proposa alors ses

6. J. A. Petropoulos, *op. cit.*, p. 437; C. A. Vacalopoulos, *L'économiste Français Arthémond de Regny et son rôle dans l'histoire financière de la Grèce 1831-1841*, Thessaloniki 1977, pp. 84, 124 (Institute for Balkan Studies, No. 178).

7. E. Driault, *op. cit.*, p. 243; Barbara Jelavich, *Russia and the Greek Revolution of 1843*, München 1966 (Südost-europäische Arbeiten, No 65), passim.

8. «[Catacazy] était nettement désavoué, pour la part qu'il avait prise aux «déplorables événements du 15 septembre», et pour les «conseils de faiblesse et de dégradation» qu'il avait donnés au roi». E. Driault, *op. cit.*, p. 244.

9. *Ἱστορία τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ Ἔθνους*, t. 13, *op. cit.*, p. 93; J. A. Petropoulos, *op. cit.*, p. 460.

10. E. Amberger, *op. cit.*, p. 197.

11. E. Amberger, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

services comme diplomate¹². Il se peut aussi qu'il s'agisse de J. Manos, qui avec Xanthos et le docteur Pierre Epites (= *Ἡπίτης*), ont accompagné Ypsilanti lorsque ce dernier est descendu, début 1820, de Saint Petersburg en Russie du Sud, où, basé à Odessa, il a désiré se faire connaître des responsables de l'*Hétairie*¹³. Il se peut aussi qu'il s'agisse de Constantin Manos (1799-1855), «Consul» (marié avec Elena Rizo), fils d'Alexandre, *Grand Spathar* en 1792, et de Rallou Soutzo, fille de Michel Soutzo¹⁴.

L'ambassadeur de Russie Impériale, écrivant au directeur du département Asiatique des Affaires Extérieures de l'Empire (en première page et première moitié de la seconde page) — sur un problème qui ne concerne pas directement notre sujet: il s'agit là d'un problème comptable sur l'erreur nominale d'un paiement —, aborde ensuite un autre sujet qui nous concerne. Catacazy soutient au début qu'il profite de l'occasion que lui offre cette mise au point comptable, dont nous venons de parler, pour se renseigner sur une «anomalie»¹⁵ existant à Odessa. Et alors que le thème principal soit écrit sur une page et demie, le sujet «secondaire» qu'il qualifie même de sujet «entre — parenthèse»¹⁶, occupe, lui, deux pages et demie. Il y reproche à Manos de ne pas lire les journaux gouvernementaux grecs, ou tout au moins n'importe quel bulletin du même genre tenant un langage convenable et décent du pays où il est accrédité¹⁷. Il lui reproche de ne lire que le journal *La Minerve* (= *Ἀθηνᾶ*), anglophile, anti-gouvernemental et pro-

12. *Ἱστορία τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ Ἔθνους*, t. 12: *Ἡ Ἑλληνική Ἐπανάσταση καὶ ἡ Ἰδρυση τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ Κράτους (1821-1833)*, Athènes (Ekdotiki Athinōn) 1975, p. 19; Ap. E. Vacalopoulos, *Ἱστορία τοῦ Νέου Ἑλληνισμοῦ, Ἡ μεγάλη Ἑλληνική Ἐπανάσταση (1821-1829)*, t. 5: *Οἱ προποθέσεις καὶ οἱ βάσεις της (1831-1832)*, Thessaloniki 1980, pp. 185, 218, 265, 277 et 278.

13. *Ἱστορία τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ Ἔθνους*, t. 12, *op. cit.*, p. 16. Ap. E. Vacalopoulos, *op. cit.*, pp. 103, 105, 108, 188 et 247.

14. Cf. *Genealogia Familiei Mano* à la fin de l'œuvre de C. G. Mano, *Documente din secolele al XVI-lea — XIX-lea privitoare la familia Mano*, Bucarest 1907; (Compte rendu par Sp. Lambros, *Νέος Ἑλληνομνημον* 5 (1908 255-257).

15. «Irregularité» dans le texte.

16. «Je saisis cette occasion» dans le texte.

17. «...un langage décent et convenable aux pays où il est accrédité». dans le texte; D'ailleurs, il ne faut pas oublier que le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères s'appelait alors: «Ministère de la Maison Royale et des Relations Extérieures» (= *Ἰπουργεῖον ἐπὶ τοῦ Βασιλικοῦ Οἴκου καὶ τῶν Ἐξωτερικῶν σχέσεων*).

fondement libéral¹⁸, journal qui publiait les articles les plus insultants vis-à-vis des forces impériales, et principalement de la Russie. Cette curiosité fort déplacée et pour le moins indiscreète de Manos¹⁹, est incompréhensible²⁰ et c'est vue d'un très mauvais œil par Catacazy²¹. Pour lui, l'erreur de Manos n'est pas seulement de lire ce journal anti-gouvernemental, à Odessa, mais surtout de prendre cette revue de son bureau et de l'emporter chez lui, où le lisaient également ses amis et connaissances. Ce faisant, le consul général de Grèce à Odessa, donnait des idées fausses sur le comportement du gouvernement de son pays. Et Catacazy termine en faisant cette réflexion qu'en conservant des bastions anti-gouvernementaux grecs à Odessa, cela risquait de détériorer les intérêts commerciaux et nationaux de la Russie Impériale, en Egée²². Enfin, Catacazy conseille au directeur du département Asiatique du Ministère des Affaires Extérieures de la Russie Impériale, d'avoir l'œil sur les paquets qui arrivent à Odessa au nom de Manos²³. De plus, il n'oublie pas de mentionner qu'il fait quelques petites réflexions et recommandations «amicales» sur ce sujet, au ministre de la Maison Royale et des Relations Extérieures de la Grèce, C. Zo-graphos²⁴.

Le journal *La Minerve* (= Ἀθηνᾶ), comme il apparaît et par la publication de document, était anti-gouvernemental. La première édition date de 1832 à Megara, du Crétois Emmanuel Antoniadès. Plus tard, le journal a été transféré à Nauplie et de là, en 1835, dans la nouvelle capitale de la Grèce, où il a continué de s'opposer à la «domination bavaroise» et plus tard, à Othon. Le journal a lutté pour la concession de la Constitution de 1843, de la part d'Othon, mais il est resté à l'opposition après sa signature. Il a cessé de paraître en 1863 à la mort de son éditeur. C'était un journal sérieux qui a toujours suivi une politique libérale, un journal dont la diffusion était la plus large et qui eut une grande influence sur les idées politiques de l'époque. Par-

18. «... qui professe des principes ultra-libéraux» dans le texte. Exagération de Catacazy.

19. «curiosité» dans le texte.

20. «inconvenante» dans le texte.

21. «... d'un œil scrutateur» dans le texte.

22. «...influence nuisible sur nos relations commerciales dans l'archipel et sur les intérêts de nos nationaux» dans le texte.

23. «... à faire adopter par les autorités d'Odessa les précautions convenables à l'égard des paquets que Mr Mano reçoit de l'étranger» dans le texte.

24. «...quelques observations amicales» dans le texte.

mi les collaborateurs il faut citer l'archimandrite et prof. Théoclitos Pharmakides, le prof. Theodore Manoussis, le prof. Periclès Argiropoulos, etc²⁵.

Pour concevoir davantage dans quelle situation se trouvait la presse à l'époque de la monarchie absolue, il nous faut remonter à l'étude de G. P. Nakos²⁶, qui relate les faits suivants: «*Dans ses statistiques, le journal «Αἰὼν» (=Le Siècle), fait état de persécutions libres des journaux politiques: «Ἡ Ἀναγεννηθεῖσα Ἑλλάς» (=La Grèce Renaissance) de 1836, «Ὁ Ἑλληνικὸς Ταχυδρόμος» (=Le Facteur Grec) toujours, «Ἡ Ἑλλάς» (=La Grèce) de 1839 et «Ὁ Ἑλληνικὸς Παρατηρητής» (=L'Observateur Grec) de 1842.- Combien, en vérité, la Grèce aurait été prospère, si avec cet esprit-là, concordaient les autres journaux!—*»²⁷. Avec une ironie à peine dissimulée, cette citation montre les conséquences de la législation sur la presse que devaient subir les journaux qui n'auraient dû être que gouvernementaux²⁸.

Le document que nous publions est caractéristique de la situation politique, mais aussi du comportement et des intrigues de Catacazy. Il confirme son ingérence dans la politique intérieure de la Grèce à l'époque de la monarchie absolue. Ce document suffit à prouver combien, à cette époque, l'ambassadeur de Russie Impériale pouvait être indiscret, puisqu'il en était au point de connaître d'une façon détaillée, la vie privée du consul général de Grèce à Odessa.

Ce document se trouve à nos jours aux *Archives de la Politique Extérieure de Russie* (Moscou): *Archiv Vnešnej Politiki Rossii, Fond: Glavnyj Archiv 1-9, 1835-1839, delo: 4, ll.: 20-21*²⁹.

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Thessaloniki*

25. K. Mayer, *Ἱστορία τοῦ ἑλληνικοῦ τύπου*, vol. I, Athènes 1957, pp. 59 et 80; Sofia Antoniadou, *Ἐμμανουὴλ Ἀντωνιάδης, ὁ ἀγωνιστής, ὁ δημοσιογράφος, 1791-1863*, Athènes 1971; *Du même*, *Ἡ ἐφημερίδα «Ἀθηνᾶ» καὶ ὁ Ὁθων ὡς τὸ 1843*, *Δελτίον τῆς Historikῆς καὶ Ethnologikῆς Hetaireias tis Hellados* 19 (1967-1970) 77-95.

26. G. P. Nakos, *Τὸ πολιτικὸν καθεστῶς τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἐπὶ Ὀθωνος μέχρι τοῦ συντάγματος τοῦ 1844. Ἐκ τῶν δημοκρατικῶν ιδεωδῶν τῆς ἐπαναστάσεως τοῦ 1821 εἰς τὴν ἀπόλυτον μοναρχίαν*, Thessaloniki 1974.

27. «Αἰὼν» (=Le Siècle), N° 419/1843; Cf. D. A. Petrakakos, *Κοινοβουλευτικὴ Ἱστορία τῆς Ἑλλάδος*, vol. I, Athènes 1935, pp. 480 sq.

28. G. P. Nakos, *op. cit.*, pp. 248-249.

29. Je remercie bien vivement les autorités des *Archives de la Politique Extérieure de Russie* (Moscou) pour l'autorisation que j'ai eu le moi de Mai en 1979 à travailler dans ces locaux.

[*Arhiv Vnešnej Politiki Rossii*

(=Archives de la Politique Extérieure de Russie)

Moscou, Fond: *Glavnyj arhiv* 1-9,

1835-1839, *delo* 4, ll. 20-21]

f. 20

Polučeno 19 Dekabrja 1838

(= Reçu le 19 Décembre 1838)

Athènes, le 15 Octobre 1838, v.s.

A M^r de Séniacine

Monsieur,

En conséquence de la lettre que vous avez bien voulu m' écrire en date du II Mai dernier je me suis ampressé de faire rectifier sur la liste des appointements destinés aux chantes le nom de Zrelor* en y substituant celui de Zrjahor*; mais comme cet individu a déjà touché la somme entière de son tierçal de Janvier, telle qu'elle nous a été envoyée par le Département Asiatique dans la mape du traitement des chantes, sans que la somme, mentionné dans l'office, de 66 roubles 66 copeks ait été effectivement décomptée, ainsi qu'elle devait l'être, je dois vous en prévenir, Monsieur, afin que vous puissiez faire les dispositions nécessaires pour que cette somme soit retenue sur le tierçal actuel de Septembre, par suite de quoi il devra être décompté au premier envoi sur le total des appointements de Zrjahor* une somme de 133 roubles 32 copeks en assignations, dont une moitié sera remboursée au Département Asiatique et l'autre aux parents de ce chanter, ainsi que cela se fait toujours. De cette manière la petite irregularité qui s'est glissée dans cette transmission pécuniaire aura été complètement effacée.

f. 20^v

Je saisis cette occasion pour vous parler, Monsieur, d'une irregularité d'un tout autre genre qui se commet, ainsi que j'en ai la certitude, par le Consul Grec établi à Odessa et qui me semble de nature à ne pas être tolérée plus longtemps. Et voici de quoi il s'agit. Mr Mano, Consul Général de S. M. Hellénique dans la Russie méridionale, au lieu de faire venir

* En russe dans le texte.

f.21 pour son usage soit le bulletin des lois, soit un des journaux semi-officiels grecs, soit tout autre ouvrage périodique tenant un langage décent et convenable au pays où il est accrédité, ne reçoit que la *Minerve*, le seul journal grec à la dévotion des anglais, qui fait une violente opposition au Gouvernement Royal, qui professe des principes ultra-libéraux et qui publie les articles les plus injurieux contre les Puissances monarchiques et surtout contre la Russie. Cette curiosité fort déplacée de la part de Mr Mano me paraît non seulement inconvenante, sous tous les rapports, mais aussi très peu profitable, en la considérant d'un oeil scrutateur, puisque, si l'on admettait même que Mr Mano ne fût pas circuler sa feuille dans le pays, il lui est toujours loisible d'en faire prendre lecture chez lui à ses amis et connoissances et à répandre ainsi des bruits et des idées fausses tant sur la marche du gouvernement que sur la tendance des esprits et en général sur les affaires de ce pays, idées, qui en se propageant peuvent avoir une influence nuisible sur nos relations commerciales dans l'archipel et sur les intérêts de nos nationaux.

f.21v Je ne crois pas la chose assez urgente pour en faire l'objet d'un office au Ministère; je pense que le présent avertissement suffira pour fixer votre attention à cet égard et pour vous porter, Monsieur, à faire adopter par les autorités d'Odesa les précautions convenables à l'égard des paquets que Mr Mano reçoit de l'étranger. Je n'ai pas manqué de mon côté de faire ici à Mr Zographo quelques observations amicales à ce sujet.

Agréer, Monsieur, l'assurance de ma considération la plus distinguée.

Catacazy

EVANGELOS KOFOS

GREEK REACTION TO DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO THE ALBANIAN LEAGUE OF PRIZREN*

Greek diplomatic and consular reports have scarcely been utilized by scholars of Albanian history¹. Yet, they provide a wealth of information, because in 19th century, Greeks and Albanians maintained close ties: and also, because Greeks paid particular importance to lands inhabited by Albanians, as they provided a doorway to the Balkan Slavs, particularly the Montenegrins and Serbs.

Prior to the Eastern Crisis of 1875-1878, Greek consulates existed in Arta, Preveza, Janina, Santi Quaranta, Valona, Argyrocastro, Durazzo. With the outbreak of the insurrections in Bosnia-Herzegovina, new consulates were set up in Berat and Skodra. In Korcha and Elbasan, however, the Porte refused permission, apparently fearing the expansion of Greek political activity in Albania². From these consulates, as well as from those in Monastir and Thessaloniki, the Greek Government was kept well informed on the movement of the Albanians. Additional information was also forthcoming from other posts, namely Constantinople, Bucharest and even Alexandria, where Greeks maintained friendly and even family relations with Albanians.

The prevailing view among 19th century Greeks, which somehow is reflected in the consular dispatches, was that Albanians and Greeks were kin peoples. Being small in numbers, compared to the Balkan Slavs, they could not survive as separate entities, but were bound, one way or another, to form a unified state. The example of Austria-Hungary exerted a strong influence in that direction. Another argument that seemed to support this idea, was the case of the Albanian-speaking Orthodox Christians residing in the Greek Kingdom.

* This paper was read at the conference on the 100th anniversary of the League of Prizren (1878), held at Prishtina, 6-10 June 1978. It is published here with the permission of the organizers.

1. A recent study makes an extensive use of these archives. See: Eleftheria Nikolaidou, *Foreign propagandas and the Albanian National movement in the Dioceses of Durazzo and Velegrada; end of 19th and beginning of 20th century*, Janina, 1978 (in Greek).

2. Archeio Ypourgeiou Exoterikon (AYE), File, "Constantinople Embassy 1876", Kontostavlos to Koundouriotis (Constantinople), No. 9206, 8/20, Oct, 1876.

These Christians had a long tradition of association with the Greek cause — particularly during the Greek War of Independence — and had, since, been fully integrated into Greek society. Furthermore, the fact that a similar process was underway among Albanian-speaking Orthodox Christians residing in Ottoman-held Macedonia and Epirus, was, to the Greeks, a further indication, that the two people could coexist under a common state roof³.

Understandably, these notions were shared by most Greek consuls serving in Epirus and Albania. As a result, in their reports on Albanian developments, they tended to take a negative attitude of foreign propaganda among Albanians, and, in addition, to view with much skepticism signs of an Albanian national awakening.

Among the Greek consuls, one who prided himself as being an expert on Albania, was Epaminondas Mavromatis, Consul at Skodra since 1876. Among his main tasks, when he assumed duty in his faraway post, was to brief his government on the various Albanian groups and to assess their prospects in future political developments, keeping, of course, in mind, long-range Greek interests. In his view, the Albanian population in the 'seventies, did not exceed 1-1,2 million and was divided as follows: The *Catholics* (110-120 thousands), who lived compactly in the north, were not strong enough - from a political and economic point of view - to provide the unifying element for all the Albanians. Their aloofness from their fellow Moslem Albanians and the lack of powerful and wealthy families, were elements that reduced their chances of ever becoming a Piedmond for Albania. The *Moslem Albanians* (estimated at 600-700 thousands) considered the Christian element as inferior to themselves, and detested the idea of falling under the influence of the Catholics. Mavromatis believed that they were more likely to cooperate with the Orthodox Christian Albanians, with whom, most of the Moslem Tosks were related. Nevertheless, the Moslems were themselves divided, because of the individual interests and quarrels of their leading families, as well as because of animosities and suspicions cultivated among the various religious sects. As for the *Orthodox Christian Albanians* (estimated at 300-400 thousands), Mavromatis believed that they could not easily align themselves with the Catholics, as they were under stronger Greek influence.

3. Evangelos Kofos, *Greece and the Eastern Crisis, 1876-1878*, Thessaloniki, 1975, pp. 24-25.

On the contrary, because of their wealth, their weapons and especially their close relationship with the Tosks; they could play a leading role in any political movement⁴.

The view generally held by Greeks was that prior to the Eastern crisis of 1875-78, the various uprisings of the Albanians were mainly instigated by Moslem Albanian beys who were, above all, eager to safeguard their privileges from the infringing tactics of the Porte. They did not have a national character, and they did not aim at challenging Ottoman authority in their lands. This, in Professor C. Paparigopoulos' view, explains why during the various uprisings the Orthodox Christian Albanians, who did not enjoy the same privileges, had declined to join the rebels, and, indeed, had, on occasions, sided with the Ottoman authorities⁵.

Understandably, the Greeks considered the Christians as closer to them, and the element more likely to side with the Greek cause in case of a political settlement in Albania. This view was expressed also by the British Consul at Skodra Kirby Green when he wrote to the Foreign Office:⁶

«In Middle and Lower Albania the Christian Albanians look toward Greece, not towards Italy, for freedom and advancement. The Greeks do not pretend that they are pure Hellenes and call them Albano-Greeks, but they are just as much Greeks as the Piedmontese are Italians, and I can assert from personal intercourse with numerous Middle and Lower Albanians that no wish whatever exists for union with Italy, or an impracticable kingdom under the sceptre of a problematical descendant of Scanderberg. They prefer to go many steps further back in history, and recall that under Pyrrhus and Alexander the Great the world then counted them as Greeks.

4. AYE, File 99/1, 1876, Mavromatis to Kontostavlos, No. 22, 5/17 Oct. 1876. It is interesting to note that another consul, P. Matarangas of Santi Quaranta, attributed the kinship of Christians and Moslem Liaps to the fact that most of the Liaps had been Christians until, in Ali Pasha's time, they were forced to become Moslems. AYE, Unnumbered file, "Consular Reports and Dispatches, 1878", Matarangas to Delyannis, No. 41, 28 May 1878.

5. AYE, Unnumbered File, "Consulates in Macedonia, 1883", C. Paparigopoulos, President of the Association for the Advancement of Greek Letters to Prime Minister Charilaos Trikoupis, No. 773, 25 June 1883.

6. FO421/30, K. Green to Salisbury, April 22, 1878.

Besides, they have proof that in modern Hellas the children of the Albanian heroes of the war of independence from Spetzia and Hydra and other localities have been awarded their proper place and share in the government and advantages of freedom».

The events of 1875-1878, however, compelled the Greeks to take a more pragmatist view of the Albanians. Some of the Greek consuls were able to detect movements for Albanian autonomy. According to Petros Logothetis, Consul at Monastir, the idea of an Albanian autonomy in Northern Albania had been initiated and cultivated by certain followers of the Anglican Church who operated in the districts of Durazzo, Tirana, Elbasan and Starovo. The idea was welcomed by certain boys but had failed to reach the Moslem masses, who, prior to the Eastern crisis, had a vague notion of a national state⁷. Mavromatis, on the other hand, reporting from Skodra, verified the fact that the concept of national statehood had begun to win over first the more educated among the Albanians. A serious drawback, however, for turning theory into practice, he believed, were the contradictory influences of the foreign Powers. This, in his view, was the major disruptive element of the Albanians' desire for a separate autonomous state⁸.

* * *

The uprisings in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1875 opened the way to a rapprochement between the Balkan peoples. The Serbs, in 1876 proposed an entente to the Greeks, and at the same time they informed them that they had made similar feelers to Romanians, Montenegrins and Albanians. The Greeks were not ready to respond positively. And, in addition, they looked with suspicion at Serbian initiatives in Albania. Foreign Minister Alexander Kontostavlos replied that Greece was not yet ready for an entente. But if she decided to act, she would act alone in Albania, because, as he put it, "the Albanians are linked with the Greek race with many and unbreakable ties". Serbian interference there could prove dangerous and could introduce conflicting aims⁹.

7. AYE, File "A-W, 1879", P. Logothetis to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 87, 18 Feb. 1879.

8. AYE, File 99/1, 1876, Mavromatis to Kontostavlos, No. 22, 5 Oct. 1876.

9. AYE, File "Belgrade Consulate General, 1875-1878", Kontostavlos to Doskos, No. 4057, 11 Feb. 1876.

It was precisely this mentality that led Mavromatis, in 1876, to take a negative attitude toward Montenegro's territorial claims to the south. In his view, Greek interests would be better served if Prince Nicholas were involved in Herzegovina and kept out of Albania¹⁰.

Meanwhile, Prime Minister Alexander Koumoundouros, a pragmatist and a strong advocate of an all-Balkan cooperation, had sent secret emissaries to Epirus, Southern Albania and Corfu to contact individual Albanian chiefs, for instigating joint revolts against the Turks¹¹. While these initiatives continued, the new coalition government in Athens opened negotiations of a political nature with certain Albanian leaders, among them Abdul bey Frasheri, Mehmet Ali Vriوني and others. Greece was offering alternatively Albanian self-rule within an expanded Greek state, or a form of a dual Monarchy under King George, more or less on the lines of Austria - Hungary. As a last offer, she could recognize and assist an Albanian principality, provided, however, this principality did not include Epirote territories. On the other side, the Albanians argued in favour of a large Albanian principality, which would include the whole of Epirus. To the Greeks residing there, they would offer extensive self-government. Such a principality could be associated with the Greek Kingdom with a strong alliance.

These talks which had started in Janina in July 1877 — mainly between E. Mavromatis and Abdul bey Frasheri — had continued in Constantinople in December — with Stefanos Skouloudis as the Greek negotiator — and ended in failure in Corfu, early in February 1878, as the Russo-Turkish war was brought to its conclusion with the Adrianople Armistice¹². As a last gesture, the Albanians proposed to set aside the boundary issue until after the war, and asked the Greeks to be supplied with weapons and money for a joint action against the Porte. The divergent long-range objectives, however, had created deep suspicions on both sides, and neither was willing to back from what it considered its basic and fundamental theses. With the Russo-Turkish war over, and with Greek uprisings in Thessaly, Crete, Epirus and Macedonia just beginning, there could hardly be a chance to foment

10. AYE, File 99/1, 1876, Mavromatis to Kontostavlos, No. 27, 2/14, Nov. 1876.

11. E. Kofos, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

12. Greek correspondence on the talks held in Janina and Constantinople was published by M. Spyromilios in "Greece and Albania: an attempt at a Greek-Albanian rapprochement during 1877-1878", *Neos Kouparas*, Athens, 1962 (in Greek). Some additional information in E. Kofos, *op. cit.*, pp. 145-147.

a Greco-Albanian front against the Porte. On the contrary, the Greeks felt that now the Albanians would more likely side with the Ottoman army in subduing Greek uprisings in Epirus. Under the circumstances Prime Minister Koumoundouros sent the following telegram to Skouloudis in Corfu which reveals the changed climate of the Greek-Albanian negotiations:¹³

"I think it is very dangerous to cooperate in the establishment of a hostile power on our flank. The Albanians are Turks [meaning: loyal to the Ottoman State], they have common interests with them, and they have benefited from them. Why should they side with us? With us they hope to achieve the establishment of their own nationality. They lack, however, the means, and they ask us to provide them, in order to achieve their aims... The danger is that we will arm a people who contest the land from us. If they revolt alone, occupy the contested regions, and — thus organized — present their claims, how can we oppose them? Especially if we are obstructed from taking an active part in the hostilities, we run the risk to set loose a wild, untrustworthy people, whose interests conflict with our own. This is the risk we run if we do not solve, in our favour, beforehand and in a safeproof manner the boundary issue, receive concrete assurances of their sincerity, and compel them publicly and formally to declare themselves in favour of our common program. You have observed their insistence on refusing or sidestepping all these points, which if we do not get, we could injure instead of promoting, our national cause. Strive to remove these obstacles, and before you do so, abstain from concluding anything definite".

As it was revealed later¹⁴, the Greek Government, early in 1878, had begun to entertain serious doubts whether the Albanian beys, with whom it was negotiating, had a sufficient representative status capable of binding their compatriots to a definite political arrangement. This development, along with the conclusion of the Russo-Turkish armistice, and the realization that no progress had been achieved on the issue of the final political settlement, brought the negotiations to an end.

13. AYE, File, "Greek-Albanian Negotiations, 1878", Koumoundouros to Nomarch of Kerkyra and Stefanos Skouloudis, 9/15 Feb. 1878 (cyph. tel.). This telegram was partially published in Kofos, *op. cit.*, p. 146.

14. AYE, File "Consulates in Macedonia, 1883", Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Association for the Advancement of Greek Letters, No. 960, 19 July 1883.

Thus, while the treaty of San Stefano was being signed, the roads of the Greeks and the Albanians had departed. The Greeks had attempted an invasion into Thessaly, but recalled their army, the moment the signing of the armistice became known. Yet, the Greek insurrections, which had been breaking out in Crete, Thessaly, Macedonia and Southern Epirus, were allowed to continue and were even encouraged. A small Greek force landed in Santi Quaranta, early in March, but was quickly squashed by Ottoman forces from Janina and irregular Albanians. In the district of Delvino, thirty Christian villages were pillaged and set on fire¹⁵. On the other side, the Albanians, weighing the consequences of the San Stefano treaty, began to consider drastic action, independently of the Porte, both in the military and political field.

The San Stefano treaty, raised great fears among most of the Balkan peoples, and prompted them to register their opposition. Greek communities, for instance, in Thrace and Macedonia signed numerous petitions against their incorporation into a large Bulgarian state¹⁶.

Likewise, the Albanians began to put to circulation for signing their own petitions. According to S. Maratos, the Greek Consul at Argyrocastro, the idea of petitions had originated with certain Albanian pashas in Constantinople. Local Moslem leaders had attempted to collect signatures and community seals on white pieces of paper to be filled out later and dispatched to the European Congress. The attempt failed on account of differences among Moslem leaders and the opposition of the Christians. The mufti of Argyrocastro made it known that he had received a telegram from Janina signed by Abdul bey Frasheri, Roustem Tselia Pissari, and Bekir effendi Vourga, who informed him that the Christians and Moslems of the districts of Janina and Preveza were willing to sign petitions against the cession of Epirus and Thessaly to Greece and urged him to do the same in Argyrocastro. But Maratos reported that nothing came out of this plea¹⁷.

15. Miltiadis Seizanis, *The Policy of Greece and the Revolt of 1878 in Macedonia, Epirus and Thessaly* (in Greek), Athens, 1879. Also, E. Kofos, *op. cit.*, pp. 178-179.

16. Evangelos Kofos, *The Revolt in Macedonia in 1878* (in Greek), Thessaloniki, 1969.

17. ATE, File "Congress of Berlin, 1878", Maratos to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 57, 10 June 1878.

These movements had raised the apprehensions of the Greeks, who feared that Albanian reaction to the San Stefano stipulations could, subsequently, turn against Greek claims on Epirus as well. As a result, the Greek Government instructed her consuls to inform the Christians to desist from signing Albanian petitions. On the eve of the Congress of Berlin, Maratos was in a position to report that all the Christians of the sanjak of Argyrocastro—including the districts of Argyrocastro, Delvino, Tepeleni and Premeti—had declined to sign the petitions¹⁸. Similar was the attitude of the Christians of the Santi Quaranta district, as was reported by the Greek consul of that town¹⁹.

From the north, however, the Greek consuls reported that the signing of the petitions progressed well. Mavromatis informed Athens that all Albanians (Moslems, Catholics, Mirdites) had signed petitions against the incorporation of Albanian lands to Montenegro and Bulgaria. In his view these petitions had the active support of the Ottoman authorities, as well as that of the consuls of Austria and Italy. He had been informed that the Italian consul had even drafted, in his own hand, a different text for the Catholic Albanians—to represent «all» the Albanians—who objected to any territorial changes. But his efforts did not meet with success²⁰.

Finally, the Greek consul in Berat, reported an increasing hostility, among Central and Northern Albanians, to the idea of any political arrangement with the Greeks. There were even certain leaders who expressed the view that if a foreign settlement were imposed, it would be preferable for Albanians to opt for a British protectorate²¹.

The problem with the petitions was a clear sign of the divergent political objectives of Greeks and Albanians. Until the beginning of 1878, Greek diplomats had been merely trying to counterbalance foreign influences among Albanians and cultivate close ties with them. Now, their efforts were directed at minimizing Albanian nationalist initiatives, lest they would turn against the long-range interests of Hellen-

18. AYE, File "Consular Reports and Dispatches, 1878", S. Maratos to Th. Delyannis, No. 50, 27 May; No. 57, 10 June; No. 62, 17 June.

19. AYE, File, "Consular Reports and Dispatches, 1878", Matarangas (Santi Quaranta) to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 May.

20. AYE, File, "Skodra Consulate, 1878", Mavromatis to Delyannis, unnumbered 4/16 June 1878, and No. 12, 5/17 June 1878.

21. AYE, File "Consular Reports and Dispatches, 1878", Evangelides (Berat) to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 35, 22 March.

ism. This attitude is clearly portrayed in Greek consular and diplomatic dispatches of that period.

An interesting illustration is the Greek attitude toward Albanian-Montenegrin relations. Two years prior to the 1878 developments, the Greek consul at Skodra wished the Montenegrins to keep out of Albania. Now that Montenegro — as well as Greece — were faced with an identical refusal by the Porte to abide by the decisions of the Congress, Mavromatis was eager to advise an entente between Montenegro and Greece so that both would exert pressure and acquire the lands assigned to them by the Congress. This, naturally, meant lands which the Albanians strongly contested from the Montenegrins as well as from the Greeks²².

The Greek Government had been receiving ample indication of the mounting Albanian opposition to her claims in Epirus. Already in March 1878, through an Epirote Greek in Constantinople, it had learned of Vassa Pasha's memorandum to the Ambassadors of the Powers²³. As is well known, that memorandum spoke of the Albanians' willingness to resist the terms of the San Stefano treaty, and demanded the establishment of an Albanian principality, including the whole of Epirus.

But the real flood of news concerning Albanian nationalist movements began to reach the Greek capital on the eve of the convocation and during the Congress of Berlin. The main channels of information on developments in Upper Albania and Macedonia were the consulates in Thessaloniki and Skodra and to a lesser extent the consulate at Monastir. Of the events in the south, most of the information was provided by the consulate at Janina, as well as the sub-consulates in Berat, Santi Quaranta and Argyrocastro.

The first report of the assembly in Prizren was sent on 7/19 June by Constantine Vatikiotis, the Greek Consul General at Thessaloniki. Vatikiotis had received information, via Veleš, of Albanian beys and pashas from Skopje, Kunstendil, Veleš and Štip converging on Prizren for the purpose of assembling a military force to resist a possible cession of their lands to other Balkan Christians. There was talk of

22. AYE, File "Skodra Consulate, 1878", Mavromatis to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 2, 22 March, and No. 11, 29 May.

23. AYE, File, "Constantinople Embassy, 1878", Koundouriotis (Constantinople) to Delyannis, No. 783, 18/30 March 1878 (secret).

forming seven military corpses to be ready to march toward five different directions. The Ottoman authorities were aware of this activity, and there were rumours that they encouraged it. Vatikiotis, however, cautioned against accepting on its face value this information, but he assured his Minister that an armed resistance by the Moslem inhabitants of the region was a likely possibility. A week later, with more concrete news, which included the names of the representatives, Vatikiotis appeared more confirmed in his suspicion that the Porte was behind the Prizren convocation, with the possible encouragement of Austria and Italy²⁴.

From Monastir, just a few days later, Petros Logothetis reported that the agitation among the "Ottomans" — as he put it — had reached a peak over the past weeks. Despite the initial hesitation of the Monastiriotes to endorse a project of confederation which would include Kossovo, Upper Albania and Monastir, the "Ottomans" of Monastir elected suddenly two representatives who immediately left for Prizren. Logothetis believed that an independent "Ottoman" force was being created, although the local authorities professed ignorance²⁵.

Closer to the scene, Mavromatis directly informed Foreign Minister Delyannis, already in Berlin, that "a state within a state" was already functioning in Prizren, where 17 beys from Prishtina, upper, lower and reka Dibra, Tetovo, Jakova, Teslitza(?) and Mati had formed a kind of a provisional government; that new delegates from Skodra, the mountain tribes and the Mirdites had been dispatched; and that money was collected to prepare an army of about 100,000 men. As for the Mirdites, Mavromatis had learned that initially their representatives had been handpicked by the Ottoman authorities without the consent of Prince Bib Doda. Less than a fortnight later, Mavromatis had secured more trustworthy information and could now confirm that the Mirdites actively participated in the League, that their Prince had received the title of Pasha of the Albanians, along with four others, and that he was a strong advocate of Albanian nationalism. Indeed, in private talks with the Greek consul, the Prince had

24. AYE, File, "Consulate of Greece in Thessaloniki; Confidential Reports, 1878", Vatikiotis to Delyannis, No. 546, 7 June 1878, and No. 576, 13/27 June (File "Congress of Berlin").

25. AYE, File, "Consulate of Greece in Monastir, 1878" Logothetis to Delyannis, No. 183, 11/23 June 1878.

claimed that Albania was composed of the four vilayets of Skodra, Monastir, Kossovo and Janina with a total Albanian population of nine million, and he wanted the consul's opinion on whether the provisions of the Berlin Treaty could still be considered as valid, in the event of the Albanians deciding to act as a separate nation²⁶.

Mavromatis, as most of his colleagues, held the view that the Ottoman Government had actively encouraged the proceedings in Prizren, while Austrian influences might have also played a role. Nevertheless, his initial reaction was not altogether negative:²⁷

"Up to a point" he wrote, "this state of mind could be to our interest. If, however, it assumes greater proportions, if it assumes a pure and rather wide Albanian nature, if the beys of Middle and Lower Albania also go to Prizren, which until this moment has not happened, then it will acquire a serious and dangerous influence on important Greek interests".

In general lines, Greek consular reports on the League of Prizren, tendend to adopt the view that the convocation of the meeting in Prizren was to the knowledge of the Ottoman Administration, if indeed, it were not inspired by the Porte, and even encouraged by Austria and possibly Italy. Mavromatis appeared to be more positive, although he could offer no concrete proof, or even strong evidence in support of his suppositions. Reports from the consuls at Monastir and Thessaloniki tended to corroborate this assessment, but only so far as it concerned the knowledge — not the connivance — of the Ottoman authorities.

Later, when Mehmet Ali was killed, Mavromatis took the view, that the incident was due to the duplicity of the Porte, which on the one hand had incited the Albanians to resist the decisions of the Congress, while on the other, it sent Mehmet Ali, "to certain slaughter" in order to show to the Powers that it had no control over the rebellious Albanians²⁸. This interpretation, however, was refuted by Am-

26. AYE, File "Congress of Berlin", Mavromatis to Delyannis, semi-official (mid-June, no date); and Mavromatis to Koumoundouros No. 19, 19 June/1 July 1878 (File 61/1a, 1878).

27. AYE, File unnumbered, "Consular Reports and Dispatches, 1878", Mavromatis to Koundouriotis (Constantinople), No. 22, 26 June 1878.

28. AYE, File "Embassy at Berlin, 1878", Mavromatis to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1/13 Sept. 1878 (cyph. tel).

bassador Alexander Koundouriotis who, with better insight, wrote that although in the beginning the Porte had, indeed, encouraged popular resistance, after a while, it had realized that by pushing things to the extreme, it ran the risk of loosing control over the Albanians. This was precisely the reason why it had dispatched Mehmet Ali, hoping to calm the situation²⁹.

* * *

During the months of uncertainty which prevailed throughout 1878, and especially prior and immediately after the convocation of the Congress of Berlin, the unexpected emergence of an Albanian question had taken the Greeks — as indeed most foreign Powers — by surprise. Their instinctive reaction was either to minimize it, or to attribute it to foreign and Turkish instigation. Undoubtedly there was some truth in this assessment. Gradually, however, as the Albanian movement showed strength and stamina, despite its ups and downs and its internal dissensions, more sober appraisals were voiced. This happened a few years later, in 1881, when the Porte had found itself compelled to use stern military measures to squash Albanian insubordination and open revolt. At that time, the Greek Government of Koumoundouros, facing the possibility of an open conflict with the Turks, sought to reach an understanding with the Albanians. He cabled his Consul General at Thessaloniki to go north and examine the possibilities of reaching an agreement with the Albanians. He believed that if the Albanian movement became stronger, "a certain action and collaboration between Greeks and Albanians could be possible", adding that "we have a sincere interest for Albania and we will not refuse her our support"³⁰.

The course of events at the time did not allow the realization of such a collaboration. But the Greeks, on more than one occasion, sought to reach a political understanding with the Albanians. The events of 1875-1878, and particularly the formation of the Albanian League of Prizren had helped them establish a clearer view of the Albanians as

29. AYE, File "Circulars and Telegrams to Missions, 1878", Koundouriotis (Constantinople) to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 2633, 12 Sept. 1878.

30. AYE, Unnumbered File E, sub-file "Consulate of Thessaloniki, 1881", Koumoundouros to P. Logothetis (Thessaloniki), No. 806, 5/17 April 1881 (tel.), and Logothetis to Koumoundouros, No. 364, 11/23 April 1881.

a separate nation, and thus set their policy on a more realistic basis. It is worth quoting in this respect a report by a new Greek consul at Skodra written in 1883, which so differs from Mavromatis' earlier accounts:³¹ "The Albanians", he wrote, "have an unburning urge for overthrowing their yoke and becoming self-governed.... In fact, they do not belong to anyone, and have no other aim but to achieve at all cost their autonomy".

And in 1886, the Greek bishop of Korcha made the following appraisal of Abdul bey Frasheri's activities, in a long confidential report to the Greek Government:³²

"Abdul bey worked sincerely for the unification of both Christian and Moslem Albanians, residing in Epirus and Macedonia, and for raising them to the status of a [modern] nation, with their own Principality. For this he sacrificed riches and official posts; he suffered privations and exile, and lost everything. He did not ignore that his efforts had little chance of succeeding, and he probably knew what was in store for his person. But, to all those who tried to warn him of the consequences, he would firmly reply, that he was sowing the seed as best as he could, so that others may reap the harvest".

Finally, an eminent Greek authority, Professor Constantine Paparigopoulos, who as a historian and president of the Association for the Advancement of Greek Letters held an influential position in Greek society and politics, in a report to Prime Minister Trikoupis in 1883, took a very critical attitude of former Greek policy toward the Albanians. He proposed that, in view of growing Albanian nationalism, Greece had only two alternatives: either to seek the establishment of an autonomous Albanian principality under a common — with Greece — king and parliament; or to encourage the establishment of an independent Albanian principality joined to Greece by a permanent alliance. If the latter course were adopted, then the Greek Government should cultivate friendly ties with the Albanians, starting with the teaching of the Albanian language in Greek schools in Epi-

31. AYE, File "A-W, 1883", sub-file "Consulate at Skodra", Report unnumbered, 30 April 1883.

32. Copy of report by the Bishop of Korcha Filotheos, 1 September, 1886, in AYE, File "Albanian Question — Consulates in Macedonia, 1886".

rus, Albania and wherever else Albanians lived. The thorny issue of Epirus could well be disposed with by a plebiscite³³.

All these views indicate that a general reappraisal of the Albanian factor had began to take place among leading Greeks after 1878. Old ideas did not vanish overnight. But a start had been made. It was not very difficult to trace this gradual development to the Albanian movement of the 1870's, and to the League of Prizren in particular.

33. AYE, File "Consulates in Macedonia; Association for the Advancement of Greek Letters 1883", Paparigopoulos to Trikoupis, No. 773, 25 June 1883.

CONSTANTIN AP. VACALOPOULOS

TÉMOIGNAGES HISTORIQUES SUR L'ÉTAT POLITIQUE AU MONT ATHOS (1880-1884)

1. L'établissement officiel des moines Russes au Mont Athos durant les années critiques 1873-1876 effectué par la possession définitive du monastère de St. Pantéléïmon ou Russikon¹, contribua considérablement à la consolidation de la présence russe dans cette région en même temps que la propagande panslaviste menait des luttes dures afin de pouvoir convertir les populations slavophones dans tout l'espace macédonien. Il est vrai que les moines Grecs du Mont Athos s'adressèrent continuellement au patriarcat oecuménique en le considérant comme responsable unique de la violation du statut établi par la pro-

1 Sur le background historique du monastère de St. Pantéléïmon ou Russikon et la pénétration russe ainsi que le Hilandar Voir G.A. Nicolopoulos, *Περὶ ἡγήσεις εἰς τὰς ἐκδὰς μονᾶς τοῦ Ἁγίου Ὁρους καὶ τῆς Χαλκιδικῆς Χερσονήσου*, Athènes 1874, pp. 40-44, 52-54, Emmanuel I. Gedeon, *Ὁ Ἄθως, Ἀναμνήσεις-Ἐγγράφα-Σημειώσεις*, Constantinople 1885, pp. 192-195, Gerassimos Smyrnakis, *Τὸ Ἅγιον Ὄρος*, Athènes 1903, pp. 140-250, Meletios Metaxakis, *Τὸ Ἅγιον Ὄρος καὶ ἡ ρωσικὴ πολιτικὴ ἐν Ἀνατολῇ* Athènes 1913, p. 143, Alexander Soloviev, *Histoire du monastère russe au Mont-Athos*, «*Byzantion*» 8(1933) 213-238, Chr. Ktenas, *Ἀπαντα τὰ ἐν Ἁγίῳ Ὄρει ἱερὰ Καθιδρύματα*, Athènes 1935, p. 102, G. Tsioran, *Σχέσεις τῶν γερμανικῶν χωρῶν μετὰ τοῦ Ἄθω καὶ δὴ τῶν μονῶν Κοντλουμουσίου, Λαύρας, Δοχειαρίου καὶ Ἁγίου Παντελεήμονος ἢ τῶν Ρώσων*, «*Texte und Forschungen zur Byzantinisch-Neugriechischen Philologie*», Nr. 25, Athen 1938, pp. 278-283, Stavros Papadatos, *Αἱ Ἑλλαντικαὶ διεισδύσεις ἐν Ἁγίῳ Ὄρει καὶ αἱ ἐξ αὐτῶν Πολιτικαὶ καὶ Νομικαὶ συνέπειαι*, Ioannina 1961, pp. 46-91, I. Smolitsch, *Le Mont Athos et la Russie*, «*Millénaire du Mont Athos*». I. 963-1963, Études et Mélanges, Chevetogne 1963, surtout les pp. 300-307 où se trouve la bibliographie russe, A.E. Tachiaos, *Controverses entre Grecs et Russes à l'Athos*, «*Millénaire du Mont Athos*» II, 963 - 1963, Études et Mélanges Actes du «*Convegno internazionale di Studio*» à la «*Fondazione Cini*» (3-6 septembre 1963) à Venise, Venezia 1963, pp. 159-179, Charalambos K. Papastathis, *Πέντε ἔγγραφα τοῦ ἑλληνικοῦ προξενίου Θεσσαλονίκης περὶ τῆς ρωσικῆς πολιτικῆς ἐν Ἁγίῳ Ὄρει*, «*Γρηγόριος δ Παλαμᾶς*», 594 (novembre-décembre) 1967, pp. 479-480, annotation 9 où se trouve toute la bibliographie relative, Emmanuel Amand de Mendieta, *Mount Athos, the Garden of the Panaghia*, Berlin 1972, pp. 134-141, Ioannis P. Mamalakis, *Τὸ Ἅγιον Ὄρος (Ἄθως) διὰ μέσον τῶν αἰώνων*, Thessaloniki 1971, pp. 449-453, Athanassios Angelopoulos, *Ἡ ἐν Ἀθῶν σερβικὴ μονὴ Χιλανδαρίου*, Athènes 1968 (article publié dans la revue *Θρησκευτικὴ καὶ Ἠθικὴ Ἐγκυκλοπαίδεια*, t. 12, 1968).

pagande panslaviste² tandis que les représentants du patriarcat ne cessèrent jamais à souligner l'incapacité des moines Grecs, leur égoïsme assidu et leur cupidité désastreuse. Cependant il faut admettre que les moines Grecs du Mont Athos se distinguèrent en général par leur honnêteté et leur sincérité exemplaires et leurs sacrifices héroïques dans leurs efforts vigoureux visant à la préservation des privilèges patriarcaux. D'autre part on ne doit pas ignorer l'attitude de la politique œcuménique du patriarcat ne lui permettant pas à soutenir exclusivement les intérêts grecs et méconnaître ainsi les revendications des autres peuples balkaniques³. En outre le but direct du patriarcat visant à la préservation intacte de ses privilèges présupposa quelques fois le soutien politique de la Russie et suggéra par conséquence une politique pliante de sa part. Ce fait ne lui pas permis à imposer sa volonté aux moines Grecs du Mont Athos en but d'organiser une résistance bien préparée contre la pénétration russe. C'est ainsi que la propagande panslaviste obtint à faire sentir son influence aux plusieurs monastères et skites du Mont Athos. L'augmentation numérique remarquable des moines Russes établis dans cette région au début de la décennie 1880-1890, leur puissance considérable dans le domaine de l'administration des monastères et enfin la création d'un comité spécial au monastère de St. Pantéléimon chargé à manipuler le développement de la propagande panslaviste constituèrent sans doute des preuves convaincantes sur les intentions de la politique russe visant à renverser le régime établi depuis des siècles au Mont Athos et à abolir les privilèges patriarcaux⁴.

2. Suivant les statistiques anglaises en 1878 existèrent au Mont Athos 3.000 moines Grecs, 1600 Russes, 280 Bulgares et Serbes, et 120 Roumains⁵. Quelques années plus tard, en 1883, les rapports des consuls

2. Ainsi l'attitude du patriarcat à l'égard des moines Géorgiens de la cellule de St. Jean le Théologien provoqua plusieurs fois l'indignation de la part des moines Grecs du couvent des Ibères qui considérèrent le patriarche comme un allié de la politique russe. (Antonios-Emilios Tachiaos, *Τὸ Γεωργιανικὸν Ζήτημα (1868-1918)*, Συμβολὴ εἰς τὴν ἱστορίαν τῆς ρωσικῆς πολιτικῆς ἐν Ἀγίῳ Ὄρει, Thessaloniki 1962, p. 86).

3. Athanassios Angelopoulos, The Relations between the ecumenical patriarchate and the church of Serbia during the period of 1885-1912, The Episcopal Question in Old Serbia and Northern Macedonia, «*Balkan Studies*» 13 1 (1972) 125.

4. Nikolaos Vlachos, *Τὸ Μακεδονικὸν ὡς φάσις τοῦ Ἀνατολικοῦ Ζητήματος, 1878-1908*, Athènes 1908, pp. 206-211.

5. F.O. 195/1458/ f. 371.

Grecs de Thessalonique citent 2412 moines Grecs, 998 Russes, 200 Bulgares et 206 Roumains⁶. La colonie russe était administrée par l'hégumène Makarios mais les moines Grecs crurent que le vrai chef du couvent de Russicon était un certain Ieronymus qui se tenait éloigné. On le considérait comme le conseiller spirituel du monastère et entr' autres on avait répandu qu'il entretenait des relations étroites avec ses agents à Constantinople et ailleurs qui lui fournirent des informations précieuses sur le sort de ceux qui se proposèrent à visiter le monastère de St. Pantéléimon⁷. Sans doute le nombre des moines Russes au Mont Athos connut chaque année une augmentation considérable et le monastère Russicon devint un presque village où on construisit partout des installations nouvelles ayant à sa disposition des subventions importantes provenant de la Russie. Le même phénomène parut aussi dans la skite de St. André (Seraj) trouvant dans la région du monastère de Vatopedi. En 1883 ses moines Russes avaient déjà commencé à bâtir une nouvelle église⁸.

Les voyageurs Anglais qui visitèrent au début de la décennie 1880-1890 le Mont Athos constatèrent la défiance existant entre les moines Grecs et Russes. Les Grecs se plaignirent des prétentions erronées de la part des Russes sur le Mont Athos et de leurs revendications territoriales aspirant à transformer cette région dans une colonie russe lorsqu'ils eurent obtenu la prédominance numérique. Leur but direct visa particulièrement à contester l'autorité du patriarcat oecuménique et à pouvoir subordonner l'église grecque sous les auspices de l'église russe⁹. Les mêmes voyageurs remarquèrent qu'au nombre total de 17 monastères grecs du Mont Athos, les plus grands, celui de Vatopedi contenait à cette époque 220 moines et 120 serviteurs, et celui de Lavra 170 moines et 100 serviteurs. Le monastère de Vatopedi, soulignèrent-ils, était le plus important monastère grec au Mont Athos et ses moines se distinguèrent par leur intelligence remarquable et leur culture rare¹⁰.

Dans le monastère serbe de Hilandari vécurent en 1883 60 moines

6. N. Vlachos, *Τὸ Μακεδονικὸν ὡς φάσις τοῦ Ἀνατολικοῦ Ζητήματος*, p. 211.

7. *F.O.* 195/1453/ f. 371.

8. *F.O.* 195/1453/f. 371.

9. *F.O.* 195/1453/f. 361. Voir aussi Athelstan Riley, *Athos or the mountain of the monks*, London 1887, p. 249.

10. *F.O.* 195/1453/ f. 362.

Serbes, 10 Grecs et 30 serviteurs. Le monastère bulgare Zographou se trouvant à cette époque dans un état florissant contenait 120 moines Bulgares dont quelques Grecs et 150 serviteurs. Lorsqu'en 1858 le monastère se détruisit, on avait dès lors commencé à le reconstruire et en 1883 il était presque fini. En dehors du monastère les cultivateurs et les serviteurs qui firent partie du couvent, formèrent un petit village. Les moines Grecs du Mont Athos confirmèrent que le couvent de Zographou était subventionné somptueusement par la Russie. Toutefois les deux monastères de Hilandari et Zographou appuyèrent-ils toujours les propositions russes au sein de la sainte synode de Karyes¹¹.

Au monastère Russicon ou St. Pantéléïmon constituant à cette époque le noyau russe au Mont Athos vécurent 800 moines Russes et 150 serviteurs. En 1875 le nombre de ses moines ne dépassa pas les 600¹². D'après les informations des rapports consulaires grecs il contenait en 1883 380-400 moines Russes dont 80 Grecs¹³. Quelques années plus tard, en 1887, dans le couvent russe de Saint Pantéléïmon vécurent plus de 1000 moines dont 700 sujets russes¹⁴. Ce monastère était considéré comme le centre exclusif de la propagande panslaviste qui subventionna annuellement le Mont Athos d'une somme de 40.000 livres turques¹⁵. Jusqu'en 1839 il n'y avait que des moines Grecs au St. Pantéléïmon, à peu-près 150. Mais déjà en 1868 les moines Russes formèrent la majorité du monastère (400). C'est ainsi qu'ils prédominèrent graduellement et obtinèrent enfin à éloigner les moines Grecs sous divers prétextes. Eutropius était le dernier moine Grec vivant encore au monastère de Vatopedi. En 1876 l'hégumène Macarios suborna le patriarche d'une somme de 20.000 livres turques et d'une croix d'une valeur de 5.000 livres et aussi les autres membres de la saint synode.— Ce qui impressionna particulièrement les visiteurs Anglais c'était sans doute la discipline absolue regnant dans ce monastère où il y eut des moines bien éduqués. Entr' eux se trouvèrent des

11. F.O. 195/1453/-f. 362, I. Mamalakis, *Τὸ Ἅγιον Ὄρος (Ἄθως) διὰ μέσου τῶν αἰώνων*, pp. 477-482.

12. Kiril Patriarh Balgarski, *Prinos kām Balgarskij ėrkoven vapros. Dokumenti od Avstrijskoto konsulstvo v Solun*, Sofija 1961, p. 138.

13. N. Vlachos, *Τὸ Μακεδονικὸν ὡς φάσις τοῦ Ἀνατολικοῦ Ζητήματος*, p. 211.

14. Kiril Patriarh Balgarski, *Prinos kam uniatsvoto v Makedonija sled osobodilelnata vojna 1879-1895*, Sofija 1968, p. 573.

15. N. Vlachos, *Τὸ Μακεδονικὸν ὡς φάσις τοῦ Ἀνατολικοῦ Ζητήματος*, p. 211.

officiers Russes retirées de l'armée et quelques Grecs laboureurs admis dernièrement au couvent. La communication entre Russicon et la skite de St. André se fit pendant la nuit afin d'éviter la publicité¹⁶.

3. Dans la présente étude sont analysées par l'auteur d'une façon minutieuse les controverses soulevées entre les moines Grecs et Russes au Mont Athos en 1883-1884 principalement dans les monastères des Ibères, dans la skite du Prophète Hélié dépendant du couvent de Pandokrator ainsi que dans la skite roumaine de St. Ioannis Prodromos et ses relations avec le couvent de Lavra. L'auteur se base sur quelques rapports inédits du consul Anglais de Thessalonique Charles Blunt et autres documents écrits de la part des moines Grecs et adressés au représentant Anglais en le mettant au courant de l'état politique existant dans cette région. La substance du contenu de ces rapports et autres écrits nous montre clairement d'une part les tentatives de la propagande panslaviste à obtenir des résultats favorables au détriment des intérêts des monastères grecs et d'autre part l'attitude et la résistance continuelle des moines Grecs des monastères Pandokrator et Ibères aux provocations russes. En effet les moines-Grecs du monastère de Pandokrator s'opposèrent avec efficacité aux efforts des moines Russes de la skite du Prophète Hélié¹⁷ qui cherchèrent à étendre le territoire de la skite au détriment du monastère grec souverain. De la même manière les moines des Ibères réussirent à renvoyer les moines Géorgiens de la cellule de St. Jean le Théologicien¹⁸.

Le phénomène de l'affluence énorme des moines Russes au Mont Athos pendant cette époque obligea en 1880 le comité dirigeant des Grecs à ne recevoir point des moines étrangers sans avoir préalablement des indications concrètes sur leur origine, leur moyens pécuniaires disposés et autres détails. Cette décision du comité dirigeant du Mont Athos fut communiqué aux moines Russes en octobre 1880. Le consul général de la Russie à Thessalonique se hâta à persuader le consul Roumain de Linche sur leur réaction commune contre les mesures prises. Mais de Linche refusa à participer aux projets de l'initiative russe en alléguant que la communication grecque concernait seulement les monastères russes. Il est évident que le consul Roumain

16. F. O. 195/1453/II. 363-364.

17. Kosmas Vlachos, *Ἡ χειρόγραφος τοῦ Ἁγίου Ὁρους Ἔθνη καὶ αἱ ἐν αὐτῇ μοναὶ καὶ οἱ μοναχοὶ πάλαι τε καὶ νῦν*, Μελέτη ἱστορικὴ καὶ κριτικὴ, Volos 1903, pp. 230-231.

18. Voir aussi N. Vlachos, *op. cit.*, p. 212.

poursuivit une attitude particulière à l'égard de son œuvre de prosélytisme dans le domaine du développement de la propagande roumaine dans l'espace macédonien. Le consul général de l'Autriche à Thessalonique souligna en octobre 1880 que déjà dès la fondation du consulat roumain dans la même ville, son collègue Roumain fit des tentatives continuelles auprès des autorités politiques turques afin d'obtenir l'émancipation de la skite de St. Ioannis Prodromos et la formation d'un nouveau monastère souverain au Mont Athos¹⁹.

4. En écrivant au Foreign Office le 20 octobre 1883 le consul Anglais de Thessalonique Charles Blunt joignit deux annexes-mémoires de la part des moines Grecs des monastères Pandokrator et Ibères qui dénoncèrent l'attitude russe au Mont Athos et demandèrent l'intervention du gouvernement anglais. En effet le représentant diplomatique Anglais souligna dans sa lettre sa tâche délicate à rendre justice aux droits des moines Grecs mais en même temps il reconnut l'accroissement sensible de l'influence spirituelle et politique des moines Russes au Mont Athos. Des pareilles protestations adressèrent aussi les moines Grecs au gouvernement hellénique et au consul Grec Logothetis qui se proposa à cette époque à rendre visite au Mont Athos²⁰.

En effet les représentants officiels du monastère de Pandokrator, l'archimandrite Athanassios et l'hégumène Theoklitos, adressèrent le 24 juillet 1883 un mémoire détaillé à C. Blunt dans lequel ils lui exposèrent la nature de la querelle entre eux et les moines Russes de l'ermitage du Prophète Hélié se trouvant dans les limites du monastère grec²¹. Il est vrai que les moines Russes habitant cet ermitage et reconnaissant l'autorité du couvent grec vécurent tranquillement avant la guerre russo-turque (1877-1878) et respectèrent les droits du couvent souverain. Après la guerre, le panslavisme commença par ses comités à poursuivre systématiquement la slavisation de la Macédoine, les moines de cet ermitage conduits par le comité panslaviste, qui résida dans le couvent Russicon, se mirent doucement à violer le régime constitué au Mont Athos. Vers l'an 1881 les moines Russes du Prophète Hélié demandèrent l'autorisation au couvent souverain de re-

19. HHS (-Haus - Hof.- Staatsarchiv), Politisches Archiv, XXXVIII, τ. 235, Saloniki 23 Oktober 1880, no. 120.

20. F. O. 195/1453/ ff. 383-385.

21. I. Smolitsch, Le Mont Athos et la Russie, «*Millénaire du Mont Athos*» I, pp. 298-304.

construire la vieille église dominicale de l'ermitage qui avait besoin de réparations. Le couvent de Pandokrator leur accorda la permission mais sous la condition que cette nouvelle église aurait été égale en grandeur à l'ancienne et bâtie dans le même endroit parce qu'elle était assez vaste d'une contenance de 200 personnes tandis que, d'après la statistique, le nombre des moines de cet ermitage ne dépassait pas les 50. Mais comme ils demandèrent à faire cette église plus grande au double que l'ancienne et à l'extrémité orientale de la cour de l'ermitage et non pas au milieu, comme habituellement étaient bâties dans tous les monastères et ermitages, l'autorisation à cet égard ne leur était pas accordée par le couvent souverain car celui-ci remarqua que sous le prétexte de la réédification de l'église on ne cherchait que l'extension et l'agrandissement de l'ermitage. Ainsi les moines Russes s'adressèrent contre le couvent souverain au patriarche en se plaignant d'être empêchés de rebâtir l'église de l'ermitage. Le patriarche écrivit plusieurs fois à propos au couvent de Pandokrator en l'engageant à accorder aux requérants l'autorisation de bâtir une si grande église mais celui-ci répondit que cela lui était impossible parce qu'il croyait que sous le prétexte de la réédification de l'église «était caché un but étranger au régime monastique»²².

Sans autorisation du monastère souverain les moines Russes de la skite du Prophète Hélié commencèrent aussitôt à élever de nouveaux édifices et causer de grands dommages au couvent. C'est ainsi que le monastère porta le chef de l'ermitage Dikaion devant la sainte communauté du Mont Athos. Ayant jugé ce différend en tribunal de première instance, elle condamna Dikaion et ses compagnons comme violeurs du régime constitué et des stipulations du contrat de l'ermitage. La sainte synode communiqua ce jugement aux deux parties plaidantes le 26 mai 1882. Les représentants du Prophète Hélié s'adressèrent ensuite encore une fois au patriarche et lui même nomma à propos deux exarques qui, après avoir fait une enquête judiciaire sur les lieux et examiné toutes les pièces échangées relatives à ce différend, répondirent par un rapport au patriarcat condamnant l'ermitage subordonné. Sous les instances continuelles de la skite contre le couvent, le patriarcat envoya encore un des membres de la sainte synode du patriarche œcuménique, l'archevêque de Didimoticho Méthodios, pour chercher à arranger le différend. Au mois de mai 1883 Méthodios

arriva au Mont Athos et pressa le monastère de Pandokrator de céder et de consentir aux prétentions des moines Russes de l'ermitage. Les moines Grecs de Pandokrator finirent par céder sous quelques conditions incluses dans une lettre écrite le 20 mai 1883 et adressée à Methodios et aux consuls Européens de Thessalonique²³.

Dans la lettre précitée les moines Grecs du monastère de Pandokrator soulignèrent le nécessité à ce que l'église dominicale aurait été bâtie dans des conditions d'égale grandeur à celle qu'il y avait et dans le même endroit du fait que sous le prétexte de la réédification de l'église dominicale les moines Russes poursuivirent l'extension de l'ermitage. Ainsi le couvent de Pandokrator mis les conditions suivantes: 1) obligation de l'ermitage à dédommager le couvent, 2) acceptation du monastère à accorder l'autorisation de bâtir l'église dominicale, 3) le mur oriental qui reliait les deux parois nord et sud serait démoli et prolongé de 7 archines soit environ 6 pics (de maçon), 4) les moines Russes seraient obligés de ne point toucher les parois nord et sud de l'ermitage et de ne pas les pousser jusqu'au mur oriental, 5) le prolongement projeté de l'ermitage serait au niveau de terre et servirait seulement pour les processions et comme terrasse, 6) un contrat spécial entre le couvent et l'ermitage fixerait l'indemnité de l'ermitage envers le couvent pour toutes les oeuvres de construction, 7) les baraquements de bois ou planettes qui seraient élevés dans la cour de l'ermitage, après le terme des travaux de l'église auraient été démolis et 8) les deux parties seraient obligés d'agir conformément au document daté le 26 août 1839²⁴. Sous ces conditions seulement le couvent de Pandokrator consentit à céder aux exigences de la skite russe du Prophète Hélié. En fait leurs propositions ne furent point acceptées par les moines Russes²⁵.

Une nouvelle lettre écrite le 15/24 mars 1884 de la part des moines Grecs de Pandokrator au consul Anglais C. Blunt nous fait connaitre que le différend existant entre le couvent et l'ermitage russe avait été définitivement soumis à la juridiction de la communauté sainte du Mont Athos. En délivrant sa sentence elle donna cependant l'avantage d'obliger le couvent d'accepter l'agrandissement de l'église do-

23. *F.O.* 195/1453/ff. 389-840, G. Smyrnakis, *Τὸ Ἅγιον Ὄρος*, pp. 540-541, St. Papadatos, *Αἱ Σλαβικαὶ διευθετήσεις ἐν Ἁγίῳ Ὄρει*, pp. 67-68.

24. *F.O.* 195/1453/ ff. 842-847.

25. *F.O.* 195/1458/ f. 8430.

menicale de la skite. Mais puisque la skite du Prophète Hélié s'obligeait par la sentence de conjoindre une convention avec le couvent afin de payer le matériel fourni et les dédommagements pour le préjudice à cause de la perte d'une partie de la circonférence fournie à l'ermitage et puisque encore la sentence fit mention des documents officiels, qui prouvèrent le status quo du Mont Athos, la subordination et la soumission de la skite au couvent, la skite du Prophète Hélié en refusant de se soumettre à cette décision, que lui avait été communiquée le 22 juillet 1883, continua les travaux dans la circonférence du couvent, construisant des rues et exploitant les bois et les pierres²⁶.

La communauté sainte du Mont Athos tint sa séance le 23 août 1883 sous la présidence du caimakame Hassan Bey. Comme tribunal de première instance elle prit en considération la requête du couvent Pandokrator contre la skite du Prophète Hélié présentée à la communauté le 3 juin 1883 et accompagnée de deux actes de protestation datés le 19 et 21 juin du même couvent propriétaire. Cette décision a été délivrée par coutumace, car quoique les significations faites tant de la part du caimakame, comme de la part de la communauté, la skite refusa d'envoyer son représentant au tribunal ainsi qu'à la commission composée de cinq membres, nommée ad hoc sous la présidence du caimakame afin de se rendre sur les lieux et examiner la situation des limites. Cette commission se rendit aux lieux, examina les limites et reçut les dépositions d'onze témoins qui connurent bien les limites. Après cela elle délivra la sentence connue et l'a communiqua selon la règle aux deux parties en litige. Mais la skite du Prophète Hélié sans faire préalablement l'opposition nécessaire pardevant le tribunal de première instance, appela l'affaire devant le patriarcat qui fixa le jour de la séance malgré les objections du fondé du pouvoir du couvent Pandokrator. La démission du patriarche Ioakim III ajourna la solution du problème. Quelques jours avant, les supérieurs de la skite du Prophète Hélié envoyèrent aux supérieurs du couvent les citations par lesquelles ils les invitèrent pardevant le tribunal civil de Thessalonique pour que le procès en question serait jugé sous la protection du consul général de la Russie²⁷.

Les circonstances critiques incitèrent les moines Grecs du couvent Pandokrator à s'adresser le 15/24 mars 1884 au consul Anglais

26. F.O. 195/1484/ ff. 91-92.

27. F.O. 195/1484/ ff. 92-93.

C. Blunt, lui raconter la préhistoire de leur litige et le prier à continuer à intervenir auprès de la Porte en faveur d'eux: «La magnanimité anglaise surtout, qui dans des circonstances très graves a bien voulu intervenir pour retenir la force qui menaçait de renverser tout le passé de l'Orient, et qui noblement et humainement toujours offre son appui en faveur des grands intérêts helléniques qu'il a raisonnablement considéré comme intérêts de l'Europe et de la civilisation; la grandeur d'âme anglaise, croyons nous, ne cessera pas de venir en aide et au concours du Mont Athos pour repousser ses ennemis, qui considèrent le passé de ce saint lieu, comme s'il n'existait pas, qui méconnaissent les grands services rendus par les couvents grecs du Mont Athos à tous les Chrétiens de l'Orient dans de circonstances très critiques pour eux ainsi que les conditions sous lesquelles ont été admis dans les couvents, skites et kélia grecs les trompeurs moines Russes qui poursuivent l'expulsion des possesseurs et fondateurs de ce saint lieu»²⁸.

5. En même temps que la querelle entre le monastère grec Pandokrator et la skite russe du Prophète Héli se poursuivait, la violation du régime octroyé depuis des siècles au Mont Athos se manifesta aux plusieurs cellules ou ermitages des couvents grecs. Les dispositions réelles des moines Russes provenant plutôt d'une conquête politique que d'une conviction religieuse ne tardèrent pas à se dévoiler aussi dans le monastère des Ibères dans lequel vécurent en 1883 180 moines Grecs et 60 serviteurs²⁹. Dans la cellule de St. Jean le Théologicien située dans les limites des Ibères³⁰ et cédée en 1868 sous l'autorisation du couvent souverain au moine Géorgien Bénédict³¹, le nombre des moines Russes connut une augmentation considérable pendant les dernières années contrairement aux stipulations prévues³².

L'éminent professeur A.E. Tachiaos dans son étude précieuse «Τὸ Γεωργιανικὸν Ζήτημα (1868-1918)» s'occupa substantiellement du background des relations ecclésiastiques entre les moines Grecs et Ibères

28. *F.O.* 195/1484/ f. 95.

29. *F.O.* 195/195/ f. 868, A propos du background historique du couvent des Ibères voir Em. I. Gedeon, 'Ο Ἅθως, pp. 169-172, G. A. Nikolopoulos, *Περὶ ἡγήσεως εἰς τὰς ἐκτὸς μονὰς τοῦ Ἁγίου Ὄρους καὶ τῆς Χαλκιδικῆς Χερσονήσου*, pp. 37-39.

30. Kosmas Vlachos, *Ἡ χερσονήσος τοῦ Ἁγίου Ὄρους Ἄθω καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ μοναὶ καὶ οἱ μοναχοὶ πάλαι τε καὶ νῦν*, pp. 205.

31. Ioan. P. Mamalakis, *Τὸ Ἅγιον Ὄρος (Ἄθως) διὰ μέσου τῶν αἰώνων*, pp. 455-456.

32. A.E. Tachiaos, *Τὸ Γεωργιανικὸν Ζήτημα (1862-1918)*, pp. 7, 16.

et les Géorgiens de St. Jean le Théologicien en examinant profondément les diverses phases déroulées et en se basant principalement aux manuscrits conservés aux archives du monastère des Ibères. Nous nous bornons ici seulement à élucider quelques points obscurs tirés des rapports consulaires anglais de Foreign Office qui nous offrent d'ailleurs des informations de premier rang. Les contacts étroits suivis entre les moines Grecs des diverses monastères et le consul C. Blunt à Thessalonique témoignent le vif intérêt de la diplomatie anglaise au sort du Mont Athos. D'ailleurs la présence du facteur anglais et son intervention aux affaires du Mont Athos ne constitue pas en effet une nouveauté dans l'histoire des relations internationales de cette région. Grâce à l'intervention anglaise en 1860 fut échappée la russification du monastère grec Koutloumoussiou³³. De la même façon les moines Grecs des Ibères rencontrèrent en 1883 C. Blunt qui leur proposa l'internationalisation de leur problème par la presse et l'orientation de l'opinion publique sur l'influence exercée sur eux de la part de la Russie³⁴.

En 1882 le moine Géorgien Bénédicté étant allé dans son pays revint avec quinze moines Géorgiens bien que le couvent des Ibères lui signala que ses actes constituèrent une infraction aux lois du gouvernement turc. La communauté sainte le manda devant elle et lui ordonna de diminuer le nombre des moines mais Bénédicté échappa et revient en juillet 1883 avec une autre quinzaine de moines Géorgiens. Sa conduite provoqua l'ordonnance du couvent grec de s'éloigner de la cellule et de renvoyer le nombre excédant des Géorgiens y installés par lui illégalement. Mais celui se rendit à Constantinople où il s'adressa au gouvernement turc et au patriarcat oecuménique. A la suite de sa plainte le ministre Turc des Affaires Etrangères adressa par le gouverneur de Thessalonique au caimakame du mont Athos un télégramme dans lequel il demanda les motifs de l'expulsion de quarante à peu près moines Géorgiens. En même temps le patriarcat dans une dépêche désapprouva la démarche isolée et signala les suites sérieuses de cet acte. A ces télégrammes le couvent répondit en donnant des informations nécessaires et exigea le renvoi de la cellule du nombre excédant des Géorgiens d'autant plus que cette augmentation cachait des vues de conquête³⁵.

33. *Op. cit.* p. 49 annotation 14 se référant à la bibliographie relative.

34. *Op. cit.*, p. 49.

35. F. O. 195/1453/ ff. 355-356. A. E. Tachiaos, *Tò Γεωργιανικόν Ζήτημα (1868-1918)*, pp. 39-58 où sont relatées tous les détails de la querelle en 1883-1884.

Lorsque Bénédicté amena en 1882 les quinze moines Géorgiens et le couvent lui ordonna de les renvoyer, celui-ci donna une petition demandant la transformation de la cellule en ermitage, savoir, l'accroissement indéterminé du nombre des moines, l'agrandissement de l'annexe se la cellule et sollicita l'autorisation en vertu de laquelle les Géorgiens puissent librement entrer au couvent des Ibères et faire des prières à l'église de Saint Vierge. Ces deux actes ayant été rejetés, il en remis une autre à la communauté dans laquelle il éleva la prétention de la possession de tout le couvent, de ses propriétés et de toute sa fortune³⁶.

Il est étonnant de constater ici l'intérêt prouvé par l'ambassadeur Russe à Constantinople au sujet du règlement intérieur du monastère Grec des Ibères et du sort des moines Russes de la cellule de St. Jean Théologicien. Au début de l'année 1883 il invita chez lui le représentant-officiel du Mont Athos auprès du patriarcat et lui a soumis une liste des questions sur l'organisation intérieure des Ibères. Entr'autres il se proposa à apprendre sur la différence existant entre l'organisation intérieure du couvent des Ibères et celui de Pantéléimon, sur le mode de l'élection des représentants du couvent des Ibères, sur le nombre des moines Grecs et Russes existant dans ce monastère, sur les conditions exigées pour l'admission dans la communauté du couvent des Ibères et autres sujets touchant en général le couvent grec et révélant d'une façon claire les intentions directes de la politique russe au Mont Athos³⁷.

En effet le 22 février 1884 le consul général de Russie à Thessalonique Jacobson arriva au Mont Athos et adressa du couvent russe de St. Pantéléimon à celui des Ibères, une pièce rédigée en russe par laquelle il invitait les représentants du susdit couvent à venir auprès de lui pour entendre une communication qu'il avait à leur faire de la part de l'ambassadeur Russe de Constantinople. Quand se fut rendu près de lui un des représentants du couvent ainsi qu'un des primats de mé-

36. F.O. 195/1453/ f. 357.

37. F.O. 195/1453/ ff. 348-352, F. O. 195/1484/ f. 83. Voir aussi A. E. Tachias, *Τὸ Γεωργιανικὸν Ζήτημα (1868-1918)* p. 100, 45 annotation 12 soulignant l'absence de la liste des questions dans les archives du monastère des Ibères. Au contraire dans le dossier F.O. 195 /1453/ ff. 848-352 est conservée intacte cette liste des questions posées par l'ambassadeur Russe à Constantinople au représentant du Mont Athos.

me couvent connaissant tous les deux le russe, le consul Russe leur communiqua de la part de son ambassadeur à Constantinople qu'il était avantageux que les moines Géorgiens restassent en tranquillité dans leur cellule et que toutes les exigences des pères du couvent grec cessassent ayant pour objet la diminution du nombre des moines cellulaires. En conformant à ses propositions, ils auraient la faveur du tsar de la Russie, mais dans le cas contraire il leur prévient que la diplomatie russe emploierait la violence contre les moines Grecs du monastère des Ibères. Les envoyés du couvent s'étant bornés à déclarer que leur mission n'était autre que d'entendre les communications du représentant diplomatique Russe, transmirent aux moines Grecs les propositions de Jacobson. Les moines Grecs des Ibères s'étant réunis en conseil, selon l'usage des couvents, composé des représentants et des primats, prirent le parti de persister à repousser des propositions pareilles, dont l'acceptation ne visait à rien autre qu'à la «russification» du couvent. A peine eurent-ils pris cette décision, Jacobson arriva personnellement au couvent des Ibères pour entendre leur réponse aux propositions qu'il leur a faites depuis deux jours. Les moines Grecs lui annoncèrent leur décision et le consul Russe se rendit d'abord à la cellule de St. Jean le Théologicien pour encourager les moines Géorgiens. Ensuite il se rendit à l'ermitage russe de St. André après avoir visité la veille l'ermitage du Prophète Hélié et incité les moines à persister dans leur exigences contre le couvent souverain de Pandokrator. En plus il invita le caimakame du Mont Athos à l'ermitage de St. André et s'entretient avec lui sur la possibilité de forcer les moines Grecs du monastère des Ibères à céder une partie de leur couvent d'après les ordres des autorités turques de Thessalonique³⁸.

6. Sur l'action déployée par la propagande roumaine au Mont Athos et dans l'île de Thassos à cette époque, le vice-consul Anglais à Cavala D. Pecchiotti en écrivant à C. Blunt le 18 octobre 1880 lui fit une description courte des controverses existant entre les moines de la skite roumaine St. Ioannis Prodromos et ceux du monastère grec souverain de Lavra³⁹. Il se réfère particulièrement aux intentions proches de la skite roumaine depuis l'indépendance de la Roumanie qui tendirent à développer son importance et se ranger parmi le nombre

38. F.O. 195/1484/II. 81-89. Le même document écrit en grec est publié par A. E. Tachiaos, *op. cit.*, pp. 98-103, voir surtout les pages 100-102.

39. G. Tsioran, *Σχέσεις τῶν ρουμανικῶν χωρῶν μετὰ τοῦ Ἄθω*, pp. 141-200 où

de 20 monastères du Mont Athos avec le droit de votation dans la communauté sainte de Karyes et un sceau particulier⁴⁰. Les moines Roumains de cette skite commencèrent déjà en 1879 à demander le droit de sceau et de recevoir, sans l'ingérence du monastère grec de Lavra, les provisions qui lui arrivèrent de la part des bienfaiteurs Roumains. La sainte synode s'opposa aux prétentions des Roumains et le gouverneur Turc ne voulut non plus reconnaître l'indépendance ou métamorphose de la skite de St. Ioannis Prodromos. Il souligna que le nombre des véritables couvents était fixé, seulement la synode avait le droit d'en augmenter ou diminuer. La même skite posséda aussi à cette époque dans l'île de Thassos un metochion qu'il entretient et qui jusqu'alors n'eut pas une vie florissante. Ses moines n'avaient jamais atteint le nombre de 12 étant toujours 6 à 8. C'est ainsi que, suivant les écrits du vice-consul Anglais D. Pecchiotti, la propagande roumaine n'eut nullement de succès dans l'île de Thassos⁴¹.

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sont analysées toutes les phases de ces controverses. Quelques notions historiques sur le couvent de Lavra voir M. Gedeon, 'O "Αθως, pp. 158-163.

40. G. Tsioran, *op. cit.*, pp. 201-215

41. F.O. 195/324/ff. 324-327

JON V. KOFAS

GREAT BRITAIN AND THE RESTORATION
OF KING GEORGE II

George II had one of the most erratic reigns of any Greek monarch in the nation's modern history. He spent more time in exile than on his throne and he had the dubious distinction of sharing responsibility for the authoritarian regime of General John Metaxas. George inherited from his father a legacy of intense Royalist-Republican power struggle and he fell victim to political conflicts because he sided with the most reactionary forces in the country.

In 1922 he succeeded his father, Constantine I, as the latter was forced to abdicate his throne. In December 1923 after ruling for about a year the Republican Officers League forced the young King to leave the country. Greece had just suffered a major defeat in Asia Minor in the war against Turkey and the monarchists were principally responsible for the debacle. It was hardly an unexpected development therefore given the rivalry between Royalists and Republicans that George was exiled and Greece became a Republic after a plebiscite on April 13, 1924¹.

From 1924 until he was restored to his throne in 1935 George lived in London where he established cordial relations with political and business circles. In the early 1930's the idea of restoration became increasingly appealing to the ex-King's host government. Great Britain which enjoyed a preeminent influence in Greece ever since the War of Independence became concerned about the restoration of George II primarily for foreign policy reasons. After Eleftherios Venizelos, leader of the Liberal Party ever since 1910, was elected Prime Minister in 1928 he chose a course of *rapprochement* towards Italy. On September 23, 1928 he signed the Friendship Treaty with the Fascist government thus arousing suspicions in the Foreign Office about Greece's new direction in international politics. England was apprehensive about Mussolini's expansionist schemes in the Eastern Mediterranean therefore it was disgruntled with the Greek Liberal Government which

1. For more on the King's brief reign and the plebiscite see J.P.C. Carey and A. G. Carey *The Web of Modern Greek Politics*. New York: 1968, 95-8. Also see Constantine Tsoukalas *The Greek Tragedy*. Baltimore: 1969, 41-2.

avored greater Italian involvement in Balkan affairs². The foreign policy of Venizelos was clearly designed to underscore British and French influence in the Balkan region³.

Both France and England welcomed the electoral victory of the Populist Party which defeated the Venizelists in the March 1933 elections. The Populists who were affiliated with the Monarchist bloc factions entertained a pro-Western foreign policy and generally favored greater not less Franco-British involvement in the Balkans. After the Monarchists took power the ex-King's hopes of returning to his throne were raised once again. The first indication that George II contemplated returning to Greece came in the form of a letter addressed to General Metaxas⁴. The Government newspapers published the letter in January 1934 as a gesture of their sympathy with the dynasty. The letter stated: «I have no personal ambition; I simply believe that the historic mission of my Royal House has not ended and that, with a precipitous people like the Greeks, a strong royal power is an indispensable factor to a smooth political life»⁵. Metaxas was the leader of the Freeopinionist Party, the most extreme royalist faction, which favored the abolition of the Republic and the end of democratic institutions.

Many republicans drew the conclusion that George II expressed a willingness to reclaim his throne not by constitutional methods (a plebiscite) but rather by appealing to extremists like Metaxas who had a history of counter-revolutionary activity⁶. After the ex-King's letter was published the right-wing Populists⁷ rallied behind the Minister of the Interior, John Rallis and General Metaxas and pressured the President of the Council to adopt strong anti-republican measures⁸. Tsaldaris who acted as the balance between extremists and mo-

2. D. K. Nikoles *Istoriike Poreia Tou Ellinikou Ethnous*, 1863-1941 (Historical Course of the Greek Nation). Athens: 1978, 553. Also see P. Gregoriades *Ellinike Demokratia*, 1924-1935 (Greek Republic, 1924-1935). Athens: 1972, 346-54.

3. Nikos Psyroukis *O Fasismos Kai E Tetarte Avgoustou* (Fascism and the Fourth of August). Athens: 1977, 63.

4. F. O. 371/18393, No. 48, Waterlow to Simon, Athens, January 31, 1934.

5. Cited in SDNA 868.00/736, No. 155, MacVeagh, Athens, February 9, 1934.

6. Psyroukis, *op. cit.* 63.

7. The Populist Party was divided on the restoration issue with the extremists supporting the return of George II and the moderates opposing it.

8. SDNA 868.00/736, No. 155, *op. cit.*

derates in the Royalist camp refused to resort to extra-Constitutional means against the Opposition preferring to weaken the latter by parliamentary manouvres. Metaxas who aspired to head the government interpreted the Premier's policies as weak and ineffective. After January 1934 the Freeopinionist chief became more outspoken about the bankruptcy of the Parliamentary regime and advocated the establishment of a dictatorship⁹.

On January 1934 the conservative newspaper *Kathemerine* published an article entitled «Dictatorship or Parliamentarism?». That was Metaxas' first major public statement about his leanings towards Fascism. According to the General the origin of parliamentary democracy was in nineteenth century Europe. It was a political system which the middle class embraced once it replaced the feudal class in society. The bourgeoisie mobilized economically in the nineteenth century and organized politically devising a system which reflected their interests. The only demand that the new class made on the state was that the latter should provide internal security by maintaining a police force and security from external threat by having a military force.

As long as the free enterprise system progressed, Metaxas continued, under the bourgeois state, parliamentarism augmented and secured bourgeois interests. The system therefore was desirable because it was useful to the middle class. Capitalism, however, found it necessary to abandon *laissez faire* and the bourgeoisie demanded government intervention to protect its economic interests. In the twentieth century the middle class lost the socio-political status which at once enjoyed. The masses had their own leaders to organize them therefore they became politically stronger. Their political mobilization contributed to the decline of bourgeois supremacy. Parliamentary democracy no longer worked for the middle class but for the masses and if that political system remained unchanged, Metaxas concluded, it would lead society to communism. The alternative to the antiquated parliamentary regime was dictatorship. Greece had to choose between communism which would spring forth from parliamentary democracy or a dictatorship modelled after that of Fascism¹⁰.

Although it is true that a number of politicians, republican and

9. John Metaxas *To Prosopiko tou Emerologio* (His Personal Diary). Athens: 1951-64, IV, 592-93

10. *Ibid.*, IV, 594-95.

monarchist, flirted with fascist doctrines¹¹, only Metaxas was serious about the installation of a totalitarian regime. It must be emphasized at this point that Monarcho-Fascism was preceeded by the monarchical restoration and it was the crown which was used as the stepping-stone to institute a distatorship on August 4, 1936.

Despite the enthusiasm which Metaxas and other extremists displayed about the Palace, the prospects for restoration were not favorable in 1934. The majority of the population was not receptive to the idea of crowned democracy and as Sir Sydney Waterlow, British Minister in Athens, noted in March 1934 the Republic was still strong. He wrote:

Firstly I do not think that restoration is at all likely. It might conceivably be attempted if parliamentarism were to break down completely and be succeeded by a dictatorship, but those well qualified to judge say that the Royal Family are not popular, and that if they were to return they would probably not leave the country alive¹².

That was indeed a prophetic statement because one year after the Minister wrote the above despatch parliamentarism did break down completely, a dictatorship was installed and the King restored.

The bankruptcy of parliamentarism resulted from the fierce Royalist-Republican power struggle which was accentuated after the March 1933 elections. In the autumn of 1934 Premier Tsaldaris scored a major victory over his Venizelist (almost synonymous with Republican) opponents. He persuaded a group of Senators to defect from the Republican party-line and vote for Alexander Zaimes, the Royalists' candidate for President of the Republic¹³. Venizelos and his followers retaliated in March 1935 by staging a twelveday military revolt to overthrow the Government¹⁴.

The March Revolt failed and Venizelos' political career ended with the demise of the Republican bloc. The Government purged thousands of republicans from the military, the public schools and the bu-

11. *Ibid*, IV, 596-97.

12. F. O. 371/18393, 140/24/34, Waterlow to O'Malley, Athens, March 3, 1934.

13. F. O. 371/18393, R 5983, No. 390, *Confidential*, Walker to Simon, Athens, October 24, 1934.

14. For complete details on the March Revolt see Gregoriades, *op. cit.* 383-435.

reaucracy replacing them with royalists. The purges were principally carried out because the monarchists wished to remove all obstacles for the dynasty's restoration¹⁵.

After the purges and trials the restoration was only a mere formality. The British Legation in Athens regarded the King's return as necessary and inevitable. Waterlow wrote to the Foreign Office:

In these circumstances (political polarization) it is natural that men's thoughts should turn to monarchy as a possible factor of reconstruction... And what better means to that end than a monarchical system,..... The case for monarchy in Greece may be summed up by the saying that with a people so politically minded as the Greeks, a dynasty is indispensable as a steadying force and as a supreme court of appeal¹⁶.

In the same report the Minister pointed out that he doubted if the Greeks were ready for George II. Nevertheless he submitted reports favorable to the Greek Royal House throughout May 1935.

He outlined the advantages to England if the dynasty was restored. He argued that the British government should play a greater role in Greek internal affairs because Great Britain had a responsibility to protect its interests in the Balkans. He continued:

This is the opportunity of communism, not only in the towns, but in the villages where I gather the feeling in anything for a quite life, with a growing discontent for the propertied classes, who seem able to do nothing but make trouble. The spread of this feeling unchecked means anarchy in the end, and except by the restoration of the dynasty, a survey of the Greek political scene today suggests no means to which it is likely to be checked. May it not, therefore, be to our interest to promote restoration, by giving suitable advice as opportunity offers, and even possibly by helping to remove some of the obstacles that militate against it.¹⁷

15. For details concerning the trials and purges see Nikoies, *op. cit.*, 570-71 and Spyros Linardatos *Pos Eftasame stin Tetarte Avgoustou* (How We Reached the Fourth of August). Athens: 1974, 52-68.

16. F. O. 371/19506, R 2288, No. 119, *Confidential*, Waterlow to Simon, Athens, April 4, 1935.

17. F. O. 371/19507, R 3208, No. 202, *Confidential*, Waterlow to Simon, Athens, May 13, 1935.

There was no «communist threat» to Greece in the 1930s and John Simon, British Foreign Secretary, was cautious about British official efforts to restore the exiled King. He responded to Waterlow that the Greek dynasty's return was certainly desirable but the Government's official policy was one of neutrality in the matter¹⁸.

The restoration became the principal campaign issue before the June 3, 1935 special elections for a National Assembly. Tsaldaris' Populist Party and General George Kondylis' National Radicals did not publically support the dynasty's return. These were the front-runner royalist parties who wanted to capture the republican vote so they avoided the controversial restoration issue¹⁹. There was no doubt, however, that Vice Premier Kondylis, who like Metaxas aspired to become a dictator, wanted the King back in Greece. In a despatch marked *very confidential* Neville Henderson, British ambassador in Belgrade, revealed to Waterlow that the Greek Vice Premier planned to restore George II²⁰.

Tsaldaris remained committed to the Republic and according to Waterlow's assessment just before the elections the prospects for crowned democracy had diminished because of the Premier's lack of enthusiasm for the monarchist cause²¹. After the June election — one of the most «corrupt and unreal in modern times»²² — the monarchist camp was returned to power. The first major decision which the new National Assembly made was to announce that a plebiscite would be held to decide the fate of the regime²³. Tsaldaris' enthusiasm for the Crown had waned after his party scored a major electoral victory. The British Minister in Athens wrote to Sir Samuel Hoare, British Foreign Secretary, that the Government Deputies no longer favored restoration because they enjoyed «unlimited power to monopolize the loaves and

18. F. O. 371/19507, R 3203, No. 187, *Confidential*, Simon to Waterlow, Foreign Office, May 30, 1935.

19. F.O. 371/19507, R 2862, No. 175, *Confidential*, Waterlow to Simon, Athens, April 27, 1935.

20. F. O. 171/19507, 103/2/35, *Very Confidential*, Henderson to Waterlow, Belgrade, May 7, 1935.

21. F. O. 371/19507, R 3909, No. 266, *Confidential*, Waterlow to Simon, Athens, June 17, 1935.

22. *Ibid.*

23. For more details on the restoration issue before the National Assembly see Linardatos, *op. cit.* 77-89.

fishes for themselves». Many republican politicians on the other hand did not object to the ex-King's return because «only under a monarchy can a general amnesty and some mitigation of the purge be expected»²⁴.

In July the Southern Division Chief of the Foreign Office concluded that restoration was necessary and indeed inevitable despite the political developments in Athens. He admitted that the Greeks did not want a change in regimes but he did not regard popular opposition to the Court as an obstacle. «The plebiscite on the question», he wrote, «can be rigged in the same way that any Balkan election is rigged, and probably would be»²⁵. He was correct of course because eight months later the plebiscite was rigged. The man primarily responsible for that affair was General Kondylis.

After the National Assembly recessed for the summer the Vice Premier went to Italy in response to an official invitation from the Fascist Government²⁶. His visit, which took place just before Italy attacked Ethiopia, was designed to convince Mussolini not to interfere in the contemplated restoration of George II. The Italian dictator had no such intention but since he was sympathetic to the Venizelists the Greek monarchists suspected that he might become involved. Kondylis was an honorary member of the Italian League of War Volunteers and while in Rome he delivered the following speech before the League:

It seems though, that Rome's mission in the world is not over, because even today when after the Great War the devastating wind blew from Russia, overthrowing throne, regimes and civilizations, we see only one man standing against this storm, and this man was Italian, il Duce. By creating fascism and placing it as barrier against the wave of destruction and utopian ideas, he saved the world from return to barbarism. We admire with sympathy this achievement and the civilizing struggle that Italy has accomplished. You have created a new regime which Germany has already imitated and today there are Fascist circles in every nation which sooner or later will be triumphant. Long live Italy! Long live il Duce!²⁷

24. F. O. 371/19508, R 4306, No. 309, *Confidential*, Waterlow to Hoare, Athens, July 8, 1935.

25. F. O. 371/19508, R 4397, No. 37, Waterlow, Athens, July 11, 1935.

26. Linardatos, *op. cit.* 94.

27. Cited in Nikoles, *op. cit.* 576.

The Liberal press in Greece criticized Kondylis' visit to Rome and his pro-Fascist address before the League. The Populist newspapers also criticized the Vice Premier and charged that his trip to Rome was linked to the preparations for the restoration²⁸.

On July 16, the day before Kondylis arrived in Athens, the Mayor of the capital, Kostas Kotzias, went to London as the official representative of the Secret Royalist Organization to confer with George II and British officials. After ten days of meetings in London the royalist major returned to Greece and reported to the press that «... the British and French circles place as a principal condition the *legitimacy* of the restoration»²⁹. That however was not actually the case. In a confidential despatch to the Foreign Office the British Legation in Athens reported that during Kotzias' deliberations with George II the latter said that «if he did not go back in the autumn, as he expects to do, he will have to become dictator»³⁰. The question of legitimacy was for the public while covertly illegitimate methods were used to end the Republic. This was with the knowledge of the Foreign Office.

On August 1 Tsaldaris left for his annual vacation in Bavaria. During his absence Kondylis was Acting-Premier. Republican politicians feared that the General would collaborate with the armed forces to install a dictatorship³¹. George II and the die-hard monarchists were pleased that a «man of action» like Kondylis was the head of the government even if for a brief period³².

The Acting-Premier's strategy for restoring George was to create a socio-political crisis during Tsaldaris' absence so that a State of emergency would become necessary and martial law inevitable. Once the Populist Prime Minister was out of the country, Kondylis adopted harsh measures against the anti-royalists. In Macedonia the Governor-General issued an order which banned meetings that supported the Republic. In Epirus three republicans were expelled from the country because they publically expressed their political views. The Minister

28. Linardatos, *op. cit.* 95. Also see SDNA 868.00/885, No. 756, C.A. Aldridge, Athens, July 18, 1935.

29. Linardatos, *op. cit.* 100-01

30. F. O. 871/19508, R 4859, *Confidential*, Walker to O'Malley, Athens, July 30, 1935.

31. SDNA 868.00/886, No. 108, Aldridge, Athens, August 5, 1935. Also see F.O. 371/19508, R 4859, *op. cit.*

32. Linardatos, *op. cit.* 102.

of Justice ordered the police throughout the nation to prohibit the formation of any Republican organizations³³.

Freedom of the press, speech and assembly were banished for republicans only under Kondylis' temporary leadership. The Opposition press was attacked by the Government and by independent royalist organizations³⁴. Thirty armed terrorists of an extreme right-wing organization broke into the offices of *Patris*, a leading Opposition newspaper, and destroyed the machinery and furniture. They injured several of the personnel and left without the slightest interference from the police³⁵. The Government prosecuted *Patris*' editor and sentenced him to two years in prison. Several republican newspapers including the Communist were ordered to stop circulation under emergency measures³⁶.

According to the intelligence reports of the United States Legation in Athens the man behind the anti-republican terrorism was air force General Reppas³⁷. Reppas took orders from the Minister of War, General Kondylis. The Government's persecutions of anti-royalists coincided with working class unrest during August. At the beginning of the month workers at Eraklion, Crete, went on strike demanding higher wages and improved living conditions³⁸. The Prefect (Nomarch) agreed to mediate on behalf of employees and employers but when the strikers marched toward the Prefect's office to attend the scheduled meeting they were met with gunfire. The local authorities ordered troops to fire at the unarmed workers killing seven people and wounding many more³⁹.

The Cretans, enraged with the government's display of brutality, took up arms and prepared for a showdown with the troops. The Acting-Premier adopted emergency measures to suppress the Cretans. The navy sent two destroyers and the air force sent two bombers to the island. The strikers quickly succumbed to the combined strength

33. F. O. 371/19508, R 4973, No. 861, Walker to Hoare, Athens, August 6, 1935.

34. Linardatos, *op. cit.* 104.

35. SDNA 868.00/894, No. 780, Aldridge, Athens, August 14, 1935. Also see F.O. 371/19508, R 5043, No. 377, Walker to Hoare, Athens, August 13, 1935.

36. Ibid.

37. SDNA 868.00/894, No. 780, *op. cit.*

38. F.O. 371/19508, R 4962, No. 48, Walker, Athens, August 6, 1935.

39. SDNA 868.00/894, No. 780, *op. cit.*



of the armed forces. As the ordeal ended hundreds of workers were arrested and imprisoned⁴⁰.

When the news of the Cretan strike reached Athens the Greek Communist Party organized workers, students, intellectuals, and other anti-monarchists under the leadership of the United Democratic Committee. This organization was composed of communists and other republican forces whose purpose was to prevent the restoration. Themistocles Sophoulis, the Liberal chief who inherited Venizelos' position, did not support the organization because he maintained that Tsaldaris assured him the Republic was not in danger⁴¹.

The popular response to the United Democratic Committee's anti-Government call was phenomenal. Labor unions throughout major cities sympathized with the Cretan struggle and on August 5 the Greek General Confederation of Labor asked all workers to support their Cretan counterparts⁴². Thousands went on strike while the police and the armed forces were called on the scene to deal with the unrest. On August 11 twenty-three people were killed in labor demonstrations and others wounded. In some cases employers agreed to satisfy labor's wage demands but the concessions were too few and the grievances overwhelming. A general strike was planned but Sophoulis warned the unions that unless they averted the strike the nation would be victimized by a social revolution. He stressed that a national strike constituted a revolutionary threat and he hinted that only leftist forces could possibly benefit from such activity⁴³.

In the midst of social unrest George Pesmatzoglou, a staunch royalist, went on a European tour to confer with Tsaldaris, George II and Venizelos about the restoration issue⁴⁴. The Premier favored postponement of the plebiscite but after he realized that the extremists in the monarchist camp would return the King by extraparliamentary means, he agreed not to delay the proposed plans for the November plebiscite⁴⁵. Venizelos who was the victim of monarchist persecution

40. Linardatos, *op. cit.* 104-05

41. *Ibid.* 105-06.

42. Kommounistiko Komma tis Elladas, *Episema Keimena*, 1934-1940 (Greek Communist Party, *Official Documents*, 1934-1940). Athens: 1974, IV, 517-19.

43. Linardatos, *op. cit.* 106.

44. *Ibid.* 111. Also see Georgios Vouros *Panagis Tsaldaris*. Athens: 1955, 507.

45. Georgios Pesmatzoglou *Gyro Apo Tin Palinorthosin Tou 1935* (On the Restoration of 1935). Athens: 1950, 45-6, 62-4.

many times during his long political career promised Pesmatzoglou that he would not obstruct the dynasty's return.⁴⁶ The ex-Liberal chief hoped that George II would grant amnesty to Venizelists who were purged after the March Revolt. The King confided in Pesmatzoglou that the plebiscite should take place as scheduled without any delays⁴⁷.

On September 5 Foreign Minister Dimitris Maximos and Pesmatzoglou decided to announce the Government's unqualified support for the dynasty. Tsaldaris concurred and he planned to step aside for the formation of a provisional government headed by Kondylis which would have prepared for the plebiscite⁴⁸.

On the same day that Maximos and Pesmatzoglou conferred with the Premier, the die-hard royalist military officers in collaboration with the Minister of War planned a *coup d'état*. The British Legation in Athens was informed about the military plot on September 6⁴⁹. The chief strategists behind the scheme were generals Reppas and Demestichas, Commander of the Athens regiment, who sided with Kondylis on the restoration issue against the President of the Council who appeared to have been stalling. The generals and the Acting-Premier intended to arrest Tsaldaris once he returned to Greece and then they would form «a directorate pending the restoration of the ex-King»⁵⁰. Apparently Kondylis and his cohorts were belatedly notified that Tsaldaris was willing to fully embrace the restoration issue. As a result of that development the Minister of War postponed the plot to overthrow the government. On September 7 the Government newspapers acknowledged the abortive coup which was scheduled to take place on September 9, the day Tsaldaris arrived in Athens⁵¹.

When rumors of the Kondylis scheme reached Pericles Rallis Minister of the Interior and General Panayotakos, both loyal Tsaldarists, they acted swiftly to save the Prime Minister. Panayotakos stationed troops in Corinth where Tsaldaris was due to arrive. He replaced a number of military officers who were devoted to the Minister of War with

46. *Ibid*, 59-62. Also see Linardatos, *op. cit.* 115-16 and Psyroukis, *op. cit.* 66.

47. Pesmatzoglou, *op. cit.* 55-8.

48. *Ibid*, 63-5.

49. F.O. 371/19508, R 5450, No. 219, Walker, Athens, September 6, 1935.

50. F.O. 371/19508, R 5552, No. 398, *Confidential*, Walker to Hoare, Athens, September 11, 1935.

51. F.O. 371/19508, R 5450, No. 119, *op. cit.*

Tsaldarists. All these measures were taken with Rallis' approval while Kondylis was ignorant of the counter-coup preparations⁵².

Kondylis arrived in Athens from Spetzes on September 9 and was informed that Rallis and Panayotakos had secretly prepared a counter-coup. Overwhelmed by the consternation of the plot against him the Vice Premier demanded the immediate dismissal of General Panayotakos as Commander of the First Army Corps otherwise he threatened to resign. Tsaldaris grudgingly consented to Kondylis' ultimatum hoping to avoid a possible military confrontation among royalists⁵³.

Rallis was also forced out of office giving a decisive administrative victory to the extreme monarchists in government. On September 10 the Prime Minister publically announced that he supported the restoration and he asked the people to vote for the dynasty. After that date the Populist chief lost control of his Cabinet to Kondylis who had mobilized the ultra-royalists behind him. Alan Walker, Waterlow's temporary replacement at the Legation, informed the Foreign Office on September 11 that the die-hard royalists were in total control of the government. «The events outlined above», he wrote, «have resulted in an undoubted victory for the extreme royalists who, though a minority in the country, now have the whip hand over their less organized opponents⁵⁴».

The republicans were indeed rather loosely organized and were not resisting the systematic monarchist measures to restore the ex-King by forcible methods. On September 17 the republican parties formally announced for the first time that they considered the plebiscite illegal but they intended to participate in the process⁵⁵. That announcement coincided with the disintegration of the Populist party. Fifteen Tsaldarist deputies resigned to protest Kondylis' attempted coup and his blatant manipulation of the Cabinet. Many military officers who were loyal Tsaldarists and who had supported Panayotakos resented the Vice Premier's domination of the government and his control of the armed forces⁵⁶. The Minister of War, however, was firmly in power and a few renegade officers did not pose a threat to his

52. Linardatos, *op. cit.* 116-17.

53. *Ibid.*, 118-21. Also see Pesmatzoglou, *op. cit.* 69-71.

54. F.O. 371/19508, R 5552, No. 398, *op. cit.*

55. Linardatos, *op. cit.* 124.

56. F.O. 371/10508, R 5586, No. 54, Walker, Athens, September 17, 1985.

carefully constructed power-base. It would have taken much more than editorial criticism, Cabinet resignations and political and military defections to stop the irreversible trend of dictatorship and Monarcho-Fascism.

Within a few days of Rallis' resignation Kondylis consolidated power in the Cabinet to the extent that he ruled Greece without any active opposition from the moderates. Walker remarked on September 17 that «General Kondylis is a virtual dictator, and is consolidating his position by transferring to provincial garrisons such senior officers as carried out orders of General Panayotakos on the Prime Minister's return to Athens⁵⁷». Kondylis managed to expand and solidify his power primarily because of the Opposition's weakness and failure to rally behind Tsaldaris and the moderate royalist forces⁵⁸.

On September 18 the Council announced that a decree was drafted which outlined the manner by which the plebiscite was to be carried out. There were fourteen articles in the Ministerial Decree and they were designed to provide the legal foundation for the plebiscite. According to the second article all registered voters were required to participate. Everyone in the military had to vote whether he had registered or not. Anyone who abstained without «justification» was subject to penalty⁵⁹.

The ballot papers were marked by two different colors; blue for the King and red for the Republic. Article XI stipulated that a simple majority of fifty per cent was required to reinstate the monarchy. The simple majority rule was a departure from the Government's original position which required seventy per cent of the vote in the King's favor for his return. Needless to say that the Decree was drafted by the extreme royalists.

After the Cabinet announced the Ministerial Decree Tsaldaris held a Party meeting and threatened that if anyone opposed the Decree he would be expelled from the party. Alan Walker wrote that the Government in Athens expected the King to return as the head of the Royalist bloc and hence the opponent of the Republicans⁶⁰. The monarchists

57. F. O. 371/19508, R 5640, No. 402, *Confidential*, Walker to Hoare, Athens, September 24, 1935.

58. SDNA 868.00/910, No. 844, MacVeagh, Athens, September 24, 1935.

59. For complete details concerning the Ministerial Decree see F.O. 371/19508, R 5640, No. 402, *op. cit.* and SDNA 868.00/910, No. 844, *op. cit.*

60. *Ibid.*

naturally craved to secure the Crown's grace but they realized that George would be forced to make concessions to the Opposition.

Just a few weeks before the plebiscite the republicans launched some last minute attacks on the Ministerial Decree and the Crown. The Opposition press charged that the royalists intended to engage in multiple voting practices because the Decree allowed for it. Some newspapers charged that the servicemen and the gendarmes who should have been kept out of politics were forced to vote in the plebiscite in the King's favor. Furthermore, the press charged that the color difference on the ballots lucidly illustrated the fraudulent character of the entire process. The fact that authorities prevented the Opposition from openly campaigning for the Republic and against crowned democracy was another indication that the plebiscite would be conducted unethically and illegally. Finally, the Government supervising committees at the polling places were composed of the same persons with which M. Tsaldaris carried out the elections of 9th June after illegally dismissing those who had been legally appointed by his own Government the preceeding January⁶¹. According to the Opposition and to the British and American intelligence reports the election process was expected to be very corrupt:

On September 29, less than a week before the plebiscite, a massive demonstration was staged in Thessaloniki where the Liberal leader Sophoulis and a Communist politician, Giannes Partsalides spoke out against the Government's illegal practices. The local authorities ordered the troops present at the demonstration and during Sophoulis' speech soldiers opened fire on the amorphous crowd wounding thirty people⁶². The British Legation informed the Foreign Office that «there is much dissatisfaction in the country and that opposition to the return of the King is rapidly spreading even to those parts of Greece which are traditionally royalist in the Peloponnese⁶³. In Athens the Republican resistance against the restoration was so intense during the last week of September that the State resorted to terrorist activities to suppress it⁶⁴.

61. F.O. 371/19508, R 57508, No. 413, *Confidential*, Walker to Hoare, Athens, September 24, 1935.

62. Linardatos, *op. cit.* 125-26.

63. F.O. 371/19508, R 5781, No. 413, *op. cit.*

64. Linardatos, *op. cit.* 126. Also see F.O. 371/19508, R 5949, No. 422, October 4, 1935.

On October 2 republican party chiefs Sophoulis, George Papan-dreou, Alexander Papanastasiou, George Kaphandaris and Alexander Mylonas addressed a letter to George II in which they expressed the views of their constituents.

The popular will, in all corners of the country, shows itself to be strongly in favor of the republican form of government. The saddest thing of all is that the restoration of your throne will inevitably increase and perpetuate the spiritual division and, in the final analysis, the complete destruction of the nation. It would be a very sad sign indeed if your attention were not called, and if you felt no uneasiness as to the manner in which the plebiscite is being prepared in undisguised contempt of the rights and liberties of the people. There is no kind of fraud for which ordaining the plebiscite does not provide and pave the way. This is why we feel obliged to inform you that the great majority of the Greek people not only will never recognize as legal a throne which is based on violence and fraud, but will continue to fight to the end for the republic,.....⁶⁵

The above letter was the strongest against the restoration since the issue resurfaced but as Lincoln MacVeagh pointed out the republicans were not so much against the Crown as they were against the royalist parties.

On October 2 a special Chamber session was held in which one hundred and eighty-seven of the two-hundred and eighty-seven deputies participated. The Chamber agreed to support the Prime Minister's decisions on state affairs. The vote of confidence was an astonishing victory for the Populist leader over his arch rival Kondylis. It was further proof that many Royalists opposed the extremist policies of Kondylo-Metaxists. The Minister of War was not dismayed, however, because he lost his colleagues' support. According to the intelligence reports of the United States Legation in Athens Kondylis secretly conspired to carry out a coup «to sweep Mr. Tsaldaris into the discord and invite the King back by decree, he himself then assuming

65. Cited in SDNA 868.00/914, 862, MacVeagh, Athens, October 14, 1935. Also see Linardatos, *op. cit.* 126-27.

the post of Regent, and if the King will not return that of a dictator»⁶⁶. MacVeagh's sources could not have been more accurate. On October 8 the adventurous General walked into the Premier's office and presented him with an ultimatum to adopt a more determined role in support of the dynasty.

Tsaldaris knew that Kondylis had conspired with the chiefs of the armed forces otherwise he would not have delivered the ultimatum. The Prime Minister telephoned Alexander Papagos, Head of the First Army Corps, rear-Admiral Oikonomou, Head of Naval Staff and General Reppas, Head of the Air Force, to assure them that he consented to Kondylis' terms. The following day the Minister of War met with the three military leaders and convinced them that Tsaldaris would betray them. At that meeting they all agreed to overthrow the government⁶⁷.

On October 10 Reppas, Papagos and Oikonomou ambushed the Premier and presented him with an ultimatum to recall the ex-King immediately. Tsaldaris refused to be coerced by «soldiers» so he was ousted. The three officers pronounced themselves a triumvirate and at noon of that day announced that the *coup d'état* had succeeded⁶⁸.

According to MacVeagh's sources the Minister of War planned the entire plot before he met with Tsaldaris on October 8. The die-hard royalist forces were scheming to restore George II and then hold a plebiscite. The reason behind these developments according to the American Minister was that many monarchist politicians had extended loans to the Royal House and they did not wish to gamble with the dynasty's fate by relying on Constitutional methods. Moreover, the British financial institution Habro's bank, with substantial investments in the Greek economy and finances, had extended loans to the ex-King. The Habros found it profitable therefore to finance the Crown's restoration⁶⁹.

On October 10 the National Assembly was to meet to decide if the ex-monarch should return before the plebiscite. The Minister of War feared that the National Assembly would not favor him preferring Tsaldaris' more moderate approach to the restoration. The day

66. SDNA 868.00/914, No. 862, *op. cit.*

67. Linardatos, *op. cit.*, 128.

98. *Ibid*, 129.

69. SDNA 868.00/915, No. 874, MacVeagh, Athens, October 9, 1935.

before the military coup took place the *Messenger d'Athènes* reported that George II was willing to abide by the Assembly's decision whether favorable or unfavorable. The article stated that:

Consequently there would be no objection on the King's part if the National Assembly, reversing its previous position, should vote for the abolition of the Republic and the restoration of the monarchy before the holding of a plebiscite, which would then have the quality of a ratification by the people.

Before the above article was published the ex-King stated categorically that he would only return to his throne if the people willed it.

On the same day that Kondylis presented Tsaldaris with the ultimatum, George II reversed his position about returning to Greece upon popular consent. The Vice Premier therefore arranged for the dictatorship with the aid of the extremists in order to force the monarchy upon the reluctant Greek people and to prevent the National Assembly from freely exercising its duty.

The Triumvirate, or the Revolutionary Committee, as the officers labelled themselves, abolished the Republic immediately after seizing power. No-one in the Government resisted the takeover as though they all expected it and were willing to tolerate it⁷¹. The Revolutionary Committee appointed Kondylis President of the Council and then it dissolved itself. General Kondylis was finally dictator, a long awaited dream. He announced to the public that he was Regent until November 3, the date of the plebiscite⁷².

As expected the new Cabinet was composed entirely of die-hard monarchists⁷³. In the afternoon of October 10 the National Assembly met as scheduled under heavy military guard. A few hours before the Assembly convened the Regent-Premier signed a proclamation of martial law. At the session Tsaldaris condemned the conspirators who engineered the coup. He ascertained that they did not represent the

70. Cited in *Ibid*.

71. Linardatos, *op. cit.* 130-31.

72. F.O. 371/19508, R 6097, No. 239, Waterlow to Hoare, Athens, October 10, 1935.

73. F.O. 371/19508, R 6160, No. 434, *Confidential*, Waterlow to Hoare, Athens, October 11, 1935.

peoplès' interests but those of foreign Powers, obviously meaning Great Britain⁷⁴.

After he finished speaking the ex-Prime Minister walked out of the meeting followed by one-hundred and sixty-five Populist deputies⁷⁵. Only eighty-two deputies remained to listen to Kondylis' justifications for the military overthrow of the government. He explained to the rump Assembly that the former President of the Council intended to cancel the plebiscite thus making military intervention unavoidable⁷⁶. The deputies sympathized with the Regent-Premier so there were no questions asked. They passed a motion to abolish the Republic and revive the royalist constitution of 1911. General Metaxas and all the extremists at the session gave their vote of confidence and pledged to support the new government's policies until the King's triumphant return⁷⁷.

Great Britain's official position concerning the new Government was not one of jubilation. The Foreign Office did not trust General Kondylis because he flirted with Mussolini's Fascist regime and because he had dictatorial ambitions which compromised the Crown's power. On October 11 Waterlow warned the Foreign Secretary that Kondylis wanted to «postpone the plebiscite indefinitely and govern as dictator without the King»⁷⁸. The British representative recommended that in view of that consideration the Foreign Office should not be hasty in recognizing the Dictatorship.

Waterlow was sceptical about the strength of the new regime. He was concerned that Kondylis was extremely unpopular in the country and even though he enjoyed the loyalty of the armed forces, the popular opposition was too widespread to be taken lightly. Because of the opposition to the Dictatorship the opposition to the Crown had also increased⁷⁹. Sir Sydney continued:

74. Linardatos, *op. cit.* 130-31.

75. *Ibid.*, 131, Waterlow informed Hoare that one-hundred and seventeen deputies remained in the Chamber while one-hundred and twenty Populist deputies followed Tsaldaris. These figures have been disputed by recent research in Greece. For Waterlow's account see F.O. 371/19508, R 6105, No. 241, Waterlow to Hoare, Athens, October 11, 1935.

76. Linardatos, *op. cit.*, 131.

77. F.O. 371/19508, R 6160, No. 434, *op. cit.*

78. F.O. 371/19508, R 6107, No. 243, Waterlow, Athens, October 11, 1935.

79. F.O. 371/19508, R 6108, No. 244, Waterlow, Athens, October 11, 1935.

In conclusion I feel that the consequences of this militarist stroke must be regarded with some apprehension. The strong suspicion that it has the approval of the ex-King, and that in that sense is a put up job, makes it the more difficult to believe that His Majesty's return can be for the good of the country or that the basis of his restoration can be either popular or lasting..... The Republicans, certainly more than half the country now, and excluded from any share in public life, will be violently hostile and may go the length of boycotting the plebiscite if it is held⁸⁰.

The British government recognized the Kondylis' dictatorship despite Waterlow's recommendations not to do so. Sir Sydney informed the Foreign Office on October 10 that «There is general agreement that plebiscite is bound to be a farce. Reign of terror is a fact. I understand that German Government regard restoration prospect with satisfaction for this reason»⁸¹.

Six days after the military dictatorship was established George II conferred with Sir Samuel Hoare to express his willingness to return to Greece. He asked the Foreign Secretary what England's official position would be concerning the plebiscite. Hoare replied: «...in the face of so many disquieting features we would not take the responsibility of encouraging it or discouraging it»⁸². He added that it was the King's choice of whether to return or not but Great Britain intended to recognize the dynasty once restored.

The Greek ex-monarch asked for British advisers once he regained his Crown and Hoare assured him that his request would be fulfilled. In a despatch to Waterlow the Foreign Secretary wrote: «As the restoration is now inevitable we had much better do everything that we legitimately can to help to make the monarchy as secure as possible⁸³.» Officially therefore England retained a role of a friendly supporter to the Crown.

The Foreign Office did not share Waterlow's stiff opposition to Kondylis' dictatorship and to the restoration. A memorandum dated October 22 pointed out that Sir Sydney was so enthusiastic about the

80. F.O. 371/19508, R 6160, No. 434, *op. cit.*

81. F.O. 371/19508, R 6174, No. 68, Waterlow, Athens, October 10, 1935.

82. F.O. 371/19508, R 6249, Hoare Foreign Office, October 16, 1935.

83. *Ibid.*

monarchy after the March Revolt that he «recommended that H.M. Government should officially support the restoration of King George⁸⁴». The author of the memorandum, Southern Division Chief O'Malley, argued that the Minister in Athens apparently changed his mind about the dynasty after the October coup. He should have understood, however, O'Malley maintained, that it was part of the Greek political nature to disregard Constitutional procedure and orderly compromise. He concluded:

Roughly speaking, it may be said that hardly any change of Government, and certainly no change of regime, has ever been carried through in modern Greece except by more or less illegal forcible means. It may be said, therefore, that the restoration of the monarchy by means of a *coup d'état* is quite inaccordance with Greek custom and therefore almost inevitable⁸⁵.

The reality however was that a British Bank financed the restoration and the Foreign Office recognized the terrorist dictatorship of General Kondylis — despite Waterlow's best judgement — because approximately half of the Greek foreign debt was owed to British financial institutions and because George II was to be the «British connection» in Greece.

England, Germany, France and Italy recognized the Greek dictatorship almost immediately⁸⁶. The United States followed the course of its European allies only after a slight hesitation⁸⁷. The State Department argued that in March 1924 when the Fourth Constituent Assembly abolished the Glucksburg dynasty, the United States recognized the Republic and continued normal relations with Greece. There was no reason therefore for the government in Washington to break diplomatic relations with Greece because Kondylis abolished the Republic⁸⁸.

General Kondylis was secure in his new role because he enjoyed the loyalty of the armed forces and the recognition of the Great Powers. The political leadership however and the people resisted the

84. F.O. 371/19509, R 6297, No. 73, Waterlow, Athens, October 14, 1935.

85. *Ibid.*

86. SDNA 868.00/911, No. 156, MacVeagh to Hull, Athens, October 14, 1935.

87. SDNA 868.00/911, No. 68, Hull to MacVeagh, State Department, October 15, 1935.

88. SDNA 868.00/911, (not numbered), State Department, October 11, 1935.

new government. The Cretans who were mostly Republicans refused to accept the legitimacy of the new government and the change in the regime⁸⁹. Northern Greece (New Greece) which was primarily Republican was at a state of social unrest because of the military coup and the reign of terror. The Republican bloc formed a committee to prevent the rigged plebiscite but martial law prohibited free activity and organizing by political parties or other groups opposed to the dictatorship⁹⁰. Martial law could not prevent the republican newspaper *Kypriakos Typos* from expressing its indignation against the reign of terror instituted by the new government. On October 12 the following article entitled «The Curse» was published.

The republican government of the country has been overthrown, the liberties of the people have been curtailed and abolished and a wave of the most terrible terrorism has been let free.... It has been shown that the supreme rulers were nothing else than agents in the service of the exiled royal family... And what next? Is the King of the Greeks expected to return! But who are these Greeks? Are they those who betrayed their leaders? Of the Greeks whose opinion has not been consulted? Of those Greeks who a few years ago had sent the King, now brought back with the aid of the bayonets of his agents, far away from the country?...⁹¹

The day after the above article was published another appeared in the same newspaper. It stated that the royalists prepared for the restoration long before the October coup⁹².

The new administration included die-hard royalists some of who openly supported Fascism⁹³. Kondylis who was on record for his enthusiasm for the «Italian accomplishment» announced six days after he seized power that Greece would maintain cordial relations with Italy and Germany⁹⁴. In view of his foreign policy and his ideological leanings, Waterlow questioned the wisdom of reestab-

89. F.O. 371/19508, R 6170, No. 69, Waterlow, Athens, October 12, 1935.

90. F.O. 371/19509, R 6289, No. 445, *op. cit.*

91. Cited in F.O. 371/19509, No. 415, Athens, October 31, 1935.

92. Cited in *Ibid.*

93. F.O. 371/19508, R 6170, No. 69, *op. cit.*

94. F.O. 371/19508, R 6170, No. 69, *op. cit.*

lishing the Crown under a government with fascist tendencies. He pointed out that the reactionary clique in power led by General Kondylis intended to hold the King prisoner to the dictatorship once he was restored⁹⁵.

The government in London was somewhat concerned about Kondylis' strong sympathies for the Fascist government of Rome. On October 21 the Foreign Office recommended that «The King would do well not to entrust himself to General Kondylis»⁹⁶. The British tolerated the Greek dictatorship for it served the useful function of returning the Royal House but after George was restored he alienated Kondylis as the British had advised.

The Regent-Premier was not only distrusted by the Foreign Office and opposed by the Republicans in Greece, he was also the target of monarchist plots to overthrow him. There was widespread dissension among military officers who refused to serve the extremist government. Overall the new administration was plagued with fragmented and opposing royalist forces who felt that the Premier was not the best representative of the monarchist camp despite his attempts to portray that role⁹⁷.

To consolidate power Kondylis forced Zaimes out of office and prepared to launch even more austere anti-republican measures. Although the monarchists presented a major threat to his government he wanted to display his power by crushing the Opposition hoping that the effects would dissuade moderate royalists from dissension⁹⁸.

One week before the plebiscite the administration resorted to repressive measures against the anti-royalist forces in order to secure majority vote for the Crown. The British Legation in Athens reported to the Foreign Office some of Kondylis' tactics which were designed to ensure a Royalist victory.

Measures of intimidation and suppression include the refusal of all applications from Republicans to hold public me-

95. *Ibid.*

96. F.O. 371/19509, R 6301, No. 258, Waterlow, Athens, October 18, 1935.

97. *Ibid* and F.O. 371/19509, R 6250, No. 252, Waterlow, Athens, October 17, 1935.

98. F.O. 371/19509, R 6299, No. 75, Waterlow, Athens, October 16, 1935, and F.O. 371/19509, R 6466, No. 468, Waterlow, Athens, October 26, 1935 and SDNA 868.00/913, No. 165, *op. cit.*

etings, indoor or outdoor; abolition of the free expression of opinion in the press; the arrest and bludgeoning, before trial by court martial, of all persons shouting for the republic, while Royalists cheer for the King with impunity and fire off pistols in the streets; concentration camps for persons *suspected* of communism or «communizing»; and the deportation on police initiative, of anyone provoking breach of peace (i.e. Republicans)... In the arts of propaganda, display, lies and mass suggestion, by which modern dictatorships mould the mob, General Kondylis is showing himself an apt pupil of other leaders of people⁹⁹.

Kondylis was a ruthless authoritarian but he was no Mussolini or Hitler. Nevertheless it was his dictatorship which laid the foundations for the Monarcho-Fascist regime of General Metaxas. In a celebration ceremony commemorating King Constantine and the Greek military victory of 1912 at Thessaloniki, the Regent-Premier delivered a speech fused with fascist slogans¹⁰⁰. It was Metaxas however who developed a fascist ideology and implemented his dream of the «New State» and the «Third Greek Civilization».

Kondylis' oppressive policies were so extreme that even the conservative London *Times* which often reflected official views deplored the Greek government's methods designed to restore George II¹⁰¹. The royalist press in Greece however proudly announced that Great Britain backed the restoration efforts¹⁰². It was widely believed in many circles in Europe and the United States that England was forcing an unpopular dynasty upon the Greek people. Such suspicions were well founded of course because George II never concealed his love for England and his dissatisfaction with the Greeks. In 1938 the King con-

99. F.O. 371/19509, R 6554, No. 466, *Confidential*, Waterlow to Foreign Office, Athens, October 25, 1935.

100. F.O. 371/19509, R 6703, No. 474, *Confidential*, Waterlow to Hoare, Athens, October 29, 1935.

101. For the London *Times* article dated October 26, 1935 see SDNA 868/00 934, No. 915, MacVeagh, Athens, November 9, 1935.

102. F.O. 371/19509, R 6350, Waterlow, Athens, October 16, 1935 and F.O. 371/19509, R 6446, Greek Republican Union to Samuel Hoare, Chicago, October 29, 1935.

fided in the Sweedish Minister in Athens that, «I was sent down here against my will..... this is a damnable profession»¹⁰³.

On the eve of the plebiscite the Government created an artificial atmosphere of enthusiasm for the monarchy. It was clear however even to the die-hard royalists that there was a lack of genuine support for the Crown¹⁰⁴. On November 3 the plebiscite was held, as predicted, under the most fraudulent conditions. There were 400,000 more votes than registered voters. The grand total of votes polled was 1,527, 714; 1,491,992 were for the monarchy and only 32,454 for the Republic with 3,268 invalid ballots. Royalist officials admitted privately that the published figures were meaningless¹⁰⁵. The published figures were exaggerated because they not only represented popular approval for the Glucksburgs but they were also indicative of mass support for the Kondylis dictatorship.

In reality very few voters actually casted a ballot and very few people were so gullible as to believe the government's fraudulent figures. George II however was thankful for the favorable results and sent the following message to his subjects:

Greeks, with God's help and with the Greek peoples will, I am returning to the country. I am not resentful towards anyone. I shut the near past, I consider only the future, supported only by the feeling of my beloved people and the genuine help of all¹⁰⁶.

Obviously the King wished to return as the representative of all parties not as the head of the Royalist factions. Nevertheless he did become a prisoner of the extreme right wing parties after he was restored because he chose to do so.

It is worth noting at this point Lincoln MacVeagh's comments concerning the King's address to «his beloved people». He wrote to Secretary of State Hull:

103. SDNA 868.00/1031, No. 2088, MacVeagh, Athens, February 5, 1935.

104. F.O. 371/19509, R 6566, No. 266, Waterlow, Athens, November 1, 1935.

105. For the British Legation's observations on the vote fraud see F.O. 371/19509, R 6717, No. 482, Waterlow to Hoare, Athens, November 6, 1935.

106. Cited in Linardatos, *op. cit.* 193-40. For the King's message see F.O 371/19509, R 7362, No. 518, *Confidential*, Waterlow, Athens, December 2, 1935.

But these are days of high royalist hopes. So far, God has not been invoked as the Author of the Restoration. But his name has at least been mentioned among those invited to attend (the enthronement ceremonies). M. Mavromichalis (Minister of Communications) is reported to have said that the ceremonies attending will be principally religious, «car les Grecs commencent toujours par Dieu». The word «always» opens up a long cista into the past. Certainly God Hermes would have delighted in the recent plebiscite¹⁰⁷.

The American and British representatives informed their respective governments that a large number of people stayed away from the polls for fear intimidation. Both Ministers agreed about the fraudulent character of the plebiscite¹⁰⁸.

According to MacVeagh vote fraud was so extensive that even Kondylis was annoyed with his followers for «exaggerating» the figures. Publically however the Premier expressed gratitude and satisfaction for the plebiscite results¹⁰⁹. He declared that: «There are happily no longer any political parties in Greece today. The Greek people, in presenting itself at the polls as a unit, has destroyed them. The new political order began in our land of Greece from the day of the 3rd of November»¹¹⁰.

George II had scored a major victory despite the overwhelming opposition to his throne. The principal beneficiary of his return was not Kondylis or the royalists who labored for his reinstatement, but rather Great Britain which after the restoration improved financial and commercial relations with Greece and exerted more diplomatic influence than before. On November 18 four days before George was scheduled to arrive in Athens, Sir Sydney Waterlow outlined the policy which the Court would follow. He wrote to the Foreign Office:

It is not difficult to see that there are two things imperatively requiring to be done if the necessary conditions (for Constitutional Monarchy) are to be created; the armed forces must be inspired with a sence of personal loyalty to the Crown,

107. SDNA 868.00/984, No. 915, *op. cit.*

108. SDNA, 868.00/920, No. 167, MacVeagh, Athens, November 4, 1935.

109. SDNA 868.00/984, No. 915, *op. cit.*

110. *Ibid.*

since otherwise they will never be taken out of politics; and an election must be held as soon as possible, with the minimum of manipulation and with all parties, Republican or otherwise, freely participating, since otherwise the influence of the Crown will be based from the start on Government that will not represent the people¹¹¹.

It was essential for the dynasty to have the loyalty of the armed forces so that no political party or leader could present a threat to the Court which represented British interests in Greece.

On the same day that Waterlow submitted the above despatch MacVeagh informed the State Department that the Foreign Office had instructed its Minister in Athens to «guide and counsel» the Greek Court. He also ascertained that George II did not trust anyone other than his British associates. Finally, MacVeagh concluded that Sir Sydney agreed to advise the King on internal affairs¹¹². Clearly that constituted foreign interference in the affairs of a sovereign nation.

George II arrived in Athens on November 25 to an unreceptive population. The Republican leaders did not recognize the Court's legitimacy and they refused to compromise with the monarchy. Upon the advice of Waterlow the King ameliorated relations with the Republicans and elections were held in January 1936. There was a political deadlock, however, between Liberals and Populists and it was finally resolved by the royal appointment of General Metaxas as Premier on April 13 and dictator on August 4, 1936. The King's restoration which was to be the «balancing factor» in the political arena the stepping-stone for the authoritarian regime of 1936-1941.

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111. F.O. 871/19509, R 6989, No. 502, *Confidential*, Waterlow, Athens, November 18, 1935.

112. SDNA 868.00/924, No. 172, MacVeagh, Athens, November 18, 1935.

LUTHER CRAIG

GERMAN DEFENSIVE POLICY IN THE BALKANS, A CASE STUDY: THE BUILDUP IN GREECE, 1943

Shortly before dawn, April 30, 1943, a lone British submarine slipped into the Gulf of Cadiz and surfaced off the Spanish coast at Huelva, an old Moorish fishing town. As the submarine, HMS *Seraph*, bobbed in the gentle swell, men scrambled on deck with a large container. They opened it and removed the corpse of a Major Martin. A briefcase filled with bogus British documents had been securely fastened to the body with a chain. Crewmen inflated Martin's lifejacket and dropped the corpse gently into the surf. The wash of the screws propelled the body shoreward as the *Seraph* put out to sea and quietly submerged.

So began Operation Mincemeat¹ — an ingenious «ruse de guerre» designed to confuse and mislead the German High Command on the eve of Operation Husky — the Allied invasion of Sicily. That same day, a fisherman scooped the Major's body from the water and returned to port. Spanish officials seized the corpse and, just as the British had hoped, quickly notified the Germans of their peculiar catch. An Abwehr (German military Intelligence) official quietly photocopied the documents; by May 7, the German High Command learned of their spectacular content². According to the falsified papers³, the Anglo-Americans planned double blows in the Mediterranean in the near-future — one against Greece, at two points on the Peloponnese (Kalamata and Cape Araxos); the other against Sardinia or Corsica. Sicily was also mentioned, but here the documents pointed only to a diversionary effort.

1. For a detailed account of the planning and execution of Mincemeat, see Montagu, Ewen, *The Man Who Never Was*. New York. J. B. Lippincott Company, 1954. Mongagu, son of a Jewish banking baron, masterminded the brilliant plan.

2. Schröder, Josef, *Italiens Kriegaustritt 1943*. Die deutschen Gegenmassnahmen im italienischen Raum: Fall «Alarich» und «Achse». Musterschmidt-Verlag. Göttingen. p. 113; Kriegstagebuch der Seekriegsleitung, 7.5.43. Within days of «Major Martin's swim», the British, through intercepts of the Abwehr radio circuit from Madrid to Germany, were aware that Mincemeat was succeeding. Lewin, Ronald, *Ultra Goes To War*. McGraw-Hill. New York, 1978, pp. 279-80.

3. Chief among these was a letter from Lieutenant General Sir Archibald Nye, Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff, to General Sir Harold Alexander, dated April 23, 1943.

The genius of the Mincemeat plant was the way it wholly confirmed the contours of German strategic thought. Pressed on the strategic defensive through the collapse of Rommel's Afrikakorps and the Allied landings in Morocco and Algeria (November 1942), Hitler and his military advisors had begun to worry about the security of the suddenly vulnerable and inadequately defended southern tier of their «Festung Europa»⁴. Their underlying assumption was that Allied shipping space would permit two simultaneous and independent operations in the Mediterranean theater⁵. In the western Mediterranean, the Germans considered the Italian islands of Sardinia, Corsica and Sicily targets for one prong of the future Anglo-American offensive. By February, 1943, Hitler envisaged the principal danger in Sardinia. From here, he argued, the Allies could threaten Rome and the ports of Genoa and Leghorn; the island could also serve as a springboard for a thrust into upper Italy or southern France⁶.

But the Germans focused their concern upon the Balkans, and principally, Greece⁷. With their turbulent populations and reserves of vital war materials, they represented the neurological point of Festung Europa⁸. Greece itself was less important for its mineral reserves than

4. The Germans were fully cognizant that the war had entered a new and forboding stage. See Lagebetrachtung der Seekriegsleitung vom 1.12.1942. In: Salewski, Michael, *Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung. 1935-1945*. Band II and III. Bernard and Graefe Verlag für Wehrwesen. München, 1975. Band III, p. 315.

5. Salewski, *Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung*, p. 361; Kriegstagebuch der Seekriegsleitung (War Diary, Operations Division, German Naval Staff), 6.4.43, 20.5.43 (National Archives); Schramm, Percy E., *Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht* (Wehrmachtführungsstab) 1940-1945. Band III: 1. Januar 1943-31. Dezember 1943. Bernard and Graefe Verlag für Wehrwesen. Frankfurt am Main. 1963. (Band III: pp. 763-64).

6. Schröder, *Italiens Kriegaustritt*, p. 112; Deakin, F.W., *The Brutal Friendship*, p. 346. Mussolini, Hitler and the Fall of Italian Fascism. Harper and Row. New York. According to Warlimont, Admiral Riccardi, commander-in-chief of the Italian navy, also considered Sardinia the chief Allied target in the western Mediterranean. Mussolini, Field Marshal Kesselring (titular commander of all German forces in the central Mediterranean) and Fremde Heere West, however, expected Anglo-American assault in Sicily. Warlimont, Walter, *Die Kriegführung der Achsenmächte im Mittelmeerraum. Ein Strategischer Überblick*. Foreign Military Study #P-216. pp. 783 and 784.

7. See, for example, KTB OKW. Band III: 1943. pp. 109-10, 121, 182-83. As early as the beginning of 1943, Hitler had instructed OKW to make a detailed examination of the defense of the Peloponnese.

8. In an address to the German Gauleiters in Munich on November 7, 1943,

its strategic location at the Balkan southern tip. From a secure bridgehead in Greece, the Allies could bomb Hitler's precious Romanian oilfields, provide additional support to Balkan resistance movements, forge a link to the Russians through the Dardanelles, and prepare their big invasion of Europe, which, as the German Naval High Command (Seekriegsleitung) noted in its war diary (June 1943), «is probably planned to take place in the Balkans and to be decisive»⁹. A German setback in the area, moreover, would have an adverse political impact upon its eastern European satellites, and could sweep Turkey into the war on the side of the Allies.

The historic pattern of British intervention in the Balkans, as well as the traditional English-Russian competition in the region, reinforced Hitler's conviction that the southeast would be the target of a major enemy assault. The Dardanelles and Salonika campaigns of World War One, and the disastrous Balkan venture of 1941, illustrated the tenacity of British imperial interests in the eastern Mediterranean. Surely, Churchill would attempt to demonstrate in 1943 the validity of his grand design of 1915 — of a decisive offensive against enemy occupied Europe from the southeast. But with the German debacle at Stalingrad (November 1942 - January 1943), the prospect of eventual Soviet penetration into the Balkans had become very real indeed. Only a British military return to southeastern Europe could hold back Soviet expansion into the area. Such were Hitler's thoughts, and they fuelled his fears that the Balkans would be the principal object of Anglo-American strategy upon the conclusion of the North African campaign. Thus, as early as December 1942, the Germans had begun to reorganize and to reinforce their position in the southeastern theater. These efforts accelerated significantly after the «revelations» furnished by Mincemeat, which, by May 14, 1943, Hitler, OKW (Oberkom-

General Jodl (Chief of operations branch, OKW) asserted that the continued control of the Balkans was of decisive importance («kriegsentscheidend») to the German war effort. According to Jodl, 50% of Germany's oil, 100% of chrome, 60% of bauxite, 29% of antimony and 21% of copper were drawn from the Balkans. KTB OKW, p. 1612. See also, KTB Skl, 29.5.43; Lagebetrachtung der Seekriegsleitung, 20. Februar 1943, in: Salewski, *Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung*. Band III. p. 334.

9. KTB Skl. 16.6.43. As late as September 10, 1943, Goebbels would note in his diary that «without doubt the spearhead of the Anglo-American invasion will be pointed in that direction (i.e., at the Balkans) in the immediate future». Lochner, Louis P. (ed.), *The Goebbels Diaries 1942-1943*. Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, 1976. pp. 433.

mando der Wehrmacht, German High Command) and the concerned German intelligence staffs had accepted as genuine¹⁰.

Until December 1942, the Germans had been content to leave the occupation and the defence of Greece almost exclusively to the Italians. A strip of territory along the Greek-Turkish border, as well as Athens, Piraeus, Salonika, half of Crete and a handful of Aegean islands had come under German control. In the Peloponnese there were no German troops, only a handful of naval and wireless personnel sprinkled along the coastline¹¹. The Italians, in contrast, fielded some 10 divisions upon the Greek mainland and in the outlying Dodecanese islands. Altogether, their forces in the Balkans and the islands amounted to 33 divisions¹². But the great majority of these formations consisted of older occupation troops, poorly officered and equipped; their contribution to the common defense negligible. The Italians, moreover, by early 1943, had done little to fortify the extended Greek coastline. Their few «strong points» lacked modern coastal artillery, reinforced concrete bunkers and supplies beyond five days¹³.

The burden of providing a realistic defense for the Balkans fell squarely upon the Germans. Hitler proceeded first to reorganize the German command structure in the area. His Directive No. 47 (December 28, 1942) made the «South East» a fully operational theater

10. Schröder, *Italiens Kriegaustritt*, pp. 113-14; KTB Skl, 12.-13.5.43; Wagner, Gerhard (ed.), *Lagevorträge des Oberbefehlshabers der Kriegsmarine vor Hitler 1939-1945*: Vortrag beim Führer im Hauptquartier «Wolfschanze» am 14.5. 17.30 Uhr. pp. 501-02. Frederick A. Prager. New York; Tashjean, John E., «Operation 'Mince meat' - 5 deutsche Dokumenten». In: Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau 11, 1961, pp. 278-82. The fourth document, a directive issued by Hitler on May 12, stated that «measures regarding Sardinia and the Peloponnese take precedence over all others». OKW/WFST/Op. Nr. 661055/48.

11. Stadtmüller, Georg, «Der Partisanenkrieg in Südgriechenland», p. 83. In: Das Parlament, aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B v/57.

12. Schröder, *Italiens Kriegaustritt*, Verteilung der italienischen Divisionen. Stand 1.8.43. Map opposite p. 136. The Italian 11 Army was responsible for the defense of Greece. According to A. A. Pallis, German occupation policy in the Balkans «was everywhere the same — that is, to hold the valleys and principal towns through which the main lines of communication passed but not to fritter away troops on the permanent garrisoning of remote mountain areas». Pallis, A. A., «Problems of Resistance in the Occupied Countries». Document located at Hoover Library, Stanford, California.

13. Kriegstagebuch der Heeresgruppe E. (U.S. National Archives). T-311, Roll 175, 000566: Aktennotizen, Chefbesprechungen, Tätigkeitsberichte. January to July, 1943; Kriegstagebuch, Admiral Aegean. T-1022, Roll 4023. 17.5.43.

of war, with its commander-in-chief, Colonel General Alexander Löhr (Oberbefehlshaber Südost/OB Heeresgruppe E) directly responsible to the Führer. The task of Löhr's Heeresgruppe E was three-fold: a) to prepare the coastal defenses, b) destroy the growing resistance movement¹⁴, and c) secure the Balkans from an enemy offensive from Turkish territory¹⁵. Directly subordinate to OB Südost in Greece were the Befehlshaber Salonika-Aegean (Major General von Studnitz) and Befehlshaber Southern Greece (General Wilhelm Speidel). Despite its ambitious assignment, Löhr's army group was diminutive in size, for it amounted to no more than a half-dozen divisions¹⁶, including the elite 7 SS Prinz Eugen Gebirgsjäger (mountain) Division. The remaining divisions were distinctly second class, and earmarked for counterinsurgency operations in Yugoslavia¹⁷. None of these formations were stationed in Greece. Löhr would have to start from scratch to build his defensive front.

To buttress the Italian positions on the Peloponnese, Rhodes and in the Dodecanese islands, the Germans supplied their Axis partners with large quantities of modern weapons¹⁸. By mid-February 1943, the construction of coastal fortifications on the islands of Crete and Lemnos, as well as in southern Greece and Salonika was well underway; earlier, the German High Command had approved the dispatch of several batteries of coastal artillery each for Crete and Lemnos. The reinforcement of Rhodes, the Peloponnese and Salonika with modern coastal artillery remained a pressing concern¹⁹. In addition to these efforts

14. The Greek resistance, assisted by a tiny British military mission, had scored their first major success on November 25, 1942, when they blew up the Gorgopotamos railway viaduct. See Woodhouse, C. M., «The Greek Resistance». In: *European Resistance Movements 1939-1945*. Pergamon Press. New York. 1960.

15. Hubatsch, Walther, *Hitlers Weisungen für die Kriegsführung*, pp. 209-16. Bernard and Graefe Verlag für Wehrwesen. Frankfurt am Main. 1962.

16. OKW KTB. p. 9. Schematische Kriegsgliederung, 1.1.43. These divisions were 704, 714, 717, 718 infantry divisions and 7 SS Prinz Eugen.

17. The 700 number divisions were established in April 1941, as divisions of the 15th wave. They consisted primarily of older personnel and were poorly equipped with heavy weapons. In the spring of 1943, OKW would reorganize and upgrade them into Jäger divisions. See Kriegstagebuch der Heeresgruppe E. T-311, Roll ≠ 175, ≠ 000463.

18. KTB Heeresgruppe E, ≠ 000551; KTB OKW, pp. 14, 16. According to the records of Heeresgruppe E, the question of weapons deliveries to the Italians commanded the «highest interest of the Führer».

19. KTB Heeresgruppe E, ≠ 000412.

on land, the German navy blanketed the approaches to the Greek mainland and the strategically important islands with mine barrages. To strengthen the Luftwaffe in the Balkans, Hitler reorganized the X Fliegerkorps (air corps) into Luftwaffenkommando Südost (South East Air Command). Löhner had earlier received three JU-88 D high altitude reconnaissance aircraft (Höhenaufklärungsflugzeugen)²⁰.

To parry an Allied landing operation in Greece, OKW envisaged an operational reserve of four divisions. To this purpose, Hitler ordered the transfer of the newly created 11 Luftwaffe Field Division to the Peloponnese (December 21, 1942)²¹. Heeresgruppe E proposed the complete motorization of the division and its employment as a mobile reserve; OKW agreed. When a lack of resources thwarted this intent, Löhner allotted the division to the static defense of the valuable Corinth Canal²²; by late May 1943, its battalions were firmly ensconced on the Saronic Gulf²³. In March, OKW decreed the dispatch of 117 Jäger (light) Division to Greece, as well as the formation and transfer of a Sturmbrigade (assault brigade) to Rhodes. By early April, the troop trains carrying 117 Jäger Division were chugging southward from Yugoslavia; by early May, its regiments were established in Attica as an operational reserve (operative Eingreifreserve)²⁴. The Sturmbrigade Rhodes was formed from elements of 22 Infantry Division on Crete. Lavishly equipped and extremely mobile, it was later expanded into a full division²⁵.

20. KTB OKW, pp. 116, 469. Because of the insatiable demands of other theaters of war for aircraft, the German Balkan airforce remained necessarily small. During Operation «Schwarz», (May-June 1943) a counterin-surgency operation in Yugoslavia in which the Luftwaffe was involved, the number of daily sorties flown fluctuated from a half-dozen to approximately 90 on June 1 and 8. OKW KTB, pp. 497, 574, 612, etc.

21. OKW KTB, p. 28. The division consisted of the following elements: Luftwaffen-Jag. Rgt. 21 and 22; Luftwaffen-Art. Rgt. 11; Panzerjäger-Abt. Lw. Feld-Div. 11 and Luftwaffen-Pion. Btl. 11.

22. For the value of the Corinth Canal to the Germans, see KTB Skl, 11.6.43.

23. KTB OKW, pp. 502, 539-40, 552; Heiber, Helmut, *Hitlers Lagebesprechungen*. Die Protokollfragmente seiner militärischen Konferenzen. 1942-1945. p. 206. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt. Stuttgart. 1962.

24. KTB Heeresgruppe E, ≠ 000449, 000453; KTB OKW, pp. 295, 427. 117 Jäger Division was comprised of the following units: Jäger-Rgt. 737 and 749; Art.-Rgt. 670 plus miscellaneous elements.

25. KTB Heeresgruppe E, ≠ 000046. By September 1943, the Sturmdivision Rhodes boasted four battalions of motorized grenadiers, equipped with guns of 75, 50 and 28 mm calibre; a reconnaissance group, outfitted with some 40 armored

Despite the German efforts to shore up their eastern Mediterranean defenses, the results, by early May 1943, had been modest at best. Instead of the desired corps-size operational reserve, the OKW situation maps showed only two complete divisions in Greece, and one of these was limited to static coastal defense. The naval and Luftwaffe forces at Löhrr's disposal remained meager indeed²⁶. The Italians, moreover, the bulk of their better formations destroyed at Stalingrad and in North Africa, could offer no meaningful reinforcement²⁷.

The slowness of the German buildup resulted, in part, from specific logistical problems presented by the southeastern theater. The lack of an adequate rail infra-structure was particularly crippling. A single, one-track railroad from Zagreb (Agram) to Athens funnelled troops and supplies to Greece; as of mid-March 1943, its daily capacity was limited to 12 trains from Belgrade to Salonika and to seven trains from Salonika to Athens. By mid-May, the latter stretch could handle 9½ trains per day. The gradual accretion of Allied sea and air superiority in the Mediterranean and the lack of adequate shipping space in the Adriatic further diminished the flow of supplies to Löhrr's army group²⁸.

The Balkan Resistance movements, as well as the dubious reliability and fighting value of the weary Italian occupation forces, posed additional dilemmas for the German defense of Greece. OKW recognized clearly that a successful defense against an enemy landing would require a pacified hinterland and secure lines of communication²⁹. In

cars and 20 jeeps; a tank battalion with 41 tanks; two batteries of 105 mm and one battery of 150 mm guns, many self-propelled, plus additional divisional artillery; five batteries of 88 mm guns; in all, some 6,000 to 7,000 men. Smith, Peter C.; Walker, Edwin, *War in the Aegean*. pp. 54-55. William Kimber. London, 1974.

26. As of May 1943, German naval forces in Greek waters included the 21 Sub-Chaser Flotilla (Unterseebootsjagdflotilla), with its complement of mine-laying vessels; the coastal patrol flotillas «Attica», «Salonica» and «Crete»; and the former Greek destroyer «Hermes», which was sunk on May 7. In addition, a detachment of naval artillery and a flak unit were in position off the Attica coastline: Marineartillerieabteilung 603 (Aegina-Phleves) and Marineflakabteilung 720 (Salamis). On the island of Crete, the Germans had established the Marineartillerieabteilung 520. See Lohmann, Walter; Hildebrand, Hans H., *Die deutsche Kriegsmarine 1935-1945*. Podzun Verlag. Bad Nauheim.

27. The Axis setbacks in southern Russia coupled with the capitulation of their forces in Tunisia (May 1943) had claimed some 16 Italian divisions.

28. KTB OKW, p. 1561; KTB Heeresgruppe E, № 000565; Heiber, *Hitlers Lagebesprechungen*, pp. 208, 219.

29. KTB OKW, p. 168.

January 1943, the Germans, with support from the Italians and the Croatians, began a series of vigorous operations in Yugoslavia («Weiss» 1-3) against the insurgent forces of Tito and Mihailovic³⁰. But success was not forthcoming, for the Italians performed in sub-par fashion³¹. In May, the Germans launched a more successful offensive when they struck hard at communist forces in Herzegovina (Operation «Schwarz»)³². At no time, however, did they succeed in completely eliminating the insurgent threat in the Balkans.

The expulsion of the Axis forces from North Africa (May 1943) complicated further the task of Lühr's army group, for it raised the spectre of an Italian withdrawal from the war. Increasingly despondent over the disintegration of their African empire and the aerial bombing of their homeland³³, the Italians tottered on the brink of collapse. Fully aware that the loss of their Axis partner would uncover their entire southern flank, Hitler and OKW began to prepare plans for the defense of the Mediterranean without Italy³⁴. Thus, the transfer of German formations to Greece also served to fill the vacuum that would exist there following an Italian capitulation³⁵. In the meantime, the Germans could hardly feel sanguine about the determination of Italian troops in Greece to resist an enemy landing. In an effort to tighten his control of the expected invasion battle, General Lühr recom-

30. The three-stage offensive was concluded by mid-March 1943. General Lütters, the German Commissioner General (Bevollmächtigter General) in Croatia, conducted the operations, in which 12 German, Italian and Croatia divisions participated.

31. KTB OKW, p. 168. Hitler, angered by the poor showing of the Italian forces, complained to Mussolini in an «unusually sharp letter». (May 19, 1943). Warlimont, Walter, *Die Kriegführung der Achsenmächte im Mittelmeerraum*. Foreign Military Study # P-216 (U.S. National Archives). p. 806.

32. Operation «Schwarz» continued until mid-June. According to German estimates, Tito's partisans suffered 11,000-12,000 dead. KTB OKW, p. 694. German formations involved included 118 Jäger, 369 Infantry, 7 SS Prinz Eugen and 1 Gebirgsjäger divisions. Italian, Croatian and Bulgarian units also participated in «Schwarz».

33. KTB SkI, 22.24. - 26.5.43.

34. According to Warlimont, it was during the Führer conferences on May 19-20, 1943, that this planning began: Operation «Alarich», for southern France and Italy and «Konstantin» for the Balkans. OKW later combined them into one plan - «Achsen».

35. The Italian capitulation came on September 8, 1943. In most cases, the German forces in Italy, southern France and the Balkans were able to disarm Italian troops with a minimum of bloodshed.

mended, albeit unsuccessfully, the tactical subordination of the Italian 11 Army to his army group (February 1943)³⁶.

Following the dramatic «confirmation» of their Mediterranean strategy by the Mincemeat plant, the Germans redoubled their efforts in Greece, their alarm now centered clearly on the Peloponnese. From his «Wolfsschanze» (Wolf's Lair) headquarters, hidden deep within an East Prussian forest, Hitler pondered the new developments and charted his response. At a conference with Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel (Chief, OKW), on May 19, 1943, his thoughts and intentions were clear. An attack on the Balkans, Hitler admonished, was «almost more dangerous than the problem of Italy, which if worse comes to worse can always be sealed off somewhere». The danger, he continued, «is on the Peloponnese, that they (the Allies) establish themselves there... I have therefore decided... to place a tank division squarely on the Peloponnese...»³⁷.

Chosen for the task was 1 Panzer Division (Lieutenant General Walter Krüger). All but destroyed in the fighting in central Russia, it had withdrawn to France (January 1943) to refit and recuperate. In mid-May, it possessed 60 Mark IV and a dozen Mark III flamethrower tanks³⁸. On May 23, it began the circuitous three week, ca. 100 train journey from France, through Karlsruhe-Vienna-Budapest-Ploesti-Sofia to Greece. By June 17, all elements of 1 Panzer had reached the Peloponnese³⁹. Krüger's Kampfgruppen (battlegroups) deployed quickly, and prepared for their role as an operational reserve. A tank battalion (II./Pz.Rgt.1) occupied the area around Nauplia; the division's two Panzer Grenadier Regiments (1 and 113 Pz.Gren.Rgt.) the Patras the Tripolis areas. The divisional artillery was distributed among the individual battlegroups. OKW subordinated the division to Gen-

36. KTB Heeresgruppe E, # 000430.

37. Heiber, *Hitlers Lagebesprechungen*, pp. 210-12; KTB Heeresgruppe E, # 000046; also, Walter Warlimont, *Inside Hitler's Headquarters*, pp. 317-19.

38. The Mark IV's were equipped with 7.5-cm-KWK L/58 m. guns and armored skirting («Panzerschürzen»). Stoves, Rolf O. G., *1. Panzer-Division*. p. 411-20. *Chronik einer der drei Stamm-Divisionen der deutschen Panzerwaffe*. Verlag Hans-Henning Podzun. Bad Nauheim. 1961. The division also had a dozen command tanks (Befehlspanzer) and was earmarked to receive a battalion of the new Panther tanks by mid-July. Heiber, *Hitlers Lagebesprechungen*, pp. 211-12.

39. KTB OKW, pp. 432, 521, 561, 592, 617, 648, 659. Stoves, *1 Panzer Division*, p. 415. The terrain and poor quality roads in the Peloponnese, however, were hardly suited for the activities of a tank division. KTB Heeresgruppe E, # 000592.

eral Hellmuth Felmy's LXVIII Army Corps staff, recently transferred to Greece to assume operational command of German formations on the Peloponnese⁴⁰.

In addition to Krüger's tank division, OKW ordered the immediate transfer of 117 Jäger Division from Thebes to the Peloponnese. The division moved swiftly to reinforce the Italian security units at the Araxos and Kalamata airfields, each with a battalion supported by additional artillery and anti-tank weaponry. By May 26-27, regimental groups were in position around Argos (Jäger Regiment 749) and Tripolis (Jäger Regiment 737). For service as coastal defense battalions, the High Command funneled elements of 999 Strafgefangene (convict) Division to the Peloponnese⁴¹. And, in mid-June, 104 Jäger and 1 Gebirgsjäger divisions were on their way to Greece⁴². The rail movement of 104 Jäger Division (General Ludwiger) from Serbia commenced on June 15; OKW ordered its deployment in the Arta-Agrinion area of southwest Greece. 1 Gebirgsjäger Division (Lieutenant General Stettner) began its arduous land march from Montenegro four days later. Discomfited by near tropical heat and occasional thundershowers, elements of the division reached Florina in early July⁴³. Some two weeks later, the division would be deployed in northwestern Greece (Epirus). The assignment for both divisions was two-fold: a) to provide an operational reserve and support (Rückhalt) for the local Italian troops in case of an Allied landing, b) to combat the growing insurgent activity in western Greece. To complete this substantial migration of men and machines, OKW shifted a battalion on assault guns to western Greece (Sturmgeschützabteilung 201), to serve as a small mobile reserve⁴⁴.

Meanwhile, Hitler's little navy in the eastern Mediterranean had

40. KTB OKW, pp. 588, 648, 659, 670, 686; KTB Heeresgruppe E, # 000017, # 000588.

41. KTB OKW, pp. 514, 519, 540, 552, 558, 592; KTB Heeresgruppe E, # 000035, # 000039; Heiber, *Hitlers Lagebesprechungen*, pp. 208, 248.

42. 104 Jäger Division consisted of Jäger-Rgt. 724 and 784 and Art. Rgt. 654; 1 Gebirgsjäger Division was composed of Geb. Jäger-Rgt. 98 and 99, Geb. Art. Rgt. 79.

43. Tagesmeldungen 1. Gebirgsjäger Division, (U.S. National Archives) T-815, Roll 68: # 001144, # 001172, # 001186; also Lanz, Hubert, *Gebirgsjäger. Die 1. Gebirgsdivision. 1935-1945*, pp. 249-52. Verlag Hans-Henning Podzun. Bad Nauheim. 1954.

44. Kriegstagebuch der Heeresgruppe E. T-311, Roll # 176, # 000007; Führungsabteilung: Tagesmeldungen, Beurteilungen, Einzelbefehle and other miscellaneous documents.

been hard at work. Spurred to action by the Mincemeat documents, minelaying operations accelerated rapidly. The German mine layers honeycombed the western approaches to the Peloponnese and the Gulf of Patras with mines; they also placed their barrages off Corfu, in the Dodecanese and at other threatened areas⁴⁵. On May 19, the Commanding Admiral, Aegean (Vice Admiral Werner Lange) received instructions «to investigate and prepare the initiation of a patrol service off Crete, and the establishment of well-stocked PT boat bases on Crete and in the southern Peloponnese». Some two weeks later, the responsible authorities ordered Naval Group South (Marinegruppenkommando Süd, Admiral Kurt Fricke) to select and establish bases and operational harbors for PT boats and motor minesweepers in the Aegean⁴⁶. In August, the Kriegsmarine positioned a new minesweeper flottila (12. Räumbootsflottilla) to Greek waters. Proposals of Naval Group South to reinforce the coastal defenses with large quantities of artillery far exceeded the material resources of the navy⁴⁷. But here, too, the Germans managed some progress. From May-August 1943, they established artillery detachments at the Gulf of Patras and Kalamata (Marineartillerieabteilungen 617 and 609, respectively) and a flak unit at Piraeus (31. Marinebordflakabteilung)⁴⁸. Plans to interrupt Allied shipping in the eastern Mediterranean by mining the ports of Said and Alexandria could not be carried through for want of the appropriate aircraft. In general, the efforts of the German navy to make a meaningful contribution to the defense of Greece failed because of the need to concentrate their resources in Italian waters⁴⁹.

45. KTB Skl, 19.-20.5.43, 28.5.43, 2.6.43, 10.6.43, 11.6.43, 13.6.43, 18.6.43, 22.6.43, 30.6.43, 12.7.43, 13.7.43. Axis mine laying vessels included the *Drache*, *Bulgaria*, *Barletta* and the *Morosini*.

46. KTB Skl, 19.5.43, 2.6.43. The war diaries of Admiral Aegean and of the Kommandant der Seeverteidigung Attika have also been thoroughly examined, though they yielded little of value. (T-1022, Rolls # 4023 and 2669, respectively).

47. KTB Skl, 22.6.43.

48. Lohmann; Hildebrand. *Die deutsche Kriegsmarine*. Following the Italian capitulation, the German navy employed two additional groups of torpedo boats in the Aegean (21 and 24 Schnellbootsflottillen).

49. Warlimont, *Die Kriegführung der Achsenmächte im Mittelmeerraum*. pp. 808-09. According to Warlimont, although «the sum total of the OKW measures in the Balkan area remained considerably behind the defensive preparations against landings in Italy, in no way did this signify a vacillation or a change in our appreciation of the situation. The German High Command still viewed the Balkans as the strategic goal of allied Mediterranean strategy».

Suddenly, in early July, German concern shifted from the Peloponnese to the area north of the Gulf of Patras. Numerous reports, Löhrr informed the High Command on July 3, pointed to an Anglo-American landing operation on the west coast of central Greece (west of Jannina, Arta and Agrinion)⁵⁰. To meet the enemy attack, Heeresgruppe E quickly flung motorized advance guards (mot.-Vorausabteilungen) of 1 Gebirgsjäger and 117 Jäger divisions into the threatened sectors, with the mass of both formations to follow⁵¹. To obtain a clearer picture of the Italian defensive preparations on the west coast, OKW instructed Löhrr to dispatch two staff officers on an inspection of the area.

On July 10, 1943, the Allies landed in Sicily⁵². That Mincemeat was indeed a ruse was no longer in doubt, yet the Germans refused to revise their estimates of Allied intentions in the Balkans. On the 9th, when the Anglo-American deployment against Sicily was clearly apparent, Keitel produced an «Appreciation of the Enemy Intentions in the Mediterranean». The Allied assault on Sicily, Keitel reasoned, would most likely be followed by landings in Greece, not Italy. The attack would begin with the seizure of the islands off the Gulf of Patras. «If the enemy succeeded in reaching the rail line Salonika-Athens», he continued, «the Peloponnese as well as Crete and the Dodecanese would fall like ripe fruit in his lap». The political repercussions on Hungary and Romania would be most unpleasant; and from air bases in northern Greece, the Allies could bomb the Romanian oil fields. For the first time of such an operation, Keitel estimated that the Allies had three tank divisions, three tank brigades and eight infantry divisions⁵³.

50. KTB OKW, p. 753; KTB Heeresgruppe E, # 000597.

51. KTB OKW, p. 754, KTB Heeresgruppe E, T-311, Roll 176, # 000008, # 000009.

52. Tactically, at least, the Germans were not taken by surprise. German aerial reconnaissance had observed the movements of the Allied convoys throughout July 9. About their destination there could be no doubt. KTB Skl, 9.7.43; Salewski, *Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung*, p. 363. German aerial reconnaissance in the eastern Mediterranean was severely curtailed by the inexorable growth of Allied air supremacy. By June-July 1943, a truly accurate picture of the Allied buildup in the ports from Tripoli east and in the Levant was impossible to obtain. KTB Skl, 16.6.43, 23.6.43, 21.7.43; KTB Heeresgruppe E, T-311, Roll 175, # 000601.

53. Though the bogus Mincemeat documents had pointed only to a landing in the Peloponnese with two divisions, German estimates of Anglo-American shipping space had very early led to the conclusion that the Allies could land as many as 6-10 divisions in the first wave of their Mediterranean offensive. Keitel's estimate is higher still. KTB Heeresgruppe E, T-311, Roll 176, # 000028; see also, Tashjean.

Long after the Allied landings in Sicily, in fact, the Germans clung to the delusion that Greece would be the target of a major Anglo-American amphibious assault. On July 21, OKW ordered their most celebrated general, Rommel, and the staff of Heeresgruppe B to Salonika, with instructions to take over the defense of Greece, where an Allied landing was considered «increasingly possible» in the near future⁵⁴. Several days before, Löhrr had reported the disturbing results of the staff inspections of 11 Italian Army readiness to his superiors. The Italians had done nothing to fortify the coastline; the airfields also lacked adequate protection. The strength of General Vecchiarelli's (C-in-C-Italian 11 Army) forces in western Greece was wholly incommensurate with the tasks at hand. Löhrr proposed the immediate subordination of Italian 11 Army to Heeresgruppe E. A meaningful reinforcement of the coastal defenses, he asserted, would require a dozen additional fortress battalions, as well as adequate flak and Luftwaffe reinforcements. 1 Gebirgsjäger Division should be shifted closer to the coast⁵⁵.

Hitler issued a new directive (Führerweisung 48) for the defense of the Balkans on July 26. Enemy landings, it began, would soon commence on the Peloponnese, on the west coast of Greece, and against the islands of Crete or Rhodes. The directive embraced the proposals put forth by Heeresgruppe E and emphasized the pressing importance of effective counterinsurgency measures to secure lines of communication in the southeast⁵⁶. More importantly, it provided for the forma-

«Operation 'Mincemeat' - 5 deutsche Dokumente»: Abt. Fremde Heere West., Nr. 7/43 gkdos Chets. den 8. Februar 1943, KTB Heeresgruppe E, T-311, Roll 175, # 000590.

54. Following the collapse of Mussolini's government on July 25, however, Hitler immediately recalled Rommel to Rastenburg, and entrusted him with the command of German forces in northern Italy, as originally intended. KTB OKW, pp. 774, 815; KTB Skl, 21.7.43.

55. KTB OKW, pp. 753-54, 800-01; KTB Heeresgruppe E, T-811, Roll 176, # 000086. On July 12, OKW had decided to send another battalion of assault guns to Greece, this time to the Peloponnese.

56. On the night of 20-21 June, Greek resistance fighters had cut the railway between Salonika and Athens at six points; shortly before, partisans had ambushed a motor vehicle column of 117 Jäger Division. To counter this sudden surge of activity, OKW had ordered the transfer of 2 Regiment «Brandenburg» and SS Gebirgspolizei Regiment 18 to Greece. The High Command also dispatched large quantities of anti-aircraft artillery to Greece to secure the rail line from Salonika to Athens (28 8.8 cm, 18 3.7 cm and 72 2 cm. flak guns). KTB OKW, pp. 746, 764, 816-17.

tion of a six division reserve (two tank, two armored infantry and two mountain divisions) along the rail line Belgrade-Larissa⁵⁷. To implement these plans, OKW reorganized the entire command structure in the Balkans. Special Order No. 3 to Directive 48 (August 7) created a new army group, F, and charged its commander, Field Marshal Maximilian von Weichs, with the defense of the entire southeastern theater. Löhr's Heeresgruppe E, though subordinate to Weichs, remained operationally responsible for the defense of Greece and the islands⁵⁸. To complete the reorganization in Greece, the High Command ordered the formation of a new army corps staff-XXII Gebirgsjäger. Commanded by General Hubert Lanz, it would assume control of 1 Gebirgsjäger and 104 Jäger divisions on the west coast⁵⁹.

By August 1943, the German buildup in Greece was essentially concluded. Yet, when measured against the wishes of the High Command, the results were clearly unsatisfactory. Five divisions, some fortress battalions and additional regiments lay scattered along a bulging front from Epirus to Salonika; the mobile reserve envisaged in Directive 48 would never materialize. Indeed, the sporadic, incremental nature of the buildup illustrates the want of a consistent strategic purpose; the failure to concentrate forces at a given point, the lack of secure knowledge of enemy intent. Hitler's injunction that Greece be defended everywhere along its outer coastal perimeter was wholly beyond the forces at Lohr's disposal. By early August, in fact, Heeresgruppe E faced a grim three-fold task which taxed its slender resources to the utmost: destruction of the partisans; disarming of Italian troops in the event of an Italian capitulation; preparation of the defense against an enemy landing. In an appreciation on September 16, 1943, the commander of Heeresgruppe F (Weichs) laid out his problems in fulsome detail: «The defender must fight on the Aegean, Ionian and Adriatic fronts. The length of the front and the weakness of our own forces require mobile operations; the ruggedness (Unwegsamkeit) of the operational area forbids it. The advantage of interior lines is, consequently, not present, and a central reserve does not exist. Thus, the

57. Hubatsch, *Hitlers Weisungen für die Kriegführung, 1939-1945*, pp. 218-22.

58. Hubatsch, *Hitlers Weisungen*, pp. 224-27.

59. KTB OKW, pp. 914, 943, 946; Fricke, Gert, «Das Unternehmen des XXII. Gebirgsarmee Korps gegen die Inseln Kefalonia und Korfu im Rahmen des Falles «Achse». (September 1943). p. 33. In: *Militärische Mitteilungen*. Vol. I:1, 1967.

Aegean and Ionian fronts must be defended rigidly and without depth»⁶⁰. Proposals to shorten the front along the line Corfu-Salonika encountered Hitler's firm opposition⁶¹.

But the German defensive preparations in Greece must be considered within the mosaic of Germany's overall war effort. Simply stated, by early 1943, Hitler's resources were alarmingly insufficient when compared with his ballooning military commitments. In the East, 159 German divisions clung precariously to a front some 2,600 kilometers in length, opposite Soviet forces greatly superior in number. To regain the initiative lost at Stalingrad, Hitler planned a spring offensive in southern Russia, against the Kursk salient. Though limited in scope, it would consume the most important reserves of the German High Command⁶². And despite German anxieties vis-à-vis the Balkans, the entire sweep of the western European coastline, from Norway to the Iberian Peninsula, was now vulnerable to Anglo-American amphibious operations. To confront this awesome challenge would require prodigious quantities of coastal troops, fixed fortifications and mobile reserves⁶³. The surrender of Axis forces in North Africa (May 1943) had created an additional concern. To Hitler, a complete Italian collapse was inevitable; when it came, the defense of the Italian peninsula would demand a formidable German military commitment⁶⁴. Thus, the multiple strains along the periphery of Hitler's embattled empire and the resources they consumed, left little for the defense of the eastern Mediterranean.

60. KTB OKW. p. 1114.

61. Apparently, Hitler feared the impact that a German withdrawal from the outer coastal perimeter and the Greek islands would have on the neutral posture of Turkey. Salewski, *Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung*. p. 381; see also Röhrich, Edgar, «Die Entwicklung auf dem Balkan 1943-45». p. 391. In: *Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau*. Juli 1962, Heft 7.

62. Hitler would delay the offensive until early July, to build up his tank forces. Thirty-three first class divisions, including 19 tank and armored infantry divisions, would be employed in the Kursk offensive. See Klink, E., *Das Gesetz des Handelns - Die Operation Zitadelle 1943*.

63. As of February 1943, the German High Command envisioned a mobile reserve of 6-8 divisions in the area of OB West (France and the Low Countries). OKW KTB, pp. 100, 124, 130, 136.

64. By late-July, Hitler had already shifted four divisions (16 and 26 Panzer and 3 and 29 Panzer Grenadier divisions) from France to Italy. Schröder, *Italiens Kriegsaustritt*, pp. 121-30.

Viewed in the above context, the German buildup in Greece in 1943, given additional impetus by Mincemeat, represented a significant investment in men and material; it mirrors, moreover, a fundamental fallacy of German strategic thinking. Never really understanding the nature of or tensions within the Allied coalition, the Germans tended to exaggerate the British-Russian antagonism and to neglect the very real differences in the history, temperament and war goals between the British and the Americans. To Hitler, buried away in his East Prussia headquarters, it was axiomatic that Churchill would attempt to beat the advancing Red Army to the Balkans. Hitler was basically correct in his analysis of Churchill's thinking, for throughout 1943 the Prime Minister remained a vigorous advocate of a Balkan strategy⁶⁵. What the German dictator and his military advisors failed to see was that the Americans would never sanction such a policy. With their inveterate suspicion of colonial powers, the Americans refused to serve as an adjunct to Britain's «Imperial» ambitions⁶⁶. But the Germans, mesmerized by their own strategic misconceptions, built up their defenses, deployed their divisions, and waited for an invasion of Greece that would never come.

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65. See Elisabeth Barker, *British Policy in South-East Europe in the Second World War*.

66. For discussions of Anglo-American diplomacy, see Howard, Michael, *Grand Strategy*. Vol. IV: August 1942 - September 1943. Her Majesty's Stationary Office. London. 1972; Matloff, Maurice, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare*.

*German Order of Battle in Greece
(July 1943)*

OKW

Heeresgruppe E (Löhr)

Befh. Saloniki-Ägäis	Sturm- Division Rhodos	Befh. Süd- griechenland	LXVIII Armeekorps	Kommandant Festung Kreta
1. Gebirgs-Division		11. Luftwaffen- Feld Division	1. Panzer-Division	
			117. Jäger-Division	
		104. Jäger Division		Festungs- Brigade Kreta
				22. Division ital. Sienna

*German Order of Battle in Greece
(August 1943)*

OKW

Heeresgruppe F. Weichs

Heeresgruppe E. Löhr

XXII. Gebirgs- Armeekorps (Lanz)	Sturm- Division Rhodos	LXVIII Armeekorps (Felmy)	SS-Polizei- Regiment 18 SS Polizei- Panzer-Grenadier Regiments 1+2	Kommandant Festung Kreta
1. Gebirgs-Division		1. Panzer- Division*	2. Regiment Brandenburg	22. Division Festungs- Brigade Kreta
104. Jäger-Division		11. Luftwaffen- Feld Division 117. Jäger-Division		

* 1 Panzer Division was transferred to the Ukraine in October 1943.



War operations, Southeastern Theater

Review Essays

DESPINA TSOURKA-PAPASTATHI

A PROPOS DES COMPAGNIES GRECQUES DE TRANSYLVANIE A SIBIU ET BRAȘOV

Olga Cicanci, *Companiile grecești din Transilvania și comerțul european în anii 1636-1746* (Les Compagnies grecques de Transylvanie et le commerce européen aux années 1636-1746), Bucarest (Editura Academiei), 1981, 8^{vo}, pp. 200+Résumé en français.

Parmi les multiples aspects de l'histoire économique des peuples du Sud-est européen, un a été particulièrement négligé par l'historiographie balkanique, celui des associations économiques, sous quelque forme qu'elles fussent apparues (corporations, guildes, compagnies de commerce, etc.). On ne saurait cependant faire tort à l'historiographie roumaine qui, par la publication affluente de documents, d'études et de monographies sur l'histoire économique des Pays Roumains et des Balkans, se trouve en tête des autres historiographies nationales sud-est européennes. D'autre part, vu la situation géographique, politique et économique des Pays Roumains dans cette région, surtout pendant la Domination ottomane de la Péninsule balkanique, on peut affirmer avec peu de réserves que ces Pays furent le carrefour culturel et économique, où se sont rencontrées toutes les transformations majeures entre l'Est et l'Ouest, le Nord et le Sud.

La Transylvanie de son côté fut un important intermédiaire dans la rencontre des peuples sud-est européens avec l'économie de l'Europe Centrale; l'étude de l'histoire économique transylvaine présente donc un vaste champ de recherche, plein d'intérêt pour ses répercussions et influences dans le sud-est européen. Elle présente aussi une grande diversité de difficultés, qui tiennent de la diversité de ses institutions politiques, économiques et sociales, et auxquelles il n'est pas facile de s'attaquer.

La monographie de Mme O. Cicanci s'occupe des Compagnies des commerçants grecs de Transylvanie à Sibiu et à Brașov pendant le XVII^e et la première moitié du XVIII^e siècle. Entre autres mérites, elle a celui d'être le premier ouvrage qui étudie à fond l'organisation et



l'activité commerciale de ces deux Compagnies dans le Sud-est européen sur base de leurs archives, dans presque leur totalité inédites, qui ont été conservées à la Bibliothèque de l'Académie Roumaine à Bucarest et aux Archives d'État à Sibiu et à Braşov, ainsi qu'à l'église de la Ste. Trinité (ayant appartenu à la Compagnie et ensuite à la communauté grecque) de Braşov, où l'A. a découvert deux Codes de la Compagnie (Codex A/1683-1782 et Codex B/1782-). Ce matériel est rédigé en grec surtout, en latin et en roumain. Les documents et codes en grec et en latin sont tous inédits et s'élèvent à plus de mille pages, tandis que les documents en roumain ont été en partie publiés par N. Iorga au début du siècle. L'A. cependant s'arrête à l'année 1746, date du dernier règlement de la Compagnie de Sibiu, tandis que les documents et les codes des Compagnies avancent jusqu'au début du XIX^e siècle. Mais continuer jusqu'à cette date serait entreprendre l'impossible.

Après une brève introduction (pp. 7-10), l'A. dans un premier chapitre (*Historiographie*, pp. 11-15) passe en revue les quelques travaux (publication de documents, articles, etc.) qui s'occupent des deux Compagnies grecques de Transylvanie sous un aspect ou un autre. Dans ce même chapitre elle énumère les sources documentaires qu'elle a utilisé dans son ouvrage, avec les références d'archive respectives. L'A. annonce à la fin du chapitre la publication des documents des deux Compagnies, sans préciser cependant si elle se propose de publier un *corpus* de tous les documents ou seulement ceux employés à l'élaboration du présent ouvrage. On ne saurait assez insister sur la nécessité d'une telle publication des documents *in extenso*, sous la forme d'un *corpus*, dans une édition diplomatique.

Dans le second chapitre (*Fondation des Compagnies grecques de Transylvanie*, pp. 16-26), l'A. traite d'abord des commerçants Grecs de Transylvanie pendant la période précédant la fondation des Compagnies de Sibiu et de Braşov (leur statut juridique, leur activité dans le commerce extérieur et de transit en Transylvanie, les produits véhiculés et les routes commerciales suivies, les lieux d'origine des commerçants, etc.). En conclusion l'A. présente une série d'arguments sur les raisons possibles qui ont conduit à l'octroi de privilèges de la part des Princes transylvains. Enfin, l'A. soutient que la formation des Compagnies grecques a eu pour modèle les compagnies ou sociétés de commerce oriental européennes (Angleterre, Hollande, France), qui avaient été fondées depuis la fin du XVI^e siècle (p. 23). Nous nous bornerons ici à signaler seulement qu'il y a, entre autres, une différence

majeure entre le type des compagnies occidentales et celui des compagnies grecques de Transylvanie: nommément que les premières étaient organisées et fonctionnaient d'après le principe mercantiliste, exerçant le commerce au nom de leurs membres; les compagnies grecques de Transylvanie par contre, n'exerçaient pas de commerce en tant que telles, mais seulement leurs membres, chacun à son propre compte. De même, les compagnies occidentales étaient de règle propriétaires de capitaux et de fonds commerciaux cédés par leurs membres mais propres à chaque compagnie, tandis que les compagnies grecques n'en possédaient pas. De là découlent des différences fondamentales dans l'organisation économique, malgré quelques similitudes superficielles, ainsi que dans la fonction économique de chaque type de compagnie.

L' A. décrit ensuite la fondation des compagnies de Sibiu et de Braşov, en faisant appel aux Privilèges octroyés par les Princes transylvains (en 1636 et en 1678) et aux documents internes des deux Compagnies. En ce qui concerne les Privilèges de fondation, nous partageons l'opinion de N. Iorga, mentionnée par l'A. (p. 23-24), que le Privilège de 1636, octroyé par G. Rákóczi, était un privilège général accordé à tous les commerçants Grecs de Transylvanie et pas seulement à ceux de Sibiu, car nulle part dans le privilège il n'est fait mention spécifique des commerçants Grecs de Sibiu. L' A. n'adopte pas cette opinion.

Dans le troisième chapitre sur le *Statut juridique et les Règlements de fonctionnement des Compagnies grecques de Transylvanie* (pp. 26-44), l'A. examine d'abord la Compagnie de Sibiu (pp. 26-37) et ensuite celle de Braşov (pp. 38-44). Elle analyse les privilèges de fondation des deux Compagnies et les règlements qu'elles ont élaboré dans leurs registres respectifs, avec une riche illustration puisée dans ces documents, en suivant leur ordre chronologique. L'A. fait dans son commentaire des remarques pertinentes, parmi lesquelles nous signalons celles concernant les différences entre les compagnies occidentales et celles de Transylvanie (pp. 32-33, 35), ainsi que celles sur les relations des Compagnies avec les organes administratifs et le pouvoir central du pays.

En ce qui concerne la question du Diplôme accordé aux Grecs de Braşov par l'empereur d'Autriche Léopold le 16 septembre 1701 (discussion de l'A. aux pp. 40-41), nous voudrions remarquer qu'à notre avis il concerne uniquement les Grecs établis dans le quartier Bolgarszeg de Braşov et non pas la Compagnie grecque de Braşov.

D'autre part, le Diplôme du même empereur en date du 12 septembre 1701 ne mentionne pas expressément qu'il est accordé à la Compagnie grecque de Sibiu; de fait, il y a quelques dispositions en faveur de tous les Grecs de Transylvanie («...universorum Graecorum...») qui pratiquent le commerce en Transylvanie, mais surtout il y en a en faveur des Compagnies («.... Societates») des commerçants Grecs de Transylvanie. Nous sommes donc inclinés à soutenir que le Diplôme «Léopoldin» du 12 septembre 1701 est aussi un Privilège général en faveur des compagnies et des commerçants grecs de Transylvanie. Le problème cependant ne pourrait être élucidé qu'après un examen à fond de la question des contestations contre la validité et l'authenticité du Diplôme «Léopoldin» du 12 septembre 1701, ainsi que de la question de son application effective et de son respect par les autorités de Vienne et de Transylvanie.

L'A. donne ensuite un aperçu a) des décisions de la Diète transylvaine en ce qui concerne les obligations et les droits des commerçants grecs et des deux Compagnies privilégiées, b) des mesures prises par la Cour de Vienne et la Chancellerie impériale au sujet des commerçants grecs et des Compagnies, concernant le tribut et autres obligations financières. Dans une deuxième partie de ce même chapitre, l'A. met en évidence les relations des deux Compagnies avec les autorités locales, c'est-à-dire les municipalités de Sibiu et de Braşov, sur base des documents relatifs tirés des Archives municipales des deux villes et des registres des Compagnies grecques. Ce chapitre est particulièrement utile pour que l'on puisse encadrer l'activité des deux Compagnies dans le système administratif, économique et fiscal de la Transylvanie au temps de la Principauté autonome ainsi que sous la domination autrichienne.

Dans le sixième chapitre (pp. 96-118), l'A. discute la *Structure ethnique* des deux Compagnies. Elle passe d'abord en revue les opinions de certains auteurs (roumains, grecs etc.) sur le terme de «commerçant grec», en usage dans les sources manuscrites transylvaines et dans les documents des deux compagnies, mais rarement, car le terme qui y est usité est «Ρομαϊτοι». Sur base de ces documents, l'A. examine le lieu d'origine des membres des deux Compagnies, leurs noms et prénoms, en remarquant, et avec raison, que ces deux critères (lieu d'origine et onomastique) ne constituent pas à eux seuls des facteurs concluants pour l'évaluation de la structure ethnique des deux Compagnies. Comme critère valable l'A. considère la langue des documents

et des signatures autographes qui y sont apposées. De fait, elle affirme que «la concurrence de plusieurs langues balkaniques employées par les membres est l'argument important pour l'existence de plusieurs 'nationalités' au sein des deux Compagnies» (p. 110). Ainsi l'A. conclut que:

a) la majorité des membres des deux Compagnies étaient Grecs ou Macédo-grecs [«macedo-greci» (p. 117), ou «macedoneni grecizați» (p. 104)] de différentes régions de la Grèce et des autres pays du Sud du Danube;

b) quelques membres étaient Bulgares ou Serbes (p. 104) venus de l'Empire ottoman;

c) plusieurs roumains faisaient partie des deux Compagnies (plus dans celle de Braşov et moins dans celle de Sibiu) dont l'origine était surtout de Transylvanie (p. 117);

d) le terme «commerçant grec» n'a pas un contexte ethnique, mais indique le commerçant orthodoxe de l'empire ottoman en Transylvanie et en Autriche-Hongrie (pp. 117 et 96-99).

En ce qui concerne la structure ethnique des Compagnies, nous avons à remarquer la confusion qui existe en général dans la terminologie au sujet des Aroumains: «armanii», «aromîni», «macedoneni», «κουτσόβλαχοι», c'est-à dire des latinophones du Sud de la Péninsule balkanique, terme qui ne correspond nullement à une conscience nationale propre. Ainsi, on ne peut considérer ces latinophones ni «grécisés», car ils ont toujours été bilingues (langues: aroumain et grec), ni pour autant «grécomanes», car ils n'ont pas seulement participé à la culture grecque, mais ils ont été les facteurs les plus importants à la continuation, à la renaissance et à la diffusion de cette culture; et ceci non pas sous quelque «influence» ou «réception», mais de manière spontanée et originelle. On n'aurait à penser qu'au foyers de la culture grecque sous la domination ottomane que furent Moschopolis, Iannina, les centres urbains de toute la Macédoine, de la Thessalie, de la Bulgarie, où l'on trouve en masse des Aroumains; même ceux des Pays Roumains, de la Serbie et de la Hongrie, où ils ont émigré de leur localités d'origine. Ces négociants, même ceux analphabètes ou ignorants, ont fondé des écoles grecques, ont tenu à la langue grecque dans leur culture et leurs églises; ils ont financé et encouragé des livres grecs; ils se sont considérés Hellènes, tout comme les turcophones de Caramanie, et se sont assimilés aux habitants des pays qui les ont hébergés, mais ni plus ni moins que les Grecs d'autres régions. Le peuple grec a par

ailleurs toujours été très sensible aux différences régionales, jusque très tard [par exemple, A. Pallatides, en 1845, dans son *Mémoire* sur la Communauté grecque de Vienne, parle de «Ἑλληνικαὶ φυλαὶ» (p. 5), de «οἰκουμένη τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ κόσμου» (p. 9), de «γεννήματα καὶ θρέμματα Ἑλληνικὰ τῆς Ἀσίας καὶ Εὐρώπης: τῆς Μικρᾶς Ἀσίας δηλονότι, τῆς στερεᾶς Ἑλλάδος καὶ τῶν νήσων, τῆς Θεσσαλίας, Ἡπείρου, Μακεδονίας, Θράκης, Βουλγαρίας, Δακίας» ὥστε τὴν... συνοικίαν τῶν ἐν Βιέννῃ Ἑλλήνων, πανσπερμίαν Ἑλληνικὴν δύναται τις ὀνομάσαι... «(p. 13)]. On doit de même remarquer que dans les riches sources documentaires des deux Compagnies il n'est jamais fait d'allusion à l'identité ethnique d'Aroumain, comme il en est fait pour les Albanais, Bulgares, Roumains («Βλάχοι»), ou Serbes orthodoxes; les Aroumains y sont incorporés à la notion de «Ρωμαῖοι».

La coexistence de Roumains, Albanais, Serbes et Bulgares orthodoxes, au sein d'une forte majorité grecque, dans les Compagnies de Sibiu et de Braşov, sans aucune discrimination et en égalité absolue, montre de plus, non pas une tolérance mais une réception à titre égal de ces négociants «ἀλλογενεῖς» par rapport aux «ὀμογενεῖς», et «ἀλλόφυλοι» par rapport aux «ὁμόφυλοι», termes qu'on rencontre souvent dans ces documents. Ceux qui ne faisaient pas partie des Compagnies étaient des étrangers, «ἑτέροι», Grecs ou autres, tout comme ceux qui étaient sujets du Prince transylvain ou de l'Empereur d'Autriche, qui avaient une résidence permanente en Transylvanie et qu'on appelle dans les documents «ἐντόπιον», ou «τοπικόν», comme les Hongrois ou les Saxons, ainsi que l'A. l'indique. Dans les documents des Compagnies, le terme «Ρωμαῖοι» sert à désigner les Grecs des différentes régions qui en étaient membres et non pas les orthodoxes en général; car le terme «Ἕλλην» à cette époque (XVII-XVIII ss.) indiquait les Grecs de l'Antiquité (cf. C. Dimaras, *Νεοελληνικὸς Διαφωτισμός*, Athènes 1977, p. 3).

Pour ce qui est du contexte ethnique du terme «commerçant grec», il est à remarquer que: a) les autorités transylvaines dans les actes officiels (décisions diétales, correspondance officielle), savent de règle très bien discerner les Grecs des Roumains, des Serbes, des Bulgares, des Turcs ou des Juifs; b) en se référant donc aux commerçants grecs en général pour indiquer dans certains cas les commerçants étrangers, elles visaient à la grande majorité ethnique ou l'importance économique de cette catégorie de négociants qui faisaient le commerce des produits orientaux, sans se confondre en détails; c) le caractère grec des deux Compagnies n'exclut nullement la participation, en

nombre plus ou moins grand, de commerçants d'autres nationalités, même de religion ou de rite différents. Il est donc évident qu'il y avait des consciences ethniques bien définies, mais sans discriminations ou intolérance.

Le septième chapitre traite des *Formes de l'activité commerciale*, des produits véhiculés par les membres des Compagnies grecques et de leurs prix. L'A. s'occupe des foires et marchés locaux fréquentés par les membres des deux Compagnies, des boutiques et étalages tenus par ceux-ci dans les villes et les foires, ainsi que des dispositions des règlements des Compagnies qui délimitaient leurs droits et obligations. Dans une autre partie de ce chapitre, l'A. décrit les formes d'association commerciale, ainsi que les rapports du travail salarié réglementés par les Compagnies, les diverses fonctions des salariés et leur place dans celles-ci. Dans ce même chapitre, on trouve de précieuses informations sur les divers produits qui ont fait l'objet du commerce des membres des deux Compagnies grecques de Transylvanie, fût-il de transit ou d'importation, sur le volume de ce commerce ainsi que sur les prix, leur fluctuation et les équivalences monétaires, toutes tirées des registres et des documents des Compagnies (v. Tables, aux pp. 139-140, 142-143).

Les routes commerciales utilisées par les membres des Compagnies de Sibiu et de Braşov, ainsi que les localités d'achat et de vente des produits commercialisés forment le huitième chapitre du livre (pp. 145-151). L'A. s'est servie des ouvrages traitant le sujet pour le commerce sud-est européen mais a aussi abondamment utilisé les informations éparées dans les documents des deux Compagnies et leurs registres, pour donner une image complète tant des routes suivies que des points douaniers par lesquels ils passaient, des taxes qui y étaient perçues, et des centres économiques européens, ottomans et asiatiques auxquels les deux Compagnies étaient liées.

Le neuvième chapitre (pp. 152-158) établit les *Relations des deux Compagnies grecques de Transylvanie avec la Valachie et la Moldavie*, sur base des documents et des registres des Compagnies et des Archives locales. Il en ressort des rapports très étroits et harmonieux, autant que possible en questions d'argent, qui fécondèrent de manière ininterrompue pendant plus de deux siècles dans les trois pays. On constate, d'autre part, la mobilité des membres des deux Compagnies et la pluralité de leur activité commerciale dans tous les trois.

Le dixième et dernier chapitre (pp. 159-168) concerne la *Vie spi-*

rituelle des Compagnies, toujours d'après leurs documents internes. L'A. s'y occupe de la fondation et du fonctionnement d'églises ou de lieux de culte des Compagnies dans les villes de Sibiu et de Braşov; des relations des Compagnies avec les centres de l'Orthodoxie (Mont Athos, Mont Sinai, Jérusalem, Constantinople) et avec l'Eglise orthodoxe roumaine en Transylvanie; des prêtres en charge de l'Eglise de chaque Compagnie, de leurs lieux d'origine et des monastères dont ils provenaient; enfin des livres qui ont appartenu aux églises des deux Compagnies, et du problème de l'existence d'un instituteur pour les enfants des membres, quand ceux-ci ont eu le droit d'apporter leurs familles de leurs localités d'origine (XVIII^e s). L'A. s'y occupe aussi de deux membres de la Compagnie de Sibiu qui ont eu une activité intellectuelle, de Panos Ioannou, pour lequel l'A. emmet l'hypothèse qu'il fut le copiste d'un manuscrit du roman «Στεφανίτης καὶ Ἰχνηλάτης», et de Ioannis Adami, auteur de la «Σύνοψις φυσιολογικῇ» (1709) (se trouvant actuellement à la Bibliothèque Nationale d'Athènes) que Mme Cicanci identifie pour la première fois, d'une traduction en grec de la «Pax corporis» (1760) du docteur transylvain Ferencz Páriz Pápai, et d'un manuel—compilation de la législation transylvaine «Σύνταγμα τῶν Νόμων» (1760), et des Statuts saxons, «Στατοῦτα.... τῶν ἐν Τρανσυλβανίᾳ ἤτοι Ἑρδελίας.... Σαξόνων κοινῶς Σασῶν....» (1762), dont l'original autographe se trouve au Mont Athos*.

Dans ses conclusions (pp. 169-175), l'A. résume sa thèse sur le type d'organisation des deux Compagnies grecques de Transylvanie sur le modèle de la Levant Company, tout en indiquant leurs différences avec le modèle proposé et avec les corporations de métiers en Transylvanie et dans l'empire ottoman; elle fait d'autre part un rapprochement des deux Compagnies avec l'organisation des communes grecques, dont leurs membres étaient originaires, et l'organisation judiciaire en Transylvanie. Comme nous avons remarqué plus haut, nous sommes d'avis que les similitudes entre ces Compagnies grecques et la Levant Company sont superficielles et que les éléments décisifs, comme p.ex. le but d'association et la fonction économique sont loin d'être similaires. D'autre part, nous souscrivons sans réserves à l'opinion de l'A. que ces Compagnies ont assez tôt été transformées en communautés, sans toutefois perdre leur but économique. Mais nous ne pouvons pas ac-

* Nous avons préparé une édition diplomatique de ces deux manuscrits d'après l'original.

cepter le caractère «interbalkanique» que l'A. attribue aux Compagnies de Sibiu et de Braşov (partageant l'opinion de Tr. Stoyanovich et N. Svoronos sur les commerçants originaires des pays balkaniques dans l'Empire ottoman et l'Europe Centrale), tout comme on ne pourrait pas penser le faire pour la Compagnie serbe de Timişoara, ou pour la Compagnie arménienne de Gherla, ou la Compagnie bulgare de Deva (v. BAR Ms. gr. 976, f 116r), auxquelles participaient nombre de Grecs et de Roumains. Le contexte d'orthodoxes attribué aux «Ρωμαῖοι» des documents, est loin de correspondre au sens que ces mêmes documents des Compagnies lui attribuent (v. p. ex. BAR Ms. gr. 976, f 122v en date de 1746). Quant à la formule «ἄγνοι καὶ καθολικοὶ Ρωμαῖοι» du même règlement (BAR Ms. gr. 976 f 119v) citée par l'A., elle fait suite à la constatation «.... νὰ ὁποῦ βλέπομεν.... εἰς τοὺς ὑστερινοὺς καιροὺς... μὲ κάθε λογῆς μὸδον καὶ τρόπον ἐχώθησαν μερικοὶ ξένοι καὶ ἀλλόφυλοι μέσα εἰς τὴν Κομπάνιαν μας (: μὲ ὅλον ὁποῦ πρῶτα ἤμυσθαν μόνον ἄγνοι καὶ καθολικοὶ Ρωμαῖοι)». Le mot-clé ici est «ἀλλόφυλοι», c'est-à-dire de race, mais pas de religion différente («ἀλλόθρησκοι»).

L'A. remarque (p. 174) que l'emploi des termes «Bulgare», «Serbe», «Roumain» («Βλάχος») indique le début de formation d'une conscience de l'origine ethnique. Nous dirions plutôt que cet emploi indique la continuation de cette conscience ethnique, formée déjà antérieurement, et qui, contemporain à l'emploi de «Ρωμαῖος» est rencontré dans les documents dès les débuts de la Compagnie de Sibiu (première moitié du XVII^e s.) qui groupait alors tous les commerçants grecs de Transylvanie: ainsi dans BAR Ms. gr. 975, f 9r «ρομεηκα», f 96v «κοσταντηνος ὁ βουλγαράς», loc. cit. «βλάχος εδο εἰς στο ερδέλη» en date de 1657; f 125, Prologue de la 3^e Partie du premier Code de la Compagnie de Sibiu (BAR Ms. gr. 975), dont la date est de 1655 «ἐτῇ Κυρίου 1639... εἰς τὸ συμπήνη ἐγγενεν ἡ ἀρχή του συνεδρίου τον εν το ερδέλη ρομεον πραματευτάδων...». En 1747, quand Ioannis Adami copia le premier code (BAR Ms. gr. 975) dans un autre (BAR Ms. gr. 976), en transcrivant le prologue de la II^e Partie de l'ancien code, au terme «ἡμετερον γενος» (BAR 975 f 71) il ajouta «τῶν Γραικῶν ἤτοι Ρωμαίων» (BAR 976 f 58v), le «Γραικοί» étant une forme hellénisée de «graecus», terme par lequel étaient désignées par l'administration transylvaine et autrichienne les «Ρωμαῖοι». On ne pourrait donc pas parler d'une «conscience interbalkanique» (p. 171 n. 29), mais bien volontiers d'une culture matérielle sud-est européenne, indépendante des consciences ethni-

ques, dont le véhicule principal fut la classe marchande des peuples du Sud-est européen, à côté des équipes d'artisans itinérants.

Quant aux rapports économiques des Compagnies avec les pays du Sud-est européen, l'A. établit incontestablement la part du lion qu'ont eu les Pays Roumains dans l'intensification de leur production et de leur économie, qui grâce à ces Compagnies sont sorties de l'impasse économique causée par le monopole ottoman sur leur production. Toutes les autres régions de l'empire ottoman et de l'empire des Habsbourgs ont d'ailleurs bénéficié de l'activité des membres des Compagnies grecques, sauf l'ancienne classe marchande des Saxons de Transylvanie qui se virent lésés dans leurs anciens droits, et, malgré leurs efforts intenses, ne réussirent pas à reconquérir leur place initiale, plus par manque d'adaptation aux nouvelles exigences et techniques économiques que par manque de talent et de productivité.

Le texte est complété en annexe par des tables des produits véhiculés par les membres des deux Compagnies, où sont indiqués le volume, le prix par unité, le total, la localité de destination, pour chaque produit séparément en ordre chronologique (Annexe I, pp. 176-191). Une deuxième annexe comporte une liste des prêtres de l'église de la Compagnie de Sibiu, à partir de l'année 1640 jusqu'en 1746, avec le lieu ou le monastère d'origine du hiéromoine respectif; y figure aussi une liste des «epitropi», c'est-à-dire des membres de la Compagnie de Sibiu qui étaient responsables de l'église et de l'administration de ses biens (1721-1746). Un index détaillé de noms et de lieux complète l'ouvrage.

De ce bref aperçu on peut bien se rendre compte de l'apport et de l'importance du livre de Mme Olga Cicanci, et les remarques qui ont été faites plus haut ne visent, et ne peuvent, pas les minimiser. Bien au contraire, elles ont pour but de rectifier quelques détails importants ou présenter un autre aspect à la discussion de certains problèmes; elles montrent de plus que dans cette multitude ahurissante de documents épars et incomplets dans leur rédaction, la tâche de l'A. a été bien difficile et son mérite donc plus grand: dépouiller les manuscrits, en recueillir et ordonner les informations, enfin présenter le matériel de manière cohérente. Il faut aussi tenir compte du fait que Mme O. Cicanci traite dans son ouvrage des deux Compagnies, de Sibiu et de Braşov en même temps, pour lesquelles le matériel manuscrit est différent, et qui présentent des différences d'organisation et de fonctionnement qui, tout en n'étant pas de prime abord décisives, ne

sauraient être ignorées sans de graves conséquences au niveau de la synthèse.

Nous ne trouvons pas exagéré de dire que l'A. a parfaitement réussi à présenter avec de précieux détails et des remarques pertinentes, le riche matériel inédit qu'elle a dépouillé et en partie découvert. Elle a fourni aux chercheurs un très bon travail d'érudition et elle a brossé un vif tableau des Compagnies grecques de Transylvanie et de leur commerce. Je voudrais souligner tout particulièrement l'originalité et l'apport du travail de l'A. aux études d'histoire économique du Sud-est européen, par la richesse des informations, puisées directement aux sources manuscrites, qu'elle a bien su analyser et mettre en évidence.

Il ne peut rester aux chercheurs qu'un regret: le fait que ce matériel si riche et original reste inédit. Car il n'intéresserait pas seulement les historiens (économie, société, mentalités), mais aussi les linguistes, les folkloristes et, à un certain point, les historiens de l'art et de l'architecture. On peut toujours espérer qu'une institution scientifique voudra entreprendre la publication intégrale de ces documents, à un avenir pas très lointain.

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KARL NEHRING

SÜDOST-INSTITUT MÜNCHEN. DIE ABTEILUNG GESCHICHTE

Mehr als zwei Generationen von Historikern und Wissenschaftlern fachverwandter Disziplinen haben seit der Gründung des Südost-Instituts als Stiftung des öffentlichen Rechts im Jahre 1930 zu der internationalen Bedeutung des Instituts und seiner Veröffentlichungen beigetragen. Stellvertretend sei hier der verstorbene Wissenschaftler Franz Babinger, Otto Brunner, Bistra Cvetkova, Franz Dölger, Ernst Gamillscheg, Hugo Hantsch, Nikolai Iorga, Hasan Kaleshi, Fritz Machatschek, Georg Ostrogorsky, Nikola und Svetozar Radojčić, Günter Reichenkron, Alois Schmaus, Petar Skok, Gyula Szekfü und Dimitrij Tschizewskij gedacht, die durch ihre Beiträge in der historischen Zeitschrift «Südost-Forschungen» und in der vom Institut herausgegebenen Monographienreihe «Südosteuropäische Arbeiten» der historischen Südosteuropaforschung wesentliche Impulse gegeben haben. Mit jedem der genannten Namen verbinden sich Teildisziplinen, deren Summe den Aufgabenbereich und die Tätigkeit des Südost-Instituts besser beschreiben als jegliche Panegyrik. «Wenn sich in der internationalen Fachwelt «Südosteuropa» als Raumbegriff und als Gegenstand interdisziplinärer Regionalforschung weitgehend durchgesetzt hat, so ist dies nicht zuletzt auf das Wirken des Instituts und seiner Leiter zurückzuführen - vor allem auf das ganz wesentlich dem Südost-Institut Lebenswerk des Kulturhistorikers Fritz Valjavec (1909-1960)»¹.

Mit den «Südost-Forschungen» hatte Valjavec nicht nur ein Forum für die historische Südosteuropaforschung geschaffen, sondern auch die einzige deutsche historische Zeitschrift, die sich seit 1936 kontinuierlich mit der Geschichte Südosteuropas befasst. Nach dem Tod von Fritz Valjavec wurde Mathias Bernath-Professor für Geschichte Südosteuropas an der Freien Universität Berlin - 1960 mit der Leitung des Südost-Instituts und der Herausgabe der «Südost-Forschungen» sowie der «Südosteuropäischen Arbeiten» betraut. Ihm zur Seite stand als Leiter der Historischen Abteilung und als einer der beiden stellvertretenden Institutsleiter Felix von Schroeder, dessen Nachfolger 1977 Karl Nehring wurde.

1. Mathias Bernath in der Festschrift: *Südost-Institut München 1930-1980*. Red. K. Nehring. München (1980) S. 3. Vgl. hierzu auch M. Bernath: Das Südost-Institut-Rückschau und Ausblick. In: *Südosteuropa* 81 (1982) S. 375-379.

Unter veränderten atmosphärischen Bedingungen gelang es Mathias Bernath und seinen Mitarbeitern, die durch den Zweiten Weltkrieg und die darauf folgende Polarisierung entstandenen Berührungsgänge abzubauen und den Dialog mit den Historikern in Südosteuropa wieder aufzunehmen und auszubauen. Heute ist es eine Selbstverständlichkeit, dass Historiker aus dem Westen und aus Südosteuropa gleichermaßen an den von Helga Neroutsos redigierten «Südost-Forschungen» mitarbeiten und die Zeitschrift mit ihrem Rezensionsteil nicht nur das Zentralorgan der westdeutschen Südosteuropahistoriker ist, sondern auch zur Diskussion und Information zwischen den Fackkollegen in Südosteuropa beiträgt².

Seit der Gründung des Südost-Instituts gibt es die Monographienreihe «Südosteuropäische Arbeiten», die zur Zeit aus 78 Titeln und mehr als 80 Bänden besteht. Bei den Arbeiten überwiegen die Spezialuntersuchungen. Ihre Thematik reicht angefangen vom serbischen und ungarischen Mittelalter³ über das Wesen der «Knabenlese» im Osmanischen Reich⁴, die Stellung Russlands zur griechischen Revolution⁵, den ungarischen Parlamentarismus im 19. Jahrhundert⁶, eine Biographie Ferdinands von Bulgarien⁷, die Problematik von Staat, Nation

2. Zu den Bänden 1 bis 39 der «Südost-Forschungen» siehe das Gesamtinhaltsverzeichnis in: *Südost-Institut München 1930-1980*. S. 12-43. Zu den Forschungsergebnissen westdeutscher Südosteuropahistoriker vgl. E. Turczynski: Geschichte Südosteuropas. Bilanz einer Dekade (1969-1979) In: *Osteuropa* 30 (1980) S. 725-748; K. Nehring: Veröffentlichungen zur Geschichte Südosteuropas in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1971-1980. In: *Südost-Forschungen* 40 (1981) S. 285-315 und zuletzt K. D. Grothusen: Die historische Südosteuropa-Forschung. In: *Südosteuropa-Mitteilungen* 22 Heft 3/4 (1982) S. 122-131.

3. Stanislaus Hafner: *Studien zur altserbischen dynastischen Historiographie*. München 1964 = SOA Bd. 62. Karl Nehring: *Matthias Corvinus, Kaiser Friedrich III. und das Reich. Zum hunyadisch-habsburgischen Gegensatz im Donauraum*. München 1975 = SOA Bd. 72.

4. Basilike D. Papoulia: *Ursprung und Wesen der «Knabenlese» im Osmanischen Reich*. München 1968 = SOA 59. (vergriffen).

5. Barbara Jelavich: *Russia and the Greek Revolution of 1843*. München 1966 = SOA Bd. 65.

6. László Révész: *Die Anfänge des ungarischen Parlamentarismus*. München 1968 = SOA Bd. 68. Adalbert Tóth: *Parteien und Reichstagswahlen in Ungarn 1848 bis 1892*. München 1973 = SOA Bd. 70.

7. Joachim von Königsłow. *Fürst Ferdinand von Bulgarien*. München 1970 = SOA Bd. 69.

und Gesellschaft bei den Südslawen⁸ bis zur türkischen Aussenpolitik im Zweiten Weltkrieg⁹.

Neben diesen Untersuchungen werden in der gleichen Reihe Quellen zur Geschichte Südosteuropas veröffentlicht. An erster Stelle sind hier die Lebenserinnerungen des albanischen Politikers Ekrem Bey Vlora (1885-1964) zu nennen¹⁰, deren Veröffentlichung Felix von Schroeder besorgt hat. Das Südost-Institut rechnet es sich als Verdienst an, bei der Entstehung dieser Memoiren, die eine wertvolle Quelle zum osmanischen *fin de siècle* und zur Entstehung des albanischen Staates sind, Pate gestanden zu haben. «Spätmittelalterliche fränkische Briefschaften aus dem grossherrlichen Seraj zu Stambul» lautet der Titel einer Quellenveröffentlichung von Franz Babinger, die vornehmlich italienische Schriftstücke zur osmanischen Geschichte in der Zeit Mehmeds II. und Bayezids II. enthält. Im Sinne der im gleichen Band von Babinger formulierten Forderung: —«Der Ablauf der osmanischen Reichsgeschichte kann unmöglich ohne sorgfältige und peinliche Erforschung der nicht orientalischen Quellen geklärt werden» — hat das Südost-Institut soeben einen der bedeutendsten kaiserlichen Gesandtschaftsberichte veröffentlicht, der die Gesandtschaftsreise von Adam zu Herberstein an die Hohe Pforte (1608/09) zum Gegenstand hat¹¹.

Besonderes Gewicht hat das Institut in den letzten 15 Jahren auf die historische Grundlagenforschung gelegt. Dank der Unterstützung durch die Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft waren die materiellen Voraussetzungen für zwei Grossprojekte geschaffen worden, die in ihrem wissenschaftlichen Anspruch und ihrer Verwirklichung die Tätigkeit der Historischen Abteilung akzentuieren. Bereits abgeschlossen ist von dem Mathias Bernath, Felix von Schroeder und Karl Nehring herausgege-

8. Wolf Dietrich Behschnitt: *Nationalismus bei Serben und Kroaten 1830-1914. Analyse und Typologie der nationalen Ideologie*. München 1980 = SOA Bd. 74. Wolfgang Kessler: *Politik, Kultur und Gesellschaft in Kroatien und Slawonien in der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts. Historiographie und Grundlagen*. München 1981 = SOA Bd. 77.

9. Zehra Önder: *Die türkische Aussenpolitik im Zweiten Weltkrieg*. München 1977 = SOA Bd. 73.

10. Ekrem Bey Vlora: *Lebenserinnerungen (1885-1925)*. 2 Bde. München 1968, 1973 = SOA Bd. 68, 69.

11. Karl Nehring: *Adam Freiherrn zu Herbersteins Gesandtschaftsreise nach Konstantinopel. Ein Beitrag zum Frieden von Zsitvatorok (1606)*. München 1983 = SOA Bd. 78. Zu weiteren Bänden der Reihe «Südosteuropäische Arbeiten» vgl. Südost-Institut München 1930-1980. S. 45-48.

bene «Biographische Lexikon zur Geschichte Südosteuropas». Unter der Redaktion von Gerda Bartl erschienen die vier Bände des Lexikons in der Zeit von 1974 bis 1981. Insgesamt enthält dieses Nachschlagewerk mehr als 1500 biographische Darstellungen von Persönlichkeiten, die für die südosteuropäische Geschichte vom Ausgang der Antike bis zum Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs von Bedeutung waren. Einbezogen wurden die Länder Slowakei, Ungarn, Rumänien, Jugoslawien, Albanien, Bulgarien und Griechenland sowie die übergreifenden Imperien Byzanz, Osmanisches Reich und Habsburger Monarchie. Zum Gelingen dieses Unternehmens haben schliesslich mehr als hundert Wissenschaftler aus Südosteuropa und der westlichen Welt beigetragen.

Während die Neuerscheinungen zur Geschichte Südosteuropas in der vom Südost-Institut herausgegebenen laufenden «Südosteuropa-Bibliographie» (bisher 10 Teilbände mit dem Berichtszeitraum von 1945 bis 1970) erfasst werden, hat sich das Projekt «Historische Bücherkunde Südosteuropas» zur Aufgabe gemacht, in der Form einer annotierten Auswahlbibliographie die einschlägigen Quellen und Darstellungen zur Geschichte Südosteuropas zu erfassen. Mit mehr als 1700 Seiten Umfang sind in der Reihe «Südosteuropäische Arbeiten» die von Mathias Bernath herausgegebenen und von Gertrud Krallert redigierten ersten beiden Teilbände erschienen, die dem Mittelalter gewidmet sind. Die Bearbeitung der folgenden Bände (Neuzeit) ist so weit fortgeschritten, dass in absehbarer Zeit mit ihrer Veröffentlichung zu rechnen ist.

Das «Biographische Lexikon zur Geschichte Südosteuropas» und die «Historische Bücherkunde Südosteuropas» bilden im Rahmen der von der Historischen Abteilung erstellten Subsidia die Voraussetzung für das unter der Leitung von Mathias Bernath in Planung begriffene «Handbuch zur Geschichte Südosteuropas». Gestützt auf die bibliographischen und biographischen Veröffentlichungen des Instituts wird zur Zeit an der Konzeption des ersten Bandes des Handbuchs gearbeitet, der die mittelalterliche Geschichte Südosteuropas behandeln soll.

Neben den genannten Forschungsvorhaben lädt das Südost-Institut in Verbindung mit anderen in München beheimateten Institutionen zu Vorträgen über Themen der südosteuropäischen Geschichte ein. So hielten im vergangenen Jahr Jenő Szűcs (Ungarische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Budapest) einen Vortrag über die Entstehung des ungarischen Städtewesens (Mitveranstalter: Institut für Finnougristik der Universität München) und Dan Berindei (Rumänische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Bukarest) über die rumänischen Führungsschichten im 19. Jahrhundert (Mitveranstalter: Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft). Wesen-

tlich beteiligt war die Historische Abteilung des Instituts an der von der Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft ausgerichteten 19. Internationalen Hochschulwoche «Hundert Jahre nationalstaatliche Unabhängigkeit in Südosteuropa», die unter der wissenschaftlichen Leitung von Mathias Bernath stand. Unter derselben Leitung wird das Südost-Institut auch zu der diesjährigen 24. Internationalen Hochschulwoche beitragen, die unter dem Thema «Friedenssicherung in Südosteuropa: Föderationsprojekte und Allianzen seit dem Beginn der nationalen Eigenständigkeit» steht.

Abschliessend ist festzuhalten, dass das Südost-Institut mit seiner Historischen Abteilung Wesentliches zur Erforschung der Geschichte Südosteuropas beitragen konnte. Der Dank hierfür gilt seit mehr als 50 Jahren dem Bayerischen Staatsministerium für Unterricht und Kultus und vor allem den Fachkollegen in Ost und West, die als Autoren zur Bedeutung und zum Ruf des Südost-Instituts beigetragen haben.

Karl Nehring (München)
Stellvertretender Leiter
des Südost-Instituts

Annals

REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INSTITUTE IN 1982

A.

SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH

I. The Institute's Directorate has continued to promote and assist the collaborators' research work according to their particular special subjects within the Institute's general sphere of interests. They have continued to conduct their research and to present their conclusions in the form of independent publications, articles, and reports given at international conferences.

In order to facilitate their research work we re-examined and arranged for a more systematic organisation of our collaborators' journeys both abroad and within Greece itself. In connection with this, and at the suggestion of the interested parties, the following people have undertaken journeys for the purpose of research: K. Vakalopoulos (Paris, Vienna, Athens), A. Iordanoglou (Istanbul), G. Ioannidou-Bitsiadou (London, Sofia, Athens), A. Karathanassis (Sofia, Athens), V. Kondis (Athens, London), E. Kyriakoudis (Sofia, Belgrade), D. Mavridou-Loukidou (Sofia, Athens), I. Papadrianos (Belgrade), K. Papoulidis (Moscow, Athens), Th. Tsiovaridou (Sofia, Athens), K. Hatzopoulos (Athens). We have also endeavoured to make full use of the opportunities available in respect of cultural exchanges in Greece and the Institute's mutual agreements with the corresponding Institutes of Sofia, Belgrade, and Moscow. At the same time we have also secured the annual provision by the Onasis Public Benefit Institution of four three-month scholarships for research abroad, which were granted in 1982-3 to: K. Papoulidis, Th. Tsiovaridou, D. Sampsaris (special collaborator with the Institute), G. Kioutoutskas (for research on behalf of the Institute).

II. In addition to these efforts towards the better organisation and systematisation of the work undertaken and carried out the Institute's collaborators, we have also arranged the preparation of a more general common programme organised on a collective basis. The success of this enterprise will bring positive results in many respects: the collection of valuable archive material and the systematic formation of

a tabulated micro-film archive; the fuller development of the research work of at least some of our collaborators and its partial re-orientation towards subjects of more direct interest to the Institute; and finally the preparation and publication of a collective work. The preparation of this scheme has been conducted in two stages:

a. The Advisory Board decided to approve the amassing of a more extensive collection of unpublished original material by microfilming. Specifically, it was decided that from the current year 1982, - and with a view to completing the work within three years - the task of micro-filming the following archive sources should commence:

1. Consular reports from the region of Macedonia and Thrace from 1830 to 1912, from the archives of Great Britain, France, and Austria.

2. The archives of the League of Nations concerning the minorities and the refugees in the southern Balkans.

Apart from its significance as a vital foundation for a collective work programme, the microfilming programme will also assist the Institute better to fulfill its scientific mission: i.e. the support of research work and the creation of new areas of interest for our researchers; the ensuring of a systematic supply of information upon matters of fundamental interest; the Institute's elevation to the level of a study centre capable of providing information for visitors from both Greece and abroad.

b. After the Director had held collective discussions with the Institute's collaborators a subject of general interest was selected which was deemed suitable for discussion with the Institute's scientific workforce and to a limited extent with specialists from outside the Institute. The chosen subject is the History of Macedonia (in the broadest sense) from 1830 to 1912. It is anticipated that the work will be accomplished in two stages. The first will cover the period 1830-1878, and the general outline of the task will involve the contribution of K. Vakalopoulos, A. Iordanoglou, G. Ioannidou-Bitsiadou, A. Karathanassis, V. Kondis, I. Papadrianos, K. Papoulidis, Th. Tsiovaridou, K. Hatzopoulos (the Institutes's scientific collaborators), B. Papoulia (member of the Advisory Board), B. Dimitriadis (special scientific collaborator), G. Velenis (lecturer at the Polytechnic School), G. Kioutoutskas (assistant lecturer at the School of Philosophy), Ch. Papastathis, (assistant professor at the Law School) and S. Sfetas (philologist and historian).

III. In addition to executing the individual and collective research programmes, the Directorate has also investigated the possibility of carrying out special research programmes to be financed by other bodies and to be undertaken by working parties of specialists and researchers who are not part of the Institute's regular active workforce. Specifically, it would be possible to form a limited number of research groups under the leadership of one specialist and the supervision of a specially selected member of the Advisory Board and the Director of the Institute, with the aim of investigating subjects of particular scientific interest.

B.

RELATIONS AND COLLABORATION WITH INSTITUTES ABROAD

The development and expansion of the existing relations and the creation of new forms of collaboration with our fellow institutes abroad is one of this Institute's constant aims. Our close relations with the neighbouring Balkan Institutes have been maintained and strengthened, and at the same time we have also made positive advances in our relations with other institutes abroad. A brief account of our permanent relations with institutes in other countries is as follows:

I. Albania: the President, the Director, and the Institute's special collaborator Dr. B. Kondis, visited Albania at the invitation of the Albanian Academy. In the course of their visit the ground was prepared for collaboration between the Institute for Balkan Studies and the Historical Institute of the Albanian Academy. Afterwards, in an exchange of letters, both sides confirmed the periodic organisation of symposia and the mutual exchange of collaborators between the two institutes. It was agreed that the first Greek-Albanian symposium, on the subject of «Greek and Albanian Relations from the Fifteenth to the Nineteenth Century», should be held in 1983 in Tirana.

Bulgaria: Between 2 and 7 November 1982 the third Greek-Bulgarian symposium was held in Thessaloniki on the subject of «Greek and Bulgarian Relations from the end of the Eighteenth Century to the beginning of the Twentieth Century». It was organised by the Balkan Institute of the Bulgarian Academy and the Institute for Balkan Studies, and some twenty well-known scholars from each country presented papers. A particular indication of the cordiality of the two countries' relations was the arrival and participation in the proceedings of the Bulgarian Ambassador to Greece, N. Todorov, who, during the

opening ceremony, decorated the President of the Institute for Balkan Studies for his contribution in this capacity to the promotion of Greek-Bulgarian relations.

The mutual exchange of scholars has continued between the two countries; ten students from Greece have been sent to Bulgaria, and vice versa, in order to pursue language studies, on the basis of the existing agreement between the two Institutes.

Yugoslavia: Between 4 and 7 October 1982 the third Greek-Serbian symposium took place on the subject of «Intellectual and Cultural Greek and Serbian Relations from the fifteenth to the nineteenth Century». It was organised by the Balkan Institute of the Serbian Academy of Sciences in Belgrade and the Institute for Balkan Studies, and more than twenty well-known scholars from both sides presented papers, including the academicians R. Samardžić, T. Nikčević, and M. Chatzidakis.

The mutual exchange of scholars has continued in accordance with the standing agreement between the two Institutes.

Romania: The particularly cordial collaboration has continued between the Institute and Romanian scholars (for example, the inclusion in 1982 of the works of N. Camariano and A. Cioranescu amongst the Institute's publications, the publication of articles by Romanian scholars in *Balkan Studies*, a visit to the Institute and a lecture by the academician E. Condurachi, and the mutual exchange of students between the two countries for the purpose of learning the respective languages). The Romanian Ambassador in Athens, Ion Brad, made a special visit to the Institute and affirmed the mutual desire for further extending the collaboration between the scholars of the two countries.

II. Great Britain: The Director of the Institute has made various contacts in London, following which the Advisory Board has decided to propose that two successive symposia be organised between the Institute for Balkan Studies and King's College London, on the subject of the First and Second World Wars. The first symposium will be held in Thessaloniki from 15 to 17 December 1983 and distinguished British historians have already agreed to take part.

Germany: Letters were exchanged with the well-known Südost-Institut and the Südosteuropas Gesellschaft of Munich, following which a special representative of the latter Institute visited Thessaloniki. The President and the Director of the Institute for Balkan Studies also exchanged views with representatives of both Institutes in the course of the International Conference of the Directors of Balkan Institutes, held

in Belgrade in September 1982. As a result of this, specific proposals for collaboration in the immediate future have now been formulated.

USSR: Following the success of the first symposium in Thessaloniki, which was organised jointly by the Institute for Balkan Studies and the Soviet Academy of Sciences in September 1981, the mutual exchange of scholars between both institutes has continued, and the Soviet Academy of Sciences has invited the President and the Director of our own Institute to travel to the Soviet Union in the near future to settle the details for the second Greek-Soviet symposium, which is to take place in Moscow in 1984.

USA: In addition to maintaining close contact with well-known American specialists on Balkan subjects, we have endeavoured to establish closer relations with various institutes. Professor Bela Kiraly, Director of the well-known international programme «War and Society in Southeastern Europe» under the aegis of Brooklyn College, in which distinguished American specialists on the history of Eastern Europe are taking part, has visited Greece and discussed with representatives from the Institute for Balkan Studies the possibility of the two Institutes' organising an international symposium in Thessaloniki in which some thirty-five scholars would participate. The chosen subjects is «Maritime Commerce and Naval Power in East Central Europe, 1740-1913», and the symposium is to take place in 1985.

C.

THE LIBRARY

The library has continued to expand, chiefly by means of the exchange system. New efforts are under way to update the library systematically with new publications suggested at regular intervals by our collaborators in accordance with their special fields of study.

D.

PUBLICATIONS

In 1982 the following independent and periodical publications of the Institute have been completed.

Balkan Studies 22, 2 (1981)

Balkan Studies 23, 1 (1982)

Βαλκανική Βιβλιογραφία VII and Supplement (1978).

(194) Καραθανάσης, Α.Ε., *Οι Έλληνες Λόγιοι στη Βλαχία 1678-1714*.

- (168) Γούναρης, Γ., *Τὰ τείχη τῆς Θεσσαλονίκης* - (reprint)
 - Gounaris, G., *The Walls of Thessaloniki*. (reprint)
 (196) Βακαλόπουλος, Κ. Α., *Ὁ Βόρειος Ἑλληνισμός κατὰ τὴν Πρώιμη Φάση τοῦ Μακεδονικοῦ ἀγῶνα (1878-1894)*.

In addition the following publications of the Institute are in preparation:

IInd Symposium on Linguistics in Northern Greece: Epirus, Macedonia, Thrace.

IVth Symposium on Folklore in Northern Greece: Epirus, Macedonia, Thrace.

IIIrd International Symposium on Ancient Macedonia.

Ist Greek-Russian Symposium.

We have now established, for the first time, a uniform cover for our publications, which has met with general approval.

E.

SCHOOL OF BALKAN LANGUAGES

The School of Balkan Languages entered its twentieth year in 1982. During this period it has been attended by 5.000 students, of whom 631 have completed a three-year course and received a diploma in one of the five Balkan languages or Russian.

During the period 1981-2 fourteen groups were in operation with 343 registered students. The school's annual educational trip took place in 1982 to Romania; and through the Institute's exchange programme seventeen students were sent abroad to attend lectures and gain proficiency in the languages taught by the School.

F.

SUMMER SCHOOL FOR FOREIGN STUDENTS AND SCHOLARS

Between 1 and 31 August the summer school for foreign scholars and students was held for the tenth year in succession, its purpose being on the one hand to improve their knowledge of the Greek language, and on the other to increase their familiarity with the history and culture of our country.

The 1982 course was attended by 97 foreigners from twenty-three countries, amongst them university professors, people working in the EEC, post-graduate students pursuing studies of general Greek interest, and Greeks from the United States, Canada, and Australia. The syl-

labus comprised daily three-hour Greek language classes divided into seven groups according to the students' level of proficiency, and courses on culture, history, art, literature, and philosophy presented by well-known professors from Greek and foreign universities. The foreign students were accommodated at the Capsis Hotel. The success of the 1982 Summer School has been confirmed by the significant increase we anticipate in the number of participants in the new 1983 programme.

* * *

The annual scheduling of the Institute's work is carried out with the criterion that, with the available resources, it should fulfil its basic aims as far as possible. And the fulfilment of these aims should also be correlated to an endeavour to improve - albeit with short-term returns - the conditions under which it functions.

This aspiration has lead the Institutes' Administration to come to positive decisions in another area: i.e. to secure a privately-owned building which will correspond to the Institute's mission and fulfil its needs. After intense efforts, in 1981 we finally secured the concession of public land in a central position in Thessaloniki. The plans have been drawn up, and permission has been given to construct a seven-storey building with a total area of some 1,000 m². The solving of our accommodation problem will contribute to the more efficient organisation and functioning of the Institute for Balkan Studies.

Book Reviews

Γεωργίου Ν. Μοσχopoύλου, *Οι Έλληνες της Βενετίας και Ίλλυρίας (1768-1797). Η μητρόπολις Φιλαδέλφειας και η σημασία της για τον Έλληνισμό της Β. Αδριατικής*. [Les Grecs de Venise et d'Illyrie (1768-1797) — La métropole de Philadelphie et son importance pour l'Hellénisme de l'Adriatique du Nord], Athènes 1980, p. 254.

Les divers aspects de l'histoire soit ecclésiastique soit culturelle de la colonie grecque de Venise ont fait l'objet des publications et des recherches approfondies surtout après la fondation de l'Institut Hellénique de Venise. Parmi ces travaux l'étude récente du M. Georges N. Moschopoulos met le jour sur l'importance de la métropole de Philadelphie, à Venise, pour l'Hellénisme de l'Adriatique du Nord durant la période 1768-1797. Il s'agit d'un récit détaillé des événements de cette période qui ont lieu donc dans le cadre de la Communauté Grecque de Venise en liaison avec le rôle de la métropole orthodoxe et relativement à sa politique face aux populations slaves de l'Adriatique du Nord. Ces populations appartenaient à la juridiction spirituelle du métropolite de Philadelphie, installé à Venise depuis le 1577.; d'autre part dans la même région étaient installés de nombreux Grecs qui avaient fondé de petites colonies sous la domination venitienne. Les Grecs réfugiés de Chypre (après 1571), de Crète (après la guerre de 1645-1669) et du Péloponèse (après la fin de l'occupation venitienne, 1715) constituaient le noyau de ces colonies grecques. Certainement les populations slaves étaient plus nombreuses du point de vue démographique, mais les Grecs contrôlaient le commerce et l'activité culturelle de ces pays. La supériorité démographique des Slaves eut comme résultat durant le XVIII^{ème} siècle l'affaiblissement de l'Hellénisme de l'Adriatique du Nord. Cette supériorité provoqua divers problèmes entre les deux nations; la République Sérénissime de Venise qui avait la souveraineté politique sur la région en collaboration avec le métropole de Philadelphie, responsable pour les affaires religieuses, essayaient de les résoudre. Le métropolite de Philadelphie S. Cottouvalis entreprit de satisfaire les ambitions slaves et pour protéger les Grecs, en nommant comme vicaire ecclésiastique l'indigène Nikanor Bogdanovich (1783-1788), réduisant simultanément le rôle qui avait jusqu'à ce moment là le grec Mathaios Vegias (Vellianitis); certes, il s'agissait d'une politique qui satisfaisait les nombreux Slaves. D'autre part, cette action du métropolite grec de Philadelphie se heurta à l'opposition des autorités venitiennes, qui favorisaient la présence d'un Grec à la tête des orthodoxes de l'Adriatique du Nord, et, face à cette décision du métropolite, partageaient les réserves des Grecs de l'Adriatique. Après ces réactions le métropolite Cottouvalis préféra un système de co-administration sous la direction du Grec Végias et du Slave Bogdanovich. Ce système fut beaucoup critiqué par les Slaves qui voyaient diminuer leur rôle dans les affaires du ce pays. De l'autre côté l'Hellénisme allait au pire du point de vue démographique; les florissantes colonies de Zara, de Pola, de Šibenik, de Split, de Dubrovnik avaient perdu l'ancienne importance et par conséquent la présence d'un Grec à la tête des af-

fares ecclésiastiques était presque impossible. L'auteur de l'étude en question Dr. G. Moschopoulos, étudia tous ces problèmes en effectuant des recherches dans les archives des églises et des monastères orthodoxes de l'Adriatique du Nord, une recherche complétée par les informations qui lui donnèrent les archives de la Communauté Grecque de Venise (fond d'archives du métropolite Cottouvalis et des archives d'État de Venise).

Les problèmes de la métropole de Philadelphie, à Venise, pendant cette époque (1768-1797), font l'objet, eux, aussi, d'une analyse minutieuse pour ses relations avec la Venise, le Pape, la Sublime Porte, la Russie. La République des doges souhaitait avoir sous son contrôle les populations grecques de ses colonies, et, certes, avait besoin de la collaboration de la métropole orthodoxe de Philadelphie; le Pape, au contraire, considérait la même métropole comme un grand obstacle pour le succès de sa propagande; la Porte, de sa part, soupçonna, toujours, la métropole et les grecs de Venise à cause de leurs relations avec la Russie et la France; la Russie estimait que le rôle de Grecs de Venise lui était nécessaire pour le succès de ses plans en Grèce. Le livre de M. Moschopoulos constitue une intéressante contribution à la connaissance d'un domaine de l'historiographie jusqu'ici presque inconnu. L'utilisation du matériel inédit est son grand avantage; les divers aspects, d'ailleurs, sur lesquels M. Moschopoulos met l'accent ouvrent de nouveaux chemins pour une future étude de l'activité grecque dans l'Adriatique du Nord, une activité qui a eu une longue durée de trois siècles et qui pourra donner une autre vue du caractère de l'Hellénisme dans cette région adriatique. Je note ici un argument éloquent en ce sens-là; à savoir l'édition d'une liste des baptêmes des Grecs de Šibenik (1768-1780), tirée des archives paroissiales de l'église du Dormition de la Vierge de Šibenik et publiée en annexe de l'étude de M. Moschopoulos. Dans ce livre les chercheurs de l'Hellénisme, et même les historiens yougoslaves, trouveront maints détails d'importance et constateront que cette étude du Dr. Moschopoulos constitue un instrument de travail de première main pour ceux qui étudient l'Hellénisme de la Diaspora.

Institut d'Études balkaniques
Thessalonique

ATH. E. KARATHANASSIS

'Αρχείο 'Αλεξάνδρου Στ. Καραθεοδωρή, Κατάλογος και εἰσαγωγή, Ἀθήνα 1981, ἐπιμ. Κατερίνας Γαρδικιά-Ἀλεξανδροπούλου, Κέντρον Νεοελληνικῶν Ἑρευνῶν, Ε.Ι.Ε. 26, p. 80 [Archive d'Alexandre St. Karatheodoris, Catalogue et Index, Athènes 1981, présenté par Katherine Gardika-Alexandropoulou, Centre des Recherches Néohelléniques, Institut National des Recherches, 26, p. 80, avec une préface de Mme L. Droulia].

La classification de l'archives, l'enregistrement, l'inventaire et ensuite la présentation du matériel de l'archive de Karatheodoris, du ce grand connaisseur des questions d'Orient dans la série des publications du Centre des Recherches Néohelléniques d'Athènes c'est un beau travail de Mme Gardikas. Les archives, selon l'auteur, contiennent trois unités: 1. Les restes d'archives de Stephanos Th. Karatheo-

doris. 2. Les restes de l'archive de K. L. Mousouros (1807-1891) et 3. Les archives d'Alexandre Karatheodoris; les deux premières unités appartiennent à Stephanos Karatheodoris et au beau-père de Alexandre Karatheodoris Mousouros. Le matériel de Karatheodoris découvre son multiple activité à partir des ses premières études jusqu'aux ses plus officielles occupations professionnelles. Selon les affirmations de Mme Gardikas, les années 1885-1894, à savoir pendant la période où Katatheodoris était gouverneur de Samos, occupent la plus grande partie de ses archives. Un certain intérêt se dégage des archives Karatheodoris qui constitue, en même temps, un éloquent témoin de ses occupations littéraires et scientifiques, plutôt juridiques. Il convient de citer ici que Mme Gardikas dans son introduction nous donne des informations sur la personnalité de Karatheodoris, informations liées avec le contenu de ses archives. Elle suit une description des 25 liasses classées suivant les étapes de sa carrière, ainsi qu'un matériau relatif à ses intérêts; un inventaire des personnes, un inventaire général et enfin une annexe avec des imprimés grecs et étrangers complètent le livre. Bien sûr parmi ses amis, collaborateurs et personnalités avec qui il correspondait se distinguent plusieurs Grecs et étrangers dont le rôle pendant la dernière phase du Quest d'Orient fut considérable. Mais les archives de Karatheodoris présentent une extrême importance pour la littérature néohellénique, puisque son créateur était un homme de lettres remarquable à l'époque et ses notes et commentaires reflètent les intérêts d'un érudit grec du XIX^{ème} siècle qui était au courant du ce qui passait en Occident.

Institut d'Études balkaniques
Thessaloniki

ATH. KARATHANASSIS

Paul Graham Trueblood, editor, *Byron's Political and Cultural Influence in Nineteenth-Century Europe: A Symposium*. London: Macmillan, 1981. Pages xix+212.

The 1974 Lord Byron Seminar at Cambridge, observing the 150th anniversary of his death in 1824, gave impetus for the creation of this handsome volume of studies that its veteran editor collected and presented with patience and enthusiasm.

A known scholar, author of *The Flowering of Byron's Genius: Studies in Byron's 'Don Juan'* (1945) and of *Lord Byron* (1969, 1977), a genuine philhellene, Dr. Trueblood is now Emeritus Professor of English, Willamette University, Oregon. His *Symposium* consists of twelve studies by celebrated scholars and critics, for the most part, which had been delivered as lectures at various international symposia like the already mentioned one at Cambridge and the Second International Byron Seminar at Missolonghi, Greece, in 1976. Some had been published before.

The circulation of this volume revived and enhanced scholarly interest in Byron which had somewhat lost momentum since the period of New Criticism and the generally anti-romantic attitudes of the troubled decades, 1930-50. There is no doubt that this book belongs in the company of serious studies by scholars like L. A. Marchand, A. Rutherford, J. Jump, J. McGann, G. Ridenour, D. L. Moore,

E. Langford, P. Quennell, W. W. Pratt, E. E. Bostetter and other biographers and critics of our times.

The first of these essays, "The Historical Background: Revolution and Counter-Revolution 1789-1948", is written by Douglas Dakin (Emeritus Professor of History, University of London), who is an authority on Philhellenism and the Greek Revolution of 1821. It offers a quite objective and extensive panorama of the historical, diplomatic, and ideological trends and events which created the intellectual climate within which Byron's poetic talent flourished as an honest reaction to established practices and beliefs. In it Professor Dakin dismisses some romantic and revolutionary myths *vis-à-vis* that period and its dominant personalities.

In the second entry, "Byron and England: The Persistence of Byron's Political Ideas", lecturer W. Ruddick (University of Manchester) quite persuasively argues that the reasons for Byron's rebelliousness did not begin to be understood in his country before 1860, and that his influence on "radical" authors and thinkers — such as Ruskin, Morris, Orwell, and Auden — manifested itself long after the end of the Romantic Period.

Things were different on the Continent, though. The British Germanist C. Hentschell (The British Council) in his detailed comparative study of Byron and Byronism in Germany and Austria offers us numerous observations on their enormous artistic impact on local poets from Goethe and Heine to Pückler-Muskau, and on the substantial ideological attraction they exercised on leading personalities like Bismarck and Nietzsche. Quite soundly Dr. Hentschell relates his topic to the more general one of Philhellenism, and even mentions the Bavarian monarch Ludwig, father of the first king of Greece, Otto.

In his short but cogent article, "Byron and France: Byron as a Political Figure," the famous comparatist R. Escarpit (University of Bordeaux III) clarifies with precision and ease that Byronism in France appeared mainly as an ideological, not a literary, phenomenon, and that poetic imitators of Byron's style and pose had depended on rather hasty and irresponsible translations of his verse which, in their turn, had misrepresented many salient features.

The entries by professors G. Melchiori (Rome), F. de Mello Moser (Lisbon), E. Pujals (Madrid), E. Giddey (Lausanne), N. Diakonova and V. Vacuro (Leningrad), and the account by novelist-translator J. Zulawski (Warsaw) examine the handling of local cultural elements by Byron in his poetry, and the impact of his life and work on the national literatures of Italy, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Russia, and Poland, respectively. Undoubtedly, from a purely literary view point, Byron's impact was greater in Poland, Russia, and, naturally, Greece, where many direct and indirect influences converged, as it were, since many a European model to local poets had been influenced by Byron directly.

"Byron and Greece: Byron's Love of Classical Greece and His Role in the Greek Revolution," by Emeritus Professor E. G. Protopsaltis (Athens), deals with the political significance of Byron's presence in embattled Greece, 1823-24, discusses various official documents related to his activities and eventual death at Missolonghi, and even mentions some new details of interest to Greek historians of the Revolution. Byron's impact on the literature, art, and culture of modern Greece is almost ignored, unfortunately, thus this article is not in harmony with most of the contributions by the literary scholars of Europe. It seems to me that the e-

ditor should have solicited an essay comparable in nature and contents to those of Melchiori, Diakonova, or Moser — to name just three — where the reader is given a chance to realize the degree of Byron's multifaceted influence on, for instance, the Risorgimento in Italy, the poems and stories of Pushkin and Lermontov, or to read an honest revaluation of his lordship's rather derogatory comments on the character of the Portuguese, as all these figure in his poems and other writings.

A general comprehensive survey by Professor Trueblood rounds off this presentation of studies about Byron's political and cultural influence in nineteenth-century Europe. This fine *Symposium* is completed by a necessary Index of names, Notes on the Contributors, and by a Preface where the energetic American Byronist explains its purpose and genesis. All entries are properly documented; and the volume constitutes a precious source of most reliable information and commentary for Byronists, comparatists, and scholars of English Romanticism.

Through Dr. Trueblood's labours, the Pole, the Russian, and the Greek student of the composite cultural phenomenon Byronism-liberalism-philhellenism is assisted in forming a complete and sound idea as to motives and consequences. Older studies of Byronic liberalism and philhellenism tended to almost canonize the eccentric English nobleman and his disciples as angels or saints of Liberty tormented in a world of cynicism, intrigue, and reactionary activities on the part of the socio-political and religious establishment. Newer treatises, such as William St. Clair's eloquent though slightly prejudiced *That Greece Might Still Be Free: The Philhellenes in the War of Independence* (1972), with their application of marxist principles and other fashionable criteria, not only had demythologized Byron and the other "freedom fighters" of that time, but had even suggested that their motives were, more often than not, mercenary, opportunistic, egotistical, and the like. Paul Trueblood's collection of essays restores the balance between these two extreme attitudes.

International volunteers fought for the Independence of the American Colonies, the preservation of the Spanish Republic, the defeat of fascism, colonialism, and imperialism all over the world. No serious academic ever suggested that Lafayette, Garibaldi, or Che Guevara were restless misfits or sublime egotists rather than dedicated and honest idealists. To suggest that Lord Byron and those inspired by his example were so, is more than unfair: it is a pseudosophisticated and almost cynical pose worth no more than the pseudo-idealistic and melodramatic practices of many third-rate petty imitators of Byron's life and poetic creation.

The University of Athens
and *Southern Illinois University-Carbondale*

M. BYRON RAIZIS

Osmanlı Arastirmalari I [The Journal of Ottoman Studies I] Editorial Board: Halil Inalcik - Nejat Goyunc-Heath W. Lowry, Istanbul 1980, VIII+287 pp.

It is only a few decades that the scholars of Ottoman history have started to take an interest in the Ottoman archives and their fields of research have been moulded accordingly. Interest in the study of Ottoman history has increased as archival

sources have been uncovered and published. *The journal of Ottoman Studies*, whose editors are well acquainted with the Ottoman archives, is a product of such an interest.

The journal opens with one of the most important issues in the Ottoman history. H. Inalcık, in his article "Osmanlı Bürokrasisinde Aklâm ve muâmelât", examines the procedure followed in the appointments to the fief-holdings and outlines various forms of writs (*arzlar*). In most cases timars were given out to those persons recommended by the notables. Such conferments as discerned from the *Muhimme defters* are usually made to the persons distinguished for their bravery and loyal services. In some cases the "blank Noble Commands", complete with *tugra*, were sent to the beglerbegis to bestow fief-holdings on those they found fit to. Bıyıklı Mehmet Paşa, the conqueror and later belgerbegi of Diyarbekir province, was given such a permission to hand out fiefs to the notables of the region, (see Hoca Sa'deddin, *Tâcüttevarikh*, vol. II, 1280, pp. 322-323).

The second article is Machiel Kiel's "The Vakıfnâme of Rakkas Sinân Beg in Karnobat (Karınâbâd) and the Ottoman Colonization of Bulgarian Thrace (14th-15th century)". Karınâbâd, a region of neither geographic or economic importance, was conquered by the Ottomans in 1368. It was used as a base for the *Akincis* during the war between two of Bayezid's sons Musa and Mehmed who were quarrelling over the throne. From 1400 to 1800 the town lived in a peace unknown since Roman antiquity. The district, in accordance with the Turkish settlement policy, was settled with the *Yörüks* Kiel, while doing research in Sofia in 1978, discovered a Bulgarian translation of the *Vakıfnâme* of the foundations of Rakkas Sinân in Karnobat and gives an English translation of it at the end of this article. His study of the *Vakıfnâme* shows that with the work of Rakkas Sinan Beg the town started to flourish as a town in a real sense of the word. The information on Rakkas Sinân's life and career is derived from this vakfiye. In 884/1479-80 he is mentioned as tutor (*lâld*) of Bayezid II, then prince, residing in Amasya. He was born in the village of Köpeklu in the district of Karnobat. Later he moved to Karnobat where he erected a Friday mosque, school, a bath and other objects. After 1488 Rakkas Sinân disappears from the scene, perhaps because he died.

I. Oltaýlı in his "Anadolu'da XVI Yüzyılda Evlilik ilişkileri Üzerine Bazı Gözlemler" claims that the marriage bonds in the Ottoman state were not, as some of the historians have argued, in agreement with the shari'a law. For instance, *mehr* (the dower) in most cases, contrary to the shari'a, was given to the bride's father than to the bride herself. Polygamy was not so widespread and adultery was hardly punished in accordance with the shari'a law. Although the subject deserves further research by the specialists, one may offer the assumption that polygamy in Islam was left to the judgment of the Muslim rather than being an obligation upon him. There have been few cases of adultery punished throughout the history of Islam because of the difficulty of coming up with four witnesses. (For the accusations of adultery and the punishment for it see Ibn al-Ukhuwwa, *The Ma'alim al-Qurba fi Ahkâm al-Hisba*, ed. R. Levy, London 1938, pp. 185-190).

H.W. Lowry's article is an attempt to show the corpus of the *kânunnâmes* for the whole provinces of the Ottoman Empire. As an example, the comparison of tax rates derived from the Limnos *kânunnâmes* is given. The author also gives the facsimiles of seven *kânunnâmes* on Limnos and their transcription.

Suraiya Faroqhi bases her article "Textile production in Rumeli and the Arab provinces: Geographical Distribution and Internal Trade (1560-1650)" on 125 *muhimme* documents relating to the provinces and period in question. Probably silk was imported from Peloponnese to Venice. Cotton cloths were mostly manufactured in Greece especially in the centre like town of Livadiya, Athens, the island of Agriboz (Euboea) and the town of Istefa. Hemp cloths (*kanaviçe bezi*) came from Walachia, Moldavia and Transylvania. Filibe could be mentioned for 175 coarse woolen fabrics (*aba*) while Edirne and Salonica for their better quality woolen cloths (*cuha*). Faroqhi tries to point out that there existed a competition between the Balkan and Venetian cloth industry.

As far as the Arab provinces were concerned, Egypt was well known for its carpets, Palestine for its woolen fabrics, and Syria for a mixed fabric of wool and silk known as *alaca*. Of course it has to be pointed out that "until the beginning of the 17th century the *kisce-i şerife*, a ceremonial covering for the Kaaba in black silk, was woven and embroidered in Cairo".

The authors of two separate articles on the city of Ankara treat two important aspects of it: its settlement and the 1830 population census. Özer Ergenç, extracting mostly from his thesis (1580-1596 Yılları arasında Ankara ve Konya Şehirlerinin Mukayeseli İncelemesi Yoluyla Osmanlı Şehir Müesseseleri ve Sosyo-Ekonomik Yapısı Üzerinde Bir Deneme, DTCF. Nr. 172, Ankara 1974—unpublished), after giving a brief outline of the old settlements in the town, sketches out its generale view and main road system. He gives some information on the craft and trade centres, government, religious and social buildings and lastly the quarters of the town. M. Çadırcı in his article starts with a brief introduction on the 1830 general survey and then comments on the statistical tables showing crafts and professions and the distribution of population among the quarters. He argues that according to an Ankara judicial record (*şer'iye sicili*) no. 281 the survey was completed in 1246/1830. His calculation of the figures for the census work ought to be 6308 Muslims and 5157 non-Muslims (including Jews). There were 91 quarters in Ankara of which 59 were Muslim, 17 non-Muslim and 15 mixed quarters.

J. M. Landau's article is a study of travelling account entitled "Rihlat Al-Sayyid Humûd ibn Ahmed ibn Sayf al-Bû-Sa'îd", whose author was apparently an Arab Muslim from Zanzibar. Landau states that "The author started out from Zanzibar, travelling first to the Hejaz as a pilgrimage to the 'House of Allah in Mecca', on 26 Shawwal 1288 (January 8, 1872). He then visited Egypt, Palestine and Syria, reaching as far north as Damascus. Afterwards, he returned to Beirut and sailed back to Port Said, .. The entire trip lasted several months".

F. Kocak takes up the question of migrations from the Balkans to Anatolia (1878-1890). It was the Turko-Russian war which mainly caused migrations. According to the author, the Russians were following the Pan Slavist policy, the Christians were not tolerant of the Muslims and their main aim was to annihilate the Muslims from Rumelia. Then the author deals with the process of migration; the problems involved in transporting and settling the migrants. In fact problems are greater after getting the migrants settled. The Ottoman Empire was faced with many problems in meeting their health, educational and social needs.

S. J. Shaw, in his article "Ottoman Population Movements During the Last Years of the Empire, 1885-1914: Some Preliminary Remarks", uses Ottoman ar-

chival material. The author expresses surprise that an Empire's overall population which had lost 83% of its land and 63% of its people in Rumelia, should remain so constant and even increase between 1885 and 1914 from 17, 375, 225 to 18, 520, 016. He explains this by trying to show that the Muslim population of the Empire increased due to the refugees from the Christian conquests.

K. Kreiser in his article "Der Haushalt der Provinz Jemen Zwischen 1887/8 und 1910/1" deals with the budget of the province of Jemen under the Ottoman rule during the years in question.

Mubahat S. Küttükoğlu in her "Gümrük Kayıtları" gives an introductory information on the customs records. She classifies the records according to their contents: *mufassal defters* (detailed registers) are the records of almost anything subject to the customs duty; *icmâl defters* (summary registers) are the monthly or annual summarised versions of the first; *teslimât bakayâ defterleri* which also have summarised versions are the records of the amount from the customs revenue delivered to the treasury; *muhâsebe defterleri* are the recordings of various accounts of a main customs' subbranches formed out; *vasıfe defterleri* are the recordings of salaries paid from the customs' revenue to the retired officials and religious functioners; *ahkâm defterleri* are the registers containing various *hükms* regarding customs. Küttükoğlu in this article has pointed out various customs' revenue registers from all the lands of Ottoman Empire.

N. Göyünç in his article "Trablusgarb'a ait bir layiha" introduces a *layiha* (memorandum) of Muhammed Hilal Efendi who was born in Aleppo in 1256/1840-41. The *layiha* is mainly about the trade goods, particularly the export of grass of the region. Göyünç in this article has given the transliteration and facsimile of the text.

The books reviewed in the periodical are: David Kusher, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism*, London 1977; Die Turken—und was von ihnen blieb [The Turks—and what they left to us], Vienne 1978; Abdeljelil Temimi, *Le Beylik de Constantine et Hadj Ahmed Bey, 1830-1837*, Tunis 1978; Muhammed Morsi Abdullah, *The United Arab Emirates, A Modern History*, New York 1978; A. H. de Groot, *The Ottoman Empire and the Dutch Republic, A History of the Earliest Diplomatic Relations, 1610-1630*, Leiden 1978; Gazavat-ı Sultan Murad b. Mehmed Han: Haz. Halil Inalcık, Mevlud Oguz T.T.K. Yayını XVIII dizi, sayı 1; Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ile Lehistan Polonya Arasındaki munasebetlerle ilgili Tarihi belgeler: Haz. Nigar Anafarta, pub. Mehmed Kavala, Noplace or date of publication; Hans Georg Majer, *Zu Uşakizâde, seiner Familie und seinem Zeyl-i şakayık*, München 1978; Balcanica-Guide to the Polish Relative to the History of the Balkan Countries, Warsaw 1979; Wölf-Dieter Hütteroth-Kamal Abdulfattah, *Historical Geographiy of Palestine, Trans Jordan and Southern Syria in the late 16th Century*, Erlanger 1977; Wölf-Dieter Hütteroth; *Palastine und Transjordanien im 16. Jahrhundert. Wirtschaftsstruktur Landlicher Siedlungen nach osmanischen Steuerregistern*, Wiesbaden 1978.

D. M. MEHDI ILHAN

Κωφός Εὐάγγελος, 'Ο 'Ελληνισμός στην περίοδο 1869-1881. 'Από τὸ τέλος τῆς Κρητικῆς ἐπαναστάσεως στὴν προσάρτηση τῆς Θεσσαλίας. 'Ανάτυπο ἀπὸ τὸν II' τόμο τῆς 'Ιστορίας τοῦ 'Ελληνικοῦ 'Εθνους τῆς 'Εκδοτικῆς 'Αθηνῶν, 'Εκδοτικὴ 'Αθηνῶν Α.Ε., 1981, 197 σσ.

L'auteur s'occupe pratiquement de tous les aspects de l'histoire de l'État hellénique au cours de la période allant de l'étouffement de la révolution crétoise en 1869 à l'annexion de la Thessalie et du district d'Arta au royaume en 1881, couvrant ainsi une lacune bibliographique peu remarquée peut-être mais très importante. Le poids est néanmoins donné à l'analyse de la politique extérieure des gouvernements successifs en Grèce - ce qui est normal, E. Kofos étant un spécialiste de l'histoire de Thessalie et de Macédoine pendant les dernières décennies de la domination ottomane ainsi que des questions balkaniques en général. Or, cette analyse est faite en liaison étroite avec l'étude de la vie politique du pays; et ainsi sont mis en relief les motifs qui déterminèrent l'attitude adoptée par la Grèce durant la crise en Orient des années 1875-1878.

Le réveil du nationalisme bulgare est le prélude des événements qui sont exposés dans ce livre: avec une objectivité remarquable l'auteur décrit, d'une part, les conditions dans lesquelles les Bulgares prirent conscience de leur propre existence et, d'autre part, le progrès du mouvement panslaviste en Russie et son retentissement dans les Balkans; il souligne néanmoins que les idées panslavistes-produit de la résistance qu'opposa une partie de la société russe à la propagation des idées «occidentales» - ne furent pas à l'origine d'un dogme dont l'application caractériserait de façon exclusive l'exercice de la politique extérieure russe. La question, en outre, de l'église bulgare est exposée en détail, l'auteur insistant, à juste titre, sur l'appui que le gouvernement grec prêta, en 1867, aux efforts conciliateurs du patriarche œcuménique Grégoire VI.

Ensuite sont étudiés l'effort de redressement accompli en Grèce à partir de l'année 1869, les problèmes que cet effort visait à résoudre et ce tournant important de la politique extérieure du pays que fut le rapprochement gréco-turc, qui apparut dès 1872 et fut le fruit tant de l'impuissance du royaume hellénique à mener une politique irrédentiste efficace que de la méfiance qu'éprouvait désormais une partie considérable de l'Hellénisme à l'égard de la Russie et des peuples balkaniques. Or, cette politique nouvelle ainsi que l'épanouissement de l'élément grec de l'empire ottoman - surtout dans les domaines de l'éducation et de la culture - sont liés à l'évolution (inattendue à première vue) de la Grande Idée (Μεγάλη Ἰδέα) à cette époque-là: une partie des dirigeants de l'Hellénisme avançaient la thèse selon laquelle les aspirations nationales seraient réalisées par le biais de la collaboration avec les Turcs et non pas par celui du conflit avec eux. Cette conception fut d'ailleurs à l'origine de la proposition que fit en 1878 le banquier grec de Constantinople G. Zarifis à l'ambassadeur britannique auprès de la Porte Layard, concernant la création d'un État gréco-turc sur le modèle de l'Autriche-Hongrie.

Après cette analyse, l'auteur s'occupe de la crise qui éclata dans les provinces européennes de l'empire ottoman en 1875/1876, il examine les événements qui précédèrent la déclaration de guerre par la Russie à la Turquie en 1877 et ensuite il «localise» avec succès les facteurs qui «dictèrent» à la Grèce la politique à suivre: l'état plutôt déplorable des forces armées et l'attitude notamment de la Grande-Bretagne, qui préconisait la neutralité. Parallèlement, il réussit à débarrasser les

principaux personnages de l'époque des brumes de malentendus qui les enveloppaient: on peut voir, pendant la durée des hostilités entre la Russie et la Turquie, le roi Georges et Ch. Trikoupis en particulier chercher, avec angoisse dirait-on, la réponse au dilemme «guerre ou neutralité?» et la ligne la plus conforme aux intérêts de la nation. En outre, la conception dominante en ce qui concerne l'invasion de l'armée grecque en Thessalie en 1878 est renversée, l'auteur soulignant à juste titre que cette action permit la prise en considération des revendications grecques par les grandes puissances.

Ensuite, après avoir exposé les événements relatifs aux insurrections de l'élément grec en Crète, en Épire, en Thessalie et en Macédoine, au traité de San Stefano et au Congrès de Berlin, l'auteur met en relief l'œuvre très difficile de la délégation grecque pendant les travaux de ce dernier, la satisfaction d'une partie des revendications grecques étant - jusqu'à un certain degré au moins - le fruit de sa présence dans la capitale allemande. En fait, les décisions du Congrès - malgré les problèmes qu'allait poser leur application - contenaient des points jugés positifs pour l'Hellénisme. L'annexion notamment de la Thessalie et du district d'Arta en 1881 couronnait de succès les manœuvres diplomatiques angoissantes de trois années et encore la politique menée par un homme réaliste mais souvent malcompris, Al. Koumoundouros.

En conclusion, il faut souligner qu' E. Kofos ne se borne point à donner, dans le cadre de ce travail, un exposé satisfaisant des événements. Connaissant à fond son matériel, il réussit, grâce à une analyse objective et méthodique, quelque chose de beaucoup plus important, c'est-à-dire à donner aux facteurs qui déterminèrent l'histoire de l'époque étudiée leur juste valeur: peuples, personnages et événements forment une mosaïque éblouissante, où nulle pièce n'est détruite en raison d'une incompréhension ou d'un préjugé de la part de l'auteur.

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DIMITRIS MICHALOPOULOS

Dimitrije Djordjevic and Stephen Fischer-Galati, editors. *The Balkan Revolutionary Tradition*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1981, pp 264.

With its long history of human settlement and strategic location, the Balkan peninsula offers the historian a wealth of material and intriguing issues to ponder and assess. In recent years scholars have examined the history of the region from an ever increasing number of points of view. Some have turned to new methodologies while others have unhesitatingly adopted theories from a wide variety of the social disciplines in their efforts at historical explanation. Although fruitful in some cases, not all such work has enhanced our understanding of the historical vicissitudes of the peninsula. The authors of this study, seasoned and discerning scholars, have chosen a careful and straightforward though less intellectually stimulating path of inquiry in tracing the historical development of the Balkans.

The work is a century by century account, beginning with the Ottoman conquest, of the social and political upheavals that erupted for centuries and gave the Balkans the reputation of being a "powder keg". It ends pretty much with the emergence of the "New Europe" after the Great War, though the authors do try to

tie up the main threads of their story with references to the disastrous events of World War II and their consequences. They devote much of their attention to the affairs of the nineteenth century, which take up more than half the pages of the text.

Dominated as they were for centuries by a ruler who was alien in faith and outlook to most of the peoples in Balkans, friction between masters and subjects was bound to occur. When such friction produced flames of revolt, the conflicts were neither continuous nor the simple struggle of the downtrodden against their imperial oppressor. Rather, as the authors make quite clear, down to the end of the eighteenth century resistance to authority, whether in the form of rebellions born of conspiracy, spontaneous peasant jacqueries, or revolts instigated from outside the area, was the result of a combination of factors. To begin with the Ottomans had only about a century of good fortune in which they faced weak rivals in the heart of Europe. By the seventeenth century the growing power of the Habsburgs and Romanovs heightened the strategic importance of the Balkan peninsula. Due in part to the stress produced by the intervention of both neighboring and more distant European states in the affairs of southeastern Europe, the Ottomans experienced significant internal alterations to their imperial power structure. This in turn affected the socio-economic life of the empire, especially that of the subject Christian peoples in the Balkans. But neither intervention from without on the international level nor altered local conditions from within were sufficient to produce a significant revolutionary movement with an alternative set of goals to the traditional way of life.

It was not until the late eighteenth century that small segments of the Balkan populace recognized the possibility of breaking with the order of life as it had been and found the rationale for such a move in the ideas circulating through western Europe. This was the vehicle which, when coupled with local domestic unrest, produced the rapid and often violent change associated with revolution. In chronicling the revolutionary movements of the nineteenth century, the authors stress the dual aspects of these upheavals: the social issue involving the peasant masses' desire for land and the benefits accruing from it, and the national problem focusing on the attainment of political sovereignty over a defined territory. The national issue of course quickly gained the upper hand, becoming the leading factor in the revolutionary upheavals of the last century. The authors present almost a decade by decade account of the innumerable revolts, failed or otherwise, in the Balkans. Indeed the narrative swells with such events to the degree that the reader has the feeling that there must have been haiduks to the left, klephts to the right and conspiracies swirling all around.

Out of all of this activity the authors have discerned a spatial and chronological pattern. They see the revolutionary impulse in the nineteenth century beginning on the geographic periphery of the region. Once a national center of some sort was established it became the core from which the nationalist program radiated. Finally, when several such centers had been created in the peninsula, intra-regional competitiveness erupted among rival national revolutionary movements. Because so much ground is covered in a relatively limited amount of space, however, significant aspects within this pattern do not receive the attention in this work that they deserve.

To begin with, the narrative speaks of movements of "national rebirth" occur-

ring in the nineteenth century, nurtured and guided by a nascent, indigenous "bourgeoisie". This urban, commercial, and educated stratum of Balkan society promoted what capital formation there was in private hands, cared little about the plight of the rural folk, steered a political course of national territorial expansion and arrogated to itself the historical consciousness that was the crucible of its people's past and presumably its future. Yet one cannot generalize too much about this element and its role in the political and social transformation of southeastern Europe. It of course differed both in nature and size from its western European counterpart. And it remained divided within itself with regard to courses of action to be followed. Indeed it would probably serve the historian's purpose better to speak of the "mercantile" sector in Balkan society rather than the umbrella term "bourgeoisie".

Much of the discussion surrounding the nationalist movements that arose after the French Revolution and Napoleonic eras focuses of necessity on the ideology that underpinned them. From the peninsular vision of Rhigas, the *Načertanije* of Garašanin and the plans for a South Slav federation, to the revolutionary thought of Hristo Botev the development of nationalist ideology in the Balkans was a multi-faceted process resulting in a plethora of political schemes for the welfare of the nation. The many threads that made up this world of secular belief are fairly and adequately described. But what was the significance of all of this? This question is especially important when one realizes that the fate of the peninsula and its peoples was essentially in the hands of determined politicians representing the practical interests of the great European states, a crumbling Ottoman empire, and fledgling national governments and not messianic revolutionaries. Yet ideas were obviously important, but to whom, in what manner and most important, with what result?

In a part of the world that became engulfed in revolutionary violence for much of the past century and a half, there had to have been a significant impact on the formal political structures that emerged as tangible evidence of all that activity, the states. It is as important to evaluate the impression, lasting or otherwise, of that activity on the state as it is to describe it. Some Balkan revolutionaries, for example, quickly placed their faith in the ethnic vessel, the nation, rather than the political community represented by the state. In what manner did the revolutionary syndrome affect the perceptions of those who separated the world of the nation and the state, endowing in their minds only the one with the quality of permanence? Here surely lies much of the relevance of the affairs in the Balkan peninsula to the phenomenal acceptance of the nation-state system in the twentieth century around the globe.

One considerable merit of this three-century survey of political upheavals in the Balkans is to point up how a region of geo-strategic importance could draw upon it larger competing interests from pre-modern to modern times. In the seventeenth century rival powers in the name of different faiths battled for ascendancy in the heart of Europe. The rise of a secular world by the end of the nineteenth century continued to draw competing states to the area, now in the name of a new god, economic interest. Into this continuing swirl of competition a new factor had emerged, however. The peoples of the region had taken their fate into their own hands and managed to create political units, fulfilling "historic goals" to some de-

gree, while creating historicist myths at the same time. In this centuries long process the Balkan peoples had gone from religious to historical nationalism. From a limited identity and spatial sense vis-a-vis, those who ruled them, they emerged with a broader consciousness based on time. And that fuller sense through historical awareness provided the validating principle for both national and social revolt.

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GERASIMOS AUGUSTINOS

Walter F. Weiker, *The Modernization of Turkey: From Ataturk to the Present Day*. New York and London: Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc., 1981. 308 pp.

Professor Weiker's latest book touches on most of the social, political, and economic issues which complicate yet propel Republican Turkey's modernization into the twenty-first century. In nine chapters, he presents the various forces, the major leaders, and the political parties involved in developing the necessary infrastructure for such modernization. Despite its title, the book only superficially covers the period from Ataturk to World War II but treats in depth the important years 1945 through 1979. The momentary Turkish retreat from parliamentary democracy (in 1980) does not fundamentally affect the author's general conclusions. Based on his formulation of more than 50 tables, from original Turkish and other research, he explains statistically many of the issues arising out of Turkey's special geo-political position between the Soviet Union and the West, and its special Islamic relationship between the Ottoman caliphate and Kemalist secularism. Despite many stumbling steps, the Turks, in Weiker's view, will continue to modernize toward a state-supported capitalist system, toward parliamentary democracy, and probably acceptance as an integral part of the European community and the West.

Although the author looks positively on this Turkish struggle to modernize along western lines, he carefully notes Turkish setbacks, to be sure, and does not hide the oftentimes extreme political and social problems which they themselves have raised. A temptation has always existed among some Turks to accept an authoritarian solution. In the past forty-five years, internal disagreement often pushed them away from parliamentarianism: an undisciplined press and a divided and often polarized electorate led to the excesses of the Sixties; more recently in the Seventies uncompromising politicization resulted in virtual civil war. The Parliament itself often could not compromise sufficiently with its own leadership to solve fundamental issues within Turkey, issues which led to the impasses and military coups of 1960 and of 1980. Weiker believes that it is still too early to judge the final outcome, and that adherence to the parliamentary institutions established by Ataturk and the early Kemalist reformers of the Twenties seems to be deeply ingrained among the Turks. Despite the excesses Weiker believes the forces of moderation in Turkey can prevail, given good leadership and a willingness to compromise.

Unlike some of his other books, the author here tends to expose rather than to analyse. The major points are covered, but sometimes not enough space is de-

voted to study in depth. For example, the role of Turkish agricultural workers which the author states make up more than 64% of Turkey's 1975 work force, tend to receive perfunctory treatment in some seven pages whereas the mass media (radio, television, literature) receives 10. The author devotes little space to analysis of the role of US funds in Turkey's modernization process. Did US military and economic aid keep Prime Minister Menderes in power, as has been alleged in the Turkish popular press? To what extent was Truman aid responsible for rising expectations of Turks in the 1950s which allegedly allowed and perpetuated the excesses of the Democrat Party? How did the millions pumped in for military aid affect the Turkish private sector, if at all? At one point we are told that the US has provided Turkey \$ 2.7 billion from 1949-1973, a sum which surely must have affected the economy and the process of modernization in some very specific ways. Or did it? Weiker lays little stress on the role of US military power in Turkey or the role of the CIA, groups whose strength may have been a chimera, yet effected strong concerns among the Turkish youth who became radicalized in the mid-Seventies. Were these issues important in the modernization process or merely superficial, used by left-wing groups for their own purposes? This reviewer could find no mention of the World War II Wealth Tax, the memory of which still provokes strong concern among non-Muslim business and professional people in Turkey. To what extent does such a memory act as a psychological barrier to full participation in the modernization process? Or are the non-Muslims all that important? Weiker does not raise the issue. The question of population expansion and the various programs in Turkey of birth control in the Seventies gain little attention in the book. In the intriguing section (p. 201) of the "paradox of land reform" Weiker notes that Islamic land inheritance laws are partially responsible for the extraordinary movement of landless siblings to urban centers in search of gainful employment. Moreover, the Turkish birth rate continues at a high pace. Does the fundamentalist Muslim revival, so apparent in political confrontations, affect attempts at controlling the population? Does this also affect the process of modernization? Again, the issue is not developed.

On a formal level, the organizational outline and the Index sometimes lack consistency. A useful Conclusion in Chapter Three is not mentioned in the Contents, yet an important section on Turkish Workers in Europe is curiously added after the Conclusion. The Index sometimes omits items that would seem to have an important bearing on problems of modernization, e.g., population control. It fails to include the countries mentioned in the book which are neighbors to Turkey and with which the Turks compete economically and politically.

One valuable asset of Weiker's book for readers of this journal is his use of various studies by first-rate Turkish scholars, like sociologist Mübcecel Kiray and political scientists Ergun Özbudun and Metin Heper, to name only a few. These western-trained younger scholars have published important researches and observations bringing a solid Turkish component into such a work. The scholarship of these Turks helps to clarify Turkey's modernization problems. Those who do the "digging" and those who interpret from a different perspective benefit from the merger. What forty years ago were sometimes naive often nationalistic interpretations by the Turks are today sophisticated scholarly, dependable, and relatively unbiased works. That Professor Weiker has the capacity to use these important Tur-

kish sources and has done so in a very clearly-written, well-organized format, makes available for readers of English a trustworthy document which will certainly be the basis for much further research in years to come.

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WILLIAM J. GRISWOLD

Υπουργείον Ἐξωτερικῶν, 1940-41. Ἑλληνικά Διπλωματικά Ἔγγραφα, Athens, 1980, p.p. 238.

Greek diplomatic activity following the Italian invasion of 28 October 1940 offers useful insights into a number of issues which, in their totality, constitute an important chapter of the Second World War's opening phase. Determined not to capitulate to aggression and struggling against overwhelming military odds Greece could turn only to Britain for support. Yet she did so nervously and irresolutely, afraid that the arrival of British forces would embroil her in the broader European conflict and offer Germany the excuse to attack Greece as well. This balancing act, in which Greece tried to maintain the pretence of neutrality while seeking the aid of a principal belligerent, was destined to fail and the Metaxas regime became a pawn of British strategy, receiving little tangible assistance in return. For her part, Britain, preoccupied in North Africa as well as in her own defense, saw in the Italian-Greek war an opportunity to inflict damage upon the Axis and to sponsor a phantom Balkan front, expending considerable diplomatic energy but little military force and thus without a chance for success. Similarly, Balkan cooperation against outsiders, the subject of numerous consultations and pledges throughout the 1930s, proved to be a sham. Bulgaria became a willing tool of the Axis, hoping to secure from Hitler what she had failed to win in the Balkan wars two decades earlier. Yugoslavia's rulers struggled in vain to keep their country out of harm's way, all along debating which of the warring sides had more to offer. Turkey's ever-shifting position on her promises of alliance to Britain and Greece offers a fascinating example of diplomatic double-talk and evasion.

For the casual observer there is a strong temptation to pass moral judgment on such state behavior. On the other hand the historian's task is to explain it, carefully analyzing varying views of the national interest as perceived by those in power. Such analysis is possible only on the basis of extensive and detailed state archival materials.

Collections of diplomatic papers dealing with the Italian and German invasions of Greece have been available in print for some time, drawn on the archives of Britain, Italy, Germany and the United States. In 1941 the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a number of key documents in a slender volume entitled *Diplomatika engrapha. I Italiki epithesis enantion tis Ellados* (Diplomatic Papers. The Italian Attack Against Greece); an English edition appeared under the title *The Greek White Book* (London, 1942). The present publication, timed to appear on the fortieth anniversary of the Italian invasion, offers a much more complete and elaborate documentary record. It covers the period from 28 October 1940, the day of the Italian ultimatum, to 27 April 1941, when the German forces occupied Athens.

The book contains 239 documents, printed in their entirety and chronologically arranged. A neatly organized "log" provides basic information on each document: date, sender, addressee, and brief summary of contents. Occasional footnotes give additional cross-references and supplementary details. Greek translations of documents originally in French or English are given in an appendix, and there is also a detailed index of names. With few exceptions the documents are of a diplomatic nature; there are also a number of bulletins issued by the Greek General Headquarters reporting on the war's progress and the minutes of British-Greek military consultations.

In his introduction the editor, K. Svolopoulos, professor of diplomatic history at the School of Law and Economics of the University of Thessaloniki, states that the purpose of the compilation is to offer a balanced coverage of the principal diplomatic developments of the period under review without commentary or analysis. He also explains that because parts of the wartime records of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were destroyed or otherwise lost, the collection contains many documents from the files of the Greek embassy in London. Given Britain's dominant role, this heavy reliance on the Athens-London diplomatic traffic appears to be justified.

Most of the documents appearing in these pages deal with Greek efforts to secure from Britain more weapons, equipment and air support, to ascertain the attitude of Yugoslavia and Turkey in the event of a German advance through Bulgaria, and to determine the best moment for British troops to come to Greece if Germany did attack. Slowly all hope of substantial assistance and regional cooperation fades and Greece faces two formidable enemies virtually alone: when British forces arrive, it is "too little, too late". In the last days before capitulation there are references to Greek requests, rejected by Britain, to have the government in exile go to Cyprus, part of which might be declared "Greek".

Perhaps the most significant portion of the collection is that of the minutes of British-Greek military consultations aimed at coordinating the deployment of their forces in northern Greece. The question of a misunderstanding between the two military commands, or of the failure of General Papagos to honor a key agreement (to cover the British advance to the Aliakmon line with Greek forces withdrawn from the fortifications in western Macedonia) has been the subject of considerable debate. Most recently, John S. Koliopoulos, in his excellent book entitled *Greece and the British Connection, 1935-1941* (Oxford, 1977), suggested that Papagos' subsequent explanations on this issue are not altogether convincing. The minutes of the controversial meeting in question (22 February 1941), reprinted here but apparently available to Koliopoulos, suggest that responsibility for the resulting confusion must be shared by all. Papagos was clearly pressured to agree to action against his better judgment and was therefore less than anxious to go along with the plan. However, the lack of clarity on the actual execution of the plan is striking and may indeed have been at the root of the problem.

Collections of this kind do, of course, confront the researcher with certain troublesome problems. By reproducing only the "finished product" of diplomacy they present the formal side of governmental conduct, leaving one to speculate about the gyrations of the decision-making process. Also, despite assurances concerning balanced coverage and objectivity on controversial issues, one cannot help but

wonder about possible documents not selected for publication. In research one does not like to have to rely on someone else's judgment as to what sources are important. Nevertheless, as long as the archives of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the period of the Second World War remain closed, this volume will be an indispensable source on a multitude of topics. The editor and his collaborators deserve the gratitude of all students of contemporary Greek history.

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JOHN O. IATRIDES

Thomas A. Bailey, *The Marshall Plan Summer: An Eyewitness Report on Europe and the Russians in 1947*. Stanford: Stanford University, Hoover Institution Press, 1977. viii+256 pp., Bibliography, Index.

Early in 1947 the American diplomatic historian Thomas A. Bailey was asked to lecture at the National War College in the coming fall. In preparation for this assignment the National War College sent him to Europe during that summer where he visited Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Scandinavia, and the low lands. *The Marshall Plan Summer* is the curious result of this journey. Presented as "a diary — a primary source — and as such an historical document of some value," (p. vii) its being offered for publication thirty years after the events took place weakens its claim to being a primary source; especially as a very flexible time sense is used. At one moment the observations are clearly from 1947, at the next data is interpreted in the light of more recent events and analysis.

True to his belief that American foreign policy is determined by public opinion, Prof. Bailey explains numerous events in terms of American ethnic voting blocks and shows no hesitation to repeat undocumented rumors. It may be possible that, "about two million German troops had been demobilized in the British zone, but only five hundred thousand rifles had been surrendered", (p. 77) but no supporting reference is provided. Of course these were the working notes of a man preparing a course and were not gathered with publication in mind. Why then were they published? Two themes run through the book; one deals with the summer during which the Marshall Plan was being debated and the other with revisionist scholarship in the United States today. Thus though the author focuses on the environment in which the Marshall Plan developed, he frequently takes the revisionists to task for their willingness to absolve the Soviet Union of any blame for the Cold War. Unfortunately, some of the evidence offered seems too obvious to be of value. Reporting a vote in the Norwegian parliament in which only the eleven Communist members voted to grant Russia bases in Spitzbergen, Bailey writes, "A detective would want no better evidence that the Norwegian Communists were more favorably disposed to the interests of the USSR than to those of the United States" (p. 192). Few scholars, revisionist or otherwise, will find this surprising, nor should they have in 1947.

Bailey is on sound ground in his challenge to the oversimplifications presented by many revisionist writers but given his own stand on the role of public opinion, his portrayal of American generosity, the Marshall Plan, must be weighed against

the opposition the proposal met in Congress. Had the Soviet block come forward as eager recipients, had Moscow not recalled Czechoslovakia's initial expression of interest, would the Plan have passed? Would, for example, Polish-American voters have tolerated aid to a Russian dominated Poland? Indeed, without what was seen as a clear Soviet threat to Western Europe would the United States have been so generous?

Readers interested in European conditions immediately after the Second World War will find this book worth reading and certainly well written but its contribution to an understanding of the Marshall Plan appears limited.

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JOHN R. PAVIA JR.

John H. Moore, *Growth With Self-Management: Yugoslav Industrialization, 1952-1975*. Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1980. Pp. xiii — 384. ISBN: 0-8179-7201-3.

The theory of decentralized socialism became the center of the "socialist controversy" in the 1980s. Although the number of participants was very large, the names of two antagonists, Oskar Lange and Friedrich Hayek, came to be associated with the controversy of whether the marginal conditions of efficient resource allocation are compatible with socialism. Since there was no empirical prototype of market (or decentralized) socialism, the debate remained an intellectual exercise whose main claims could not be tested empirically. The schism between Stalin and Tito in 1948 compelled the Yugoslavs to find an alternative form of social organization and create a distinct prototype of socialism. The Yugoslavs adopted "workers' self-management" which was perceived by western writers to be an approximation of Lange's market socialism.

Because of its experimental nature, the Yugoslav system received great attention in the West. Benjamin N. Ward was one of the earliest economists to study the Yugoslavian alternative to Soviet type of planning. His work was followed by the works of other authors; John H. Moore's book is the most recent addition to an impressive list of works on the Yugoslavian economy. His work is, however, distinctly different from the works of others.

The author starts with the correct observation that "Workers' self-management was... experimental; it was adopted above all for political reasons" (p. 3). Because of its experimental nature, the system required frequent changes; its political imperatives imposed constraints and changes that were political in nature, not economic. As Joseph T. Bombelles has observed, "What actually happened in Yugoslavia after the early 1950s was a change in instruments used in directing economic development, but the direction continued to be prescribed by the top political leadership".

Moore's book is not concerned with the theory of decentralized socialism. Its purpose is "to measure and analyze Yugoslavia's success in generating industrial growth during the first twenty years or so of worker's self-management" (p. 4). The Yugoslav prototype retained the emphasis on high rates of investment and

industrialization that characterize the Soviet type of planning models. Did the system of workers' self-management succeed in generating high rates of industrial growth? Success can be measured meaningfully only in terms of alternative methods pursued by other countries not using workers' self-management. However, international comparisons are misleading when the methodology, definitions, and systems of social accounting differ among countries. Therefore, the author "develops a new sample index of industrial production, methodologically comparable to indexes commonly used in the West" (p. 4). This is the unique characteristic of this study. Unlike other studies, it does not take the official Yugoslavian data at their face value.

The first part of the book (pp. 2-28) gives an overview of Yugoslavians' objective to transform a traditional, backward, economy to a modern industrialized one. Broadly defined, two instruments of policy were adopted: control planning, and enterprise autonomy. The degree of autonomy of enterprises varied from time to time, reaching its peak with the 1965 reforms. However, since enterprises and banks became "centers of independent power of a magnitude that the central party evidently could not tolerate" (p. 7), the power of enterprises was reduced in the 1970s.

Part II of the book deals with the methodological problems of measuring economic growth, while Part III deals with analysis and appraisal of Yugoslav performance and workers' self-management. "For some purposes, official Yugoslav indexes are satisfactory" (p. 31), but they do not lead to meaningful comparisons with industrial growth in the West. Sources of distortion include: reliability of reports by enterprises, the tendency of Yugoslav authorities to add to or drop from the official statistics products without explanation, and ambiguity of product classification. Moreover, there was pressure to show that Yugoslavia's revisions and policies produce good economic results. "There is an incentive to overstate production, and there are no statistical agencies independent of the state to provide outside checks on the official data" (p. 34). Given these sources and the differences in methodology, one would expect the sample indexes to be at variance with the official indexes. Between 1952 and 1975, industrial output grew, according to the official index, at an annual rate of 10 percent. "According to the sample indexes, this is an overstatement. The highest average annual growth rate implied by the sample indexes is 8.9 per cent" (p. 40). This is not a small achievement of industrial growth, but it does create a divergence between officially reported rates and rates implied by methodology commonly used in the West. Moreover, both sample and official indexes indicate that the rates of growth were substantially higher before 1967 than they were after 1967. The author attributes the stagnation of the better period to changes in the composition of output, not the failure of the reforms.

Is the change in composition of output costless, in terms of rates of growth? There is evidence in the Yugoslav case that reforms and high rates of structural change are closely associated, and that "there is an inverse relation between growth in output and changes in the composition of output" (p. 88). Modernization requires structural change, although not all changes constitute modernization. The author compares Yugoslav and Japanese experiences and concludes that "the Yugoslav economic system and its methods of planning and plan implementation were not unique in their power to generate growth and change" (p. 90).

Yugoslav annual rates of growth of industrial output were very high in the

period 1952-64, substantially lower in 1964-67, and moderately high in 1967-75 whether measured by official or sample indexes (p. 50). "By international standards, industrial growth in Yugoslavia from 1952 to 1971 was rapid. However, if Yugoslavia's initial stage of development is considered, its growth is unremarkable" (p. 51). This is true whether one compares Yugoslav rates of growth with noncommunist countries or with Eastern bloc countries such as Bulgaria, and Romania (p. 53-56).

Starting with the 1957-61 Five-Year Plan, Yugoslav economic policy was directed towards achieving both high rates of industrialization and a reduction in the disparities of per capita output between the less developed regions and the rest of the country. This policy involved the transfer of funds from more to less developed regions. There may be a trade-off between overall rates of growth and regional development if the marginal product of capital is less in the less developed regions than in the more advanced regions. However, the Yugoslavs were prepared to pay the price in terms of efficiency of investment in order to achieve a more equitable distribution of output. Although Yugoslav economists have claimed that the transfer of funds reduced the rate of overall industrial growth, the author found no conclusive evidence for such claims (p. 146).

The patterns of regional growth estimated by the sample indexes and the official indexes are in close agreement in terms of trends and the ranking of regions according to rates of growth except (a) in the case of Kosovo the official index is almost twice as high as the sample index (Table 24), and industrial output, "according to the sample indexes, grew more slowly than [in] any of the other areas" (p. 69), and (b) in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina the sample indexes indicate "a higher rate of growth than the official index" (p. 80).

The regional economic policy had economic and noneconomic objectives. It "generally failed to meet its economic objectives. Whether it satisfied its political purposes... is a question answerable only by the Yugoslavs themselves" (p. 183).

Professor Moore does not overlook the successes of the Yugoslav economy. "In the quarter century following the adoption of workers' self-management, Yugoslavia rose from the ranks of the world's economic backwaters to a position just short of the development levels of the less developed West European states" (p. 151). Productivity in industry and mining, although difficult to measure, increased dramatically during the period of workers' self-management. The structure of output changed, too. Yet, correcting for the level of development, the author found that even structural change was "unremarkable" (p. 152).

What makes the Yugoslav system unique is workers' self-management, not the record of self-management. Professor Moore makes a distinction between *de jure* decentralization and state control, not only in terms of general macroeconomic policy but also in terms of *de facto* control of the enterprises. "The Yugoslav economic system is, in fact, thoroughly politicized, a natural occurrence in the communist state with an elite party" (p. 156). The author sees the absence of private incentives in terms of property rights as the main source of retardation.

This book adds a much needed statistical reformulation of Yugoslav data. It is an excellent piece of detective work in economic analysis. Its only shortcoming

is that it does not go far enough in answering the political, organizational, and regional questions it raises.

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- Slobodan Stanković, *The End of the Tito Era: Yugoslavia's Dilemmas*, Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1981, pp. 154.

Slobodan Stanković's short book may well be the last of what has become a thriving cottage industry of political and historical analysis, the what-will-happen-after-Tito book. Even though Stanković published his book shortly after Tito's death, its substance still revolves around the famous question.

The fundamental Yugoslav dilemma to which Stanković's title refers is the tension between democratic method and hierarchical control that has marked Yugoslav politics for the past thirty years. This tension has been expressed most notably in the contradiction between self-management and one-party control, but its influence in Yugoslav public life is pervasive. Edvard Kardelj proposed a theoretical solution to the contradiction, which he called the pluralism of self-management interests. According to Kardelj, in Yugoslavia the single party itself is the institution that insures the vitality of self-managing socialist democracy. Stanković finds it difficult to imagine the practical steps to which Kardelj's notion would lead, and notes that after the Slovene's death in 1979 his theoretical views have fallen into desuetude.

If Kardelj's theories do not resolve Yugoslavia's dilemmas, perhaps the army might. It is the only institution in Yugoslavia that remains overtly hierarchical, even though it is bound to respect the individual rights of its members. Stanković sees the army as playing an important role after Tito's departure, particularly in maintaining order in the face of ethnic problems, but since the army is not equipped to deal with the complex Yugoslav economy, he does not believe it can provide long term solutions.

Yugoslav foreign relations reflect the same basic dilemmas as her internal problems. Relations with the Russians are more or less cordial, but the debate over Stalinism lies close beneath the surface. Yugoslavia has supported Eurocommunism against Russian attacks, but on the other hand does not accept it for herself or advocate it for other East European communist states. And in pursuing a basic policy of non-alignment Yugoslavs are torn between wanting to encourage, even lead, a powerful group pursuing socialist goals and their aversion to the imposition of a uniform model of socialist behavior.

Until recently, when tensions over these issues reached a peak it was Tito who provided the solutions. This singular fact of recent Yugoslav history impells Stanković to discuss, as have so many, who will take Tito's place, particularly in the party which, he covers more thoroughly than the state apparatus. Stanković does not explicitly say that collective leadership can not work, but he seems to assume it, emphasizing that when a country is governed by a single powerful person as long as Yugoslavia was by Tito, a style of "leaderism" develops that is hard to eradicate.

Stanković believes Yugoslavia will survive as an integral state, despite the apparent impossibility of resolving her fundamental dilemma without a strong leader. He expects ethnic problems to be severe, and the strong foreign policy of the Tito era to be continued, rather than softened in an effort to solve internal economic problems.

Stanković's conclusion is curious. Instead of summarizing his basic points, which are themselves not as clearly made as they could be, he finishes with a discussion of seven proposed amendments to the constitution, and eight preliminary changes to the party statutes. Brief biographies of thirty prominent Yugoslav politicians are appended. This non-conclusion reinforces the legalistic tone of the book. Perhaps such is the fate of analysts who follow Yugoslav public life, which itself on occasion achieves a similar formal quality.

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GALE STOKES

Fahir Köker, *Herausbildung der strukturellen Heterogenität in einer unterentwickelten Gesellschaftsformation am Beispiel der Türkei*, Rita Fischer Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1980, 190 Seiten.

Das Buch von Köker hat — ausgehend von der Tatsache, daß es keine allgemein anerkannte Theorie der Unterentwicklung gibt — zum Ziel, einen Ansatz zu entwickeln, mit dem die 'Peripherisierung' und 'Spatkapitalisierung' der vorkapitalistischen Gesellschaftsformationen in ihrer Geschichte analysiert werden können. Als Ursache dieser Prozesse wird hier die strukturelle Heterogenität in kapitalistischen Peripherien für die Türkei diskutiert. Die Konzepte der strukturellen Heterogenität der unterentwickelten Gesellschaftsformationen und des peripheren Kapitalismus sind die Kernbegriffe einer neueren entwicklungs-politischen Diskussion, die in den letzten Jahren erhebliche Bedeutung für die Entwicklungsprobleme der Länder der Dritten Welt insgesamt gewonnen hat.

Der Verfasser gliedert seine Arbeit in eine theoretische Einleitung und zwei Kurzabschnitte über 'die Türkei als peripheres Land' und die Schlußfolgerungen, im wesentlichen jedoch in drei Hauptabschnitte.

Nach einer wohl gelungenen Einleitung untersucht der Verfasser anhand eines Metropol-Peripherie-Modells, ob die Türkei eine kapitalistische Peripherie ist. Die periphere Situation der Türkei innerhalb des kapitalistischen Weltmarktes wird durch die vielfältigen Abhängigkeitsmechanismen durchaus belegt. Im ersten Hauptabschnitt (Kapitel III) werden die historischen und geographischen Bedingungen unterschiedlicher Produktionsverhältnisse der heutigen türkischen Gesellschafts-

formation behandelt, um die endogenen Prozesse der Peripherisierung der Türkei aus ihrer Geschichte erhellen und darstellen zu können.

Im quantitativen Hauptanteil (Kapitel IV) versucht der Verfasser den ökonomischen und sozialen Wandel in der Türkei seit der Gründung der türkischen Republik zu untersuchen. Dieser Abschnitt als ein Handbuch zur sozioökonomischen Entwicklung der Türkei bereitet die Argumentation der Folgen der strukturellen Heterogenität vor: Die Genese der Produktivitätsgefälle in den Produktionsphären und Wirtschaftssektoren ist zugleich der Grund der Auseinanderentwicklung dieser Sektoren, also der ungleichen Entwicklung, die sich mit der raschen imperialistischen und kapitalistischen Penetration nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg forciert fortgesetzt hat. Diese Umwandlung der Wirtschaftssektoren in einer sehr deformierenden Weise der türkischen Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft erklärt nicht nur die entgültige Peripherisierung der Türkei, sondern auch die Herausbildung der strukturellen Heterogenität. Um diese Entwicklung durch eine von außen bestimmte und forcierte Industrialisierung darzustellen, wird hier im wesentlichen die Entwicklung der importsubstituierenden Industrialisierung analysiert.

Im V. Kapitel beschäftigt sich der Verfasser mit der ungleichen Entwicklung der Wirtschaftssektoren, die durch die strukturelle Heterogenität gekennzeichnet ist, und mit den Folgen dieser Deformation.

Der Verfasser verwendet hier die Einkommensverteilung zur Herrschaftskritik, was zugleich zur Erklärung der öfters stattfindenden Militärputsche in der Türkei und der militärischen Maßnahmen der immer ärmer und auch rebellischer werdenden Bevölkerung erklärt.

Da in dieser Arbeit das Metropol-Peripherie-Modell zunehmend auf die Analyse der inneren hemmenden Bedingungen einer gehemmt kapitalistischen Entwicklung des untersuchten Landes reduziert wird, bemüht sich der Verfasser in dem Schlußteil, verschiedene strategische Möglichkeiten zur Überwindung der türkischen Unterentwicklung durch die Beseitigung der strukturellen Heterogenität zu zeigen.

FARUK SEM

Anna Frangoudakis, ed., "Education in Greece Today: A Symposium", New York, *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*, Vol. VIII, Nos. 1-2, Spring-Summer 1981, pp. 167.

One of the few English-language journals about modern Greece has devoted two full issues to an examination of contemporary Greek education. Sixteen articles attempt to portray what the editors term the «tapestry of education in Greece today», with varying degrees of success.

The introductory essay by «guest editor» Anna Frangoudakis sets the tone for most of the collection while also illuminating the rationale for the selection of topics and contributors. To the central question of why, despite widespread demand for reform, the educational system has changed so little, the author tries to find answers in the country's economic structure, class antagonisms and exces-

sive reliance upon foreign influence. She rejects the modest reform measures of the mid-1970's as inspired by foreign models and «Western logic». However, while her call for «new forms of educational structures» which will be genuinely Greek may seem appealing, in the absence of any clear conception of what these new structures would be it amounts to little more than a romantic dream.

If the inadequacies of Greek education are to be laid at the door of post-war foreign influences, how then does one account for the fact that its structure and content have remained highly traditional, bureaucratic and nationalistic, quite unlike contemporary Western systems? For as Alexis Dimaras observes in his brief note on frustrated educational reform, the central European prototype introduced in 1834 and progressively Hellenized has not changed significantly in philosophy and structure. Even the much-heralded «reforms» of 1976 (increased years of compulsory schooling, exclusive use of demotic language, promotion of technical secondary education, demotion of ancient Greek and Latin) were largely technical adjustments rather than changes in basic orientation.

Theopoula Anthogalidou-Vassilakakis and Marianna Kondilis examine the 1976 reforms in greater detail. The former makes the essential point that Greek educational legislation and administrative edicts so thoroughly order and regulate the system as to leave very little initiative to the actual participants in school life. The Ministry of Education constitutes a supervisory hierarchy which prescribes educational policies and practices down to the last detail. The reforms which were carried out from above without prior consultation or experimentation left untouched the ordering of roles and relationships within the system.

Babis Noutsos reviews briefly the few significant studies of Greek education in recent years, and in a second article offers some content analysis of changing themes in the secondary curriculum.

In a thoughtful article supported by data, Michael Kassotakis discusses the reasons for the negative attitudes Greek youth hold towards technical and vocational education.

The major article on higher education by Kostas Gavroglu emphasizes the inability of the university to reproduce itself given the absence of graduate training and research. Despite reform efforts in this area, none has succeeded since 1932. The author brings forth some useful information, but his case is marred by unsupported assertions about the socio-political reasons for educational stagnancy. In one of the shorter but more lucid and penetrating contributions, Maria Iliou explains the impotence of research in the makeup of a true university, and sagely analyzes the far-reaching consequences for Greek higher education of an absence of organized research and graduate training, which she documents from UNESCO figures.

Maria Nassiakou recounts how a research project in Greek mountain villages concluded that the high motivation of rural Greek families toward educational advancement was a result of their desire to abandon the life of the countryside «which the entire Greek population rejects».

Constantine Tsoucalas, in an article entitled «Some Aspects of 'Over-Education' in Modern Greece», attempts to account for the pronounced propensity of Greeks to seek higher education, and particularly the tendency for village youth to find their way into the universities in exceptional numbers. He dates this pro-

pensity from the nineteenth century when wealthy Greek communities of the diaspora used their financial strength to create a large, non-productive middle class in Athens and certain diaspora centers. Socially mobil elements of the rural population found places in this petty bourgeoisie through the medium of the university which provided the requisite cultural and ideological attainments. This social pattern became so firmly entrenched that it survived the collapse of the diaspora in 1922. After 1949 new relations of dependency upon the international capitalist market led to a swollen tertiary sector in Greece which again created a demand for certain types of higher education.

This ingenious attempt to explain a leading educational phenomenon through a materialistic analysis of Greek social evolution is too facile. Tsoucalas's data is sparse, his causal connections are vague and his reasoning tends to be mostly deductive. His hypothesis therefore seems arbitrary and unconvincing, though like all his writing, it is most provocative.

The most enlightening article in the collection, «Some Economic Aspects of Education» by Stephanos Pasmazoglou, presents extensive data from Greek and United Nations sources. Pasmazoglou documents the low level of public spending on education by comparison with the countries of Western Europe. Inadequate financing and the lack of an overall strategy for developing financial resources to serve educational needs creates both quantitative and qualitative weaknesses. A lack of confidence on the part of the citizenry in public education has driven families to make massive expenditures for para-education, i.e., private supplementary instruction at the secondary level, and for foreign university training. These financial outlays actually exceed at both levels all state expenditures for education. Students and professors exhibit little commitment to their university responsibilities, partly because of the lack of stimulation from research or graduate study. The author finds significant disparities between the educational system, which stresses general education, law and the humanities, and the real needs of the economy. He urges development of technical and vocational education, which now command little public respect, as an instrument of economic and social policy. While the author proposes tapping the private industrial sector for financial resources to support education, he stops short of suggesting that private education, which absorbs vast sums but must often operate in covert and perverse ways, be allowed to function freely and openly so as to establish higher standards which the public institutions would be obliged to emulate. While stressing the quantitative aspects of education, the author recognizes that the solution to Greece's educational problems demands not merely economic measures but rather comprehensive, in-depth reform and the building of public confidence in the system.

The uneven quality of the articles and the omission or superficial consideration of certain key problems prevent this survey from fulfilling the editors' promise of an integrated critique of the educational system. Professional training in the universities, i.e., law, medicine and engineering, goes without mention. Private education, which has pointed the way to much of whatever innovation has occurred, receives attention only in one weak article. Conspicuously absent is any analysis of the attitudes and values of teachers regarding their profession and their students; of the quality of their pedagogic training and preparedness; or of the impact of syndicalist influences upon the teaching vocation. The extraacademic

contribution to student enrichment from cultural activities, athletics and personal and vocational counselling is nowhere discussed. While some of the better articles offer useful data, most of it pre-dates 1975 whereas the discussion focuses largely upon later developments.

Granted that the educational system has serious deficiencies, it probably is not so totally devoid of merit as the contributors maintain. They overlook certain strengths, such as the rigorous secondary curriculum, particularly the heavy dosage of mathematics (six years) and physics (five) which compares favorably with other countries. Greek students' remarkable success in gaining admission to top foreign universities and their consistently high performance there signify that their previous training cannot have been altogether unworthy. Some comparative information about curriculum levels and achievement in Greece and other countries would have been useful in this respect.

One looks in vain in these studies for any clear and specific proposals for improvement. As Dimaras observes, there exists no progressive plan for comprehensive educational reform in Greece today. The publication under review unfortunately does not point the way. It must be noted, of course, that it appeared before the advent of the Andreas Papandreu government which has pledged to carry out the task which so far has eluded the country's leaders.

The basic question, left unanswered in this study, is why in Greece, where the central administration becomes involved in so many ways in the life of the citizen, the performance of the public services, including notably education, fails to win the respect and confidence of the citizenry. The incompetence and inertia of the state mechanism has been a constant factor for many decades despite social and economic change, despite political shifts. The causes must be sought in the structure and internal dynamics of the political system and the far-flung bureaucracy, and, more basically, in the social and cultural values which support these institutions. Otherwise the change-resistant and ineffectual character of education cited in these essays will continue to resist diagnosis and reform.

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WILLIAM W. MCGREW

Εκδοχή Είκοσαετίας 1960-1980. Κέντρον Νεοελληνικῶν Ἑρευνῶν Ἐθνικοῦ Ἰδρύματος Ἑρευνῶν, Ἀθήνα 1980, σ. 121 [Annal d'un vingtaine 1960-1980: Centre des Recherches Néohelléniques de l'Institut National des Recherches, Athènes 1980].

Cette édition constitue une chronique de Centre des Recherches Néohelléniques de la Grèce, qui présente son activité, ses buts et ses résultats pendant les vingt ans de son fonctionnement, ainsi que ses futurs plans de recherche. Le Centre, fondé en 1960, a suscité à l'intérieur et à l'étranger des études sur le Néohellénisme, une période qui examine les évolutions de la culture et de l'éducation néohellénique à partir de l'occupation turque et qui arriva jusqu'au XIX^{ème} siècle. Le mouvement des idées, la pensée philosophique, les relations avec l'Occident et l'influence de la littérature et de la philosophie européenne sur celles de la Grèce moderne, la

paléographie, les archives, l'histoire économique, les rapports de la Grèce avec l'Occident et l'Orient voilà les principales directions qu'a suivit le Centre des Recherches Néohelléniques. Mis à part la recherche du point de vue philosophique et historique le Centre a mené à bien (et continue de travailler dans ce sens-là) des travaux plus vastes, à savoir l'enregistrement de l'activité spirituelle du Néohellénisme telle qu'elle se présente dans la période allant de 1453-jusqu'au XIX^{ème} siècle. Ainsi le Centre des Recherches Néohelléniques a favorisé l'étude et la synthèse des œuvres-instruments de recherche rendus nécessaires pour l'approche et la compréhension de la littérature de l'histoire et de la civilisation néohelléniques. Dans cette brochure sont mentionnés aussi l'organisation et le mode de fonctionnement du Centre un système basé sur les plans déjà cités, où il convient de mentionner l'enregistrement et l'édition du matériel et des manuscrits et des sources de l'histoire des textes imprimés. Le même brochure cite aussi les chercheurs qui ont travaillé pendant ces deux décennies (1960-1980), pour mener à bien les projets du Centre, et leurs publications.

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ATH. E. KARATHANASSIS

C. A. Trypanis, *Greek poetry, from Homer to Seferis*, London 1981, pp. 896 (Faber and Faber).

Arnold Toynbee's last and posthumous work¹ returns to the Greeks, his early interest and the subject of the Professorship he held at London as young man. Being Toynbee, he follows the whole sweep of Greek history from the Myceneans to modern times. Being human he makes a number of errors and misleading generalizations. But his look is full of penetrating insights. He writes like the most brilliant and promising of graduate students, sketching a lifework.

He studies the Greeks in terms of their three breakdowns, the dark age that followed the Myceneans, the post-classical dark age and the dark age after Byzantium. Among the details we now know about the first, many of them coming to light as he was writing, he buzzes like a bee in a bottle. His solution will not convince the specialists. In the Turkish period he exaggerates the bankruptcy of Byzantium and underrates much that survived. But the central insight of the look, its treatment of Greek consciousness, and of how the Greeks in every period have dealt for better or worse with the felt burden of their inheritance, is as brilliant as anything in his writings.

C. A. Trypanis conveys a far deeper and fuller understanding of Greek history, although his subject is only the history of poetry. There has never been so full a study of the vast progression of poetry in Greek, continuous from Homer until today, either in English or in any other language.

Constantine Trypanis is a distinguished poet in English, an old and experienced scholar, and a most inspiring teacher. No one alive knows as much about

1. A. Toynbee, *The Greeks and their Heritage*, Oxford 1981.

as much of this material as he does. But part of what so excites me in this long, fat book is the continual glitter of irony and humour, the continual freshness of curiosity. To have dealt thoroughly and clearly with great poets and great crises of poetry is already more than a little. To have followed intricate pathways and obscure names and yet never to have been deserted by the Muses is much more.

Students and scholars will learn a great deal from Constantine Trypanis, and they will turn his pages with continual pleasure. This is a standard work of reference, and it will last a hundred years. He never departs from his severe clarity of judgement; at the same time he never loses his passionate enthusiasm for the fate and for the possibilities of Greek poetry. He writes not just about poetry but poems and poets with an underlying strength of conviction which arises from the power and sap of the Greek language itself.

At a time when old-fashioned Greek studies are under pressure and have lost ground, and yet the subject itself of Greek poetry has seldom seemed so attractive to so many people, perhaps never since the Roman empire, this is exactly the book need. Its price, considering its size, is reasonable. In century after century it reveals astonishing treasures that almost no one knows.

Among obscure poets, Trypanis is masterly in his analysis of the Hellenistic Parthenios, the friend of Virgil, and on the modern satirist Souris. On Homer and Greek tragedy, and on the religious poetry of the early Byzantines, he writes with special authority.

I felt he was rather too patient with Kazantzakis, or did I detect a certain dry irony, here as elsewhere? Occasionally I wondered whether some of my own obscurer favourites, the epigrammatist Erucius who gave a line or two to Virgil, and the blood-soaked Cretan tragedy Zeno in the seventeenth century, were undervalued. In the most modern period of all I have fewer reservations than he has about Seferis and more about Sikelianos, but may be that is like preferring Eliot to Yeats, no more perhaps than a profound instinct. Wherever I was in doubt, as among the ballads and epics of the middle ages, I found this look very useful, satisfying and fascinating.

One of its bold and brilliant strokes is the section heading. The Hellenistic Age, which in its subsections covers Greek poetry from 328 B.C. to 644 A.D. That is surely just, Romans or no Romans, and it disposes of one of Toynbee's dark ages. It may be that Virgil was the greatest Hellenistic poet of his time, though he happened to write in Latin, but poetry in Greek was not negligible. (Horace is another matter, may be the first great poet we can name beyond the scope of the Greeks).

Trypanis follows the twists and turns of poetry through these nine and a half centuries with more subtlety than I can indicate, and the resulting supple framework never fails to illuminate individual poems and the careers of poets. This book makes an important case for literary criticism with a historical basis. No other method could have revealed so much. We are not looking at a few mountain-tops, but walking about in a landscape that has been haunted by the Muses for three thousand years.

Oxford,

PETER LEVI

Ioanna Tsatsos, *My Brother George Seferis*. Translated from the Original Greek by Jean Demos, with a Preface by Eugene Current Garcia. A Nostos Book. Minneapolis: North Central Publishing Company, 1982. 260+xvi pages.

E. C. Garcia is quite right in observing that «this will be no ordinary compilation of biographical minutiae, but a work of art painstakingly wrought from a lifetime of inchoate memories» (p. viii). Mrs. Tsatsos's story of her older brother's life is, indeed, a personal statement with genuinely lyrical touches; it is not an academic treatise following models and styles normally utilized by scholars who «recreate» the «life and opinions» of a creative writer through inference, deduction and hypothesis. Thus, while the academically-oriented reader or researcher may find this book not directly relevant to his strictly scholastic purposes, the lover of modern poetry — and especially the sensitive person who is both charmed and challenged by Seferis's poetic achievement and aenigma — will be rewarded for this unique chance to follow the Wordsworthian growth of a poet's mind as told by a fellow poet who was his dear «little sister» and lifelong confidante.

After a few prefatory remarks, the distinguished authoress — a doctor of laws, poet and prose writer, married to a former President of the Republic — presents her intimate portrait of the poet in six chronologically-organized chapters. I «1912-18, Another Era», II «1919-22, Our Native Country Free», III «1922-25, The Doom of Ionia», IV «1926-31, Our Exile Returned», V «1931-34, London», and VI «1935-41, Poetry and Politics». A Biographical Note (with facts and dates), and an Index (with names and titles) complete this most readable translation of the 1978 Greek original.

While following the chronological development of events, Mrs. Tsatsos avoids the pitfalls of a strictly linear account by aptly transposing her narrative to the future or the past as circumstances warrant, integrating thus themes, motifs, and observations that complete the picture of a human being as he progresses from childhood and adolescence, from innocence and wonder, to the stage of maturity and professional distinction.

Supporting her explanations and comments by means of letters by and to her brother, registering many discussions and episodes, and frequently quoting his poems and other writings, the biographer succeeds in sounding authoritative while, at the same time, she never allows George Seferis to become the cold subject of a routinely academic dissertation. The special charm of *My Brother George Seferis* radiates from the fact that brother, artist, thinker, and man are never treated as separate entities. To his younger sister he was always an accomplished, three-dimensional, and dynamic personality whose devotion to Apollo and his Muses could not be isolated from his love for and loyalty to family, friends, country, moral values, and professional integrity both as a diplomat and as a writer.

The purely factual information in all chapters shows how family upbringing and ties, momentous historical events (such as the 1922 Smyrna Disaster), studies in Paris, relations with several men and women, and career as a diplomat contributed to the formation and conditioning of Seferis's personality and artistic sensibility.

An avid reader of Greek poetry, the young law student in Paris came to ma-

ster and to love the works of Laforgue, Moréas, Valéry and others in France, before making the acquaintance of T. S. Eliot's poetry and essays during his first (1931-34) official assignment in London. A master of the French language, the young Seferis contemplated composing verses in it. Soon, however, he realized that Greek was his natural medium (Chapters II and III).

Under the spell of Eliot's verse and thought (Chapter V), later on, Seferis once more allowed his Greekness to prevail, absorbing from the celebrated Anglo-American innovator only those artistic traits that would help him improve, further develop, and establish his own artistic sensitivity and style as they had been intimated for the first time in his 1931 *Turning Point*.

The son of a distinguished Venizelist professor of law, himself a democrat with Liberal sympathies, George S. Seferiades (1900-1971) was ironically destined to serve royalist and conservative administrations, and to live through two dictatorships, both World Wars, and the communist insurrection in his country before retiring as ambassador to St. James's Court in 1962. «Wherever I travel Greece wounds me» — an epigrammatic line from his poem «In the Manner of G. S.» — tellingly sums up the impact of Greece's drama on his spirit. Nor was his youthful soul unaffected by the unfulfilled eros he felt first for Jacquellin and then for Kirsten, the French and the Norwegian girls who profoundly moved him in Paris, long before he met and married Maró Zannos in 1941.

Ioanna Tsatsos ends this captivating story of her illustrious brother — the man who defied the Junta in 1969 — with two brief notes about events in 1940 and 1941. Most subsequent happenings have, in a sense, been intimated or foreshadowed in her earlier diachronic statements and observations. The 1963 Nobel Prize was but an official and international recognition of Seferis's genius, a genius she had instinctively sensed, known, admired, and adored, in ever increasing degrees of awareness, ever since both of them were carefree and innocent siblings enjoying domestic happiness in Smyrna and other enchanted spots of erstwhile Hellenic Ionia.

*The University of Athens
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M. BYRON RAIZIS

Donald C. Swanson, *Vocabulary of Modern Spoken Greek* with the assistance of Sophia P. Djaferis and a forward by Theofanis G. Stavrou. A Nostos Book, The North Central Publishing Company, St. Paul, MN. 1982, X+410 pp.

The appearance in 1959 of the late Prof. Donald C. Swanson's *Vocabulary of Modern Spoken Greek* marked a watershed in the field of English-Greek and / of Greek-English lexicography. Practitioners in the field of Modern Greek Studies in the United States (language and culture) were quick to perceive its uniqueness and within a very short span of time it had been sold out. A second printing came out in 1967 but it, too, was soon out of print. A persistent demand for yet another printing was voiced at the *First Conference on Modern Greek in the Universities of the English speaking World* (held in Athens in 1980) and Prof. Theofanis G. Stavrou took up the challenge. The book under review is the result.

Prof. Swanson, a distinguished classicist, philologist, linguist and lexicographer, joined the Department of Classics at the University of Minnesota in 1946 where he taught for 30 years until his death in 1976. In 1954 he introduced the teaching of Modern Greek at the same university, a pioneering move, since at that time not many classicists were conversant with the Modern Greek tongue. He was one of the early practitioners of the diachronic approach to the study of Greek culture in the United States, a move subsequently emulated by several universities throughout the length and breadth of that land.

As with all workers in the field of Modern Greek Studies, the lack of a practical and up-to-date dictionary to meet the needs of English-speaking students learning Greek as a second language became quite apparent. Prof. Swanson undertook to fill that gap. He realized that most Greek-English and, their counterpart, English-Greek dictionaries were compiled for the benefit of Greek students learning English. A reversal of approach was necessary to provide a useful tool to an English-speaking learner of Greek. To this end he spent a year of field work in Greece, talked to many people from all walks of life, and concluded that the Greek entries in his E-G part had to be given in the Demotic. Thus, instead of depending on written sources and written semantic lists he would ask people orally to name objects he would point to. The commonly used word for that particular item was the answer he sought. Action words asked in English would produce the corresponding standard spoken Greek equivalent(s). But since languages are not averse to borrowing, adapting, and changing to meet new needs, Prof. Swanson did not hesitate to include learned terms because of their artificial derivation. He writes in his preface: «Forms like *ὁ ἰατρός*, "O. K." although of learned (pedantic) origin, have become demotic and are used in everyday speech. Some words of katharevusa origin are labelled as such (K) because though useful and used, they may not be known to everyone and there might be a more demotic expression existing side by side».

As far as the phonology of Modern Greek is concerned, on the infrequent occasions where the orthography does not give the exact value of the speech sound concerned, the IPA (International Phonetic Alphabet) is used as is the practice in all modern dictionaries. Prof. Swanson advises the users of his Vocabulary to «consult a Greek speaker in any case, and especially for the three sounds which do not (commonly) occur in English: /X, ɣ, ʒ/».

Approximately 8750 main entries are listed on the English Greek part while its Greek-English counterpart contains nearly 800 more entries. This apparent discrepancy is due to the fact that several Greek terms of either high frequency, or wide-spread usage, do not have corresponding equivalents or corresponding priority values in English usage. Cross references are frequently used while short illustrative sentences allow the student to comprehend not only the meaning of the entry involved but also its typical syntax.

Aside from the innovative features of this *Vocabulary* just commented upon, the author's *Introduction*, taking up 55 pages of the entire book, is a scholarly exposition of the history, syntax, orthography and pronunciation of Modern Greek. Remarkable in its lucidity and readability, it gives the user of this book a bird's eye view of the whole history and evolution of the Greek language, a piece of work only a scholar of his erudition in many fields could achieve. The reader shares with the author the sense of adventure he obviously felt himself as he takes us along

the flying centuries noting the changes time and historical events have left upon the language known as Modern Greek today.

The pioneering work stated by Prof. Swanson in the field of Modern Greek studies has been carried on and greatly expanded by his successor, the editor of this present edition, Prof. Theofanis G. Stavrou. Under his leadership not only has the University of Minnesota achieved a justly deserved reputation as one of the principal centers for the study of Modern Greek language and culture in the United States but he has also, through associating with *The North Central Publishing Company of St. Paul, MN.* produced, under imprimature NOSTOS BOOKS published books by, or, on, noted Modern Greek authors either written originally in English or in English translation. The VOCABULARY is the seventh in the series to have come out by NOSTOS with two more due to appear, soon, *Two Plays* by Nikos Kazantzakis (Sodon and Gomorrah), translated by Kimon Friar, and *Angelos Sikelianos and the Delphic Idea* authored by Theofanis Stavrou himself.

Pacific Grove, Ca.

ANN ARPAJOLU

Ἀγγελόπουλος Ἀ. Ἀθαν., *Ἡ ἐκκλησιαστικὴ ἱστορία τῶν νέων χωρῶν 1912-28*, [Ecclesiastical history of the new lands: 1912-28] σελ. 196, Θεσσαλονίκη 1981.

This is a very interesting book by Ath. Angelopoulos of the University of Thessaloniki dealing with the history of the Greek orthodox church 1912-28 in Northern Greece. The latter includes those provinces of the Ottoman Empire which were freed 1912-3 in Macedonia, in Epirus and in the Aegean Sea and in the case of Thraki 1920. As World war I began in 1914 the orthodox church of this area was deprived of any contact possibility with the Patriarchate in Constantinople and following intranational quarrels in Greece 1916-7 of the possibility of contact with the authorities of the Greek orthodox church of Southern Greece. Of course it was not possible to stop the activity of the church in Northern Greece nor the settlement of its problems. Thus special institutions were created by the provisional government of Thessaloniki. Canon law imposed the consent of the Oecumenical Patriarch but this was granted for practical reasons only ex post. The administration of the Greek orthodox church in Northern Greece and in those islands which were ruled by the provisional government of Thessaloniki was assumed by the «Hierarchy of the new lands» whose decisions were carried out by the «Ecclesiastical Archierarchal Council». Both included only metropolitans of Northern Greece and of those Aegean islands ruled by the provisional government of Thessaloniki. The author analysed successfully the activity of both and stressed that their creation was indispensable, their decisions were appropriate and many were and are even applied not only in the North but also in the South of Greece when the provisional government of Thessaloniki moved to Athens.

The two institutions mentioned before did not only settle problems connected with the Greek orthodox church but also with education. Let me mention in this connection that the latter would have been more successful in Greece if instead of applying centralisation on the basis of the French precedent the decentralised

system developed under Ottoman domination would have been maintained. On the other hand the author believes that the settlement in virtue of which the Greek orthodox church in Northern Greece preserved its spiritual links with the Oecumenic Patriarch in Constantinople whilst becoming as far as administration is concerned a part of the church of the Greek state is satisfactory and has yielded good results. I do not think that the author is wrong on the basis of an already long experience inasmuch as the weakening of the Oecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople had and has to be avoided. Of course it may be argued that the simple but complete union of the orthodox church of Northern Greece with the orthodox church of the Greek State would have simplified the latter's structure and operation without however the certitude of a more satisfactory result. Let me end by noting that the author got the opportunity to analyse the unbelievably rough and bad behaviour of the Bulgarian occupation authorities in Eastern Macedonia and in Thraki 1916-18 without forgetting that the same harsh treatment was applied by the Bulgarians once more 1941-4 in the same areas.

University of Thessaloniki

D. J. DELIVANIS

Abstracts

DAN IONESCU

A MANUSCRIPT OF DIONISIE ECLESIARHUL AT THE BARLAAM MONASTERY, METEORA

In the early thirties Marcu Beza discovered at the Barlaam Monastery / Meteora a Romanian manuscript, which he described in his book *Romanian Traces in the Orthodox Orient*. The brief description was accompanied by four photographs.

The manuscript, an abridged register of the Bucovăț Monastery (Oltenia), is adorned with miniatures, among which two full-page compositions deserve particular attention: Saint Nicholas, patron of the Romanian monastery, and All Saints', dedication of the Barlaam Monastery.

In 1934 N. Iorga published the text of the documents contained in the Barlaam register. They represent a choice of charters, reconfirming the monastic properties at different times. The Bucovăț Monastery was founded in 1572 and submitted to Barlaam in 1588.

A. Sacerdoțeanu, an experienced archivist, was the first to suggest (1967) that the Barlaam manuscript could belong to Dionisie Ecclesiarhul, an outstanding Wallachian chronicler, calligrapher and miniaturist of the late 18th and early 19th centuries. His suggestion was based exclusively on the textual analysis, using the Iorga transliteration as a starting point.

The full version of the Bucovăț register is preserved at the State Archives, Bucharest (ms. no. 443). It bears Dionisie's signature and the date (1813). The decorative and the palaeographic similarities between the Bucharest and the Barlaam manuscripts are obvious. Their title pages and Saint Nicholas miniatures display even a certain identity of details.

Further comparative material is offered by the obituary of the Bucovăț Monastery (State Archives, Bucharest, ms. no. 460). The manuscript is signed by Dionisie and dates from 1813 as well.

The page-setting, the graphic characteristics and the decoration reveal Dionisie as compiler, calligrapher and illustrator of the Barlaam Romanian manuscript, written probably at the same time with the other two Dionisie / Bucovăț manuscripts (1813).

As an abstract of the original register, the Barlaam short version was destined to be kept at the patron monastery. The figuration of the All Saints'scene besides that of Saint Nicholas points out the *ad hoc* destination of the Barlaam manuscript. Its function was more representative than purely documental.

The dedication of the Barlaam Monastery furnishes the best explanation for the presence of the All Saints' scene among the wall paintings from the naos of the Bucovăț church. This infrequent scene occupies a prominent place in the naos, namely the half-dome of the south apse.

KARATHANASSIS ATH. E.

THE EXAMPLE OF A GREEK SCHOLAR ESTABLISHED IN MOLDOVALACHIA: ALEXANDER AMIRAS, 1679-1740

Alexander Amiras, a distinguished scholar of the Phanariote period, is well-known for the important role he played in the political and cultural affairs of the Rumanian principalities. After an initial period of studies in Rome and Constantinople, he worked as a Counsellor to Charles XII, king of Sweden, at his court at Bendari, and later, to Prince Gr. Grikas at his court at Iasi, in Moldavia.

During this period Amiras a) translated from Moldavian to Modern Greek the chronicle of Miron and Nicolas Costin on the history of Moldavia (1729) b) wrote the history of the life of Charles XII during his exile at Bendari c) compiled a small treatise about the names of the Turkish Sultans.

The main thesis of this article is the systematic analysis of several problems concerning Amiras' scholarly work.

CONSTANTIN PAPOULIDIS

A CHARACTERISTIC DOCUMENT OF G. CATACAZY FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF RUSSIA

The author publishes a document of G. Catacazy, ambassador of the Russian Empire in Athens, towards the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of this country, dated in 1838. The content of this manuscript is revealing the mentality of the diplomatic representative of the Russian Empire.

In the document, which is now kept at the *Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia* (Moscow), G. Catacazy denounces to St. Petersburg the Consul General of Greece at Odysso, Mano, as a collaborator to the Greek newspaper *Athena*, which is «friendly towards the British», «member of the opposition», «extremely liberal», and «against the monarchy».

EVANGELOS KOFOS

GREEK REACTION TO DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO THE ALBANIAN LEAGUE OF PRIZREN

Greek consular and diplomatic reports for 1875-1881 provide valuable source material for the Albanian national awakening and Greek reaction to it. While traditional Greek opinion in the 19th century considered Albanians and Greeks as kin peoples bound to be united under a common state roof, Albanians were viewed very much as part of the Ottoman establishment, thus unable to pursue a truly Albanian national policy. This view began to undergo considerable change under the influence of the events of 1877-1878. Certain attempts at concluding a Greek-Albanian alliance at that time failed on account of conflicting interests and mutual suspicion. After the Congress of Berlin, the Greeks carefully followed Albanian initiatives - thanks to detailed consular reports - and tried to assess their influence on Greek interests. And, although initially they tended to view the Albanian League of Prizren as Ottoman inspired, they gradually came to espouse the opinion that despite an initial encouragement by the Porte, the Albanian movement acquired its own momentum. As such, the Greek Government was compelled to weigh the Albanian factor more and more as a genuine force, emerging in the vicinity of the zone of Greek interests.

CONSTANTIN AP. VACALOPOULOS

HISTORICAL EVIDENCES ON THE POLITICAL CONDITION OF ATHOS (1880-1884)

The present article is generally dealing with the political situation of Athos at the end of the nineteenth century and more particularly

with the circumstantial examination and analysis of the ecclesiastical disputes of 1883-1884 between the greek and russian monks of the monastery of Ivron and the skete of Prophitis Helias, attached to the monastery of Pandokrator. The author is extracting information from precious and unpublished reports of the British consul Charles Blunt in Thessaloniki and documents written by greek monks, presently conserved in the Archives of the Public Records Office.

J. V. KOFAS

GREAT BRITAIN AND THE RESTORATION OF KING GEORGE II

The article argues that the restoration of King George II in November 1935 was imposed upon the Greek people by an elite group of ultra-royalist elements who enjoyed the support of the British Foreign Office and certain British financial circles. Moreover, the King's restoration was the prelude to the authoritarian regime of General John Metaxas with whom the King collaborated to install a dictatorship after August 4, 1936.

A brief synopsis of the historical antecedents pertinent to the restoration are discussed beginning with the King's forced abdication in 1923. The focus of the study, however, is on the parliamentary regime which experienced a deep crisis in the 1930s and permitted the emergence of the extreme military and political right-wing elements whose ultimate goal was to restore the dynasty and install an authoritarian government.

A highly fraudulent plebiscite took place in November 1935 and George II was returned to Greece. The role of the British government in the restoration was significant because the King was an Anglophile who was committed to serving British economic/financial and diplomatic interests in Greece. The collapse of the volatile Greek republic therefore, was caused by endogenous as well as exogenous factors.

GRAIG LUTHER

GERMAN DEFENSIVE POLICY IN THE BALKANS,
A CASE STUDY: THE BUILDUP IN GREECE, 1943

Following the collapse of Rommel's forces in North Africa and the Allied landings in Morocco and Algeria (November 1942) Hitler

and the German High Command began to worry about the security of the vulnerable and weakly defended southern tier of their «Festung Europa». This concern centered on the Balkans, and most importantly, Greece. Indeed, throughout 1943, the Germans made a genuine effort to reinforce their position in Greece and throughout the Balkans; and the buildup accelerated in May 1943, following the success of an ingenious British «ruse de guerre» designed to mislead the German High Command on the eve of the Allied invasion of Sicily.

My essay traces the nature of the German buildup in some detail; it also attempts to clarify the strategic assumptions of Hitler and his advisors upon which the buildup was based. I will argue that, in 1943, the Balkans were an area of primary strategic concern for the Germans, and that fear of major Anglo-American operation in the area was very great. I will attempt to demonstrate, however, that German fears vis-a-vis the Balkans were predicated upon some fundamental inaccurate assumptions about the nature of, and tensions within, the Allied coalition.

My essay is based principally upon unpublished German military records - war diaries, intelligent assessments, situation reports, etc. As far as I know, it is the first attempt by a historian to trace the German military buildup in Greece in 1943 in great detail.